io.github.bmoldo/terraback
PYPI · TERRABACK · SCANNED SEP 20
Scan AWS/Azure/GCP and generate Terraform HCL with import blocks, deterministically, for AI agents.
Available components
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically from public evidence about the published package, including repeated runs of it in an isolated sandbox, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Supply Chain Security82
- No malware found by supply-chain analysis.Pass
- CVE check failed: a known high-severity CVE affects PyJWT 2.10.1, a direct dependency. A fixed version is available. View diagnostics → Fail
- No install/post-install scripts declared.Pass
- Dependency health was assessed across the 154 of 155 dependencies we could resolve, so this covers what we could see, not the whole tree. View diagnostics → Partial
Provenance & Transparency6
- Repository check failed: no source repository is declared. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- Provenance check failed: no build-provenance attestation is published. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- License check failed: no license is declared. See how to fix → Fail
- Actively maintained (last published 65 days ago).Pass
- Security-disclosure policy not yet verified: we couldn't inspect the source repository.Unverified
Schema Quality & AI Usability65
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 1903 tokens (~317/item across 6 items; 6 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management83
- Stability observed for 25 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage71
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 0% of tool parameters carry a description.Fail
- Structured output schemas are declared (100% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 6 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 6 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
How do I install the io.github.bmoldo/terraback MCP server?
io.github.bmoldo/terraback runs locally as a PyPI package, launched with uvx terraback. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
pypi · terraback
claude mcp add bmoldo-terraback -- uvx terraback
{
"mcpServers": {
"bmoldo-terraback": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"terraback"
]
}
}
} {
"servers": {
"bmoldo-terraback": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"terraback"
]
}
}
} codex mcp add bmoldo-terraback -- uvx terraback
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"bmoldo-terraback": {
"type": "local",
"command": [
"uvx",
"terraback"
],
"enabled": true
}
}
} openclaw mcp add bmoldo-terraback --command uvx --arg terraback
mcp_servers:
bmoldo-terraback:
command: "uvx"
args: ["terraback"] {
"McpServers": {
"bmoldo-terraback": {
"Transport": "stdio",
"Command": "uvx",
"Arguments": [
"terraback"
]
}
}
} assistant mcp add bmoldo-terraback -t stdio -c uvx -a terraback
{
"mcpServers": {
"bmoldo-terraback": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"terraback"
]
}
}
} Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 20 Sept 26 +16
- Malware scan: unverified → pass ▲ security
- 18 Sept 26 −3
- Stability: pass → 0.77 functional
- 17 Sept 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 16 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 93 to 97. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 28 days of observed history at the previous scan, 29 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 14 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 87 to 90. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 26 days of observed history at the previous scan, 27 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 12 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 80 to 83. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 24 days of observed history at the previous scan, 25 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 11 Sept 26 −3
- Stability: pass → 0.80 functional
- 10 Sept 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 20 Sept 2026 · Analysed pypi/terraback@0.6.0
Provenance No attestation
The registry publishes no build provenance for this version, so there is nothing to verify.
| Result | No attestation |
|---|---|
| Ecosystem | pypi |
Background: How many MCP packages publish verified provenance →
Vulnerabilities 30 findings
| ID | CVE | Severity | Vector | Fix available |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GHSA-752w-5fwx-jx9f | CVE-2026-32597 | high | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N | yes |
| GHSA-993g-76c3-p5m4 | CVE-2026-48522 | medium | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N | yes |
| GHSA-fhv5-28vv-h8m8 | CVE-2026-48524 | low | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L | yes |
| GHSA-jq35-7prp-9v3f | CVE-2026-48523 | medium | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N | yes |
| GHSA-w7vc-732c-9m39 | CVE-2026-48525 | medium | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L | yes |
| GHSA-xgmm-8j9v-c9wx | CVE-2026-48526 | high | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N | yes |
| PYSEC-2025-183 | CVE-2025-45768 | high | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H | no |
| PYSEC-2026-120 | CVE-2026-32597 | high | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N | yes |
| PYSEC-2026-175 | CVE-2026-48522 | medium | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N | yes |
| PYSEC-2026-176 | CVE-2026-48523 | medium | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N | yes |
| PYSEC-2026-177 | CVE-2026-48524 | low | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L | yes |
| PYSEC-2026-178 | CVE-2026-48525 | medium | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L | yes |
| PYSEC-2026-179 | CVE-2026-48526 | high | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N | yes |
| GHSA-5239-wwwm-4pmq | CVE-2026-4539 | low | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L | yes |
| PYSEC-2026-2987 | CVE-2026-4539 | low | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L | yes |
| GHSA-m5vv-6r4h-3vj9 | CVE-2024-35255 | medium | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N | yes |
| PYSEC-2026-1209 | CVE-2024-35255 | medium | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N | yes |
| PYSEC-2026-2132 | CVE-2026-7246 | high | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H | yes |
| GHSA-7gcm-g887-7qv7 | CVE-2026-0994 | high | yes | |
| PYSEC-2026-1805 | CVE-2026-0994 | none | yes | |
| GHSA-2xpw-w6gg-jr37 | CVE-2025-66471 | high | yes | |
| GHSA-38jv-5279-wg99 | CVE-2026-21441 | high | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | yes |
| GHSA-gm62-xv2j-4w53 | CVE-2025-66418 | high | yes | |
| GHSA-pq67-6m6q-mj2v | CVE-2025-50181 | medium | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N | yes |
| GHSA-qccp-gfcp-xxvc | CVE-2026-44431 | medium | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N | yes |
| PYSEC-2026-141 | CVE-2026-44431 | medium | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N | yes |
| PYSEC-2026-1994 | CVE-2025-66471 | none | yes | |
| PYSEC-2026-1996 | CVE-2026-21441 | high | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | yes |
| PYSEC-2026-1998 | CVE-2025-66418 | none | yes | |
| PYSEC-2026-1999 | CVE-2025-50181 | medium | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N | yes |
Background: What a vulnerability scan can and cannot prove →
Dependencies 154 packages
| Packages resolved | 154 |
|---|---|
| Stale | 10 |
| Tree resolution | Partial |
The dependency tree was only partially resolved, so these counts may be incomplete.
Background: SBOMs and build attestations, explained →
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
codify_batch ~454
Scan and generate Terraform HCL + import blocks for a batch of resources. Everything is scanned into an isolated staging area first; nothing is written to output_dir unless the batch is within your license's resource cap. Nothing is imported into Terraform state by this tool - it only generates code. License cap: on the Community tier, a single call is capped at 25 total resources (after tag_filters are applied, before exclude_managed is applied). If the scope has more than that, this tool returns {"error": "resource_cap_exceeded", "total", "cap", "counts_by_type", "hint"} and writes nothing - narrow the request with `types` or `tag_filters`, or upgrade to Professional/Enterprise for unlimited batch size. exclude_managed behavior (v1): when True and state_files are given, resources whose scanned id/ARN already appears in one of the local state files are fully excluded from the generated output (not merely flagged). Requires state_files - if omitted, a warning is returned and nothing is excluded. v1 supports LOCAL state file paths only. Args: provider: Cloud provider - "aws", "azure", or "gcp". scope: AWS = region, Azure = subscription ID, GCP = project ID. types: Optional list of resource type names to restrict the batch to. tag_filters: Optional dict of tag key/value pairs a resource must match on (all pairs required). output_dir: Directory to write the generated Terraform into. exclude_managed: Drop resources already present in state_files. state_files: Paths to local Terraform state JSON files. profile: AWS named profile to use (ignored for azure/gcp). Returns: On success: {"output_dir", "files": [...], "resource_counts": {...}, "total", "warnings": [...], "errors": [...]}.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| exclude_managed | boolean | – | – |
| output_dir | string | – | – |
| profile | – | – | – |
| provider | string | yes | – |
| scope | string | yes | – |
| state_files | – | – | – |
| tag_filters | – | – | – |
| types | – | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | object | yes | – |
No examples provided.
codify_resource ~342
Generate Terraform HCL and an import block for exactly one resource. Scans just the requested resource type in the given scope, locates the resource matching resource_id, and writes a single .tf file plus a matching import JSON entry into output_dir. Nothing is imported into Terraform state by this tool - it only generates code; import is a separate, explicit step outside this MCP interface. Args: provider: Cloud provider - "aws", "azure", or "gcp". scope: AWS = region, Azure = subscription ID, GCP = project ID. type: Resource type name, bare (e.g. "ec2") or full registry key (e.g. "aws_ec2"). Call list_supported_resources to see valid types. resource_id: The cloud-provider id (or ARN) of the resource to codify. output_dir: Directory to write the generated Terraform into. profile: AWS named profile to use (ignored for azure/gcp). Returns: {"hcl": "<generated .tf file contents>", "import_block": {...}, "files": [<tf file path>, <import json path>], "dependencies": [...]} Raises: If the type is unknown or the resource_id is not found, an error result is returned listing up to 20 available ids for that type/scope so the caller can self-correct.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| output_dir | string | – | – |
| profile | – | – | – |
| provider | string | yes | – |
| resource_id | string | yes | – |
| scope | string | yes | – |
| type | string | yes | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | object | yes | – |
No examples provided.
detect_unmanaged ~290
Diff a live cloud inventory against local Terraform state to find unmanaged resources. Read-only: runs a scan_infrastructure-equivalent scan and compares resource ids/ARNs against what your Terraform state already tracks. Nothing is written to state and nothing is imported. v1 limitation: state_files must be LOCAL file paths (e.g. a checked-out `terraform.tfstate`, or the output of `terraform state pull > state.json`). Remote backends (S3, azurerm, GCS, Terraform Cloud/Enterprise) are not read directly - pull the state to a local file first. Args: provider: Cloud provider - "aws", "azure", or "gcp". scope: AWS = region, Azure = subscription ID, GCP = project ID. state_files: Paths to one or more local Terraform state JSON files. types: Optional list of resource type names to restrict the scan to. workdir: Directory for scratch scan output and the inventory file. Returns: {"unmanaged": {"<type>": [resource, ...], ...}, "managed_count": N, "unmanaged_count": N, "state_files_read": [...], "warnings": [...]}
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| provider | string | yes | – |
| scope | string | yes | – |
| state_files | array | yes | – |
| types | – | – | – |
| workdir | – | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | object | yes | – |
No examples provided.
list_supported_resources ~175
List resource types terraback can scan/codify, grouped by provider. Read-only and does not touch any cloud provider - this only reports what terraback's scan registry supports. Args: provider: Restrict the listing to one provider - "aws", "azure", or "gcp". Omit to list all three. Returns: {"providers": {"aws": [{"type": "aws_ec2", "tier": "community"}, ...], "azure": [...], "gcp": [...]}, "counts": {"aws": N, "azure": N, "gcp": N, "total": N}}. "tier" is "community", "professional", or "enterprise" - types above your license tier will fail if scanned.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| provider | – | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | object | yes | – |
No examples provided.
scan_infrastructure ~441
Run a read-only inventory scan of live cloud infrastructure. This is a discovery tool: it enumerates what currently exists in the given scope. It never writes Terraform files, never touches Terraform state, and never imports anything - it only reads from the cloud provider's API. Args: provider: Cloud provider - "aws", "azure", or "gcp". scope: The scan boundary. For AWS this is a region (e.g. "us-east-1"). For Azure this is a subscription ID. For GCP this is a project ID. types: Optional list of resource type names to restrict the scan to, e.g. ["ec2", "aws_vpc"]. Both bare names and full registry keys are accepted. Omit to scan every resource type registered for the provider (call list_supported_resources first to see the full list). tag_filters: Optional dict of tag key/value pairs a resource must match on (all pairs required). Resources with no discoverable tags are excluded whenever this is supplied. workdir: Directory to use for scratch scan output and the full inventory JSON file. Defaults to a directory under the system temp directory if omitted. profile: AWS named profile to use (ignored for azure/gcp). Returns: A dict with "summary" (total count and counts by resource type), "inventory_file" (path to the full JSON inventory on disk - always written, useful when the inventory is large), "resources" (the full list of {type, id, name, provider, scope} entries, only included inline when there are 200 or fewer - for larger inventories, read inventory_file instead), and "errors" (per resource-type scan failures, if any - a failing scanner does not abort the rest of the scan).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| profile | – | – | – |
| provider | string | yes | – |
| scope | string | yes | – |
| tag_filters | – | – | – |
| types | – | – | – |
| workdir | – | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | object | yes | – |
No examples provided.
verify_plan ~201
Run a read-only `terraform plan` against a generated directory and report drift. Never applies, imports, or otherwise mutates Terraform state - this only runs `terraform init` (if needed) and `terraform plan`. Requires Terraform >= 1.5 (import block support) installed and on PATH. Args: terraform_dir: Directory containing the generated .tf files. Returns: On success: {"drift": "none"|"drift_detected"|"plan_failed", "summary": {"imports", "adds", "changes", "destroys"}, "add_resources": [...], "change_resources": [...], "destroy_resources": [...]}. "drift" is "none" when adds == changes == destroys == 0 - pending imports alone are expected and are not drift. On a missing/too-old Terraform binary: {"error", "detail"}.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| terraform_dir | string | yes | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | object | yes | – |
No examples provided.
What is the io.github.bmoldo/terraback MCP server?
io.github.bmoldo/terraback is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.bmoldo/terraback. Scan AWS/Azure/GCP and generate Terraform HCL with import blocks, deterministically, for AI agents. This page covers its PyPI package (terraback).
Is the io.github.bmoldo/terraback MCP server safe to use?
io.github.bmoldo/terraback scores 65 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. We recorded 30 known advisories against it as of 20 September 2026. It declares no install or post-install scripts. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the io.github.bmoldo/terraback MCP server expose?
io.github.bmoldo/terraback exposes 6 tools: scan_infrastructure, detect_unmanaged, codify_resource, codify_batch, verify_plan, list_supported_resources. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,903 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Is the io.github.bmoldo/terraback MCP server still maintained?
io.github.bmoldo/terraback is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 20 September 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.