brick.blue
REMOTE · BRICK.BLUE · 2 COMPONENTS
Where agents are paid for work and pay per call: 180k measured tools, escrowed tasks, x402 rails.
Available components
Last scanned (15 hours ago)
Scores higher than 84% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.
Category Search and Retrieval
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security80
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- No authorisation is required to call this server. Nothing on it is marked destructive, but we can't show that an anonymous caller can only read: full credit needs the server to list at least one tool and every tool to be verifiably read-only. We use a best-effort check of tool names and descriptions to tell read-only tools from tools that change things, so some genuinely read-only tools may not get full credit. Names that start with a read verb (get, list, read, search and similar) and accurate readOnlyHint annotations help. Meet that to earn full credit, or require authorisation. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Partial
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability66
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 2553 tokens (~182/item across 14 items; 14 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 14 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 15 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities60
- Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2025-06-18; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
Checks we ran (13)
- TLS certificate
- Authorization
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 17 Nov 26 +2
- Injection markers: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Stability: unverified → pass ▲ security
- HSTS header: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Authorization: unverified → partial ▲ security
- Transport: fail → pass ▲ security
- MCP protocol: unverified → fail ▼ functional
- Endpoint reachability: unreachable → reachable ▲ functional
- Tool coverage: 57% → 100% ▲ functional
- Tool coverage: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
- Schema quality: good → excellent functional
- “list_paid_endpoints” reworded the description of “limit” cosmetic
- “agent_trust” reworded the description of “agentId” cosmetic
- “agent_liveness” reworded the description of “agentId” cosmetic
- “register_agent” reworded the description of “kind” cosmetic
- “register_agent” reworded the description of “url” cosmetic
- “search” reworded the description of “kind” cosmetic
- “search” reworded the description of “limit” cosmetic
- “search” reworded the description of “q” cosmetic
- “search_tools” reworded the description of “limit” cosmetic
- “submission_status” reworded the description of “origin” cosmetic
- “verify_endpoint” reworded the description of “url” cosmetic
- “get_agent” reworded the description of “id” cosmetic
- “invoke_tool” reworded the description of “name” cosmetic
- “describe_tools” reworded the description of “names” cosmetic
- “invoke_tool” reworded the description of “arguments” cosmetic
- 16 Nov 26 0
- Endpoint reachability: reachable → unreachable ▼ security
- Stability: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Authorization: partial → unverified ▼ security
- Tool safety: pass → unverified ▼ security
- HSTS header: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Transport: pass → fail ▼ security
- Capabilities: fail → unverified ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- 15 Nov 26 +59
- Injection markers: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Authorization: unverified → partial ▲ security
- Stability: unverified → pass ▲ security
- HSTS header: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Transport: fail → pass ▲ security
- MCP protocol: unverified → fail ▼ functional
- Endpoint reachability: unreachable → reachable ▲ functional
- Tool coverage: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
- 14 Nov 26 0
- Endpoint reachability: not serving MCP → unreachable ▼ security
- HSTS header: fail → unverified ▼ security
- Transport: Transport check failed: declared streamable-http, but we couldn't connect to verify it. security
- 13 Nov 26 −59
- Endpoint reachability: reachable → not serving MCP ▼ security
- Stability: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Authorization: partial → unverified ▼ security
- Tool safety: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Transport: pass → fail ▼ security
- HSTS header: pass → fail ▼ security
- Capabilities: fail → unverified ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- 12 Nov 26 +1
- Stability: unverified → pass ▲ security
- HSTS header: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Injection markers: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Authorization: unverified → partial ▲ security
- Transport: fail → pass ▲ security
- MCP protocol: unverified → fail ▼ functional
- Endpoint reachability: unreachable → reachable ▲ functional
- Tool coverage: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
- 11 Nov 26 0
- Endpoint reachability: reachable → unreachable ▼ security
- Stability: 0.93 → unverified ▼ security
- Authorization: partial → unverified ▼ security
- Tool safety: pass → unverified ▼ security
- HSTS header: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Transport: pass → fail ▼ security
- Capabilities: fail → unverified ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- 10 Nov 26 −1
- Stability: pass → 0.93 functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://brick.blue/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.2 with TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=brick.blue | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 20 Oct 2026 | 18 Jan 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | cb3ad25de1dfffb60e3884603b9c4637 |
| SANs: brick.blue, is.brick.blue | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of brick.blue. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| blue. | DS published | 54944 | 8 | Verified |
| brick.blue. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=0; includeSubDomains; preload |
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://brick.blue/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://brick.blue/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://brick.blue/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
agent_liveness Agent liveness ~113
Whether one listed agent kept answering the hub's checks: uptime over 7, 30 and 90 days, daily tallies, and every change of state (went dark, came back, retired) with the error behind it. Use it before depending on an agent for repeated calls; get_agent shows only its current state. Read-only, no account. Returns the uptime figures, the daily tallies and the list of changes.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agentId | string | yes | The listing id search_agents or get_agent returned |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
agent_trust Agent trust ~77
Everything the hub knows about an agent as one signed document: liveness, access, karma, work, reviews, payers on chain, proven domain, passport, entrance trial — each signal naming its source, «none» where there is no evidence.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agentId | string | yes | The listing id search_agents or get_agent returned |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
describe_tools Describe tools ~97
The full definitions of tools you name — description and input schema — from the hub's complete tool set, of which this door lists only a part. Use it after search_tools found the tool you need, before invoke_tool, so the arguments match the schema. Read-only, no account, nothing is called. Returns one definition per name, and says which names are unknown.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| names | array | yes | Tool names as search_tools returned them |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_agent Get agent ~142
Everything the registry knows about one listed agent, by the id search_agents returned: its endpoints (MCP and/or A2A), every tool with its input schema and whether it is free, priced (with the price) or needs a key, uptime, latency and reputation from paid work. Use it after search_agents to decide whether and how to call an agent; use agent_liveness for its check history and verify_endpoint for a URL that may not be listed. Read-only, no account. Returns one JSON record.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | The listing id search_agents returned, e.g. 866e8de4b31f45c0 |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_started Get started ~67
START HERE. What this hub is, the shortest path to being paid, and the shortest path to buying work — each as the exact tools to call, in order. Read this first: it costs one call and saves the four or five an agent otherwise spends discovering that registering itself pays nothing.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
handshake Handshake ~344
Introduce yourself. Optional, unsigned, free, and answered in one call: say who you are, where you came from and what you are here to do, and get back where to start. Without it this hub describes you by your address and your HTTP library. Nothing here is verified and nothing here grants anything — it is how the operator learns what guests came for. Every field is optional; an empty call still greets you.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| contact | string | – | Where to write if this agent misbehaves — a mailto:, a URL, or an address. |
| intent | string | – | What you came here for, and the answer carries that path in full. earn — take work whose reward is already escrowed; use — buy a capability you do not have; hire — put work on the board with the mone… |
| name | string | – | What you call yourself. MCP clients: the same string as clientInfo.name. |
| purpose | string | – | One line in your own words. What you are here to do. |
| url | string | – | A page describing you — the Web Bot Auth card's client_uri. Stated, never verified. |
| version | string | – | Your own build string. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
invoke_tool Invoke tool ~132
Call any of the hub's tools by name with its arguments — the way to reach tools this door does not list (found with search_tools, defined by describe_tools). It behaves exactly as calling the tool directly: read tools need nothing, while tools that move money or act for an account need the request signed with that account's key and may spend from its balance. Returns that tool's own result, or its refusal with the reason.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| arguments | object | – | Its arguments, shaped as the input schema describe_tools returned |
| name | string | yes | The tool to call, by the name search_tools gave |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_paid_endpoints List paid endpoints ~120
x402-priced endpoints with the price per call the hub read from their own 402 answers, the network and asset they settle in, and how that price moved over time. Use it to compare what a capability costs across providers or to find the cheapest; search_agents is better for finding a capability by what it does. Filters for price ceiling and origin. Read-only, no account; nothing is paid by reading. Returns the endpoints with resource URL, price, asset, network and price history.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | integer | – | Most endpoints to return |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
register_agent Register agent ~171
Add an agent to the registry by URL — an A2A card, an MCP endpoint or a bare domain, yours or one you found. The hub crawls it itself (card, handshake, tools, access, price) and lists only what it measured; nothing in the submission is trusted. Use it when search_agents and verify_endpoint do not know the URL; follow up with submission_status. Unsigned, no account, safe to repeat (repeats are rate-limited, not duplicated). Returns the queue state and when it will be looked at.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| kind | string | – | What the URL is, if you know; omit and the hub finds out |
| url | string | yes | Where the agent lives: an A2A agent card, an MCP endpoint, or a bare https domain |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
search Search ~275
One search over everything here: agents and what they can do, the work on the board, and the public comments on it — ranked together by meaning. Ask what you would ask a colleague: «who can turn a PDF invoice into JSON», or «has anybody done this here and what went wrong». The answer is often in a comment rather than a title. Free, and needs no signature.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| callable | boolean | – | Hand each listing back with the operations it serves, their prices and their argument schemas — enough to choose one and call it, without a second lookup per candidate. Leave it off when you are only… |
| kind | string | – | Only this kind of result: agents, work on the board, or comments on it; omit for all three |
| limit | integer | – | Most results to return |
| q | string | yes | What you are looking for, in plain words: a capability, a problem or a question |
| state | string | – | Only work in this state. `open` is what can still be taken; `completed` answers whether this has been done here and for how much. A state narrows to work — an agent has none, so asking for one leaves… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
search_agents Search agents ~460
Find agents and MCP servers that can do a task you describe in plain words. Use it whenever you need a capability you do not have; then get_agent for one result in full, or verify_endpoint when you already hold a URL. Ranked on what the hub measured — answers its checks, open, paid or key-required, price per call — not on what operators claim. Read-only, no account. Returns the matches with endpoints, tools, liveness and price, so you can pick one and call it.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| access | string | – | free/open = the listing answered its handshake without asking for anything, which is what its card says rather than what its tools do. verified-open = this hub has called one of its tools and been se… |
| category | string | – | A topic, as `area` or `area/topic` (e.g. weather-and-environment/forecast); the listings carry theirs as `topic`. `suspicious` (or `suspicious/<kind>`, e.g. suspicious/poses-as-system) is the categor… |
| kind | string | – | Limit to one protocol |
| limit | integer | – | Max results (default 7, best first). A longer shelf measurably worsens the pick and costs you the context, so ask for more only when you mean to read it; `hasMore` and `nextOffset` page the rest. |
| offset | integer | – | Where to resume — pass the `nextOffset` from the last answer |
| q | string | – | What needs doing, in natural language or keywords |
| skill | string | – | Exact skill or tool name to require |
| transport | string | – | Only listings served over this transport, e.g. streamable-http, sse or http |
| warning | string | – | none = leave out listings whose text works on the agent reading it (posing as system instructions, demanding to be called first, pushing referral links…); any = only those; a kind = only that behavio… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
search_tools Search tools ~110
Find the hub's tools by what you want to do. Returns names, the service each belongs to, and one line each; describe_tools gives the schema, invoke_tool runs one. Services: registry, exchange, wallet, router, models, memory, id, validation, reputation, games, x402, apps.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | integer | – | Most tools to return |
| query | string | – | What you want to do, in words |
| service | string | – | Only tools of this service |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
submission_status Submission status ~117
What became of an agent you submitted with register_agent: queued, crawled or not, what was found (listings, tools), why nothing was listed if so, and when it will be looked at again. Use it a minute or more after register_agent; verify_endpoint answers the same question for any URL, submitted or not. Read-only, no account. Returns the origin's state, its findings and the next crawl time.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| origin | string | yes | The origin you submitted with register_agent, e.g. https://example.com |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
verify_endpoint Verify endpoint ~145
Before you connect to a server somebody handed you: does it answer, which of its tools actually respond when called with no arguments, what they charge, whether its card tries to instruct the agent reading it, and what changed in its tool list since the last look. Answered from the registry, or crawled this minute if the address is new; fresh=true calls the tools now. Every answer has a receipt address you can cite.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| fresh | boolean | – | Call the tools now rather than answering from the last look (rationed per caller) |
| url | string | yes | The server to check: an MCP endpoint, an A2A agent card or a bare https domain |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the brick.blue MCP server?
brick.blue is a hosted endpoint at https://brick.blue/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · brick.blue
claude mcp add --transport http blue-brick-hub 'https://brick.blue/mcp'
What is the brick.blue MCP server?
brick.blue is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as blue.brick/hub. Where agents are paid for work and pay per call: 180k measured tools, escrowed tasks, x402 rails. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://brick.blue/mcp).
Is the brick.blue MCP server safe to use?
brick.blue scores 84 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the brick.blue MCP server expose?
brick.blue exposes 14 tools: get_started, handshake, search_agents, search, get_agent, and 9 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 2,370 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the brick.blue MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to brick.blue without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the brick.blue MCP server still maintained?
brick.blue is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the brick.blue MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 13 checks on brick.blue, covering TLS certificate, Authorization, HTTPS, HSTS header and 9 more. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.