io.github.bartek-filipiuk/intent-hub
REMOTE · OPENINTENTPROTOCOL.COM
Book a local business by saying what you need; matching businesses bid and you confirm one.
Available components
Last scanned (11 hours ago)
Scores higher than 10% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 5 Nov 2026.
Category E-commerce
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security63
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not yet verified: we couldn't confirm whether this endpoint requires it. View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability0
- Transport check failed: declared streamable-http, but the endpoint redirected instead of responding directly. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Schema Quality & AI Usability0
- Schema not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's schema, or could read only part of its tool list.Unverified
Stability & Change Management0
- Stability not yet verified: not enough scan history yet (needs a 30-day window).Unverified
Tool Coverage0
- Tool coverage not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's tools, or could read only part of the list.Unverified
Tool Safety0
- Tool safety not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's tools, or could read only part of the list.Unverified
Capabilities0
- Capabilities not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's capabilities.Unverified
Unverified: 5 categories
Categories scored 0 because we could not verify them: authentication we do not have, an unreachable endpoint, or not enough scan history. We only credit what we can confirm.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 28 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 24 Sept 26 0
- HSTS header: fail → pass ▲ security
- 21 Sept 26 0
- Endpoint reachability: reachable → not serving MCP ▼ security
- Stability: 0.10 → unverified ▼ security
- Tool safety: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Transport: pass → fail ▼ security
- Authorization: Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to connect, but we couldn't read the whole tool list to see what that exposes. security
- Schema quality: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- Capabilities: fail → unverified ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- 19 Sept 26 0
- Tool “confirm_booking” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “find_offers” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Schema quality: pass → fail ▼ functional
- Destructive annotations: pass → 0 functional
- New tool “confirm_phone” functional
- New tool “link_phone” functional
- New tool “unlink_phone” functional
- “confirm_booking” reworded the description of “contact” cosmetic
- 18 Sept 26 0
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- 17 Sept 26 0
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 5 Nov 2026 · Probed https://openintentprotocol.com/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=openintentprotocol.com | CN=YR2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 12 Sept 2026 | 11 Dec 2026 | RSA 4096 | SHA256-RSA | 6ea6ab073e4204807fe72d8f3603f888e99 |
| SANs: openintentprotocol.com | ||||||
| CN=YR2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YR,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | 4ebd24947e24d394802d84a52fd5b319 |
| CN=Root YR,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | RSA 4096 | SHA256-RSA | f24b6d17f9d9ad7cb1c9fea78782699f |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of openintentprotocol.com. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| com. | present | 19718 | 13 | Verified |
| openintentprotocol.com. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication Inconclusive
We could not reach the endpoint well enough to judge its authorisation posture.
| Result | Inconclusive |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 308 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=31536000 |
| content-security-policy | default-src 'none'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; connect-src 'self'; form-action 'self'; frame-ancestors 'self'; base-uri 'none' |
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
| referrer-policy | no-referrer |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://openintentprotocol.com/mcp | Redirected | 308 | https://lokelo.pl/mcp |
| http (plaintext) | http://openintentprotocol.com/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 302 | https://openintentprotocol.com/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
cancel_booking ~73
Release a held or confirmed slot of this session, so the slot is free again. Businesses that host their own agent do not offer this yet and answer `not-supported`.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| hold | string | yes | The `id` of the hold to release. |
| session | string | yes | The session id the hold was made in. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
capabilities ~93
What this hub can do, in one call: every tool by name, every resource by URI, every prompt by name, the per-client budgets, how to authenticate, the protocol revision and where the documentation is. Takes no arguments, spends no budget and reads nothing: it answers the hub's own constants, so a client that asks it first never has to guess. Called with a key it also answers who that key is.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
confirm_booking ~158
Confirm a held slot with the customer's name and phone number; this is the booking. Idempotent: confirming the same hold twice books it once and tells the business once. With a linked number (link_phone) you may send `contact` with the name alone and the linked number is used; a different number in `contact.phone` is refused as `phone-mismatch`.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| contact | object | yes | The customer's own name and phone number (9 digits, or +country code and the number). Ask them; never invent one. With a linked number the phone may be left out. |
| hold | string | yes | The `id` of the hold to confirm. |
| session | string | yes | The session id the hold was made in. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
confirm_phone ~87
Spend the code that link_phone texted, and tie this agent to that number. Ten minutes and five tries; a wrong code answers `invalid-code` with `attemptsLeft`, and the fifth wrong one throws the code away — call link_phone again for a new one. One number per agent: linking another replaces it.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| code | string | yes | The six digits from the SMS. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
find_offers ~259
Find offers from local businesses for what a person asked for. Send their sentence as `text`; the hub parses the trade, the town and the day. An answer with `complete: false` carries a `question` to put to the person: call this tool again with the same `session` and their reply as `text`. An answer with `complete: true` is one finished bidding round: `bids` ranked (price in grosz, slot, business, note) and one `outcome` per business asked. An empty `bids` list is a normal answer; `outcomes` says why. A bid whose `business.active` is true comes from a business whose owner has confirmed it is running; those are ranked above the rest, and cheapest first inside each group.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| selection | object | – | Restrict the round to one business (and optionally one of its services), by slug, as a link from a business page does. |
| session | string | – | The session id from an earlier answer. Omit it to start a new conversation. |
| text | string | yes | What the person said, in Polish or English, at most 500 characters. Their reply to the previous question goes here too. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_booking ~68
Read the state of a session: the understood intent and its open question, the bids of the current round and every hold with its present status and link. Use it to pick up a conversation you already have a session id for.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| session | string | yes | The session id from an earlier answer. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
hold_slot ~114
Hold the slot of one bid from this session's round for ten minutes, before asking the person for their details. Answers the hold, the bid it was made from and, when the hub has a public origin, the customer's private booking `link`. Never call it to browse: a hold blocks a real slot and three per client per ten minutes is the budget.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| bid | string | yes | The `id` of one bid from the latest round. |
| session | string | yes | The session id the round was run in. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
link_phone ~171
Tie this agent to the phone number of the person it books for: the hub texts that number a six-digit code naming this agent, and `confirm_phone` spends it. Afterwards `confirm_booking` may leave `contact.phone` out — the linked number is used — and every booking made through this key shows up on that person's own list of bookings at /me, next to the ones they made on the site. Ask the person for their own number and never anybody else's: a code arrives on their phone with this agent's name on it. Answers `{ ok: true, sent: true }` whatever the hub knows about the number, and 3 calls per agent per hour is the budget.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| phone | string | yes | The person's own number (9 digits, or +country code and the number). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
register_agent ~171
Get this agent its own identity, once: answers an `agent` id and a `key`. The key is shown in this answer and never again — keep it and send it as `Authorization: Bearer <key>` on every later call. hold_slot, confirm_booking, cancel_booking need it; finding offers and reading a session do not. With a key the hold and cancel budgets are yours instead of your address's, so two agents behind one address no longer take each other's. 3 registrations per client per day: register once and keep the key, do not mint one per conversation.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| name | string | yes | What to call this agent, for the operator to recognise it by: one line, 1–60 characters. Not a secret and not a login — the key is the identity. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
unlink_phone ~57
Forget the number this agent was linked to. The bookings already made keep it — they belong to the person, not to this agent — and confirm_booking needs a full `contact` again. Answers the same whether there was a link or not.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the io.github.bartek-filipiuk/intent-hub MCP server?
io.github.bartek-filipiuk/intent-hub is a hosted endpoint at https://openintentprotocol.com/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · openintentprotocol.com
claude mcp add --transport http bartek-filipiuk-intent-hub 'https://openintentprotocol.com/mcp'
What is the io.github.bartek-filipiuk/intent-hub MCP server?
io.github.bartek-filipiuk/intent-hub is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.bartek-filipiuk/intent-hub. Book a local business by saying what you need; matching businesses bid and you confirm one. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://openintentprotocol.com/mcp).
Is the io.github.bartek-filipiuk/intent-hub MCP server safe to use?
io.github.bartek-filipiuk/intent-hub scores 25 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the io.github.bartek-filipiuk/intent-hub MCP server expose?
io.github.bartek-filipiuk/intent-hub exposes 10 tools: find_offers, hold_slot, confirm_booking, cancel_booking, get_booking, and 5 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,251 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the io.github.bartek-filipiuk/intent-hub MCP server require authentication?
Its publisher declares no required credentials for io.github.bartek-filipiuk/intent-hub. We have not been able to confirm that against the live endpoint, and a server can require authorisation without declaring it here.
Is the io.github.bartek-filipiuk/intent-hub MCP server still maintained?
io.github.bartek-filipiuk/intent-hub is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 5 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.