AgentAegis
REMOTE · AGENTAEGIS-MCP-PRODUCTION.UP.RAILWAY.APP · SCANNED SEP 24
Pay-per-call cybersecurity for AI agents: vuln scans, threat intel, compliance, code security.
Available components
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security57
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 26 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability77
- 100% of prompts and resources have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the item's name).Pass
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 5067 tokens (~180/item across 28 items; 28 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage78
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 35% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 28 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 29 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
How do I install the AgentAegis MCP server?
AgentAegis is a hosted endpoint at https://agentaegis-mcp-production.up.railway.app/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · agentaegis-mcp-production.up.railway.app
claude mcp add --transport http astafford8488-agentaegis 'https://agentaegis-mcp-production.up.railway.app/mcp'
{
"mcpServers": {
"astafford8488-agentaegis": {
"url": "https://agentaegis-mcp-production.up.railway.app/mcp"
}
}
} {
"servers": {
"astafford8488-agentaegis": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://agentaegis-mcp-production.up.railway.app/mcp"
}
}
} [mcp_servers.astafford8488-agentaegis] url = "https://agentaegis-mcp-production.up.railway.app/mcp"
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"astafford8488-agentaegis": {
"type": "remote",
"url": "https://agentaegis-mcp-production.up.railway.app/mcp",
"enabled": true
}
}
} openclaw mcp add astafford8488-agentaegis --url 'https://agentaegis-mcp-production.up.railway.app/mcp' --transport streamable-http
mcp_servers:
astafford8488-agentaegis:
url: "https://agentaegis-mcp-production.up.railway.app/mcp" {
"McpServers": {
"astafford8488-agentaegis": {
"Transport": "http",
"Url": "https://agentaegis-mcp-production.up.railway.app/mcp"
}
}
} assistant mcp add astafford8488-agentaegis -t streamable-http -u 'https://agentaegis-mcp-production.up.railway.app/mcp'
{
"mcpServers": {
"astafford8488-agentaegis": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://agentaegis-mcp-production.up.railway.app/mcp"
}
}
} The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 26 Aug 26 77
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Aug 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 11 Aug 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 9 Aug 26 0
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Tool “access_review” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “audit_report_generate” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “compliance_framework_check” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “control_gap_analysis” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “credential_check” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “cve_lookup” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “dependency_audit” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “dns_security_check” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “email_security_audit” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “evidence_collect” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “incident_triage” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “mfa_audit” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “policy_generate” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “sast_scan” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “scan_mcp_plugin” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “scan_skill” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “secret_scan” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “ssl_tls_audit” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “threat_intel_lookup” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “vet_endpoint” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “vuln_prioritize” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “vuln_scan_network” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “vuln_scan_web_app” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Schema quality: pass → fail ▼ functional
- The server now declares the “prompts” capability functional
- First check of Schema quality: 100 functional
- Schema quality: poor → good functional
- New prompt “compliance_readiness” functional
- New prompt “incident_response” functional
- New prompt “pre_install_trust_check” functional
- New prompt “security_audit” functional
- 31 Jul 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 27 Jul 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 26 Jul 26 0
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 24 Sept 2026 · Probed https://agentaegis-mcp-production.up.railway.app/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=*.up.railway.app | CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 29 Jul 2026 | 27 Oct 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 6da79bb561da3efeb0e751ca21abd3999fe |
| SANs: *.up.railway.app, up.railway.app | ||||||
| CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 5ddd70dd31f801c85c186a7a04b80afe |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of agentaegis-mcp-production.up.railway.app. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| app. | present | 23684 | 8 | Verified |
| railway.app. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://agentaegis-mcp-production.up.railway.app/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://agentaegis-mcp-production.up.railway.app/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://agentaegis-mcp-production.up.railway.app/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
access_review ~138
Review user and role assignments you supply against least-privilege, flagging excessive, stale or orphaned access. Analyzes data the caller provides; it does not connect to an identity provider. Costs $1 per call.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| admin_roles | array | – | – |
| previous_scan_id | string | – | Optional. A prior scan_id (from agent_history) to record as this call's parent — builds a traversable chained-workflow lineage retrievable via agent_scan_get. Must be one of your own scans; ignored o… |
| sensitive_permissions | array | – | – |
| users | array | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
account_balance ~43
Returns the calling API key's prepaid balance, monthly limit, current month usage, and a breakdown of how many of each tool the customer can still afford. Free to call.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
agent_history ~119
Lists your recent scans (scan_id, tool, target, status, time) so you can retrieve or chain from a prior result. Optional limit/tool/target/since filters. Free to call.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | integer | – | Max scans to return (default 25). |
| since | string | – | ISO-8601 timestamp; only scans started at/after this time. |
| target | string | – | Filter to scans of a specific target. |
| tool | string | – | Filter to a single tool name (e.g. 'cve_lookup'). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
agent_scan_get ~80
Retrieves one of your prior scans by scan_id, including the stored full output, so you can build on earlier results without re-paying. Free to call.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| include_full_output | boolean | – | Include the full stored tool output, not just the summary (default true). |
| scan_id | string | yes | The scan id to retrieve (from agent_history). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
agent_whoami ~46
Returns your persistent AgentAegis agent identity (agent_id), how you're identified (API key / wallet / anonymous session), and lifetime call count + spend. Free to call.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
audit_report_generate ~165
Synthesize findings into an audit-ready compliance report. Use at the END of an engagement, once gaps are closed. If the user only wants to know where they currently stand, run compliance_framework_check instead — it costs less and answers that question directly. Costs $5 per call.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| assessment_results | array | yes | – |
| framework | string | yes | – |
| organization_name | string | yes | – |
| previous_scan_id | string | – | Optional. A prior scan_id (from agent_history) to record as this call's parent — builds a traversable chained-workflow lineage retrievable via agent_scan_get. Must be one of your own scans; ignored o… |
| report_date | string | yes | – |
| report_type | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
compliance_framework_check ~148
Assess an organization's security posture against a compliance framework (SOC 2, ISO 27001, HIPAA, PCI-DSS, NIST CSF) and report per-control status. Use this FIRST when asked whether the org is audit-ready; control_gap_analysis builds on its output. Costs $2 per call.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| framework | string | yes | – |
| organization_profile | object | yes | – |
| previous_scan_id | string | – | Optional. A prior scan_id (from agent_history) to record as this call's parent — builds a traversable chained-workflow lineage retrievable via agent_scan_get. Must be one of your own scans; ignored o… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
control_gap_analysis ~134
Turn unmet compliance controls into a prioritized remediation roadmap with effort estimates. Use after compliance_framework_check to answer 'what do we fix first'. Costs $2 per call.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| budget_constraint | string | – | – |
| failing_controls | array | yes | – |
| framework | string | yes | – |
| previous_scan_id | string | – | Optional. A prior scan_id (from agent_history) to record as this call's parent — builds a traversable chained-workflow lineage retrievable via agent_scan_get. Must be one of your own scans; ignored o… |
| timeline_constraint | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
credential_check ~130
Check whether an email address or domain appears in known credential-breach corpora (Have I Been Pwned), with the breaches and data classes exposed. Use when assessing account-takeover exposure. Costs $2 per call.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| check_type | string | yes | – |
| previous_scan_id | string | – | Optional. A prior scan_id (from agent_history) to record as this call's parent — builds a traversable chained-workflow lineage retrievable via agent_scan_get. Must be one of your own scans; ignored o… |
| target | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
cve_lookup ~118
Look up one CVE by identifier: CVSS score and vector, affected products, patch availability and references. Use when a specific CVE ID is already known. Costs $1 per call.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| cve_id | string | yes | – |
| previous_scan_id | string | – | Optional. A prior scan_id (from agent_history) to record as this call's parent — builds a traversable chained-workflow lineage retrievable via agent_scan_get. Must be one of your own scans; ignored o… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
dependency_audit ~127
Audit a dependency manifest or https git repo for known-vulnerable packages (trivy): npm, pip, Go, Ruby, Java, Cargo. The cheapest, highest-signal first step when assessing an unfamiliar repository. Costs $2 per call.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| previous_scan_id | string | – | Optional. A prior scan_id (from agent_history) to record as this call's parent — builds a traversable chained-workflow lineage retrievable via agent_scan_get. Must be one of your own scans; ignored o… |
| source | object | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
dns_security_check ~125
Check a domain's DNS security records — SPF, DKIM, DMARC, DNSSEC — and grade the configuration. Passive. Covers the records themselves; for full spoofability posture use email_security_audit. Costs $1 per call.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| domain | string | yes | – |
| previous_scan_id | string | – | Optional. A prior scan_id (from agent_history) to record as this call's parent — builds a traversable chained-workflow lineage retrievable via agent_scan_get. Must be one of your own scans; ignored o… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
email_security_audit ~137
Full email-security posture for a domain: whether mail from it can be spoofed, with DMARC/SPF/DKIM alignment and policy strength. A superset of dns_security_check for the email question specifically. Costs $2 per call.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| domain | string | yes | – |
| include_mx_analysis | boolean | – | – |
| previous_scan_id | string | – | Optional. A prior scan_id (from agent_history) to record as this call's parent — builds a traversable chained-workflow lineage retrievable via agent_scan_get. Must be one of your own scans; ignored o… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
evidence_collect ~150
Build an evidence-collection plan for specific compliance controls: what artifact each control needs, where it comes from, and what makes it sufficient. Use when preparing for a real audit, after the gaps are known. Plans the collection; does not gather evidence for you. Costs $1 per call.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| control_ids | array | yes | – |
| framework | string | yes | – |
| integrations | object | – | – |
| previous_scan_id | string | – | Optional. A prior scan_id (from agent_history) to record as this call's parent — builds a traversable chained-workflow lineage retrievable via agent_scan_get. Must be one of your own scans; ignored o… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
help ~52
Returns AgentAegis FAQ — authentication, balance/billing, tool catalog, async jobs, error codes, x402, rate limits, security. Optional topic filter. Free to call.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| topic | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
incident_triage ~152
Classify a security incident and produce severity, likely category, containment steps and a response plan. Use when something has already happened. If all you have is a suspicious IP or domain, run threat_intel_lookup first — it is cheaper and may settle the question. Costs $3 per call.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| environment_context | object | – | – |
| incident_description | string | yes | – |
| indicators | object | yes | – |
| previous_scan_id | string | – | Optional. A prior scan_id (from agent_history) to record as this call's parent — builds a traversable chained-workflow lineage retrievable via agent_scan_get. Must be one of your own scans; ignored o… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
mfa_audit ~128
Assess MFA coverage and factor strength across a user or configuration set you supply, flagging unenrolled accounts and weak factors such as SMS. Analyzes data the caller provides; it does not connect to an identity provider. Costs $1 per call.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| previous_scan_id | string | – | Optional. A prior scan_id (from agent_history) to record as this call's parent — builds a traversable chained-workflow lineage retrievable via agent_scan_get. Must be one of your own scans; ignored o… |
| users | array | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
policy_generate ~156
Generate a tailored written security policy (incident response, access control, encryption, vendor management, remote work, and similar). Use when a control gap specifically calls for documented policy. Costs $2 per call.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| customizations | object | – | – |
| employee_count | number | yes | – |
| frameworks | array | yes | – |
| industry | string | yes | – |
| organization_name | string | yes | – |
| policy_type | string | yes | – |
| previous_scan_id | string | – | Optional. A prior scan_id (from agent_history) to record as this call's parent — builds a traversable chained-workflow lineage retrievable via agent_scan_get. Must be one of your own scans; ignored o… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
sast_scan ~157
Static analysis of source code or an https git repo for security flaws (Semgrep): injection, unsafe deserialization, path traversal, crypto misuse. Python, JS/TS, Java, Go, Ruby, PHP, C/C++. For code LOGIC flaws — use secret_scan for hardcoded credentials and dependency_audit for vulnerable packages. Costs $5 per call.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| previous_scan_id | string | – | Optional. A prior scan_id (from agent_history) to record as this call's parent — builds a traversable chained-workflow lineage retrievable via agent_scan_get. Must be one of your own scans; ignored o… |
| severity_threshold | string | – | – |
| source | object | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
scan_mcp_plugin ~149
Scan an MCP server (git repo or code) for supply-chain risk BEFORE trusting it — exfiltration (secrets/env to the network), prompt-injection sinks, dangerous capabilities, npm install hooks, obfuscation, plus Semgrep + secret scanning → a PROCEED/CAUTION/BLOCK verdict with findings. Costs $5 per call.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| previous_scan_id | string | – | Optional. A prior scan_id (from agent_history) to record as this call's parent — builds a traversable chained-workflow lineage retrievable via agent_scan_get. Must be one of your own scans; ignored o… |
| source | object | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
scan_skill ~152
Scan an agent SKILL (git repo or SKILL.md) for supply-chain risk BEFORE trusting it — prompt-injection / hidden-unicode in the instructions (hard block), over-broad allowed-tools grants, plus exfiltration, dangerous capabilities, secrets and obfuscation in bundled scripts → a PROCEED/CAUTION/BLOCK verdict. Costs $5 per call.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| previous_scan_id | string | – | Optional. A prior scan_id (from agent_history) to record as this call's parent — builds a traversable chained-workflow lineage retrievable via agent_scan_get. Must be one of your own scans; ignored o… |
| source | object | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
secret_scan ~132
Detect hardcoded credentials, API keys and tokens in source code or an https git repo (trufflehog), verified against the issuing provider where supported. Use when the question is 'did we commit a secret'. Costs $2 per call.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| include_history | boolean | – | – |
| previous_scan_id | string | – | Optional. A prior scan_id (from agent_history) to record as this call's parent — builds a traversable chained-workflow lineage retrievable via agent_scan_get. Must be one of your own scans; ignored o… |
| source | object | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
ssl_tls_audit ~125
Audit a domain's TLS configuration (sslyze): certificate validity and expiry, protocol versions, cipher suites, and known TLS weaknesses. Passive — safe against any host. Costs $1 per call.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| hostname | string | yes | – |
| port | integer | – | – |
| previous_scan_id | string | – | Optional. A prior scan_id (from agent_history) to record as this call's parent — builds a traversable chained-workflow lineage retrievable via agent_scan_get. Must be one of your own scans; ignored o… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
threat_intel_lookup ~158
Reputation and indicator lookup for an IP or domain across AbuseIPDB, AlienVault OTX and abuse.ch. The cheapest way to check whether an indicator is known-bad. Interpret with care: large CDN, cloud and payment infrastructure routinely returns reputation hits, so only a curated active-malware hit is strong evidence on its own. Costs $2 per call.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| indicator | string | yes | – |
| indicator_type | string | yes | – |
| previous_scan_id | string | – | Optional. A prior scan_id (from agent_history) to record as this call's parent — builds a traversable chained-workflow lineage retrievable via agent_scan_get. Must be one of your own scans; ignored o… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
vet_endpoint ~189
Composite trust verdict (PROCEED/CAUTION/BLOCK) for an endpoint an agent is about to call or pay — combines TLS/cert health, DNS hygiene, threat-intel reputation, and domain age into one decision with reasons. Prefer this over running ssl_tls_audit + dns_security_check + threat_intel_lookup separately: it costs less than the sum and returns a decision rather than three reports to reconcile. Costs $3 per call.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| endpoint | string | yes | The endpoint to vet — a full URL (https://api.example.com/pay) or a bare domain (example.com). |
| previous_scan_id | string | – | Optional. A prior scan_id (from agent_history) to record as this call's parent — builds a traversable chained-workflow lineage retrievable via agent_scan_get. Must be one of your own scans; ignored o… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
vuln_prioritize ~124
Rank vulnerabilities you already have by exploitability and business impact, and group them into remediation actions. Analyzes findings you supply; it discovers nothing on its own. Costs $1 per call.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| business_context | object | – | – |
| findings | array | yes | – |
| previous_scan_id | string | – | Optional. A prior scan_id (from agent_history) to record as this call's parent — builds a traversable chained-workflow lineage retrievable via agent_scan_get. Must be one of your own scans; ignored o… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
vuln_scan_network ~171
Discover open ports, running services and known vulnerabilities on an IP or domain (nmap). SENDS REAL TRAFFIC to the target and may trigger intrusion detection — only run against hosts the caller owns or is explicitly authorized to test, and confirm that first. Pass async:true to get a job_id to poll instead of blocking. Costs $3 per call.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| async | boolean | – | – |
| port_range | string | – | – |
| previous_scan_id | string | – | Optional. A prior scan_id (from agent_history) to record as this call's parent — builds a traversable chained-workflow lineage retrievable via agent_scan_get. Must be one of your own scans; ignored o… |
| scan_type | string | yes | – |
| target | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
vuln_scan_web_app ~166
Scan a web application for OWASP Top 10 issues and known CVEs (Nuclei). SENDS REAL TRAFFIC to the target — authorized targets only, confirm before calling. Pass async:true to get a job_id to poll instead of blocking. Costs $5 per call.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| async | boolean | – | – |
| authentication | object | – | – |
| exclude_paths | array | – | – |
| previous_scan_id | string | – | Optional. A prior scan_id (from agent_history) to record as this call's parent — builds a traversable chained-workflow lineage retrievable via agent_scan_get. Must be one of your own scans; ignored o… |
| scan_depth | string | yes | – |
| target_url | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
What is the AgentAegis MCP server?
AgentAegis is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.astafford8488/agentaegis. Pay-per-call cybersecurity for AI agents: vuln scans, threat intel, compliance, code security. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://agentaegis-mcp-production.up.railway.app/mcp).
Is the AgentAegis MCP server safe to use?
AgentAegis scores 77 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the AgentAegis MCP server expose?
AgentAegis exposes 28 tools: compliance_framework_check, evidence_collect, control_gap_analysis, audit_report_generate, policy_generate, and 23 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 3,671 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the AgentAegis MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to AgentAegis without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the AgentAegis MCP server still maintained?
AgentAegis is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 24 September 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.