KarmaDue
REMOTE · OGOGOIZWSFADUZEHKSHB.SUPABASE.CO · 3 COMPONENTS
Pre-install safety check for agents: known traps, tested fixes, malware reports. No account.
Last scanned (12 hours ago)
Scores higher than 69% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 7 Nov 2026.
Category Security
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security97
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation is enforced on tool calls, advertised via RFC 9728 protected-resource metadata. Discovery is public, which costs nothing: no tool can be invoked without a token. View diagnostics → Pass
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- The authorisation server supports Client ID Metadata Documents, the current MCP client-registration mechanism. View diagnostics → Pass
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability59
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 843 tokens (~168/item across 5 items; 5 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management0
- Stability check failed: schema churn in the 24 days we've observed: 27 tool removals, 0 breaking changes, 0 auth/transport breaks, 3 additions. See how to fix → Fail
Tool Coverage95
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 86% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 5 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 6 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Checks we ran (13)
- TLS certificate
- Authorization
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 6 Nov 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 19 Oct 26 0
- “check_install” added an optional parameter “detail” cosmetic
1 cosmetic change on this day. Switch on “Show cosmetic changes” to see it.
- 18 Oct 26 0
- Tool “check_install” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Schema quality: pass → fail ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 42% → 85% ▲ functional
- “check_install” added an optional parameter “request_repro” cosmetic
- “report_leaf” reworded the description of “target” cosmetic
- “report_leaf” reworded the description of “stderr_snippet” cosmetic
- “report_leaf” reworded the description of “status” cosmetic
- “report_leaf” reworded the description of “runtime_env” cosmetic
- “report_leaf” reworded the description of “command_run” cosmetic
- “check_install” reworded the description of “ecosystem” cosmetic
- 15 Oct 26 −2
- Stability: unverified → fail ▼ security
- A breaking change shipped without a version bump: still 1.1.0 ▼ security
- Tool “get_thread” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “check_before_acting” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “check_manifest” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “discover_resources” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “find_collaborators” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “get_challenge” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “get_claims” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “get_credits” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “get_history” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “get_ladder” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “get_rating_card” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “get_receipt” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “get_resource” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “get_standing” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “get_watchlist” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “list_challenges” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “list_threads” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “list_topics” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “lookup_findings” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “notify_human_of_finding” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “read_scores” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “read_stream” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “set_watchlist” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “trust_query” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “verify_agent” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “watchlist_changes” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “withdraw_finding” was removed ▼ security
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Tool “search” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “fetch” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool coverage: 100% → 42% ▼ functional
- Schema quality: fail → pass ▲ functional
- Destructive annotations: 100 → pass functional
- New tool “check_install” functional
- New tool “report_leaf” functional
- New tool “search_recipes” functional
- “fetch” reworded the description of “id” cosmetic
- “search” reworded the description of “query” cosmetic
- “search” dropped the optional parameter “category” cosmetic
- “search” dropped the optional parameter “include_examples” cosmetic
- “search” dropped the optional parameter “offset” cosmetic
- 14 Oct 26 +40
- Injection markers: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Transport: unverified → pass ▲ security
- First check of Judged manipulation: pass security
- Authorization: Authorisation is enforced on tool calls, advertised via RFC 9728 protected-resource metadata. Discovery is public, which costs nothing: no tool can be invoked without a token. security
- Tool coverage: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
- MCP protocol: unverified → pass ▲ functional
- First check of Tool coverage: 100 functional
- First check of Schema quality: good functional
- First check of Destructive annotations: 100 functional
- First check of Schema quality: fail functional
- First check of Schema quality: fail functional
- 12 Oct 26 39
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 7 Nov 2026 · Probed https://ogogoizwsfaduzehkshb.supabase.co/functions/v1/mcp/connector
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=supabase.co | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 24 Oct 2026 | 22 Jan 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | d2b50611cd88e9c50e4e2231f4d3f059 |
| SANs: supabase.co, *.supabase.co | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of ogogoizwsfaduzehkshb.supabase.co. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| co. | DS published | 7786 | 8 | Verified |
| supabase.co. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication Enforced and verified
The endpoint asked for a token and published valid RFC 9728 metadata describing how to get one.
| Result | Enforced and verified |
|---|---|
| Enforced | On tool calls |
| HTTP status | 200 |
WWW-Authenticate challenge Bearer resource_metadata="https://ogogoizwsfaduzehkshb.supabase.co/functions/v1/mcp/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource", scope="kd.discovery.read kd.evidence.read"
Bearer resource_metadata="https://ogogoizwsfaduzehkshb.supabase.co/functions/v1/mcp/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource", scope="kd.discovery.read kd.evidence.read"| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload |
Protected resource metadata
| Document | https://ogogoizwsfaduzehkshb.supabase.co/functions/v1/mcp/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource |
|---|---|
| Retrieved | Yes |
| Resource | https://ogogoizwsfaduzehkshb.supabase.co/functions/v1/mcp/connector |
| Authorisation server | https://karmadue.expo.app |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://ogogoizwsfaduzehkshb.supabase.co/functions/v1/mcp/connector | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://ogogoizwsfaduzehkshb.supabase.co/functions/v1/mcp/connector | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://ogogoizwsfaduzehkshb.supabase.co/functions/v1/mcp/connector |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
check_install ~376
Read-only. Call before npm/pnpm/yarn install, pip install, uv add, npx or uvx, or adding an MCP server, including setup commands from a README or tutorial. Returns v, enforce, why; on known traps fix (tested steps), do_not (what failed, where), test, source. enforce=block: stop. enforce=ask: ask your person first. v=fix_first: use fix, not your command. Also returns safety (OSV advisories and malicious-package reports: verdict, advisories, fixed_in). When no tested record exists, repro_request says how to queue one with request_repro 'yes' (the only case where this call records anything: one anonymous request). Missing evidence is not safety clearance. Skip packages already pinned in a lockfile you are not changing.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| detail | string | – | Optional. 'full' adds tested_on, untruncated notes, records and links. |
| ecosystem | string | yes | Package ecosystem of the target: npm (npm, pnpm, yarn, npx), pypi (pip, uv, uvx) or mcp (an MCP server you are about to add, or a bare name that may exist in more than one ecosystem). A bare name fou… |
| request_repro | string | – | Optional. 'yes' queues one anonymous reproduction request (package and version only) when no tested record exists for the target. |
| runtime_env | string | – | Optional, e.g. node 20 linux. |
| target | string | yes | Package or server as you would install it, e.g. tailwindcss@4, psycopg2, @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
fetch ~22
Fetch one record by id from search.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
report_leaf ~181
Only if your owner opted in: after an install finishes, report pass or fail and the command. Reviewed before use.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| command_run | string | yes | The exact install command you ran, e.g. npm i -D tailwindcss@4. No secrets or tokens. |
| runtime_env | string | yes | Your setup, e.g. node 20 linux or python 3.13 macos. |
| status | string | yes | Outcome of the install: pass if it finished and worked, fail if it errored. |
| stderr_snippet | string | – | Optional. The key error lines if it failed, verbatim. Never include secrets, tokens or personal data. |
| target | string | yes | Package or server you installed, as you passed it to check_install, e.g. tailwindcss@4 or @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
search ~26
Search PinTree records for packages, tools and MCP servers.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| query | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
search_recipes ~72
Call when an install, build or import fails, before retrying or guessing a fix. Paste the key error line; returns tested fixes.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| error_signature | string | yes | The key error line, verbatim. |
| runtime_env | string | – | Optional, e.g. python 3.13 macos. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the KarmaDue MCP server?
KarmaDue is a hosted endpoint at https://ogogoizwsfaduzehkshb.supabase.co/functions/v1/mcp/connector, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · ogogoizwsfaduzehkshb.supabase.co
claude mcp add --transport http ashadow07-karmadue 'https://ogogoizwsfaduzehkshb.supabase.co/functions/v1/mcp/connector'
What is the KarmaDue MCP server?
KarmaDue is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.ashadow07/karmadue. Pre-install safety check for agents: known traps, tested fixes, malware reports. No account. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://ogogoizwsfaduzehkshb.supabase.co/functions/v1/mcp/connector).
Is the KarmaDue MCP server safe to use?
KarmaDue scores 77 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the KarmaDue MCP server expose?
KarmaDue exposes 5 tools: check_install, search_recipes, report_leaf, search, fetch. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 677 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the KarmaDue MCP server require authentication?
Yes. KarmaDue asked us for credentials when we connected, so you will need to authorise it in your MCP client before it can do anything.
Is the KarmaDue MCP server still maintained?
KarmaDue is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 7 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the KarmaDue MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 13 checks on KarmaDue, covering TLS certificate, Authorization, HTTPS, HSTS header and 9 more. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.