Offendersearch
REMOTE · MCP.OFFENDERSEARCH.APP
Search US sex-offender registries and criminal records, with per-source citations.
Available components
Last scanned (20 hours ago)
Scores higher than 62% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.
Category Search and Retrieval
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security57
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 10 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability58
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 5974 tokens (~597/item across 10 items; 10 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 10 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 11 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Checks we ran (12)
- TLS certificate
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Checks we could not complete (1)
These are gaps on our side, not findings about this hosted endpoint. We only credit what we can confirm, so a category made up entirely of them scores 0.
- Authorization in Endpoint SecurityAuthorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 10 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe.
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 11 Nov 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 10 Nov 26 0
- Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
- 6 Nov 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 19 Oct 26 0
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Schema quality: 521 → 597 ▼ functional
- Server version: 1.29.1 → 1.30.0 functional
- New tool “map_area” functional
- New tool “map_group” functional
- New tool “map_open_record” functional
- New tool “map_route” functional
- New tool “map_viewport” functional
- 29 Sept 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 28 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 31 Aug 26 0
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://mcp.offendersearch.app/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=mcp.offendersearch.app | CN=WR3,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 13 Oct 2026 | 11 Jan 2027 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | c5af2b17ac946cf2090b0a9012d947ce |
| SANs: mcp.offendersearch.app | ||||||
| CN=WR3,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R1,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | 7ff005a91568d63abc22861684aa4b5a |
| CN=GTS Root R1,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 19 Jun 2020 | 28 Jan 2028 | RSA 4096 | SHA256-RSA | 77bd0d6cdb36f91aea210fc4f058d30d |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of mcp.offendersearch.app. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| app. | DS published | 23684 | 8 | Verified |
| offendersearch.app. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://mcp.offendersearch.app/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://mcp.offendersearch.app/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 302 | https://mcp.offendersearch.app/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
batch_search ~376
Run many person/location lookups in one call (row-in / row-out). Each row goes through the SAME engine as search_offenders, so a row's records are identical to what a single search would return. A row that fails is reported with status='error' in place and never aborts the batch. Max 1000 rows. Returns: { count, results: [ { index, status, counts{records,sourcesQueried, sourcesIncomplete}, warnings: [str], records: [Record], error? } ] } in input order. ★ A row with `counts.sourcesIncomplete > 0` could not be searched to the end — its `records` are a LOWER BOUND, not a clean 'no match'. Auth: uses the caller's X-API-Key (request header or OFFENDERSEARCH_API_KEY env).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| extensive | boolean | – | Request extensive detail (offenses[], stateData, images) for every row. |
| freshness | string | – | Cache/pricing tier applied to every row: daily=<=24h (default), weekly=<=7d. |
| jurisdictions | – | – | Registry codes applied to EVERY row (e.g. ['FL','TX']). Omit = all 58 registries. |
| location_scoped | boolean | – | Apply per-state scoping to every row (see search_offenders). |
| match | string | – | Fuzzy tolerance applied to every row (see search_offenders). |
| queries | array | yes | List of query objects (max 1000). Each may set any of: firstName, lastName, dob (YYYY-MM-DD), age, city, state, zipcode, address, lat, lng, radiusMiles, q. One row in = one result out, in input order. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_criminal_coverage ~138
List the criminal-record jurisdictions searched, with kind and status. Use it to discover which states and counties are reachable and which are answering today, before relying on an empty result. Depth is uneven by design: counties publish independently, so a state with many county jurisdictions is not "better covered" than one that publishes a single statewide source — it is differently structured. Returns the jurisdiction roster; each entry carries its code, the state it belongs to, the kind of records it holds (jail / prison / court / warrant / registry) and whether it is currently answering.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_registry_coverage ~336
List every registry we cover plus its scope, legal status, and health. Public coverage catalog (no API key required). Use it to discover the `jurisdictions` codes accepted by search_offenders / batch_search and to check per-registry freshness/health before relying on a result. Returns: { count, registries: [ SourceInfo ] } where each SourceInfo is: - id: registry code (e.g. 'IL', 'TX', 'PR') - name: human-readable registry name - covers: [state codes] a registry covers ('*' = national / all) - scope: 'state' | 'national' - status: 'live' | 'building' - legal: { commercialUse: 'allowed'|'restricted'|'prohibited'|'unknown' } - health: { lastSuccessAt, typicalLatencyMs, ageSeconds, freshFor } `health` is OPERATIONAL COVERAGE METADATA about our ingest schedule, published for transparency. It is NOT a quality warning about a search result: a search serves every registry's best available data regardless of `freshFor`, so a registry listing only 'weekly' still contributes its records to a freshness='daily' search. Do NOT tell a user their search results are stale, unreliable or out of date on the basis of these fields — they are not. The only completeness signal that belongs in an answer is `counts.sourcesIncomplete` / `warnings[]` from the search response itself.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
map_area ~644
Get what to draw inside a drawn shape: a polygon, or a line with a buffer. The same answer as map_viewport for the shape's bounding box, limited to what is inside the shape, at the same detail levels (clusters, pins, or named pins at zoom 15+). The response adds `shape: 'polygon' | 'route'`. Returns: { shape, mode, zoom, bbox, datasetVersion, total, breakdown {street, housed, homeless, incarcerated}, clusters[], markers[], areas[], unplaced {count, states}, notice }. - A marker with `id: null` and a `groupId` stands for several people at one address: call map_group with that `groupId`. - `areas` are people placed only at the middle of a ZIP, city or county. Never describe them as being at an exact spot. - To see who one marker is, call map_open_record with its `id`. A pin shows a REGISTERED ADDRESS, not a person's current location — say so when you describe a result (`notice` carries the sentence). Billing: one map request per call ($2 per 1,000), whatever the shape holds. Marker and group ids work for 24 hours. The Map API must be turned on for the account (403 `map_not_enabled` otherwise); `sandbox=true` works without it. Auth: uses the caller's X-API-Key (request header or OFFENDERSEARCH_API_KEY env).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| buffer_miles | – | – | Distance either side of route_points, in miles, 0.05 to 5. |
| detail | string | – | full = clusters or pins (default); count = numbers only. |
| housing | – | – | Keep only people with one of these housing statuses. |
| polygon | – | – | A ring of 3 to 200 [lng, lat] points (GeoJSON order: longitude first), e.g. [[-83.0,39.9],[-82.9,39.9],[-82.95,40.0]]. A repeated closing point is fine. Send this OR route_points, not both. |
| route_points | – | – | A line of 2 to 200 [lng, lat] points (GeoJSON order). Everyone within buffer_miles either side of it is counted. Send with buffer_miles, instead of polygon. For exact per-leg and per-stop counts alon… |
| sandbox | boolean | – | If true, answer in test mode: made-up people (labels start with 'Sample') in the real response shape. Needs no plan and is never billed. |
| street_only | boolean | – | If true, keep only people with an exact street address. |
| zoom | – | – | Optional map zoom, 0 to 22. Decides the detail as on map_viewport: 3-12 clusters, 13-14 pins without names, 15+ pins with names. Omit it and the zoom is worked out from the size of the shape. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
map_group ~259
List the people behind a many-people pin or an approximate-area pin. Returns: { total, page, perPage, totalPages, kind: 'address' | 'area', named, members: [ { id, addressType, label, housingStatus, hasPhoto } ] }. Members carry `label` only when the group id came from a view at zoom 15 or closer (`named: true`). Each member `id` opens with map_open_record. Billing: one map request per page. A group id works for 24 hours and only for the account it was issued to; after that, call map_viewport again. Auth: uses the caller's X-API-Key (request header or OFFENDERSEARCH_API_KEY env).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| group_id | string | yes | A `groupId` ('mg_...') from a map_viewport, map_area or map_route marker with `id: null`, from a map_route `groups` entry, or from an entry in `areas` / `approximate.areas`. |
| page | integer | – | Page number, starting at 1. |
| per_page | integer | – | People per page, 1 to 100. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
map_open_record ~385
Open the complete record behind one map marker, or behind a saved reference. Returns: { record, recordRef, billing: { billed, unit, reason }, notice }. `record` is the same Record object search_offenders returns. `recordRef` ('mr_...') is a lasting reference: keep it to open the same record later, after the marker id has expired. Billing: one record open per person per map response, at the account's record-open rate (published price $0.035 per open; an account's agreed rate may differ) — so open a marker only when the user wants that person's record, not every marker in a view or along a route. - The same marker id again is free (`reason: 'marker_already_opened'`). - A new map_viewport, map_area, map_route or map_group answer carries new ids; opening the same person from it is a new charge. - Opening by `recordRef` is one record open, then free for 24 hours. A record just opened from a marker is also free by its reference for 24 hours. `billing.billed` says whether THIS open was charged. Marker ids work for 24 hours (410 `marker_expired` after that). A 410 `record_no_longer_listed` means the registry no longer lists the person; it is not billed. Auth: uses the caller's X-API-Key (request header or OFFENDERSEARCH_API_KEY env).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| marker_id | string | yes | A marker id ('mk_...') from map_viewport, map_area, map_route or map_group, or a saved record reference ('mr_...') from an earlier map_open_record. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
map_route ~1,161
Exact counts of registered addresses along one walking or bus route. Counts a corridor either side of the line, a radius around each stop, or both, and returns exact numbers per leg and per stop with nameless pins and their distances. Never an estimate and never partial: the answer is complete or the call fails without a charge. Returns: { shape: 'route', profile, measure, detail, datasetVersion, complete, lengthMiles, corridorMiles, stopRadiusFeet, parcelAllowanceFeet, units, total, corridorTotal, stopsTotal, breakdown {street, housed, homeless, incarcerated}, legs: [ {leg, fromStop, toStop, lengthMiles, count} ], stops: [ {stopId, alongMiles, count, nearestFeet, markerIds} ], markers: [ {id, lat, lng, precision, addressType, distanceMiles, leg, alongMiles, nearestStop, stopDistanceFeet} ], groups[], approximate {count, areas[]}, unplaced {count, states}, externalId, notice, routeNotice }. - `total` = distinct people with a street address in the corridor or a stop's reach; leg counts sum to `corridorTotal`. - Pins carry NO NAMES. A `groups` entry (several people at one address) and an `approximate.areas` entry (people placed only at the middle of a ZIP, city or county; never in `total`) open with map_group. - To see who one marker is, call map_open_record with its `id` — a separate charge at the account's record-open rate (published price $0.035 per open; an account's agreed rate may differ). Open only the records the user asks for, not every marker on the route. - More than 300 pins at detail=full is a 422 `route_too_many_people` that carries the exact counts and is not charged: use detail='count' or split the route. A count shows REGISTERED ADDRESSES, NOT WHERE ANYONE IS, and is not a rating of the route. Never describe a route as safe or unsafe; relay `notice` and `routeNotice`. It supports the user's process; it…
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| corridor_miles | – | – | Corridor width either side of the line, in miles, 0.02 to 0.25 (default 0.1). |
| detail | string | – | full = counts plus nameless pins (default); count = counts only, same price, never refused for too many pins. |
| external_id | – | – | Your own reference for this route (up to 100 characters), echoed back as `externalId`. |
| housing | – | – | Keep only people with one of these housing statuses. |
| measure | – | – | What to count: the corridor either side of the line, a radius around each stop, or both. Default: both when stop_radius_feet is sent, otherwise corridor (stops when there is no line and fewer than 2… |
| parcel_allowance_feet | – | – | Feet added to the stop radius, 0 to 500, to allow for the distance between a geocoded point and the property line. |
| path | – | – | The route line: a GeoJSON LineString {'type':'LineString','coordinates':[[lng,lat],...]} (or a Feature holding one), or a plain list [[lng, lat], ...] in GeoJSON order. Send at most one of path or po… |
| polyline | – | – | The route line as an encoded polyline (Google = precision 5; Mapbox/OSRM/Valhalla = precision 6), instead of path. |
| polyline_precision | – | – | Precision of `polyline`: 5 (Google, the default) or 6 (Mapbox/OSRM/Valhalla). |
| profile | – | – | walk (default; up to 15 miles, stop radius 500 ft) or bus (up to 60 miles, stop radius 1,000 ft). |
| sandbox | boolean | – | If true, answer in test mode: made-up people in the real response shape. Needs no plan and is never billed. |
| stop_radius_feet | – | – | Radius around each stop, in feet, 100 to 2,640 (default walk 500, bus 1,000). |
| stops | – | – | Stops along the route, in order: [{'id':'s1','lng':...,'lat':...}, ...] or [[lng, lat], ...]. Ids default to s1, s2, .... With no path or polyline, 2+ stops are joined by straight lines. Walk: up to… |
| street_only | boolean | – | If true, keep only people with an exact street address. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
map_viewport ~796
Get what to draw for one map view: clusters, pins, or named pins. Send the view as `bbox`, or as `lat` + `lng` + `radius_miles`. The detail returned depends on the zoom the view is answered at (the response states it in `zoom`): - zoom 3-12 -> mode 'clusters': a count per grid cell. Each cluster has `count`, `bbox`, `breakdown` and `expansionZoom` (fit the map to `bbox` at that zoom and the cluster comes apart). - zoom 13-14 -> mode 'pins': one pin per address, position only, no name. - zoom 15+ -> mode 'markers': pins with `label` (first initial and last name), `housingStatus`, `hasPhoto`, `registryState`. A close view holding more than 300 pins is answered as clusters instead. Returns: { mode, zoom, bbox, datasetVersion, total, breakdown {street, housed, homeless, incarcerated}, clusters[], markers[], areas[], unplaced {count, states}, notice }. In radius mode also `center`, `radiusMiles` and `withinRadius` (exact), and each marker has `distanceMiles`. - A marker with `id: null` and a `groupId` stands for several people at one address: call map_group with that `groupId`. - `areas` are people placed only at the middle of a ZIP, city or county; each has a `groupId` too. Never describe them as being at an exact spot. - `unplaced` counts people in the states this view touches who have no mappable address. Mention it rather than implying the map shows everyone. - To see who one marker is, call map_open_record with its `id`. A pin shows a REGISTERED ADDRESS, not a person's current location — say so when you describe a result (`notice` carries the sentence). Billing: one map request per call ($2 per 1,000), whatever the view holds. Marker and group ids work for 24 hours. The Map API must be turned on for the account (the API answers 403 `map_not_enabled` otherwise); `sandbox=true` works without it. Auth: uses the c…
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| bbox | – | – | The view as 'west,south,east,north' in degrees, e.g. '-83.5,39.6,-82.4,40.3'. Any size. Send this OR lat/lng with radius_miles, not both. |
| detail | string | – | full = clusters or pins (default); count = numbers only. |
| housing | – | – | Keep only people with one of these housing statuses. |
| lat | – | – | Latitude of the centre, instead of bbox (send with lng and radius_miles). |
| lng | – | – | Longitude of the centre, instead of bbox (send with lat and radius_miles). |
| radius_miles | – | – | Radius in miles around lat/lng, 0.1 to 100. |
| sandbox | boolean | – | If true, answer in test mode: made-up people (labels start with 'Sample') in the real response shape. Needs no plan and is never billed. |
| street_only | boolean | – | If true, keep only people with an exact street address. |
| zoom | – | – | Optional map zoom, 0 to 22. Decides the detail: 3-12 clusters, 13-14 pins without names, 15+ pins with names. Omit it and the zoom is worked out from the size of the view. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
search_criminal ~509
Search US criminal records — county jail bookings, state prison custody, court cases and warrants. Covers county jail rosters, statewide prison systems, court sources, warrant systems and statewide registries across the states, DC and the territories, plus the federal layer — which is a separate system holding offences no state search will surface. A surname is REQUIRED. Supply firstName and a DOB or birth year wherever you have them: a bare common surname returns thousands of people, and the scoring cannot tell you which one is yours. Each record carries `recordType`, and YOU MUST READ IT BEFORE CHARACTERISING ANYONE: - a jail booking is an ARREST-stage record — charges at booking are frequently reduced, dismissed, or never filed. It is NOT a conviction. - prison custody implies a sentence, and therefore a conviction. - a court record carries the DISPOSITION — the authoritative statement of how a case actually ended. - a warrant means the person is SOUGHT. Nothing has been tested. Never describe someone as convicted on the strength of a booking record. Records also carry: name, aliases, dob/birthYear/dobPrecision, sex, race, state, county, custody status and facility, sentence and parole detail, `cases`, `sources` (per-source citation), and `matchConfidence`/`matchBasis` explaining why it matched. `counts.records` is the total found and `counts.recordsReturned` the number in this page. Not a consumer report: results must not be used for FCRA-covered decisions (employment, tenancy, credit) without appropriate process.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| age | – | – | Approximate current age, when neither DOB nor birth year is known. |
| birthYear | – | – | Birth year alone, when a full DOB is unknown. |
| county | – | – | County name, to narrow within a state. |
| dob | – | – | Date of birth, YYYY-MM-DD. The single strongest disambiguator. |
| firstName | – | – | Given name. Strongly recommended: a bare common surname returns thousands. |
| lastName | string | yes | REQUIRED surname. The criminal corpus refuses an unbounded query — a name is the field that cannot be enumerated. |
| limit | – | – | Max records to return. Default 50. |
| state | – | – | 2-letter state code (e.g. 'TX'). Narrows to that state's jurisdictions. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
search_offenders ~1,065
Search US sex-offender registries for one person and/or location. Fans out across all 58 registries (or the ones named in `jurisdictions`), de-duplicates people across registries, scores each match, and returns the normalized records. Supply whatever identifiers you have — all args are optional but at least a name, location, or free-text `q` should be given. Returns a SearchResponse object (docs/openapi.yaml / FIELD-DICTIONARY.md): - status: 'complete' | 'partial' (partial = a source errored, or a source could not be searched to completion) - counts: { records, sourcesQueried, sourcesIncomplete } - warnings: [str] — ALWAYS present, `[]` when the search ran clean - sourceStatus: [ { source, status, matched, fromCache, note, incomplete, incompleteReason } ] per-registry outcome ★ READ `counts.sourcesIncomplete` BEFORE REPORTING A RESULT. Above 0, `records` is a LOWER BOUND: those registries could not be searched to the end, and an empty or short result is NOT evidence that a person is unregistered. Say so. `warnings[0]` states it in plain language; relay it rather than summarising it away. - records: [ Record ], each with: recordId, matchConfidence, matchBasis[], name {first, middle, last, suffix, full}, aliases[], nicknames[], dob, dobPrecision, age, sex, race, ethnicity, height, weight, eyeColor, hairColor, marks, addresses[{type,line1,city,county,state,zipcode,lat,lng}], offense {crime,statute,riskLevel,tier,convictionDate,...}, flags{absconder,predator}, source {jurisdiction,registryName,recordUrl,scrapedAt,sourceUpdatedAt}, sources[], dobVerification, unverified (offenses[], stateData, images[] are populated only when extensive=true) Auth: uses the caller's X-API-Key (request header or OFFENDERSEARCH_API_KEY env).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | – | – | Fuzzy street-address filter (every token must appear in some record address). |
| age | – | – | Age filter, used when DOB is unknown. Matched +/-1 year for birthday drift. |
| city | – | – | Residence city filter. |
| deadline_ms | integer | – | Max time to wait, in ms (default 120000 / 2 min). Lower for a faster bounded response; partial results return status='partial'. |
| dob | – | – | Date of birth 'YYYY-MM-DD'. Improves match precision; drives dobVerification (dob_match / year_match). |
| extensive | boolean | – | If true, request extensive detail (retains offenses[], stateData, images). A light call drops them. |
| first_name | – | – | Given name, e.g. 'John'. |
| freshness | string | – | Cache/pricing tier: daily=<=24h (default), weekly=<=7d. |
| jurisdictions | – | – | Registry codes to query (e.g. ['IL','TX']). Omit/null = ALL 58 registries. See get_registry_coverage for codes. |
| last_name | – | – | Surname — the primary match key, e.g. 'Smith'. |
| lat | – | – | Latitude for a GIS radius search (pair with lng). |
| lng | – | – | Longitude for a GIS radius search (pair with lat). |
| location_scoped | boolean | – | OPT-IN ONLY, and never inferred from `state`. If true AND a state is set, run only the registries covering that state instead of all 58. It is a cost knob that COSTS RECALL: anyone registered by anot… |
| match | string | – | Fuzzy tolerance: strict=exact; balanced=nicknames/variants/initials/typos on first name, exact last; broad=also prefix/typo on last name. |
| q | – | – | Free-text search across name/alias/address/city/state/zip (all tokens must appear). |
| radius_miles | – | – | GIS radius in miles around lat/lng. Defaults to 1 when a point is given; capped at 100. |
| state | – | – | 2-letter state/territory code (e.g. 'IL', 'PR'), or the full name. A residence FILTER — it does NOT change which registries run; all 58 are still searched. It filters as a UNION: a record is kept whe… |
| zipcode | – | – | Residence ZIP (first 5 digits used). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the Offendersearch MCP server?
Offendersearch is a hosted endpoint at https://mcp.offendersearch.app/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · mcp.offendersearch.app
claude mcp add --transport http app-offendersearch-offendersearch 'https://mcp.offendersearch.app/mcp'
What is the Offendersearch MCP server?
Offendersearch is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as app.offendersearch/offendersearch. Search US sex-offender registries and criminal records, with per-source citations. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://mcp.offendersearch.app/mcp).
Is the Offendersearch MCP server safe to use?
Offendersearch scores 75 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Offendersearch MCP server expose?
Offendersearch exposes 10 tools: search_offenders, batch_search, get_registry_coverage, search_criminal, get_criminal_coverage, and 5 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 5,669 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Offendersearch MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to Offendersearch without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the Offendersearch MCP server still maintained?
Offendersearch is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the Offendersearch MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 12 checks on Offendersearch, covering TLS certificate, HTTPS, HSTS header, DNSSEC and 8 more. One item could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about Offendersearch: Authorization. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.