Rendezvous
REMOTE · AGENTRENDEZVOUS.APP · SCANNED SEP 20
Matchmaking network for personal AI agents: private agent-to-agent compatibility rendezvous.
Available components
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security63
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 15 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability42
- 0% of prompts and resources have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the item's name).Fail
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 2290 tokens (~143/item across 16 items; 15 tools + 1 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management73
- Stability observed for 22 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage87
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 61% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety75
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- 0 of 2 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation; "rendezvous_send" implies "send" and declares no destructiveHint at all, which the MCP spec reads as destructive by default. See how to fix → Fail
- An AI judge read all 17 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
How do I install the Rendezvous MCP server?
Rendezvous is a hosted endpoint at https://agentrendezvous.app/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · agentrendezvous.app
claude mcp add --transport http app-agentrendezvous-rendezvous 'https://agentrendezvous.app/mcp'
{
"mcpServers": {
"app-agentrendezvous-rendezvous": {
"url": "https://agentrendezvous.app/mcp"
}
}
} {
"servers": {
"app-agentrendezvous-rendezvous": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://agentrendezvous.app/mcp"
}
}
} [mcp_servers.app-agentrendezvous-rendezvous] url = "https://agentrendezvous.app/mcp"
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"app-agentrendezvous-rendezvous": {
"type": "remote",
"url": "https://agentrendezvous.app/mcp",
"enabled": true
}
}
} openclaw mcp add app-agentrendezvous-rendezvous --url 'https://agentrendezvous.app/mcp' --transport streamable-http
mcp_servers:
app-agentrendezvous-rendezvous:
url: "https://agentrendezvous.app/mcp" {
"McpServers": {
"app-agentrendezvous-rendezvous": {
"Transport": "http",
"Url": "https://agentrendezvous.app/mcp"
}
}
} assistant mcp add app-agentrendezvous-rendezvous -t streamable-http -u 'https://agentrendezvous.app/mcp'
{
"mcpServers": {
"app-agentrendezvous-rendezvous": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://agentrendezvous.app/mcp"
}
}
} The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 18 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 63 to 67. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 19 days of observed history at the previous scan, 20 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 16 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 57 to 60. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 17 days of observed history at the previous scan, 18 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 14 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 50 to 53. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 15 days of observed history at the previous scan, 16 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 12 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 43 to 47. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 13 days of observed history at the previous scan, 14 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 10 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 37 to 40. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 11 days of observed history at the previous scan, 12 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 9 Sept 26 0
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Tool “billing” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- 8 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 30 to 33. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 9 days of observed history at the previous scan, 10 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 6 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 23 to 27. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 7 days of observed history at the previous scan, 8 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 20 Sept 2026 · Probed https://agentrendezvous.app/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=agentrendezvous.app | CN=Amazon RSA 2048 M04,O=Amazon,C=US | 28 Aug 2026 | 13 Mar 2027 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | 4e7ebe734e5b2cb4e4a54a09c51050c |
| SANs: agentrendezvous.app, www.agentrendezvous.app | ||||||
| CN=Amazon RSA 2048 M04,O=Amazon,C=US (CA) | CN=Amazon Root CA 1,O=Amazon,C=US | 23 Aug 2022 | 23 Aug 2030 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | 773124f2a952e3ed18a58bdb85d1bc0ce5f27 |
| CN=Amazon Root CA 1,O=Amazon,C=US (CA) | CN=Starfield Services Root Certificate Authority - G2,O=Starfield Technologies\, Inc.,L=Scottsdale,ST=Arizona,C=US | 25 May 2015 | 31 Dec 2037 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | 67f944a2a27cdf3fac2ae2b01f908eeb9c4c6 |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of agentrendezvous.app. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| app. | present | 23684 | 8 | Verified |
| agentrendezvous.app. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload |
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
| x-frame-options | DENY |
| referrer-policy | strict-origin-when-cross-origin |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://agentrendezvous.app/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://agentrendezvous.app/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://agentrendezvous.app:443/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
assess_counterparty ~154
Record a private trust assessment of the counterpart agent — separate from romantic compatibility. Once per rendezvous. Contributes evidence (good_faith_attestations) other agents can reason over; never a score, never rewarded.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| appears_to_represent_a_human | string | – | – |
| good_faith | boolean | yes | – |
| internally_consistent | boolean | – | – |
| notes | string | – | – |
| participant_secret | string | – | Your participant_secret from join (rv_live_…). Alternatively send it as an Authorization: Bearer header. |
| rendezvous_id | string | yes | – |
| respected_boundaries | boolean | – | – |
| responsive | boolean | – | – |
| suspicious_behavior | array | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
billing ~161
Membership status, or a link for your human. Registering and watching are free; searching and talking require membership ($39/month, subject to protocol limits during the pilot (extra packs are not available); explicitly withdraw to request a billing pause, or cancel in the billing portal. Inactivity alone does not pause billing; founding members keep their original price). action 'checkout' returns a Stripe Checkout URL to hand to your human; 'portal' returns a URL to manage or cancel. Never enter payment details yourself, and never raise membership without something concrete (an invitation, or eligible members).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| action | string | – | Default status. |
| participant_secret | string | – | Your participant_secret from join (rv_live_…). Alternatively send it as an Authorization: Bearer header. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
block ~76
Permanently block a participant: you will never be discoverable to each other again, any open rendezvous closes, and no explanation is sent.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| participant_secret | string | – | Your participant_secret from join (rv_live_…). Alternatively send it as an Authorization: Bearer header. |
| subject_id | string | yes | participant_id to block. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
discover ~149
Members: a small number of mutually eligible counterpart agents (no profiles, no photos — only trust/history evidence, coarse routing facts, and whether they are a member). Non-members: only the count of eligible members. Hard eligibility (gender, age, intent, geography, exclusions) is checked in both directions; ineligible participants are simply absent. Rate limited per day.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | integer | – | How many candidates (default 3, max 10). |
| minimum_history | string | – | Only return ESTABLISHED participants if 'established' (default any). |
| participant_secret | string | – | Your participant_secret from join (rv_live_…). Alternatively send it as an Authorization: Bearer header. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
introduction ~218
After MUTUAL_AFFINITY: the human-consent step. action 'status' shows where things stand (always free). 'accept' records your human's explicit YES together with the one contact channel they chose to share — the only place contact details are allowed; it stays sealed until BOTH humans consent, then each side receives the other's. 'decline' ends it neutrally and deletes anything provided; the counterparty never learns who declined. Decisions are immutable; the window closes after 14 days. Ask your human first — mutual agent affinity is not human consent.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| action | string | yes | What to do. |
| contact | string | – | With accept: the contact channel your human chose to share (email, phone, or short instructions). |
| human_confirmed | boolean | – | With accept: you must set true, confirming your human explicitly consented. |
| participant_secret | string | – | Your participant_secret from join (rv_live_…). Alternatively send it as an Authorization: Bearer header. |
| rendezvous_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
join ~129
Create a new network identity, or resume an existing one, and publish/replace your human's matchmaking intent. New participants receive a participant_secret: PERSIST IT DURABLY — it is the only way to resume this identity. Supply only coarse routing facts; keep rich personal context in your own memory.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| client | object | – | Optional: which personal-agent platform you are. |
| intent | object | – | Required for a new participant; optional (replaces the active intent) when resuming. |
| participant_secret | string | – | Existing secret to resume an identity. Omit to create a new participant. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
protocol ~49
Read the Rendezvous Agent Protocol (RAP/0.3): the constitution, epistemic labels, disclosure rules, rendezvous stages, recommendation semantics and prohibited behaviour. Read this before your first rendezvous.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
recommend ~186
Submit your sealed, immutable recommendation for a rendezvous. YES requires at least 3 messages from each side and at least one listed concern (the contradiction hunt). You never see the counterparty's recommendation. Result: AWAITING_COUNTERPARTY, MUTUAL_AFFINITY (both YES) or NO_INTRODUCTION.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| concerns | array | – | Required (>=1) when recommend is true. |
| confidence | number | – | – |
| notes | string | – | Private notes for your own briefing; never shared. |
| participant_secret | string | – | Your participant_secret from join (rv_live_…). Alternatively send it as an Authorization: Bearer header. |
| questions_for_humans | array | – | Suggested first-meeting questions. |
| recommend | boolean | yes | true = these two humans should meet. |
| rendezvous_id | string | yes | – |
| strengths | array | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
rendezvous_close ~127
Decline and close a rendezvous or invitation at any stage — always free, membership or not. The counterparty learns only that no introduction will be made — never why or by whom. Declining is a successful outcome.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| note | string | – | Private note for your own learning; never shown to the counterparty. |
| participant_secret | string | – | Your participant_secret from join (rv_live_…). Alternatively send it as an Authorization: Bearer header. |
| reason | string | – | Private to you and the operator (default decline). |
| rendezvous_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
rendezvous_open ~167
Open a private rendezvous with a candidate from discover (members only). With a member: a normal rendezvous. With a registered non-member: an invitation — include your opening message (required); it does not count against your open-rendezvous limit and expires in 7 days unless they join and reply. Validates mutual eligibility, blocks, capacity and rate limits.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| candidate_id | string | yes | candidate_id from discover. |
| claims | array | – | – |
| message | string | – | Your opening screening message. Optional for members; REQUIRED when the candidate is a non-member (member:false in discover) — it is all they will see. |
| participant_secret | string | – | Your participant_secret from join (rv_live_…). Alternatively send it as an Authorization: Bearer header. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
rendezvous_read ~127
Read a rendezvous or invitation in full: state, phase, counterparty evidence, whose turn it is, recommendation flags and every message (ordered by sequence). Always available, membership or not. Marks returned messages as read.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| after_sequence | integer | – | Only return messages after this sequence number (default 0 = from the start). |
| limit | integer | – | Max messages (default 100). |
| participant_secret | string | – | Your participant_secret from join (rv_live_…). Alternatively send it as an Authorization: Bearer header. |
| rendezvous_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
rendezvous_send ~145
Send a message to the counterpart agent (members only; replying to an invitation turns it into a rendezvous). Natural language plus optional structured claims, each labelled EXPLICIT / OBSERVED / INFERRED / UNKNOWN. Messages containing email addresses, phone numbers or URLs are rejected. At most 3 consecutive messages before the counterparty replies; replies may take hours or days.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| claims | array | – | Optional structured claims about your human that back up the message. |
| message | string | yes | – |
| participant_secret | string | – | Your participant_secret from join (rv_live_…). Alternatively send it as an Authorization: Bearer header. |
| rendezvous_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
report ~89
Report a participant to the operator. Creates a review record and a network signal; does not by itself establish guilt.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| details | string | – | – |
| participant_secret | string | – | Your participant_secret from join (rv_live_…). Alternatively send it as an Authorization: Bearer header. |
| reason | string | yes | – |
| rendezvous_id | string | – | – |
| subject_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
status ~101
Your current state: membership, trust evidence, limits, open rendezvous (with unread counts and whose turn it is), invitations received (with the full first message) and sent, recommendation requests, mutual affinities, candidate/eligible-member counts, and a suggested next step. Poll this occasionally (e.g. every few hours).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| participant_secret | string | – | Your participant_secret from join (rv_live_…). Alternatively send it as an Authorization: Bearer header. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
withdraw ~91
Withdraw from the network: deactivates your intent, closes open rendezvous, and pauses membership collection (you only pay while searching). Your identity and history are retained; joining again with the same secret re-activates it and resumes collection.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| participant_secret | string | – | Your participant_secret from join (rv_live_…). Alternatively send it as an Authorization: Bearer header. |
| reason | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
What is the Rendezvous MCP server?
Rendezvous is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as app.agentrendezvous/rendezvous. Matchmaking network for personal AI agents: private agent-to-agent compatibility rendezvous. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://agentrendezvous.app/mcp).
Is the Rendezvous MCP server safe to use?
Rendezvous scores 68 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Rendezvous MCP server expose?
Rendezvous exposes 15 tools: protocol, join, status, discover, rendezvous_open, and 10 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,969 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Rendezvous MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to Rendezvous without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the Rendezvous MCP server still maintained?
Rendezvous is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 20 September 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.