AIMarket Oracle Gateway
PYPI · AIMARKET-ORACLE-GATEWAY
Stdio MCP: 17 verifiable AIMarket oracles, 35 pay-per-call tools for AI agents.
Available components
Last scanned (23 hours ago)
Scores higher than 73% of PyPI servers
Category AI and Machine Learning
Recent critical change
GHSA-6q48-6c7w-9gw2 affects this package (21 Oct 2026). See the changelog before you install this server.
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically from public evidence about the published package, including repeated runs of it in an isolated sandbox, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Supply Chain Security100
- No malware found by supply-chain analysis.Pass
- No known CVEs affecting this package version or its production dependencies.Pass
- Runs setuptools.build_meta at install time, a recognised build step with no custom scripting around it. View diagnostics → Pass
- 0 of 28 dependencies flagged as unhealthy. View diagnostics → Pass
Provenance & Transparency48
- Source repository is publicly reachable at the declared URL. View diagnostics → Pass
- Provenance check failed: no build-provenance attestation is published. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- Clear OSI-approved license (MIT).Pass
- Actively maintained (last published 23 days ago).Pass
- Publishes a security disclosure policy (SECURITY.md).Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability55
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 5295 tokens (~147/item across 36 items; 36 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management83
- Stability observed for 25 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage85
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 48% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
- Structured output schemas are declared (100% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 36 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 37 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Checks we ran (16)
- Malware scan
- Known CVEs
- Install scripts
- Dependency health
- Source repository
- Provenance
- License
- Maintenance
- Security disclosure
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Does not apply to this package (2)
- Endpoint SecurityScored on hosted endpoints only. A package has no live endpoint of its own for us to probe.
- Transport & ReachabilityScored on hosted endpoints only. A package has no live endpoint of its own for us to probe.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 20 Nov 26 +1
- Package version: 0.3.1 → 0.3.3 functional
- 18 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 70 to 73. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 21 days of observed history at the previous scan, 22 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 16 Nov 26 +16
- Malware scan: unverified → pass ▲ security
- 15 Nov 26 −15
- Malware scan: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Package version: 0.3.2 → 0.3.3 functional
- 14 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 57 to 60. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 17 days of observed history at the previous scan, 18 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 12 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 50 to 53. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 15 days of observed history at the previous scan, 16 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 11 Nov 26 +7
- Stability: unverified → 0.50 ▲ functional
- 28 Oct 26 +15
- Malware scan: unverified → pass ▲ security
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Analysed pypi/aimarket-oracle-gateway@0.3.3
Provenance No attestation
The registry publishes no build provenance for this version, so there is nothing to verify.
| Result | No attestation |
|---|---|
| Ecosystem | pypi |
| Reason | No attestation published |
Background: How many MCP packages publish verified provenance →
Install scripts 1 script
| Hook | Tier | Command |
|---|---|---|
| build_backend | Known build tool | setuptools.build_meta |
Background: Why install scripts are a supply-chain risk →
Dependencies 28 packages
| Packages resolved | 28 |
|---|---|
| Tree resolution | Complete |
Background: SBOMs and build attestations, explained →
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
aestus_open ~38
Open an Aestus puzzle by sequential squaring; may take time. ~$0.01 USDC.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| puzzle | object | yes | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
aestus_seal ~63
Seal data in an RSW time-lock puzzle. Sequential squarings enforce delay. ~$0.006 USDC.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| T | integer | – | – |
| data | string | yes | – |
| encoding | string | – | – |
| modulus_bits | integer | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
aestus_verify ~45
Verify the claimed modular-squaring result of an Aestus puzzle. ~$0.001 USDC.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| b | string | yes | – |
| puzzle | object | yes | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
aggregate_values ~117
Robust consensus aggregation of multi-agent estimates (Murmuration). Combines median, trimmed mean, Tukey biweight, and DeGroot consensus — resistant to outliers and a few Byzantine agents. Use for multi-agent debate resolution, ensemble aggregation, DAO voting, and distributed anomaly consensus. Cost ~$0.002 USDC per call.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| trim | number | – | Fraction trimmed from each tail for trimmed mean (0..0.499). |
| values | array | yes | Agent-submitted scalar estimates to aggregate (>=1 value). |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
analyze_cascade_risk ~177
Systemic cascade-risk analysis via abelian sandpile / SOC (Ablation). Returns avalanche-size distribution, power-law exponent tau, VaR/CVaR tail risk, and trigger nodes. Use for financial contagion, supply-chain resilience, and microservices failure analysis. Cost ~$0.01 USDC per call.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| capacities | – | – | Per-node toppling thresholds. |
| dissipation | integer | – | Grains leaked per topple. |
| edges | array | yes | Directed graph edges as [u, v] label pairs. |
| grains | integer | – | Stress grains to drive. |
| nodes | – | – | Optional explicit node labels. |
| nonce | string | – | Commit-reveal nonce for drive schedule. |
| s_min | integer | – | Power-law fit lower cutoff. |
| sinks | – | – | Sink nodes that dissipate stress. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
analyze_network_resilience ~131
Percolation threshold and network resilience analysis (Percola). Returns critical attack fraction f_c, collapse curves P_inf(f), robustness scalar, and keystone nodes. Use before joining exposure graphs or multi-hop agent routes. Cost ~$0.01 USDC per call.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| attack | string | – | Attack mode: targeted, random, or both. |
| edges | array | yes | Directed graph edges as [u, v] label pairs. |
| nodes | – | – | Optional isolated node labels. |
| nonce | string | – | Commit-reveal nonce for attack order. |
| samples | integer | – | Collapse curve resolution. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
ask_oracle ~121
Ask the Platon oracle for a grounded, entropy-derived read-only answer. Use for lightweight oracle-mediated decisions (e.g. an unbiased pick among options). Read-only — no side effects, no state change. Returns: The standard envelope; `result` carries the oracle's answer payload. Cost ~$0.003 USDC. Example: ask_oracle(question="Pick one at random: red, green, or blue?")
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| question | string | yes | A question to answer from the oracle's entropy/state. Read-only; no side effects. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
audit_compute_cost ~144
Thermodynamic compute-cost audit via Landauer's principle (Landauer). Counts irreversible bit erasures in an operation DAG, derives the energy floor (erasures · k_B·T·ln2), efficiency, and hot gates. Use for LLM cost optimization, carbon reporting, ESG compliance, and EU AI Act energy disclosure. Cost ~$0.01 USDC per call.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ops | array | yes | Operation DAG for Landauer audit. Each gate: {id, gate, inputs:[id,...], width?}. Reversible gates erase 0 bits; boolean gates erase fan_in-1. |
| temperature_k | number | – | Kelvin (default 300). |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
betti_distance ~57
Compare topological shape of two point clouds by persistence distance. ~$0.004 USDC.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| dim | integer | – | – |
| max_scale | – | – | – |
| points_a | array | yes | – |
| points_b | array | yes | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
betti_homology ~65
Persistent homology and Betti curves of a point cloud (up to 300 points). ~$0.008 USDC.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| max_dim | integer | – | – |
| max_scale | – | – | – |
| num_steps | integer | – | – |
| points | array | yes | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
compute_least_time_route ~158
Least-time routing with eikonal potentials + dual certificate (Fermat). Finds the minimum-time path on a weighted graph and returns potentials T(v) as an optimality certificate. Use for multi-agent task routing, supply chain, logistics, and data-pipeline optimization. Cost ~$0.01 USDC per call.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| blend | – | – | Blend coefficients {cost, latency, reputation, latency_scale} for dict edges. |
| edges | array | yes | Directed weighted edges: [u, v, weight] or {from, to, cost?, latency?, reputation?} for blended refractive index. |
| goal | string | yes | Start or goal node label. |
| start | string | yes | Start or goal node label. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
compute_vdf ~352
Evaluate a Verifiable Delay Function (Chronos) — proof that real sequential work elapsed. Use when you need provable, unforgeable elapsed time / sequential work: timed reveals, fair ordering, proof-of-elapsed-time, randomness that cannot be precomputed. Producing the output requires `T` sequential squarings over an RSA-2048 modulus (no shortcut), so a valid proof attests the delay actually happened. Verify cheaply with `verify_vdf`. Returns: The standard envelope; `result` contains: - `scheme`, `g`, `y` (= g^(2^T) mod N), `proof` (`{pi, l}`, Wesolowski), `modulus`. `verifiable.has_proof` will be true. Cost ~$0.01 USDC. Example: compute_vdf(seed="0x1234abcd", difficulty=100000)
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| difficulty | integer | – | T — the number of sequential squarings to perform (1..1_000_000). Higher T = more wall-clock work that cannot be parallelized/GPU-accelerated, i.e. a longer provable delay. ~1000 is a fast demo; tune… |
| seed | string | yes | Seed (hex) the VDF is evaluated over; it binds the generator g, so the output is tied to this input. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
fourier_spectrum ~58
Graph Laplacian spectrum, connectivity and Fiedler cut. ~$0.005 USDC.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| edges | array | yes | – |
| k | integer | – | – |
| laplacian | string | – | – |
| nodes | – | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
fourier_verify ~78
Certify an eigenpair; eigenvalue is sent as the oracle's `lambda` field. ~$0.001 USDC.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| edges | array | yes | – |
| eigenvalue | number | yes | – |
| laplacian | string | – | – |
| nodes | – | – | – |
| tol | number | – | – |
| vector | array | yes | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
gauss_field ~53
Gaussian-process posterior mean and uncertainty at query points. ~$0.006 USDC.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| X | array | yes | – |
| hyperparams | – | – | – |
| query | array | yes | – |
| y | array | yes | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
gauss_suggest ~80
Best next experiment by Expected Improvement; provide candidates or bounds. ~$0.006 USDC.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| X | array | yes | – |
| bounds | – | – | – |
| candidates | – | – | – |
| goal | string | – | – |
| grid | integer | – | – |
| hyperparams | – | – | – |
| xi | number | – | – |
| y | array | yes | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
gauss_verify ~74
Replay a Gaussian-process posterior and check claimed mean/variance. ~$0.001 USDC.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| X | array | yes | – |
| claimed_mean | – | – | – |
| claimed_var | – | – | – |
| hyperparams | – | – | – |
| query | array | yes | – |
| tol | number | – | – |
| y | array | yes | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
get_agent_trust ~296
Trust score, rank, and percentile of ONE node in a trust graph you supply (LUMEN). A single-agent reputation lookup over the same PageRank as `get_reputation_scores` — use when you only care about one counterparty's standing. Returns: The standard envelope; `result` is `{target_node, score, rank (1=highest), of, percentile, graph_commitment}`. Cost ~$0.003 USDC. Example: get_agent_trust(nodes=3, edges=[[0,1,1.0],[1,2,0.5],[2,0,0.5]], target_node=1)
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| damping | number | – | PageRank damping factor in [0,1] (default 0.85). Lower = more weight on the uniform prior, dampening graph manipulation. |
| edges | array | yes | Directed, weighted trust edges as `[from_index, to_index, weight]`. An edge i→j with weight w means node i confers w trust on node j. Weights need not be normalized. |
| nodes | integer | yes | Number of nodes in the directed trust graph, 1..100000. Node indices in `edges` must be in [0, nodes). |
| target_node | integer | yes | Index of the node whose trust score/rank/percentile to return (0-based, in [0, nodes)). |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
get_blue_noise ~95
Blue-noise point set via Mitchell best-candidate (Turing). Evenly spaced points with large minimum distance — spawn placement, dithering, sensor layout. Omit seed for os.urandom (reported back). Cost ~$0.002 USDC per call.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| candidates | integer | – | Best-candidate pool size. |
| count | integer | – | Number of points. |
| seed | – | – | Optional seed for reproducibility. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
get_quasirandom_sequence ~111
Halton low-discrepancy quasi-random sequence (Lattice). Fills [0,1)^dim more evenly than RNG — faster QMC convergence for integration, pricing, and space-filling search. Deterministic from (count, dim, skip). Cost ~$0.002 USDC per call.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| count | integer | – | Number of Halton points. |
| dim | integer | – | Dimension (default 2). |
| skip | integer | – | Skip first N sequence indices. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
get_random ~321
Draw unbiasable, Ed25519-signed verifiable randomness (Platon). Use this when you need randomness an autonomous agent cannot bias or predict and that a third party can verify — fair selection, sampling, raffles, commit-reveal, anti-MEV ordering. The oracle signs the value, so you (or anyone) can verify it offline against the published signer key. Returns: The standard envelope (see server instructions). `result` contains: - `random_hex`: the random bytes, hex-encoded (`num_bytes` long). - `proof`: `{state_hash, tick, timestamp, entropy_commitment}` binding the value to the oracle's chaotic state at draw time. - `signature`: Ed25519 signature over the value+proof (verify with `verify_random`/the signer key in the Hub manifest). `verifiable.signed` will be true. Cost ~$0.004 USDC, charged per call. Example: get_random(num_bytes=32, client_seed="0xdeadbeef")
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| client_seed | string | – | Optional caller-supplied seed (hex) for domain separation — it is bound into the signed proof so two callers asking at the same tick get distinct, attributable randomness. Pass '' to omit. |
| num_bytes | integer | – | Number of random bytes to draw, 1..1024. The result's `random_hex` is this many bytes hex-encoded. Use 32 for a 256-bit seed/word. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
get_randomness_beacon ~102
Fetch the round's public randomness beacon (Platon) — one shared value all callers in the round observe, useful as a common coin / shared seed. Returns: The standard envelope; `result` has the same `{random_hex, proof, signature}` shape as `get_random`, but the value is the round-wide beacon (not caller-specific). Cost ~$0.004 USDC. Example: get_randomness_beacon()
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
get_reputation_scores ~317
Compute PageRank/EigenTrust trust scores over a directed trust graph you supply (LUMEN). Use to rank agents/entities by trust when you have who-trusts-whom edges: counterparty selection, sybil-dampened weighting, prioritization. You provide the graph; the oracle returns a normalized score per node plus convergence info. Returns: The standard envelope; `result` contains: - `scores`: array of `nodes` floats that sum to 1 (±1e-6) — node i's trust share. - `iterations`, `converged`: power-iteration convergence info. Cost ~$0.005 USDC (scales with graph size). Example: get_reputation_scores(nodes=3, edges=[[0,1,1.0],[1,2,0.5],[2,0,0.5]], damping=0.85)
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| damping | number | – | PageRank damping factor in [0,1] (default 0.85). Lower = more weight on the uniform prior, dampening graph manipulation. |
| edges | array | yes | Directed, weighted trust edges as `[from_index, to_index, weight]`. An edge i→j with weight w means node i confers w trust on node j. Weights need not be normalized. |
| nodes | integer | yes | Number of nodes in the directed trust graph, 1..100000. Node indices in `edges` must be in [0, nodes). |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
kantor_transport ~89
Optimal transport/Wasserstein distance; supply cost or source/sink points. ~$0.006 USDC.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| a | array | yes | – |
| b | array | yes | – |
| cost | – | – | – |
| eps | number | – | – |
| method | string | – | – |
| metric | string | – | – |
| p | number | – | – |
| sink_points | – | – | – |
| source_points | – | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
kantor_verify ~101
Certify transport feasibility, primal cost and dual optimality. ~$0.001 USDC.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| a | array | yes | – |
| b | array | yes | – |
| claimed_cost | number | yes | – |
| cost | – | – | – |
| metric | string | – | – |
| p | number | – | – |
| plan | array | yes | – |
| potentials | object | yes | – |
| sink_points | – | – | – |
| source_points | – | – | – |
| tol | number | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
list_oracle_capabilities ~72
List every oracle tool with capabilityId, price, category, and optional subscription tiers. Call this first to discover what's available and what each call costs before invoking. Returns: JSON with `tools` (flat catalog) and `categories` (group labels). Example: list_oracle_capabilities()
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
optimize_route ~99
Euclidean TSP tour with optimality gap certificate (Colony). Returns tour, length, admissible lower bound, and gap = how far from optimal. Use for routing, scheduling, and logistics with a quality proof. Cost ~$0.005 USDC per call.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| iterations | integer | – | 2-opt improvement budget. |
| points | array | yes | List of [x, y] coordinates (>=3 points) for TSP optimization. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
sortes_draw ~49
ECVRF randomness bound to a caller seed (UTF-8 or 'hex:' bytes). ~$0.006 USDC.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| alpha | string | yes | – |
| num_bytes | integer | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
sortes_verify ~53
Verify a Sortes VRF draw using the public key and proof (hex). ~$0.001 USDC.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| alpha | string | yes | – |
| pi | string | yes | – |
| public_key | string | yes | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
verify_cascade_risk ~132
Trustless replay of an Ablation cascade analysis (Ablation verify). Re-runs the sandpile and checks tau / topple_total claims. Cost ~$0.001 USDC.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| claimed_tau | – | – | Claimed power-law exponent. |
| claimed_topple_total | – | – | Claimed topple total. |
| dissipation | integer | – | – |
| edges | array | yes | Directed graph edges as [u, v] label pairs. |
| grains | integer | – | – |
| nonce | string | – | – |
| s_min | integer | – | – |
| seed | – | – | Reveal seed (after nonce commitment). |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
verify_compute_cost ~131
Trustless replay of a Landauer thermodynamic audit (Landauer verify). Recomputes erasures and energy floor from the ops DAG and checks claims. Cost ~$0.001 USDC.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| energy_floor_j | – | – | Claimed energy floor (joules) to verify. |
| irreversible_bits | – | – | Claimed erasure count to verify. |
| ops | array | yes | Operation DAG for Landauer audit. Each gate: {id, gate, inputs:[id,...], width?}. Reversible gates erase 0 bits; boolean gates erase fan_in-1. |
| temperature_k | number | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
verify_least_time_route ~158
Trustless certificate check for a Fermat least-time route (Fermat verify). Confirms feasibility on every edge and tightness on the path in O(E) time. Cost ~$0.001 USDC.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| blend | – | – | – |
| edges | array | yes | Directed weighted edges: [u, v, weight] or {from, to, cost?, latency?, reputation?} for blended refractive index. |
| goal | string | yes | Start or goal node label. |
| path | – | – | Claimed path (node labels). |
| potentials | object | yes | Dual certificate T(v) from compute_least_time_route. |
| start | string | yes | Start or goal node label. |
| total | – | – | Claimed path total time. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
verify_network_resilience ~119
Trustless replay of a Percola percolation threshold (Percola verify). Recomputes the attack sweep and checks the claimed f_c. Cost ~$0.001 USDC.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| attack | string | – | Attack mode used in the original analysis. |
| edges | array | yes | Directed graph edges as [u, v] label pairs. |
| f_c | number | yes | Claimed critical attack fraction to verify. |
| nonce | string | – | – |
| samples | integer | – | – |
| seed | – | – | Reveal seed for random attack order. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
verify_random ~265
Verify a Platon randomness draw without re-running it (Platon verify). Pass `random_hex`, `proof`, and `signature` exactly as returned by `get_random` / `get_randomness_beacon`. Confirms the Ed25519 signature over the canonical (random_hex, proof) against the signer's published public key — so you trust the math, not the service. Returns: The standard envelope; `result` is `{valid: <bool>}` (plus `error` if the input was malformed). Cost ~$0.001 USDC. Example: verify_random(random_hex="0x9f2c…", proof={"scheme": "platon-chaos-vrf/v1", …}, signature={"algorithm": "ed25519", "public_key": "<b64>", "value": "<b64>"})
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| proof | object | yes | The `proof` object from the draw: {scheme, state_hash, client_seed, tick, timestamp, entropy_commitment}. |
| random_hex | string | yes | The `random_hex` value returned by get_random / get_randomness_beacon. |
| signature | object | yes | The `signature` object from the draw: {algorithm:'ed25519', public_key, value}. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
verify_reputation ~345
Verify LUMEN reputation scores by re-deriving PageRank over the supplied graph (LUMEN verify). Pass the graph and the `scores` (and optionally the `graph_commitment`) from a `get_reputation_scores` result; confirms they are the correct PageRank of exactly that graph. Returns: The standard envelope; `result` is `{valid: <bool>, max_abs_diff, [commitment_match]}`. Cost ~$0.002 USDC. Example: verify_reputation(nodes=3, edges=[[0,1,1.0],[1,2,0.5],[2,0,0.5]], scores=[0.33,0.33,0.34])
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| damping | number | – | PageRank damping factor in [0,1] (default 0.85). Lower = more weight on the uniform prior, dampening graph manipulation. |
| edges | array | yes | Directed, weighted trust edges as `[from_index, to_index, weight]`. An edge i→j with weight w means node i confers w trust on node j. Weights need not be normalized. |
| graph_commitment | string | – | Optional `graph_commitment` (0x… SHA-256) from the result, to bind the check to the exact graph. Pass '' to skip. |
| nodes | integer | yes | Number of nodes in the directed trust graph, 1..100000. Node indices in `edges` must be in [0, nodes). |
| scores | array | yes | The `scores` array from a get_reputation_scores result, to be re-derived and confirmed. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
verify_vdf ~270
Verify a Chronos VDF proof in a single exponentiation. Pass the `g`, `y`, `T`, and `proof` returned by `compute_vdf` (or by any party claiming a VDF result). Confirms `y = g^(2^T) mod N` without redoing the T squarings. Returns: The standard envelope; `result` is `{valid: <bool>}`. Cost ~$0.001 USDC. Example: verify_vdf(g="0x03", y="0x9f2a…", T=100000, proof={"pi": "0x1a2b…", "l": "0x65"})
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| T | integer | yes | Difficulty T (squarings) that produced y; must match the value used in `compute_vdf`. |
| g | string | yes | Generator g (hex) as returned by `compute_vdf`. |
| proof | object | yes | The Wesolowski proof object from `compute_vdf` — `{pi, l}` (pi = proof element, l = Fiat-Shamir prime). |
| y | string | yes | Claimed VDF output y = g^(2^T) mod N (hex) from `compute_vdf`. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
How do I install the AIMarket Oracle Gateway MCP server?
AIMarket Oracle Gateway runs locally as a PyPI package, launched with uvx aimarket-oracle-gateway. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
pypi · aimarket-oracle-gateway
claude mcp add alexar76-aimarket-oracle-gateway -- uvx aimarket-oracle-gateway
What is the AIMarket Oracle Gateway MCP server?
AIMarket Oracle Gateway is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.alexar76/aimarket-oracle-gateway. Stdio MCP: 17 verifiable AIMarket oracles, 35 pay-per-call tools for AI agents. This page covers its PyPI package (aimarket-oracle-gateway).
Is the AIMarket Oracle Gateway MCP server safe to use?
AIMarket Oracle Gateway scores 78 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. We found no known CVEs affecting it as of 21 November 2026. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the AIMarket Oracle Gateway MCP server expose?
AIMarket Oracle Gateway exposes 36 tools: aggregate_values, audit_compute_cost, verify_compute_cost, compute_least_time_route, verify_least_time_route, and 31 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 4,936 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Is the AIMarket Oracle Gateway MCP server still maintained?
AIMarket Oracle Gateway is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What licence is the AIMarket Oracle Gateway MCP server under?
AIMarket Oracle Gateway declares the MIT licence, which is OSI-approved. That covers the source only, and says nothing about the cost of any service it calls.
What did VerifyMCP test on the AIMarket Oracle Gateway MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 16 checks on AIMarket Oracle Gateway, covering Malware scan, Known CVEs, Install scripts, Dependency health and 12 more. Endpoint Security and Transport & Reachability do not apply to a PyPI package, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.