RTBlint
REMOTE · RTBLINT.ORG
Validate OpenRTB bid requests and responses against IAB specs. ARTF, Rust core.
Available components
Last scanned (1 hour ago)
Scores higher than 92% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 17 Oct 2026.
Category Testing and QA
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security74
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- No authorisation is required to call this server. Every tool declares its destructiveHint and none is destructive, so open access doesn't expose one. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Partial
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability77
- 100% of prompts and resources have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the item's name).Pass
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 2145 tokens (~238/item across 9 items; 6 tools + 3 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
- Structured output schemas are declared (100% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 6 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 8 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 11 Oct 26 −1
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Server version: 0.13.0 → 0.14.0 functional
- “validate_bid_request” reworded the description of “profile” cosmetic
- “validate_bid_response” reworded the description of “profile” cosmetic
- 28 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 16 Sept 26 +1
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 31 Aug 26 0
- Server version: 0.12.0 → 0.13.0 functional
- 27 Aug 26 0
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- New resource “Privacy” functional
- 26 Aug 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 19 Aug 26 0
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Schema quality: 250 → 280 ▼ functional
- Server version: 0.10.0 → 0.12.0 functional
- “validate_bid_request” reworded the description of “profile” cosmetic
- “validate_bid_response” reworded the description of “profile” cosmetic
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 17 Oct 2026 · Probed https://rtblint.org/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=rtblint.org | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 6 Sept 2026 | 5 Dec 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | fba6a1d384c0f42c0e267f0d8413e60a |
| SANs: rtblint.org, *.rtblint.org | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of rtblint.org. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| org. | present | 26974 | 8 | Verified |
| rtblint.org. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://rtblint.org/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://rtblint.org/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://rtblint.org/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
get_adcp_capabilities ~334
AdCP protocol discovery. Returns the AdCP releases this agent speaks and the bid-stream conformance metrics it computes. Call this first when wiring rtblint into an agentic buying pipeline: it declares the experimental measurement protocol and the metric ids (openrtb_error_count, openrtb_warning_count, openrtb_conformance_rate) that validate_bid_request and validate_bid_response produce. Part of the Ad Context Protocol (AdCP 3.1) specification.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| adcp_major_version | integer | – | Deprecated in favour of adcp_version. AdCP major version the caller's payloads conform to. When omitted, assumes the highest supported major. |
| adcp_version | string | – | Release-precision AdCP version the caller pins (for example "3.1"). When the pin is not in supported_versions the call returns a VERSION_UNSUPPORTED error naming the releases that would work. When om… |
| context | object | – | Caller-supplied context object. Echoed back unchanged in the response. |
| ext | object | – | Caller extension object. Accepted and ignored; declared so envelope fields do not trip strict request-wrapper validation. |
| idempotency_key | string | – | AdCP 3.1 carries an idempotency key on every task request, reads included. This agent has no mutating surface and no replay store, so the key is accepted and ignored rather than rejected as an unknow… |
| protocols | array | – | Filter which per-protocol capability blocks are returned. Does not narrow supported_protocols, which declares what the agent implements. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| adcp_version | string | yes | – |
| operator | object | – | – |
| status | string | yes | – |
| supported_protocols | array | yes | – |
No examples provided.
list_openrtb_versions ~50
List every OpenRTB version id this build can validate against, from 2.0 through the monthly 2.6 snapshots. Call this before pinning version on a validate_* tool.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| versions | array | yes | – |
No examples provided.
validate_artf_request ~251
Validate an ARTF (IAB Tech Lab Agentic Real Time Framework) RTBRequest envelope: required members, lifecycle and payload coherence, tmax plausibility, originator and applicable_intents enums, plus full OpenRTB validation of the bid request and bid response it carries. The carried payloads are protobuf JSON, so they are validated in that dialect.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| payload | string | yes | The ARTF RTBRequest envelope as a raw JSON string. |
| version | string | – | OpenRTB version id to validate against (default 2.6-202606). One of: 2.0, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.3.1, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6-202204, 2.6-202210, 2.6-202211, 2.6-202303, 2.6-202309, 2.6-202402, 2.6-202409, 2.6-20250… |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| issues | array | yes | – |
| payload_type | string | yes | – |
| valid | boolean | yes | – |
| version | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
validate_artf_response ~367
Validate an ARTF RTBResponse mutation set against the RTBRequest it answers: envelope id echo, declared intent against applicable_intents, operation and payload coherence, and whether each semantic path (/imp/{id}, /imp/{id}/pmp/deals/{id}, /user/data/segment, /seatbid/{seat}/bid/{id}) resolves to something the auction actually carries. With apply=true the mutations are written into the payloads and revalidated, reporting the OpenRTB findings the mutations introduced. Call this before proposing mutations to an orchestrator.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| apply | boolean | – | Apply the mutations and revalidate the result (default false). Returns the mutated payloads and the findings the mutations introduced, with pre-existing findings filtered out. |
| payload | string | yes | The ARTF RTBResponse as a raw JSON string. |
| rtb_request | string | yes | The ARTF RTBRequest envelope this response answers, as a raw JSON string. Required: a mutation is only meaningful relative to the auction it targets. |
| version | string | – | OpenRTB version id to validate against (default 2.6-202606). One of: 2.0, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.3.1, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6-202204, 2.6-202210, 2.6-202211, 2.6-202303, 2.6-202309, 2.6-202402, 2.6-202409, 2.6-20250… |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| application | object | – | – |
| applied | boolean | yes | – |
| issues | array | yes | – |
| payload_type | string | yes | – |
| valid | boolean | yes | – |
| version | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
validate_bid_request ~389
Validate an OpenRTB 2.x bid request JSON payload against a tracked spec version. Returns structured issues with rule ids, severities, and JSON paths.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| dialect | string | – | JSON dialect the payload is written in. spec-json (default) types flag fields such as imp.secure, regs.coppa and pmp.private_auction as integers, the way the OpenRTB specification does. proto-json fo… |
| payload | string | yes | The OpenRTB bid request as a raw JSON string. |
| profile | string | – | Published vendor constraints on top of the selected spec. Choose the matching traffic direction. spec is the default. xandr targets Microsoft Monetize bidder traffic; magnite targets DV+ xAPI. Buyer,… |
| version | string | – | OpenRTB version id to validate against (default 2.6-202606). One of: 2.0, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.3.1, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6-202204, 2.6-202210, 2.6-202211, 2.6-202303, 2.6-202309, 2.6-202402, 2.6-202409, 2.6-20250… |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| cross_validated | boolean | – | – |
| dialect | string | – | – |
| issues | array | yes | – |
| payload_type | string | yes | – |
| profile | string | – | – |
| valid | boolean | yes | True when the payload has zero spec errors. |
| version | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
validate_bid_response ~457
Validate an OpenRTB 2.x bid response JSON payload against a tracked spec version. Optionally cross-validate it against the originating bid request (impid, mtype, adm markup, dealid, seat, and currency coherence). Returns structured issues with rule ids, severities, and JSON paths.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| bid_request | string | – | Optional: the originating OpenRTB bid request as a raw JSON string. When supplied, every bid is also cross-checked against the Imp it references. |
| dialect | string | – | JSON dialect the payload is written in. spec-json (default) types flag fields such as imp.secure, regs.coppa and pmp.private_auction as integers, the way the OpenRTB specification does. proto-json fo… |
| payload | string | yes | The OpenRTB bid response as a raw JSON string. |
| profile | string | – | Published vendor constraints on top of the selected spec. Choose the matching traffic direction. spec is the default. xandr targets Microsoft Monetize bidder traffic; magnite targets DV+ xAPI. Buyer,… |
| version | string | – | OpenRTB version id to validate against (default 2.6-202606). One of: 2.0, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.3.1, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6-202204, 2.6-202210, 2.6-202211, 2.6-202303, 2.6-202309, 2.6-202402, 2.6-202409, 2.6-20250… |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| cross_validated | boolean | – | – |
| dialect | string | – | – |
| issues | array | yes | – |
| payload_type | string | yes | – |
| profile | string | – | – |
| valid | boolean | yes | True when the payload has zero spec errors. |
| version | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
How do I install the RTBlint MCP server?
RTBlint is a hosted endpoint at https://rtblint.org/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · rtblint.org
claude mcp add --transport http aleksuix-rtblint 'https://rtblint.org/mcp'
What is the RTBlint MCP server?
RTBlint is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.aleksUIX/rtblint. Validate OpenRTB bid requests and responses against IAB specs. ARTF, Rust core. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://rtblint.org/mcp).
Is the RTBlint MCP server safe to use?
RTBlint scores 85 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the RTBlint MCP server expose?
RTBlint exposes 6 tools: validate_bid_request, validate_bid_response, validate_artf_request, validate_artf_response, list_openrtb_versions, get_adcp_capabilities. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,848 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the RTBlint MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to RTBlint without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the RTBlint MCP server still maintained?
RTBlint is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 17 October 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.