Collar Guardrail — Pre-Trade Risk Layer
REMOTE · API.COLLARGUARDRAIL.COM
Deterministic pre-trade risk checks for AI agents on Robinhood Chain. Returns allow/warn/deny.
Available components
Last scanned (1 hour ago)
Scores higher than 8% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 5 Nov 2026.
Category Finance and Payments
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security57
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not yet verified: we couldn't confirm whether this endpoint requires it. View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability0
- Transport check failed: declared streamable-http, but the endpoint returned HTTP 503. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Schema Quality & AI Usability0
- Schema not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's schema, or could read only part of its tool list.Unverified
Stability & Change Management0
- Stability not yet verified: not enough scan history yet (needs a 30-day window).Unverified
Tool Coverage0
- Tool coverage not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's tools, or could read only part of the list.Unverified
Tool Safety0
- Tool safety not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's tools, or could read only part of the list.Unverified
Capabilities0
- Capabilities not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's capabilities.Unverified
Unverified: 5 categories
Categories scored 0 because we could not verify them: authentication we do not have, an unreachable endpoint, or not enough scan history. We only credit what we can confirm.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 3 Nov 26 −62
- Endpoint reachability: reachable → not serving MCP ▼ security
- Stability: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Authorization: partial → unverified ▼ security
- Tool safety: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Transport: pass → fail ▼ security
- Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- Capabilities: pass → unverified ▼ functional
- 26 Oct 26 0
- Server version: 3.4.10 → 3.4.11 functional
- 21 Oct 26 0
- Server version: 3.4.8 → 3.4.10 functional
- 19 Oct 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 18 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 93 to 97. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 28 days of observed history at the previous scan, 29 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 16 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 87 to 90. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 26 days of observed history at the previous scan, 27 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 15 Oct 26 +50
- Authorization: unverified → partial ▲ security
- Injection markers: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Endpoint reachability: not serving MCP → reachable ▲ functional
- Stability: unverified → 0.87 ▲ functional
- Tool coverage: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
- MCP protocol: unverified → pass ▲ functional
- 14 Oct 26 −49
- Endpoint reachability: reachable → not serving MCP ▼ security
- Authorization: partial → unverified ▼ security
- Stability: 0.80 → unverified ▼ security
- Tool safety: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Capabilities: pass → unverified ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- First check of Schema quality: unverified functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 5 Nov 2026 · Probed https://api.collarguardrail.com/mcp-http/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=api.collarguardrail.com | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 18 Sept 2026 | 17 Dec 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | 163a1d13ebcba140135be8d0b1b84525 |
| SANs: api.collarguardrail.com | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of api.collarguardrail.com. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| com. | present | 19718 | 13 | Verified |
| collarguardrail.com. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication Inconclusive
We could not reach the endpoint well enough to judge its authorisation posture.
| Result | Inconclusive |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 503 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://api.collarguardrail.com/mcp-http/mcp | HTTP error | 503 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://api.collarguardrail.com/mcp-http/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://api.collarguardrail.com/mcp-http/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
check_token_safety Check Token Safety ~147
Honeypot / contract safety check for any ERC-20 token. Returns a severity classification (safe / warn / danger), the specific risk factors detected, and the result of a simulated sell. When severity=danger, the next `evaluate_trade` for the same contract is automatically denied regardless of any other checks. This is a heuristic bytecode + simulation check, not a formal audit. Use it before trading unknown tokens, memecoins, or any contract that is absent from the official Robinhood Chain registry. It is safe to call repeatedly; no transaction is ever sent.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| contract_address | string | yes | Token contract address (0x...). |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| detail | – | – | – |
| error | – | – | If present, the check failed. Do not assume 'safe'. |
| guidance | – | – | – |
| risk_factors | array | – | Specific issues detected. |
| sell_simulation_ok | – | – | Whether a simulated sell succeeded. |
| severity | string | – | Overall classification. |
No examples provided.
evaluate_trade Evaluate Trade (Free) ~230
Pre-trade risk check for a proposed trade. Call this BEFORE executing any trade and treat a "deny" decision as a hard stop. Evaluated at a fixed Tier 1 ceiling ($5,000 notional). For higher limits, use `evaluate_trade_paid` (Tier 2, $25,000) which settles an x402 payment on-chain.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| amount | number | yes | Quantity in token units — NOT a pre-computed USD value. |
| asset | string | yes | Asset symbol, e.g. NVDA, AAPL, TSLA, USDG. |
| contract_address | string | yes | Token contract address (0x...). Must match the official registry address for that symbol, or the trade is denied as a suspected fake token. |
| max_slippage_bps | integer | – | Max slippage in basis points (default 100). |
| request_id | – | – | Optional idempotency key. |
| side | string | yes | "buy" or "sell". |
| wallet | string | yes | EVM wallet address (0x...) the trade would execute from. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| audit_hash | – | – | SHA-256 hash chaining this decision. |
| audit_seq | – | – | Monotonic sequence number of this decision. |
| calculated_notional_usd | number | – | USD value of the proposed trade. |
| decision | string | – | Final verdict. 'deny' is a hard stop. |
| detail | – | – | Human-readable detail accompanying `error`, if any. |
| error | – | – | If present, no verdict was produced. Treat as a hard stop; do not execute the trade. |
| guidance | – | – | Suggested next step accompanying `error`, if any. |
| max_trade_usd | number | – | USD ceiling for this tier. |
| price_source | string | – | Where the price came from. |
| price_usd | number | – | Asset price used for the valuation. |
| reasons | array | – | Human-readable reasons. Entries prefixed with 'ADVISORY:' are non-blocking context; all other entries drove the decision. |
| request_id | – | – | Echoed idempotency key, if provided. |
| risk_score | integer | – | Composite risk score from 0 (safe) to 100 (blocked). |
| tier | integer | – | Tier the wallet was evaluated at (1-3). |
No examples provided.
evaluate_trade_paid Evaluate Trade (x402 Paid, Tier 2) ~318
Pre-trade risk check gated by an x402 payment. Evaluated as COLR Tier 2: $25,000 notional ceiling, 10/25 per-minute rate limits. No COLR holdings are required — the on-chain payment is the credential. FLOW ---- 1. Call WITHOUT payment_proof → the tool returns a `PaymentRequiredOutput` describing the on-chain payment (network, asset, amount, payTo, resource). 2. Settle the payment on-chain using an x402-capable client. The facilitator returns a proof string. 3. Call again with `payment_proof=<proof>` → the tool forwards the proof to the guardrail's x402-paid endpoint and returns a full `EvaluateTradeOutput` with `tier=2`.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| amount | number | yes | Quantity in token units. |
| asset | string | yes | Asset symbol, e.g. NVDA, AAPL, TSLA, USDG. |
| contract_address | string | yes | Token contract address (0x...). |
| max_slippage_bps | integer | – | Max slippage in basis points (default 100). |
| payment_proof | – | – | x402 payment proof from the facilitator. Omit on the first call to receive the payment challenge. |
| request_id | – | – | Optional idempotency key. |
| side | string | yes | "buy" or "sell". |
| wallet | string | yes | EVM wallet address (0x...) the trade would execute from. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | – | yes | – |
No examples provided.
get_supported_assets Get Supported Assets ~29
List every asset in the guardrail's official Robinhood Chain registry, with its canonical contract address.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| assets | array | – | Registered assets. |
| detail | – | – | – |
| error | – | – | If present, the registry was unreachable. |
| guidance | – | – | – |
No examples provided.
simulate_balance Simulate Balance ~97
Simulate a wallet's ERC-20 balance after a hypothetical trade using eth_call state override. Read-only: no transaction is ever sent.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| decimals | integer | – | Token decimals (default 18). |
| delta | number | yes | Signed amount (negative = spend). |
| holder | string | yes | Wallet address whose balance is simulated (0x...). |
| token_address | string | yes | ERC-20 contract address (0x...). |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| after | – | – | Balance after. |
| before | – | – | Balance before. |
| delta | – | – | Signed change. |
| detail | – | – | – |
| error | – | – | If present, the simulation failed. |
| guidance | – | – | – |
No examples provided.
verify_audit_trail Verify Audit Trail ~68
Verify the tamper-evident audit trail for a wallet's past guardrail decisions.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | integer | – | How many recent records to verify (1-1000, default 100). |
| wallet | string | yes | EVM wallet address (0x...). |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| detail | – | – | – |
| error | – | – | If present, verification could not run. |
| first_broken_seq | – | – | Sequence number of the first broken link, if any. |
| guidance | – | – | – |
| healthy | boolean | – | True only if every record's hash matches and the chain is unbroken. |
| records_checked | integer | – | Number of records verified. |
No examples provided.
How do I install the Collar Guardrail — Pre-Trade Risk Layer MCP server?
Collar Guardrail — Pre-Trade Risk Layer is a hosted endpoint at https://api.collarguardrail.com/mcp-http/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · api.collarguardrail.com
claude mcp add --transport http aiguardrail-backend 'https://api.collarguardrail.com/mcp-http/mcp'
What is the Collar Guardrail — Pre-Trade Risk Layer MCP server?
Collar Guardrail — Pre-Trade Risk Layer is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.aiguardrail/backend. Deterministic pre-trade risk checks for AI agents on Robinhood Chain. Returns allow/warn/deny. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://api.collarguardrail.com/mcp-http/mcp).
Is the Collar Guardrail — Pre-Trade Risk Layer MCP server safe to use?
Collar Guardrail — Pre-Trade Risk Layer scores 23 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Collar Guardrail — Pre-Trade Risk Layer MCP server expose?
Collar Guardrail — Pre-Trade Risk Layer exposes 6 tools: evaluate_trade, evaluate_trade_paid, check_token_safety, simulate_balance, get_supported_assets, verify_audit_trail. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 889 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Collar Guardrail — Pre-Trade Risk Layer MCP server require authentication?
Its publisher declares no required credentials for Collar Guardrail — Pre-Trade Risk Layer. We have not been able to confirm that against the live endpoint, and a server can require authorisation without declaring it here.
Is the Collar Guardrail — Pre-Trade Risk Layer MCP server still maintained?
Collar Guardrail — Pre-Trade Risk Layer is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 5 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.