ai.tachyo/verify
REMOTE · AUTH.XBARRY.AI
Cryptographic proof of wallet ownership in two steps, with no keys and no custody.
Available components
Last scanned (22 hours ago)
Scores higher than 76% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 4 Nov 2026.
Category Crypto and Web3
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security63
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 2 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability76
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 351 tokens (~175/item across 2 items; 2 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management97
- Stability observed for 29 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage67
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 0% of tool parameters carry a description.Fail
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 2 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 2 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 4 Nov 26 0
- Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
- 22 Oct 26 0
- Server version: 1.27.2 → 1.30.0 functional
- 7 Oct 26 0
- This server's schema is too large to store in full, so we cannot compare its tools day to day functional
- 28 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 26 Aug 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Aug 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 11 Aug 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 4 Nov 2026 · Probed https://auth.xbarry.ai/api/mcp/verify
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=xbarry.ai | CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 13 Sept 2026 | 12 Dec 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 61e8799f2d3f4bc19e5db147a98984ecc9f |
| SANs: *.xbarry.ai, xbarry.ai | ||||||
| CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 5ddd70dd31f801c85c186a7a04b80afe |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of auth.xbarry.ai. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| ai. | present | 1814, 3799 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| xbarry.ai. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains |
| content-security-policy | default-src 'self' https: data: 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval'; frame-ancestors 'self'; |
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
| x-frame-options | SAMEORIGIN |
| referrer-policy | strict-origin-when-cross-origin |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://auth.xbarry.ai/api/mcp/verify | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://auth.xbarry.ai/api/mcp/verify | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://auth.xbarry.ai/api/mcp/verify |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
request_verification_challenge ~142
Step 1 of wallet verification: get a fresh challenge for the user to sign. chain: "evm" or "solana". Pass agent_id (your marketplace identity) so the proof is bound to you. Present `challenge` to the user, have their wallet sign it (EVM personal_sign / Solana signMessage), then call verify_wallet_ownership with the returned `nonce` + signature. The challenge is single-use and expires (~10 min). Returns {challenge, nonce, expires_at}.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | – |
| agent_id | string | – | – |
| chain | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
verify_wallet_ownership ~209
Step 2 of wallet verification: prove control by signing the challenge from step 1. chain: "evm" (secp256k1, 0x-hex signature) or "solana" (ed25519, base58/base64/hex). `nonce` is from request_verification_challenge; the signature must be over that exact challenge text. Pass the same agent_id you requested the challenge with — on success the wallet is linked to you and you get a session_token to pass to Tachyo's other agents (e.g. check_token_safety) to unlock connected/premium tiers. Returns {verified, address, chain, linked, session_token?, session_expires?}. Does not move funds or expose keys.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | – |
| agent_id | string | – | – |
| chain | string | – | – |
| nonce | string | yes | – |
| signature | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the ai.tachyo/verify MCP server?
ai.tachyo/verify is a hosted endpoint at https://auth.xbarry.ai/api/mcp/verify, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · auth.xbarry.ai
claude mcp add --transport http ai-tachyo-verify 'https://auth.xbarry.ai/api/mcp/verify'
What is the ai.tachyo/verify MCP server?
ai.tachyo/verify is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as ai.tachyo/verify. Cryptographic proof of wallet ownership in two steps, with no keys and no custody. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://auth.xbarry.ai/api/mcp/verify).
Is the ai.tachyo/verify MCP server safe to use?
ai.tachyo/verify scores 78 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the ai.tachyo/verify MCP server expose?
ai.tachyo/verify exposes 2 tools: request_verification_challenge, verify_wallet_ownership. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 351 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the ai.tachyo/verify MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to ai.tachyo/verify without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the ai.tachyo/verify MCP server still maintained?
ai.tachyo/verify is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 4 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.