Surfing Dog Inbox
REMOTE · INBOX.SURFINGDOG.AI
Message, ask for a quote or book a call with Surfing Dog, through its open-source inbox.
Available components
Last scanned (23 hours ago)
Scores higher than 62% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.
Category CRM and Sales
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security63
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation check failed: no authorisation is required to call this server, and it exposes a tool marked destructive (decline_offer). See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability53
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 6462 tokens (~359/item across 18 items; 18 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management89
- Stability check failed: schema churn in the 30 days we've observed: 1 tool removals, 2 breaking changes, 0 auth/transport breaks, 0 additions. See how to fix → Fail
Tool Coverage92
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 76% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- All 2 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 19 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a current MCP spec version (2026-07-28).Pass
Checks we ran (13)
- TLS certificate
- Authorization
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 17 Nov 26 −1
- Stability: pass → fail ▼ security
- A breaking change shipped without a version bump: still 0.2.0 ▼ security
- Tool “create_order” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “quote_shipping” was removed ▼ security
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Tool “list_products” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “create_booking” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “get_business_profile” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “request_quote” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “send_message” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Schema quality: 315 → 359 ▼ functional
- “create_booking” made “contact” required, so existing callers break ▼ functional
- “request_quote” made “contact” required, so existing callers break ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 71% → 76% ▲ functional
- “accept_offer” reworded the description of “idempotency_key” cosmetic
- “cancel_item” reworded the description of “idempotency_key” cosmetic
- “create_booking” reworded the description of “contact” cosmetic
- “create_booking” reworded the description of “idempotency_key” cosmetic
- “decline_offer” reworded the description of “idempotency_key” cosmetic
- “make_offer” reworded the description of “idempotency_key” cosmetic
- “provide_details” reworded the description of “idempotency_key” cosmetic
- “request_quote” reworded the description of “contact” cosmetic
- “request_quote” reworded the description of “idempotency_key” cosmetic
- “request_return” reworded the description of “idempotency_key” cosmetic
- “send_message” reworded the description of “contact” cosmetic
- “send_message” reworded the description of “idempotency_key” cosmetic
- “suggest_time” reworded the description of “idempotency_key” cosmetic
- “withdraw_from_contract” reworded the description of “idempotency_key” cosmetic
- 10 Nov 26 0
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Tool “request_return” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “withdraw_from_contract” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- 6 Nov 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 5 Nov 26 0
- Tool “list_products” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- New tool “quote_shipping” functional
- 3 Nov 26 0
- “get_item_status” reworded the description of “item_id” cosmetic
1 cosmetic change on this day. Switch on “Show cosmetic changes” to see it.
- 1 Nov 26 0
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Tool “create_booking” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- 31 Oct 26 0
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- “accept_offer” reworded the description of “idempotency_key” cosmetic
- “cancel_item” reworded the description of “idempotency_key” cosmetic
- “create_booking” reworded the description of “idempotency_key” cosmetic
- “create_order” reworded the description of “idempotency_key” cosmetic
- “decline_offer” reworded the description of “idempotency_key” cosmetic
- “make_offer” reworded the description of “idempotency_key” cosmetic
- “provide_details” reworded the description of “idempotency_key” cosmetic
- “request_quote” reworded the description of “idempotency_key” cosmetic
- “request_return” reworded the description of “idempotency_key” cosmetic
- “send_message” reworded the description of “idempotency_key” cosmetic
- “suggest_time” reworded the description of “idempotency_key” cosmetic
- “withdraw_from_contract” reworded the description of “idempotency_key” cosmetic
- 28 Oct 26 0
- Server version: 0.1.0 → 0.2.0 functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://inbox.surfingdog.ai/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=surfingdog.ai | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 21 Oct 2026 | 19 Jan 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | e5fb02fc3dc0578c131acae3e05e8ca3 |
| SANs: surfingdog.ai, *.surfingdog.ai | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of inbox.surfingdog.ai. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| ai. | DS published | 1814 | 8 | Verified |
| surfingdog.ai. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=15552000 |
| content-security-policy | frame-ancestors 'none' |
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
| x-frame-options | DENY |
| referrer-policy | strict-origin-when-cross-origin |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://inbox.surfingdog.ai/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://inbox.surfingdog.ai/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://inbox.surfingdog.ai/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
accept_offer Accept what the business proposed ~433
Accept another time the business proposed for a booking, its quote, its changes to an order, or a change it asks for to a confirmed booking or an accepted order (offer.kind change: the promise moves). This binds your person, so send terms_sha — offer.terms_sha from get_item_status — only after they said yes to offer.human, and offer_id (offer.id) so an answer to an offer since replaced does nothing. Without terms_sha nothing is booked: you get the terms to show them. An accepted quote becomes a confirmed booking or order (linked). A yes to a change that can no longer be made online goes to a person there instead (passed_on), and what was agreed stands.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| access_token | string | – | Capability secret returned when the item was created without an account. |
| idempotency_key | string | – | Same key + same request = same answer. Required for agents. Make it a fresh random UUID per request, never one made from the request itself: a retry of a create with a random key gets its access toke… |
| item_id | string | yes | – |
| key | string | – | The person's key (sdkey1_…), if that is all you have: it is exchanged once for a pass, which comes back in identity.passes — keep the pass and send it next time instead. Never stored. |
| offer_id | string | – | The offer you answer: offer.id from get_item_status. If the business has replaced it since, nothing is done (409 offer_changed, with the current one). |
| pass | string | – | The person's passes (sdpass1_…), space-separated, at most 8: presented to the network that issued each, so the business recognises the customer. Or send them in the Sdi-Pass header. Never stored. |
| terms_sha | string | – | The fingerprint of the terms your person said yes to: offer.terms_sha from get_item_status. Leave it out to be told the terms first; nothing is booked without it. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
acknowledge_receipt Acknowledge a receipt ~462
Counter-sign a receipt this item earned, so both sides hold it: a promise, a change both sides agreed to it (kind amended), how it ended, or a refund's. Read the item to find its receipts; then send a compact JWS signed with your own Ed25519 key — header {alg:'EdDSA', typ:'sdi-receipt-ack+jws', jwk:<your public jwk>}, payload {rcp:<receipt id>, sha:<base64url(SHA-256(receipt jws))>, iat:<unix seconds>}. The instance verifies it against the key you carry and keeps it. Acknowledging twice is harmless.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| access_token | string | – | Capability secret returned when the item was created without an account. |
| counter_signature | string | – | A compact JWS by the customer's agent, EdDSA, header carrying its Ed25519 public `jwk`, payload `{"rcp": "<receipt id>", "sha": "<base64url(SHA-256(receipt JWS))>", "iat": <unix seconds>}`. Or, for a… |
| item_id | string | yes | – |
| key | string | – | The person's key (sdkey1_…), if that is all you have: it is exchanged once for a pass, which comes back in identity.passes — keep the pass and send it next time instead. Never stored. |
| pass | string | – | The person's passes (sdpass1_…), space-separated, at most 8: presented to the network that issued each, so the business recognises the customer. Or send them in the Sdi-Pass header. Never stored. |
| receipt | string | – | The receipt JWS being acknowledged, if you want the instance to check it is the one it holds. |
| receipt_id | string | – | The receipt to acknowledge, for an agent that signs this request (sdi-agent/1) with a key delegated to the pass reference it sends: the inbox forwards the signature to the network (ADR-017 §3.4). Sen… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
cancel_item Cancel ~319
Cancel an item you created. After the business's cancellation window, a confirmed booking is cancelled late where the business records late cancellations (it may count against the customer), and refused where it does not. A confirmed stay answers first with the fee under its policy and what is owed back (confirm): send its fee_sha once your person said yes.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| access_token | string | – | Capability secret returned when the item was created without an account. |
| fee_sha | string | – | A confirmed stay: the fingerprint of the cancellation fee your person saw (details.fee_sha of the 409 confirm_terms a cancel without it gets). |
| idempotency_key | string | – | Same key + same request = same answer. Required for agents. Make it a fresh random UUID per request, never one made from the request itself: a retry of a create with a random key gets its access toke… |
| item_id | string | yes | – |
| key | string | – | The person's key (sdkey1_…), if that is all you have: it is exchanged once for a pass, which comes back in identity.passes — keep the pass and send it next time instead. Never stored. |
| pass | string | – | The person's passes (sdpass1_…), space-separated, at most 8: presented to the network that issued each, so the business recognises the customer. Or send them in the Sdi-Pass header. Never stored. |
| reason | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
check_availability Check availability ~99
Free start times for a service between two instants (at most 14 days). A time that has started, or that starts within the business's minimum notice, is not offered.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| from | string | yes | Start of the window to search, ISO 8601. |
| party_size | integer | – | – |
| service_id | string | yes | – |
| to | string | yes | End of the window, at most 14 days after from. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
create_booking Request a booking ~611
Request a service at a time. Check availability first. Needs your person's name and an email address or a phone number in contact: ask them first, and send only what they agree to give this business. Never make them up or send your own; without them nothing is written. endTime and reservationFor.name may be left out: they follow from the service (its length, its name). Leave totalPrice out: the business prices the booking. A fixed-price service costs the business's price from list_services, and a different total you send is only noted for the business; one for a service priced from, or with no price, is refused unless get_business_profile says price_negotiable; one in another currency always is. A priced booking binds your person only once they confirmed it: without terms_sha nothing is sent, and you get the summary to show them (confirm.summary, confirm.terms_sha); call again with that terms_sha on their clear yes. Returns the item and, if you have no account, an access_token.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| attachments | array | – | Photos or plans of the job: JPEG, PNG, WebP or PDF, at most six of 10 MB each. Inline up to 4 MB each (8 MB a call), else by https address or upload_id. HEIC photos: send them as JPEG. Images are cle… |
| contact | object | yes | Your person's details, as they agreed to give them to this business: their name, and an email address or a phone number (at least one of the two). Ask them first; never make them up, and never send y… |
| idempotency_key | string | – | Same key + same request = same answer. Required for agents. Make it a fresh random UUID per request, never one made from the request itself: a retry of a create with a random key gets its access toke… |
| key | string | – | The person's key (sdkey1_…), if that is all you have: it is exchanged once for a pass, which comes back in identity.passes — keep the pass and send it next time instead. Never stored. |
| message | string | – | – |
| pass | string | – | The person's passes (sdpass1_…), space-separated, at most 8: presented to the network that issued each, so the business recognises the customer. Or send them in the Sdi-Pass header. Never stored. |
| payload | object | yes | – |
| terms_sha | string | – | The fingerprint of the terms your person confirmed (details.terms_sha of the 409 confirm_terms a priced request without it gets). Nothing is sent to the business without it when the request carries a… |
| visit_for | object | – | Book this as the site visit for a request for a price you made: its item_id (and access_token). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
decline_offer Decline what the business proposed ~367
Say no to another time or to changes the business proposed (the booking request or the order is closed) or to its quote. To a change it asks for to a confirmed booking or an accepted order, no keeps what was agreed; on a change your person asked for (requested_change), it takes that back. Add reason (and reason_code) for anything your person wants the business to know.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| access_token | string | – | Capability secret returned when the item was created without an account. |
| idempotency_key | string | – | Same key + same request = same answer. Required for agents. Make it a fresh random UUID per request, never one made from the request itself: a retry of a create with a random key gets its access toke… |
| item_id | string | yes | – |
| key | string | – | The person's key (sdkey1_…), if that is all you have: it is exchanged once for a pass, which comes back in identity.passes — keep the pass and send it next time instead. Never stored. |
| offer_id | string | – | The offer you answer: offer.id from get_item_status. If the business has replaced it since, nothing is done (409 offer_changed, with the current one). |
| pass | string | – | The person's passes (sdpass1_…), space-separated, at most 8: presented to the network that issued each, so the business recognises the customer. Or send them in the Sdi-Pass header. Never stored. |
| reason | string | – | Anything your person wants the business to know. |
| reason_code | string | – | Why: price_sensitivity, timing_deferred, quantity, delivery, returns_policy or other. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_business_profile Business profile ~66
Name, time zone, currency, languages and the item types this business takes here (only those: a request of another kind is refused), and where it takes any other kind instead (doors_elsewhere: each with its URL, and the platform it is on when there is one).
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_item_status Item status ~221
The current state of an item you created, in the business's words: what it proposed and waits for your person to answer (offer, with its terms_sha), who it waits on, what they can do next, and the conversation so far (thread: the business's replies and your person's messages).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| access_token | string | – | Capability secret returned when the item was created without an account. |
| item_id | string | yes | The item's id, from the answer that created it (view.item.id): not its six-character reference. |
| key | string | – | The person's key (sdkey1_…), if that is all you have: it is exchanged once for a pass, which comes back in identity.passes — keep the pass and send it next time instead. Never stored. |
| pass | string | – | The person's passes (sdpass1_…), space-separated, at most 8: presented to the network that issued each, so the business recognises the customer. Or send them in the Sdi-Pass header. Never stored. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_products Products ~228
Products with prices in minor units, each with its barcode (gtin, 14 digits) where it has one and whether it can be had (never a count). A variant names its group and options; price_model says how a price is meant (this business takes no orders here: a product is asked about with request_quote); an age-restricted product carries the label to show (ID checked at handover: 18+). ids: read the live price of products a network showed you, before your person agrees; gtin: the products with that barcode, in any of its lengths. The price here is the one that counts.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| cursor | string | – | – |
| gtin | string | – | Only products with this barcode (GTIN, EAN, UPC or ISBN), in any of its lengths. One that does not read as a barcode is refused. |
| ids | array | – | Only these products, by id (at most 50): read the live price of what a network showed you. |
| limit | integer | – | – |
| q | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_services Services ~61
Bookable services with duration and price. A price per person (price.per = person) is for each person in the booking: send partySize, and the total is the price times it.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| cursor | string | – | – |
| limit | integer | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
make_offer Suggest a change ~552
Answer what the business proposed with only what your person would change: another start_time (a booking: one of the free times check_availability lists; a quote request: the time it is for), other quantities for the lines of changes it suggested to an order (by index in offer.terms.lines; 0 drops one), another delivery_when, or how many (quantity) for a quote request. It goes back to the business as their request. On a confirmed booking or an accepted order it asks for a change to what was agreed (lines by index in the order's orderedItem), which stands until the business says yes. A price of their own is their answer only where get_business_profile says price_negotiable: total_price for a time it proposed (start_time optional), unit_price on lines of changes to an order; it goes back to the business, which takes it or answers. Otherwise — a price where the business sets its prices, on a quote, on something it does not haggle, or asked too often — it goes to a person there as their message, as do a note alone and a suggestion after a few rounds (passed_on): never refused, and what the business proposed, or what was agreed, still stands.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| access_token | string | – | Capability secret returned when the item was created without an account. |
| idempotency_key | string | – | Same key + same request = same answer. Required for agents. Make it a fresh random UUID per request, never one made from the request itself: a retry of a create with a random key gets its access toke… |
| item_id | string | yes | – |
| key | string | – | The person's key (sdkey1_…), if that is all you have: it is exchanged once for a pass, which comes back in identity.passes — keep the pass and send it next time instead. Never stored. |
| note | string | – | Anything your person wants the business to know. |
| offer_id | string | – | The offer you answer: offer.id from get_item_status. If the business has replaced it since, nothing is done (409 offer_changed, with the current one). |
| pass | string | – | The person's passes (sdpass1_…), space-separated, at most 8: presented to the network that issued each, so the business recognises the customer. Or send them in the Sdi-Pass header. Never stored. |
| reason_code | string | – | Why: price_sensitivity, timing_deferred, quantity, delivery, returns_policy or other. |
| terms | object | yes | Only what your person would change. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
provide_details Send the details ~258
Answer what the business asked about an item (get_item_status says it needs a detail). The item moves on; on any other item your details are kept as a message for the business.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| access_token | string | – | Capability secret returned when the item was created without an account. |
| details | string | yes | The answer to what the business asked. |
| idempotency_key | string | – | Same key + same request = same answer. Required for agents. Make it a fresh random UUID per request, never one made from the request itself: a retry of a create with a random key gets its access toke… |
| item_id | string | yes | – |
| key | string | – | The person's key (sdkey1_…), if that is all you have: it is exchanged once for a pass, which comes back in identity.passes — keep the pass and send it next time instead. Never stored. |
| pass | string | – | The person's passes (sdpass1_…), space-separated, at most 8: presented to the network that issued each, so the business recognises the customer. Or send them in the Sdi-Pass header. Never stored. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
request_quote Request a quote ~445
Ask for a price on something custom, in your person's words (itemOffered.name), or on a service or a product priced from, as a range or on request (itemOffered.serviceId or itemOffered.productId, from list_services or list_products). A budget, if your person gives one, is in the business's currency. Creates a quote_request item. Needs your person's name and an email address or a phone number in contact: ask them first, and send only what they agree to give this business. Never make them up or send your own; without them nothing is written.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| attachments | array | – | Photos or plans of the job: JPEG, PNG, WebP or PDF, at most six of 10 MB each. Inline up to 4 MB each (8 MB a call), else by https address or upload_id. HEIC photos: send them as JPEG. Images are cle… |
| contact | object | yes | Your person's details, as they agreed to give them to this business: their name, and an email address or a phone number (at least one of the two). Ask them first; never make them up, and never send y… |
| idempotency_key | string | – | Same key + same request = same answer. Required for agents. Make it a fresh random UUID per request, never one made from the request itself: a retry of a create with a random key gets its access toke… |
| key | string | – | The person's key (sdkey1_…), if that is all you have: it is exchanged once for a pass, which comes back in identity.passes — keep the pass and send it next time instead. Never stored. |
| message | string | – | – |
| pass | string | – | The person's passes (sdpass1_…), space-separated, at most 8: presented to the network that issued each, so the business recognises the customer. Or send them in the Sdi-Pass header. Never stored. |
| payload | object | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
request_return Send goods back ~387
Once an order's goods reached your person: ask to send them back. reason faulty, not_as_described or wrong_item (the legal guarantee: it costs them nothing), or changed_mind (a withdrawal while a period to withdraw runs, agreed at once; otherwise a return the business answers under its own policy). lines: which, by index in orderedItem, and how many; all when left out. The return comes back as linked; get_item_status lists it under refunds.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| access_token | string | – | Capability secret returned when the item was created without an account. |
| idempotency_key | string | – | Same key + same request = same answer. Required for agents. Make it a fresh random UUID per request, never one made from the request itself: a retry of a create with a random key gets its access toke… |
| item_id | string | yes | – |
| key | string | – | The person's key (sdkey1_…), if that is all you have: it is exchanged once for a pass, which comes back in identity.passes — keep the pass and send it next time instead. Never stored. |
| lines | array | – | Which lines of the order (by index in orderedItem), and how many of each; all of them when left out. |
| note | string | – | – |
| pass | string | – | The person's passes (sdpass1_…), space-separated, at most 8: presented to the network that issued each, so the business recognises the customer. Or send them in the Sdi-Pass header. Never stored. |
| reason | string | yes | Why: changed_mind, faulty, wrong_item, not_as_described or other. |
| wants | string | – | What your person would like: a refund, an exchange, or credit. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
send_message Send a message ~364
Start a conversation, or reply on an item you made (item_id). To start one, contact needs your person's name and an email address or a phone number: ask them first, and send only what they agree to give this business; never make them up. A reply needs no contact.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| access_token | string | – | Capability secret returned when the item was created without an account. |
| body | string | yes | – |
| contact | object | – | To start a conversation: your person's details, as they agreed to give them to this business, as for any new request (their name, and an email address or a phone number). Ask them first; never make t… |
| idempotency_key | string | – | Same key + same request = same answer. Required for agents. Make it a fresh random UUID per request, never one made from the request itself: a retry of a create with a random key gets its access toke… |
| item_id | string | – | Reply on an existing item; omit to start a new conversation. |
| key | string | – | The person's key (sdkey1_…), if that is all you have: it is exchanged once for a pass, which comes back in identity.passes — keep the pass and send it next time instead. Never stored. |
| message_id | string | – | – |
| pass | string | – | The person's passes (sdpass1_…), space-separated, at most 8: presented to the network that issued each, so the business recognises the customer. Or send them in the Sdi-Pass header. Never stored. |
| subject | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
suggest_time Ask for another time ~344
Instead of the time the business proposed, ask for another: start_time must be one of the free times check_availability lists (the end follows the service's length). The business confirms it or proposes again. On a confirmed booking it asks the business to move it (the end keeps the booking's length), and the booking stays as agreed until the business says yes. After a few rounds, or past the changes a booking may have, a person there answers it instead (passed_on).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| access_token | string | – | Capability secret returned when the item was created without an account. |
| idempotency_key | string | – | Same key + same request = same answer. Required for agents. Make it a fresh random UUID per request, never one made from the request itself: a retry of a create with a random key gets its access toke… |
| item_id | string | yes | – |
| key | string | – | The person's key (sdkey1_…), if that is all you have: it is exchanged once for a pass, which comes back in identity.passes — keep the pass and send it next time instead. Never stored. |
| note | string | – | – |
| pass | string | – | The person's passes (sdpass1_…), space-separated, at most 8: presented to the network that issued each, so the business recognises the customer. Or send them in the Sdi-Pass header. Never stored. |
| start_time | string | yes | The start your person would like instead: one of the free times check_availability lists. The end follows the service's length. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
verify_customer Prove a known customer ~112
When a result says identity.recognised is weak, the person gave the email of a customer the business knows. Call this with item_id and access_token to email them six digits; ask the person for the code and call it again with code. Then the business recognises them.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| access_token | string | – | Capability secret returned when the item was created without an account. |
| code | string | – | The six digits the customer received. Omit to have them sent. |
| item_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
withdraw_from_contract Withdraw from contract here ~437
Your person withdraws from their booking (one they paid for) or order, within the period the business states (withdrawal on get_item_status). Two steps: without confirm_withdrawal nothing is sent and you get the statement to show them (confirm.statement); send confirm_withdrawal: true on their yes. Before the goods went out the order ends and what was paid is refunded; once they reached your person, the goods come back (lines: only some of them) and are refunded. The business emails a copy. Never refused: past the period, where no right of withdrawal is claimed, or for something that cannot be returned, it goes to a person there instead (passed_on), or becomes a return under the business's own policy.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| access_token | string | – | Capability secret returned when the item was created without an account. |
| confirm_withdrawal | boolean | – | true once your person confirmed the statement you were shown. Left out, nothing is sent: you get the statement. |
| idempotency_key | string | – | Same key + same request = same answer. Required for agents. Make it a fresh random UUID per request, never one made from the request itself: a retry of a create with a random key gets its access toke… |
| item_id | string | yes | – |
| key | string | – | The person's key (sdkey1_…), if that is all you have: it is exchanged once for a pass, which comes back in identity.passes — keep the pass and send it next time instead. Never stored. |
| lines | array | – | Once the goods reached them: only these lines (by index in the order's orderedItem), and how many of each. |
| note | string | – | Anything your person wants to tell the business. |
| pass | string | – | The person's passes (sdpass1_…), space-separated, at most 8: presented to the network that issued each, so the business recognises the customer. Or send them in the Sdi-Pass header. Never stored. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the Surfing Dog Inbox MCP server?
Surfing Dog Inbox is a hosted endpoint at https://inbox.surfingdog.ai/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · inbox.surfingdog.ai
claude mcp add --transport http ai-surfingdog-inbox 'https://inbox.surfingdog.ai/mcp'
What is the Surfing Dog Inbox MCP server?
Surfing Dog Inbox is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as ai.surfingdog/inbox. Message, ask for a quote or book a call with Surfing Dog, through its open-source inbox. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://inbox.surfingdog.ai/mcp).
Is the Surfing Dog Inbox MCP server safe to use?
Surfing Dog Inbox scores 75 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Surfing Dog Inbox MCP server expose?
Surfing Dog Inbox exposes 18 tools: get_business_profile, list_services, list_products, check_availability, request_quote, and 13 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 5,766 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Surfing Dog Inbox MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to Surfing Dog Inbox without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the Surfing Dog Inbox MCP server still maintained?
Surfing Dog Inbox is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the Surfing Dog Inbox MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 13 checks on Surfing Dog Inbox, covering TLS certificate, Authorization, HTTPS, HSTS header and 9 more. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.