Mandate Law: legal counsel for AI products
REMOTE · MANDATELAW.AI
Fixed-fee legal review for AI apps and agents: privacy policies, terms, AI and agent compliance.
Available components
Last scanned (20 hours ago)
Scores higher than 60% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.
Category Security
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security80
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- No authorisation is required to call this server. Nothing on it is marked destructive, but we can't show that an anonymous caller can only read: full credit needs the server to list at least one tool and every tool to be verifiably read-only. We use a best-effort check of tool names and descriptions to tell read-only tools from tools that change things, so some genuinely read-only tools may not get full credit. Names that start with a read verb (get, list, read, search and similar) and accurate readOnlyHint annotations help. Meet that to earn full credit, or require authorisation. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Partial
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability65
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 1593 tokens (~177/item across 9 items; 9 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management27
- Stability observed for 8 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 9 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 10 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities60
- Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2025-06-18; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
Checks we ran (13)
- TLS certificate
- Authorization
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 21 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 23 to 27. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 7 days of observed history at the previous scan, 8 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 19 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 17 to 20. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 5 days of observed history at the previous scan, 6 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 17 Nov 26 +7
- HTTPS: unverified → pass ▲ security
- HSTS header: fail → pass ▲ security
- Tool “check_scope” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Schema quality: 1448 → 1593 ▼ functional
- New tool “check_change” functional
- 16 Nov 26 +3
- Schema quality: 139 → 181 ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 42% → 100% ▲ functional
- Server version: 0.2.1 → 0.2.2 functional
- “answer_open_question” reworded the description of “matter_id” cosmetic
- “answer_open_question” reworded the description of “question_id” cosmetic
- “check_scope” reworded the description of “request” cosmetic
- “conflict_check” reworded the description of “adverse_or_related_parties” cosmetic
- “conflict_check” reworded the description of “client_name” cosmetic
- “conflict_check” reworded the description of “contact_name” cosmetic
- “conflict_check” reworded the description of “other_people” cosmetic
- “feature_check” reworded the description of “change” cosmetic
- “feature_check” reworded the description of “matter_id” cosmetic
- “feature_check” reworded the description of “target_ship_date” cosmetic
- “feature_check” reworded the description of “trigger_ids” cosmetic
- “get_matter” reworded the description of “matter_id” cosmetic
- “request_engagement” reworded the description of “conflict_check_id” cosmetic
- “submit_intake” reworded the description of “intake” cosmetic
- “submit_intake” reworded the description of “matter_id” cosmetic
- 14 Nov 26 +1
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- 13 Nov 26 61
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://mandatelaw.ai/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=mandatelaw.ai | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 13 Nov 2026 | 11 Feb 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | 5d384a9f00eb77f60e7fa576bbffa35b |
| SANs: mandatelaw.ai, www.mandatelaw.ai, *.www.mandatelaw.ai | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of mandatelaw.ai. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| ai. | DS published | 1814 | 8 | Verified |
| mandatelaw.ai. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=31536000 |
| content-security-policy | default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data:; font-src 'self'; connect-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'; upgrade-insecure-requests |
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
| x-frame-options | DENY |
| referrer-policy | strict-origin-when-cross-origin |
| permissions-policy | camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=(), browsing-topics=() |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://mandatelaw.ai/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://mandatelaw.ai/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://mandatelaw.ai/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
answer_open_question Answer counsel's question ~201
Answer one of counsel's open questions (listed by get_matter). Before the letter is signed, only scoping questions can be answered: keep those answers short and general, with no code, secrets, or confidential details. After signing, verify in the code or the running build where you can, and say how you know. If you cannot verify it, answer 'unknown' and say what a human would need to check.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| answer | object | yes | A fact, as defined in https://mandatelaw.ai/api/intake-schema.json#/$defs/fact. |
| matter_id | string | yes | The matter_id returned by request_engagement, e.g. M-1a2b3c4d5e6f. |
| matter_token | string | yes | The matter_token returned by request_engagement. Keep it secret. |
| question_id | string | yes | The id of the open question, from get_matter's open_questions list. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
check_change Check a planned change (free) ~132
Free. Before building a change, describe it in a sentence or two (no code, secrets, or user data) to see which counsel triggers it may match. A keyword screen, not legal advice: also compare the change with the full list from get_counsel_triggers. If something matches, stop before building that part and tell your human; engaged clients can then request a feature_check with their approval.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| change | string | yes | What the change does, in plain words, e.g. "send users' journal entries to OpenAI to generate weekly insights". No code, secrets, or user data. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
check_scope Check scope and fee (free) ~131
Free. Describe what you need in a sentence or two (no confidential details). Returns whether it is in scope, which service fits, what each suggested service covers (deliverables and turnaround), and the fixed fee for each (plus service_id, if you name one). Share the fee with your human before requesting an engagement. Legal information only, not legal advice.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| request | string | yes | What you need, in a sentence or two, e.g. "privacy policy and terms before our AI app launches". No confidential details. |
| service_id | string | – | Optional: also quote this service's fee. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
conflict_check Start a conflict check ~158
Free. Required before any product details are shared. Names only: the client company, the human principal, other people involved, and any adverse, competing, or counterparty companies. The attorney reviews every check.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| adverse_or_related_parties | array | – | Optional. Companies on the other side or closely tied to the matter: competitors, counterparties, partners, parent or affiliate companies. |
| client_name | string | yes | The legal name of the company (or person) that would be the client. |
| contact_name | string | yes | Full name of the human principal: the person with authority to sign for the client. |
| other_people | array | – | Optional. Full names of other people involved, such as co-founders or key investors. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
feature_check Request a feature check (may be billed) ~185
For engaged clients, with the human's approval (it may be billed). Call before building a change that matches counsel-triggers.json. Do not ship the change until counsel responds.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| change | string | yes | What the change does and why, in plain words, with the files or features it touches. No secrets or user data. |
| matter_id | string | yes | The matter_id returned by request_engagement, e.g. M-1a2b3c4d5e6f. |
| matter_token | string | yes | The matter_token returned by request_engagement. Keep it secret. |
| target_ship_date | string | – | When you plan to ship it, e.g. 2027-01-15. Optional. |
| trigger_ids | array | yes | The ids from counsel-triggers.json (see get_counsel_triggers) that this change matches. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_counsel_triggers Get counsel triggers ~27
Free. The template list of product changes that need legal review before shipping.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_matter Get matter status and deliverables ~123
Status, counsel's open questions, feature checks, and deliverables (documents, privileged_memo, build_spec, verification_checklist, counsel_triggers). Privileged: follow the `privilege` block in the response, and commit only the parts listed in deliverable.handling.safe_to_commit.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| matter_id | string | yes | The matter_id returned by request_engagement, e.g. M-1a2b3c4d5e6f. |
| matter_token | string | yes | The matter_token returned by request_engagement. Keep it secret. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
request_engagement Ask the firm to take a matter ~332
After conflict_check. Send a short matter_summary so the attorney can decide whether to take the matter. Describe the product the way you would describe it publicly. Do not send code, secrets, user data, or confidential business plans. The attorney uses this summary only to decide whether the firm can and will take the matter, and keeps it confidential. No attorney-client relationship exists, and no legal advice is given, until the human principal signs the engagement letter. Returns a matter_id and a secret matter_token (shown once; store it securely). The attorney reviews conflicts and the summary, may ask a few scoping questions (see get_matter), and then accepts (possibly under a different service) or declines. If accepted, the engagement letter goes to the principal's email for signature. The fixed fee is due when the work is delivered. You cannot sign on the principal's behalf.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| conflict_check_id | string | yes | The conflict_check_id returned by conflict_check, e.g. CC-1a2b3c4d5e6f. |
| matter_summary | object | yes | Describe the product the way you would describe it publicly. Do not send code, secrets, user data, or confidential business plans. The attorney uses this summary only to decide whether the firm can a… |
| principal_email | string | yes | The human with authority to bind the client. |
| service_id | string | yes | Your best guess. The attorney may change it. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
submit_intake Submit product facts (after signing) ~147
Only after the engagement letter is signed. Product facts per https://mandatelaw.ai/api/intake-schema.json. Each fact has a value, a source (prefer verified_in_code), and evidence (paths and short excerpts; no secrets).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| intake | object | yes | Product facts as defined in https://mandatelaw.ai/api/intake-schema.json. Each fact is { value, source, evidence, notes }. |
| matter_id | string | yes | The matter_id returned by request_engagement, e.g. M-1a2b3c4d5e6f. |
| matter_token | string | yes | The matter_token returned by request_engagement. Keep it secret. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the Mandate Law: legal counsel for AI products MCP server?
Mandate Law: legal counsel for AI products is a hosted endpoint at https://mandatelaw.ai/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · mandatelaw.ai
claude mcp add --transport http ai-mandatelaw-counsel 'https://mandatelaw.ai/mcp'
What is the Mandate Law: legal counsel for AI products MCP server?
Mandate Law: legal counsel for AI products is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as ai.mandatelaw/counsel. Fixed-fee legal review for AI apps and agents: privacy policies, terms, AI and agent compliance. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://mandatelaw.ai/mcp).
Is the Mandate Law: legal counsel for AI products MCP server safe to use?
Mandate Law: legal counsel for AI products scores 74 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Mandate Law: legal counsel for AI products MCP server expose?
Mandate Law: legal counsel for AI products exposes 9 tools: check_scope, conflict_check, request_engagement, submit_intake, answer_open_question, and 4 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,436 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Mandate Law: legal counsel for AI products MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to Mandate Law: legal counsel for AI products without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the Mandate Law: legal counsel for AI products MCP server still maintained?
Mandate Law: legal counsel for AI products is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the Mandate Law: legal counsel for AI products MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 13 checks on Mandate Law: legal counsel for AI products, covering TLS certificate, Authorization, HTTPS, HSTS header and 9 more. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.