ai.kaiv/email-check
REMOTE · API.KAIV.AI · SCANNED SEP 20
Email posture for any domain: can it receive mail, can it be spoofed? MX, SPF and DMARC.
Available components
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security83
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- No authorisation is required to call this server. Every tool declares its destructiveHint and none is destructive, so open access doesn't expose one. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Partial
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC is configured correctly; the domain's records validate against the full chain to the root. View diagnostics → Pass
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability79
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 622 tokens (~155/item across 4 items; 4 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
- Structured output schemas are declared (100% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 4 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 5 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a current MCP spec version (2026-07-28).Pass
How do I install the ai.kaiv/email-check MCP server?
ai.kaiv/email-check is a hosted endpoint at https://api.kaiv.ai/api/bridge/mcp/email-check-b6ab5250, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · api.kaiv.ai
claude mcp add --transport http ai-kaiv-email-check 'https://api.kaiv.ai/api/bridge/mcp/email-check-b6ab5250'
{
"mcpServers": {
"ai-kaiv-email-check": {
"url": "https://api.kaiv.ai/api/bridge/mcp/email-check-b6ab5250"
}
}
} {
"servers": {
"ai-kaiv-email-check": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://api.kaiv.ai/api/bridge/mcp/email-check-b6ab5250"
}
}
} [mcp_servers.ai-kaiv-email-check] url = "https://api.kaiv.ai/api/bridge/mcp/email-check-b6ab5250"
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"ai-kaiv-email-check": {
"type": "remote",
"url": "https://api.kaiv.ai/api/bridge/mcp/email-check-b6ab5250",
"enabled": true
}
}
} openclaw mcp add ai-kaiv-email-check --url 'https://api.kaiv.ai/api/bridge/mcp/email-check-b6ab5250' --transport streamable-http
mcp_servers:
ai-kaiv-email-check:
url: "https://api.kaiv.ai/api/bridge/mcp/email-check-b6ab5250" {
"McpServers": {
"ai-kaiv-email-check": {
"Transport": "http",
"Url": "https://api.kaiv.ai/api/bridge/mcp/email-check-b6ab5250"
}
}
} assistant mcp add ai-kaiv-email-check -t streamable-http -u 'https://api.kaiv.ai/api/bridge/mcp/email-check-b6ab5250'
{
"mcpServers": {
"ai-kaiv-email-check": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://api.kaiv.ai/api/bridge/mcp/email-check-b6ab5250"
}
}
} The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 20 Sept 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 19 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 93 to 97. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 28 days of observed history at the previous scan, 29 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 16 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 83 to 87. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 25 days of observed history at the previous scan, 26 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 14 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 77 to 80. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 23 days of observed history at the previous scan, 24 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 12 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 70 to 73. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 21 days of observed history at the previous scan, 22 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 10 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 63 to 67. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 19 days of observed history at the previous scan, 20 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 8 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 57 to 60. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 17 days of observed history at the previous scan, 18 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 6 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 50 to 53. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 15 days of observed history at the previous scan, 16 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 20 Sept 2026 · Probed https://api.kaiv.ai/api/bridge/mcp/email-check-b6ab5250
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=kaiv.ai | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 9 Sept 2026 | 8 Dec 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | b225111947d906a40e56536076ff66c0 |
| SANs: kaiv.ai, *.kaiv.ai | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC secure
Validation of api.kaiv.ai. — Secure
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| ai. | present | 3799 | 8 | Verified |
| kaiv.ai. | present | 2371 | 13 | Verified |
| api.kaiv.ai. | Verified address RRset verified with the apex keys |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload |
| content-security-policy | default-src 'self';form-action 'self' https://auth.kaiv.ai;script-src 'self' https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com https://challenges.cloudflare.com 'unsafe-inline';style-src 'self' https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com 'unsafe-inline';img-src 'self' data: blob:;connect-src 'self' https://api.openai.com https://api.anthropic.com https://generativelanguage.googleapis.com https://challenges.cloudflare.com https://*.kaiv.ai;frame-src 'self' https://challenges.cloudflare.com;font-src 'self' https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com;object-src 'none';media-src 'self';base-uri 'self';frame-ancestors 'self';script-src-attr 'none';upgrade-insecure-requests |
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
| x-frame-options | DENY |
| referrer-policy | same-origin |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://api.kaiv.ai/api/bridge/mcp/email-check-b6ab5250 | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://api.kaiv.ai/api/bridge/mcp/email-check-b6ab5250 | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://api.kaiv.ai/api/bridge/mcp/email-check-b6ab5250 |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
check_email_domain Check Email Domain ~144
Full email posture for a domain: can it receive mail, and can it be spoofed? Runs MX, SPF and DMARC lookups together and returns a plain-language verdict alongside the raw records: can_receive_mail, spoofable, and a list of specific findings. Use this as the default check before emailing an unfamiliar domain, when judging whether inbound mail claiming to be from a domain could be forged, or when auditing your own domains. Prefer this over the single-record tools unless you already know which record you need.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| domain | string | yes | Domain to check, e.g. "example.com". A full email address is accepted and the domain is taken from it. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| can_receive_mail | boolean | yes | False when the domain publishes no MX records. |
| checked_at | string | – | – |
| dmarc | object | – | – |
| domain | string | yes | – |
| findings | array | – | One line per specific problem; empty when the domain is correctly configured. |
| mx | object | – | – |
| spf | object | – | – |
| spoofable | boolean | yes | True unless DMARC is present AND at an enforcing policy. Deliberately conservative: without enforcement a receiver has no instruction to reject forged mail, however good the SPF record is. |
| summary | string | yes | Plain-language verdict. |
No examples provided.
get_dmarc_record Get Dmarc Record ~163
DMARC record, policy, and whether it actually protects. Returns the DMARC TXT record at _dmarc.<domain>, its policy (none / quarantine / reject), the percentage it applies to, and whether that policy protects against spoofing. Also flags the case of MULTIPLE DMARC records, which RFC 7489 requires receivers to treat as no policy at all — a domain in that state is unprotected however strict its records look. A policy of "none" is monitoring only and does not stop forged mail. Use when assessing whether mail claiming to be from a domain can be trusted.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| domain | string | yes | Domain to check, e.g. "example.com". A full email address is accepted and the domain is taken from it. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| all_records | array | – | Present only when more than one DMARC record exists. |
| domain | string | yes | – |
| found | boolean | – | – |
| meaning | string | – | – |
| multiple_records | boolean | – | RFC 7489 requires receivers to apply NO policy when more than one record exists. |
| percent | integer | – | The pct= tag; defaults to 100. |
| policy | string | – | "ignored" means duplicate records cancelled the policy out. |
| protects | boolean | – | False for p=none (monitoring only) and for duplicate records. |
| record | string | – | – |
No examples provided.
get_mx_records Get Mx Records ~99
Mail exchanger records for a domain. Returns the MX hosts in priority order and whether any exist. A domain with no MX records cannot receive mail, so sending to it will bounce. Use when you only need deliverability and not spoofing posture; use check_email_domain for the full picture.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| domain | string | yes | Domain to check, e.g. "example.com". A full email address is accepted and the domain is taken from it. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| can_receive_mail | boolean | – | – |
| domain | string | yes | – |
| found | boolean | – | Whether any MX record exists. |
| hosts | array | – | MX hosts, lowest priority first. |
No examples provided.
get_spf_record Get Spf Record ~116
SPF record and how strict it is. Returns the SPF TXT record, the qualifier on its `all` mechanism (fail / softfail / neutral / pass) and what that means in practice, plus whether more than one SPF record exists — which receivers treat as an error, leaving the domain unprotected. Use when diagnosing why mail from a domain is being rejected or marked.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| domain | string | yes | Domain to check, e.g. "example.com". A full email address is accepted and the domain is taken from it. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| domain | string | yes | – |
| found | boolean | – | – |
| meaning | string | – | What the qualifier means in practice. |
| multiple_records | boolean | – | More than one SPF record: receivers treat this as permerror, so SPF effectively fails. |
| qualifier | string | – | The qualifier on the `all` mechanism. |
| record | string | – | The raw SPF TXT record, or null when absent. |
| strict | boolean | – | True only for `-all`, the one strict answer. |
No examples provided.
What is the ai.kaiv/email-check MCP server?
ai.kaiv/email-check is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as ai.kaiv/email-check. Email posture for any domain: can it receive mail, can it be spoofed? MX, SPF and DMARC. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://api.kaiv.ai/api/bridge/mcp/email-check-b6ab5250).
Is the ai.kaiv/email-check MCP server safe to use?
ai.kaiv/email-check scores 89 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the ai.kaiv/email-check MCP server expose?
ai.kaiv/email-check exposes 4 tools: check_email_domain, get_dmarc_record, get_mx_records, get_spf_record. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 522 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the ai.kaiv/email-check MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to ai.kaiv/email-check without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the ai.kaiv/email-check MCP server still maintained?
ai.kaiv/email-check is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 20 September 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.