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APIR Agent Verification

REMOTE · APIR.AI

Check an AI agent you did not build: is it who it claims, inside its mandate, and what's its record

Available components

62 Trust /100

Last scanned (22 hours ago)

Scores higher than 46% of remote servers

Reachable. Last reached 18 Oct 2026.

Category Security

Trust breakdown (7 categories)

How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →

Endpoint Security51
Transport & Reachability100
Schema Quality & AI Usability72
  • AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
  • Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 564 tokens (~188/item across 3 items; 3 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
  • Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management17
  • Stability observed for 5 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage100
  • 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
  • 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
Tool Safety100
  • No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
  • We read all 3 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
  • An AI judge read all 4 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities60
  • Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2025-06-18; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
Changelog

Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.

  • 17 Oct 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 10 to 13. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 3 days of observed history at the previous scan, 4 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

  • 15 Oct 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 3 to 7. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 1 days of observed history at the previous scan, 2 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

  • 14 Oct 26 0
    • Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
  • 13 Oct 26 60

    First indexed and scored.

Diagnostics

Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.

Captured 18 Oct 2026 · Probed https://apir.ai/api/mcp

TLS valid

Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .

Subject Issuer Valid from Valid until Key Signature Serial
CN=apir.ai CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US 15 Sept 2026 14 Dec 2026 ECDSA 256 ECDSA-SHA256 5a4e294a2568f3781313de5c1d51a72e
SANs: apir.ai, api.apir.ai, *.api.apir.ai
CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US 13 Dec 2023 20 Feb 2029 ECDSA 256 ECDSA-SHA384 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3
CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE 15 Nov 2023 28 Jan 2028 ECDSA 384 SHA256-RSA 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b

Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →

DNSSEC insecure

Validation of apir.ai. — Not signed

Zone DS Keys Algorithms Outcome
. trust_anchor 20326, 38696 8, 8 Verified
ai. present 3799 8 Verified
apir.ai. absent Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation
Authentication No authorisation required

The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.

Result No authorisation required
HTTP status 200
Header Value
strict-transport-security max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload
content-security-policy default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval' https://js.stripe.com https://static.cloudflareinsights.com; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com; font-src 'self' https://fonts.gstatic.com; img-src 'self' data: blob: https:; connect-src 'self' https://api.apir.ai https://auth.apir.ai wss://auth.apir.ai https://*.supabase.co wss://*.supabase.co https://api.stripe.com https://static.cloudflareinsights.com https://cloudflareinsights.com; frame-src 'self' https://js.stripe.com https://hooks.stripe.com; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self'; upgrade-insecure-requests
x-content-type-options nosniff
x-frame-options DENY
referrer-policy strict-origin-when-cross-origin
permissions-policy camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(self), interest-cohort=()

Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →

Transports 2 probes
Transport URL Outcome Status Location
streamable-http https://apir.ai/api/mcp Verified 200
http (plaintext) http://apir.ai/api/mcp Served over HTTP 200
MCP tools · 3 exposed · ~456 tokens

The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →

Tool Tokens
check_authority ~159

Resolve the human mandate behind an AI agent: which actions a named person actually permitted, any value cap, the expiry, and whether the grant itself is signed. Where authority was delegated agent to agent, the full chain is walked back to the human at the root, and one law is enforced at every hop: authority may only ever narrow. No hop can hold an action, a target or a spending cap wider than the hop above it, and the root must be a human. Use this before letting an agent transact, sign, spend or commit on someone else's behalf. An agent holding a valid credential may still be acting outside its mandate, and those are different questions.

NameTypeReqDescription
querystringyesAgent name, credential id, or agent UUID.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

get_verification_keys ~78

Return the Ed25519 public keys APIR publishes, so a signature can be recomputed offline without trusting any APIR response, including this one. Keys are published as a JWKS at apir.ai/.well-known/jwks.json and as did:web:apir.ai. Retired keys stay published so older credentials still verify.

Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

verify_agent ~219

Check whether an AI agent carries a real, cryptographically signed credential. Accepts an agent name, a credential id (TP-...), an agent UUID, a domain or a DID. Returns one of seven verdicts: VERIFIED, EXPIRED, REVOKED, SUPERSEDED, UNSIGNED, UNCHECKED or NO_RECORD. IMPORTANT for interpreting the answer: VERIFIED means the Ed25519 signature recomputes against the key published at apir.ai and the credential is unexpired and unrevoked. It confirms WHO issued the credential and that its contents are unaltered. It is NOT a guarantee that the agent behaves well. NO_RECORD is an honest, first-class answer: it means nothing is on file, which is not evidence of wrongdoing and not a warning. It means any claim the agent makes about itself is unverified. Free, unauthenticated, and no account is required.

NameTypeReqDescription
querystringyesAgent name, credential id (TP-... or APIR-TP-...), agent UUID, domain, or DID.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

Install

How do I install the APIR Agent Verification MCP server?

APIR Agent Verification is a hosted endpoint at https://apir.ai/api/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.

remote · apir.ai

# add to Claude Code
claude mcp add --transport http ai-apir-verify 'https://apir.ai/api/mcp'
Common questions

What is the APIR Agent Verification MCP server?

APIR Agent Verification is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as ai.apir/verify. Check an AI agent you did not build: is it who it claims, inside its mandate, and what's its record. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://apir.ai/api/mcp).

Is the APIR Agent Verification MCP server safe to use?

APIR Agent Verification scores 62 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.

What tools does the APIR Agent Verification MCP server expose?

APIR Agent Verification exposes 3 tools: verify_agent, check_authority, get_verification_keys. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 456 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.

Does the APIR Agent Verification MCP server require authentication?

No. We connected to APIR Agent Verification without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.

Is the APIR Agent Verification MCP server still maintained?

APIR Agent Verification is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 18 October 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.