ai.aient/mcp
REMOTE · AIENT.AI
MCP-native AI SRE: ask what's broken in production, get a reviewed GitHub fix PR.
Available components
Last scanned (4 hours ago)
Scores higher than 28% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 5 Nov 2026.
Category Monitoring and Observability
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security94
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- The endpoint enforces authorisation, advertised via RFC 9728 protected-resource metadata. View diagnostics → Pass
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- The authorisation server offers only Dynamic Client Registration (RFC 7591), which MCP 2026-07-28 deprecated in favour of Client ID Metadata Documents. View diagnostics → Partial
Transport & Reachability0
- Transport blocked by authentication: the endpoint requires auth we don't have to verify streamable-http. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
Schema Quality & AI Usability0
- Schema blocked by authentication: the endpoint requires auth we don't have to read it. See how to fix → Unverified
Stability & Change Management0
- Stability not yet verified: not enough scan history yet (needs a 30-day window).Unverified
Tool Coverage0
- Tool coverage blocked by authentication: the endpoint requires auth we don't have to read its tools.Unverified
Tool Safety0
- Tool safety blocked by authentication: the endpoint requires auth we don't have to read its tools.Unverified
Capabilities0
- Capabilities blocked by authentication: the endpoint requires auth we don't have to read them. See how to fix → Unverified
Unverified: 6 categories
Categories scored 0 because we could not verify them: authentication we do not have, an unreachable endpoint, or not enough scan history. We only credit what we can confirm. Claim this server and supply a read-only token to verify it and lift the score.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 14 Oct 26 −48
- Endpoint reachability: reachable → behind authorisation ▼ security
- Tool safety: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Stability: 0.87 → unverified ▼ security
- Transport: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Authorization: The endpoint enforces authorisation, advertised via RFC 9728 protected-resource metadata. security
- Capabilities: pass → unverified ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- 12 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 77 to 83. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 23 days of observed history at the previous scan, 25 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 9 Oct 26 +3
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 57 to 73. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 17 days of observed history at the previous scan, 22 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 3 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 50 to 53. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 15 days of observed history at the previous scan, 16 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 28 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 19 Sept 26 0
- The server now declares the “logging” capability functional
- The server now declares the “prompts” capability functional
- The server now declares the “resources” capability functional
- 18 Sept 26 0
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 5 Nov 2026 · Probed https://aient.ai/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=aient.ai | CN=YR2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 2 Oct 2026 | 31 Dec 2026 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | 526476e92a065e54a92c1a2549171a73cb5 |
| SANs: aient.ai | ||||||
| CN=YR2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YR,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | 4ebd24947e24d394802d84a52fd5b319 |
| CN=Root YR,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | RSA 4096 | SHA256-RSA | f24b6d17f9d9ad7cb1c9fea78782699f |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of aient.ai. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| ai. | present | 1814, 3799 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| aient.ai. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication Enforced and verified
The endpoint asked for a token and published valid RFC 9728 metadata describing how to get one.
| Result | Enforced and verified |
|---|---|
| Enforced | On connection |
| HTTP status | 401 |
WWW-Authenticate challenge Bearer error="invalid_token", error_description="No authorization provided", resource_metadata="https://aient.ai/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource"
Bearer error="invalid_token", error_description="No authorization provided", resource_metadata="https://aient.ai/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource"| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=63072000 |
| content-security-policy | default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-eval' 'unsafe-inline' https://www.googletagmanager.com https://snap.licdn.com https://cdn.linkedin.oribi.io; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data: blob: https://avatars.githubusercontent.com https://*.supabase.co https://cdn.aient.ai https://www.googletagmanager.com https://www.google-analytics.com https://*.google-analytics.com https://px.ads.linkedin.com https://px4.ads.linkedin.com https://p.adsymptotic.com https://cdn.linkedin.oribi.io https://www.linkedin.com; font-src 'self'; media-src 'self' https://media.aient.ai; connect-src 'self' ws: wss: https://*.supabase.co https://api.stripe.com https://r.stripe.com https://hooks.stripe.com https://aient.ai https://s3.aient.ai https://ingest.aient.ai https://www.googletagmanager.com https://www.google-analytics.com https://*.google-analytics.com https://*.analytics.google.com https://px.ads.linkedin.com https://px4.ads.linkedin.com https://p.adsymptotic.com https://cdn.linkedin.oribi.io; frame-src ' |
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
| x-frame-options | SAMEORIGIN |
| referrer-policy | strict-origin-when-cross-origin |
| permissions-policy | geolocation=(), microphone=(), camera=() |
| www-authenticate | Bearer error="invalid_token", error_description="No authorization provided", resource_metadata="https://aient.ai/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource" |
Protected resource metadata
| Document | https://aient.ai/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource |
|---|---|
| Retrieved | Yes |
| Resource | https://aient.ai/mcp |
| Authorisation server | https://aient.ai |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://aient.ai/mcp | Auth required | 401 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://aient.ai/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 308 | https://aient.ai/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
signup ~229
Create an Aient account from an email address, or get a sign-in code for an existing one, with no browser and no token. **When to use**: you have no Aient access token and the user wants a workspace, or an earlier `verify_email` answered `workspace_unavailable` or its token expired. Ask the user which email address to use. **What happens**: Aient emails a 6-10 digit one-time code to that address. Read the code from that inbox (or ask the user for it), then call `verify_email` with the same email and the code. An address that already has an Aient account receives a sign-in code from this tool instead of a new account; verify_email then returns a token for that account's workspace, preparing the workspace first if an earlier signup never finished. The emailed code is a Supabase Auth credential: it grants this MCP token, and the same email carries a browser sign-in link, so treat both as secrets. **Limits**: a few attempts per minute per address.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
verify_email ~240
Confirm the code Aient emailed after `signup` and receive the access token for this MCP server. **Returns**: `access_token` (a Bearer token for this server, valid for `expires_in` seconds), `organisation_id`, and `user_id`. For an address that already had an account, the token belongs to that account's existing workspace; a workspace that was never prepared is prepared now. Reconnect to this MCP server sending "Authorization: Bearer <access_token>" on every request. Then call `verify_connection` and `get_activation_status` and follow its `nextActions` to finish onboarding. The token is not refreshable: when it expires, call `signup` and `verify_email` again. **Errors**: `confirmation_expired` means the code is too old (call `signup` again); `confirmation_failed` means it did not match; `workspace_unavailable` means the code was accepted but the workspace could not be prepared (call `signup` again for a new code, never `verify_email` with the used one).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| code | string | yes | – |
| string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the ai.aient/mcp server?
ai.aient/mcp is a hosted endpoint at https://aient.ai/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · aient.ai
claude mcp add --transport http ai-aient-mcp 'https://aient.ai/mcp'
What is the ai.aient/mcp server?
ai.aient/mcp is listed in the public MCP registry as ai.aient/mcp. MCP-native AI SRE: ask what's broken in production, get a reviewed GitHub fix PR. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://aient.ai/mcp).
Is the ai.aient/mcp server safe to use?
ai.aient/mcp scores 38 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the ai.aient/mcp server expose?
ai.aient/mcp exposes 2 tools: signup, verify_email. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 469 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the ai.aient/mcp server require authentication?
Yes. ai.aient/mcp asked us for credentials when we connected, so you will need to authorise it in your MCP client before it can do anything.
Is the ai.aient/mcp server still maintained?
ai.aient/mcp is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 5 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.