Parley
PYPI · PARLEY-CONSENSUS
Multi-party decisions for agents: red lines rejected in code, max-min pick, SHA-256 receipt. Stdlib.
Available components
Last scanned (21 hours ago)
Scores higher than 89% of PyPI servers
Category Workflow Automation
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically from public evidence about the published package, including repeated runs of it in an isolated sandbox, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Supply Chain Security100
- No malware found by supply-chain analysis.Pass
- No known CVEs affecting this package version or its production dependencies.Pass
- Runs setuptools.build_meta at install time, a recognised build step with no custom scripting around it. View diagnostics → Pass
- No production dependencies, so there is no dependency health to assess. View diagnostics → Pass
Provenance & Transparency100
- Source repository is publicly reachable at the declared URL. View diagnostics → Pass
- Cryptographically verified build provenance (signed, bound to 5uper0/parley). View diagnostics → Pass
- Clear OSI-approved license (Apache-2.0).Pass
- Actively maintained (last published 18 days ago).Pass
- Publishes a security disclosure policy (SECURITY.md).Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability68
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 817 tokens (~272/item across 3 items; 3 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management43
- Stability observed for 13 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 3 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 3 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities60
- Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2025-06-18; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 16 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 40 to 43. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 12 days of observed history at the previous scan, 13 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 14 Oct 26 +5
- Stability: unverified → 0.37 ▲ functional
- 4 Oct 26 +15
- Malware scan: unverified → pass ▲ security
- 3 Oct 26 64
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 16 Oct 2026 · Analysed pypi/parley-consensus@0.2.0
Provenance Verified
A signed build attestation was found and verified, binding this exact artifact to the source repository it claims to come from.
| Result | Verified |
|---|---|
| Ecosystem | pypi |
| Reason | Verified |
| Discovered via | Registry attestation endpoint |
| Source repo | 5uper0/parley |
| Certificate issuer | https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com |
| Certificate SAN | https://github.com/5uper0/parley/.github/workflows/publish.yml@refs/heads/main |
| Rekor log index | 2979016379 |
| Predicate type | PyPI publish attestation https://docs.pypi.org/attestations/publish/v1 |
| Subject digest | sha256:df6f87ff33c0ad20310a0e87915b8dab147af6e15f1f48ee543a5c3774886195 |
Background: How many MCP packages publish verified provenance →
Install scripts 1 script
| Hook | Tier | Command |
|---|---|---|
| build_backend | allowlisted | setuptools.build_meta |
Background: Why install scripts are a supply-chain risk →
Dependencies 0 packages
| Packages resolved | 0 |
|---|---|
| Tree resolution | Complete |
Background: SBOMs and build attestations, explained →
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
parley_check_party ~151
Replay one party's red lines against a decision: did the outcome cross any of them? Pass the party's spec (the same object you would put in parley_decide's parties) and the decision object returned by parley_decide. Returns JSON: owner and holds (true when every red line of that party holds on the decision). A null decision (deadlock) forces nothing on anyone, so holds is true. Soft preferences are not judged here, only red lines.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| decision | object|null | yes | The decision from parley_decide, or null for a deadlock. |
| party | object | yes | One party: a distinct owner name, hard red lines, soft utility terms. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
parley_decide ~337
Reach a decision among parties with conflicting interests. Give the options and each party's red lines (hard constraints, checked in code) and soft preferences. An option that crosses any party's red line is rejected outright; among the options acceptable to everyone the max-min rule picks the one whose least-satisfied party is best off, tie-broken by total score. No option acceptable to all parties yields an honest status 'deadlock' with decision null, never a forced choice. Returns JSON: status ('agreed'|'deadlock'), decision (the winning option object or null), transcript (every option with each party's masked verdict), and transcript_sha256 (the receipt hash; keep it to verify the transcript later with parley_verify_receipt). HONESTY NOTE: in this mode you, the caller, hold every party's spec and pass them all in one call, so there is no privacy between parties or from you. What still holds: red lines reject an option deterministically (a violating option cannot win), the max-min rule picks among options feasible for everyone, and the returned transcript is tamper-evident via transcript_sha256, provided the hash is kept by someone other than whoever might edit the transcript (it is unsigned and this server does not store it). For private sheets run one process per owner: examples/run_env.py.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| rule | string | – | Selection rule. Only 'egalitarian' (max-min) exists. |
| spec | object | yes | A DecisionSpec: the shared options plus every party's position, the same JSON as examples/demo/recipe_*.json. Extra keys are ignored. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
parley_verify_receipt ~329
Two independent checks on a transcript from parley_decide. Returns JSON: match, max_min_verified, expected_sha256, recomputed_sha256. match=true means only that this transcript hashes to the sha256 you passed. The hash is unsigned and this server does not store it, so if the transcript and the hash come from the same party, match proves nothing: whoever edits the record can re-hash it. It detects tampering only when the hash was kept by someone other than whoever could edit the transcript. max_min_verified recomputes the decision from the recorded verdicts: true when the announced result is exactly the max-min option over them (or an honest deadlock), false when the announced winner does not follow from the recorded verdicts. Verdicts are unsigned, so whoever can rewrite the record can rewrite them to fit a swapped winner; only a hash kept by another party, or signed verdicts, rules that out. It needs every entry to carry exactly one verdict per owner. Pass expected_owners (the roster you know took part) so a record missing a whole owner also fails; that roster is only as trustworthy as where you got it. A malformed transcript is a tool error, not a mismatch.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| expected_owners | array | – | Optional. The owners you know took part; every entry must carry exactly this set for max_min_verified to be true. |
| sha256 | string | yes | The transcript_sha256 you were given, hex. |
| transcript | object | yes | The `transcript` object returned by parley_decide, unmodified. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the Parley MCP server?
Parley runs locally as a PyPI package, launched with uvx parley-consensus. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
pypi · parley-consensus
claude mcp add 5uper0-parley -- uvx parley-consensus
What is the Parley MCP server?
Parley is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.5uper0/parley. Multi-party decisions for agents: red lines rejected in code, max-min pick, SHA-256 receipt. Stdlib. This page covers its PyPI package (parley-consensus).
Is the Parley MCP server safe to use?
Parley scores 85 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. We found no known CVEs affecting it as of 16 October 2026. Its build provenance is signed and verified. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Parley MCP server expose?
Parley exposes 3 tools: parley_decide, parley_verify_receipt, parley_check_party. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 817 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Is the Parley MCP server still maintained?
Parley is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 16 October 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What licence is the Parley MCP server under?
Parley declares the Apache-2.0 licence, which is OSI-approved. That covers the source only, and says nothing about the cost of any service it calls.