SealGuard
REMOTE · GUARD.2CSTUDIO.APP
Check Solana wallets and transactions for risky approvals and scam tokens; find SOL to take back.
Available components
Last scanned (21 hours ago)
Scores higher than 54% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.
Category Security
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security63
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- No authorisation is required to call this server. Nothing on it is marked destructive, but we can't show that an anonymous caller can only read: full credit needs the server to list at least one tool and every tool to be verifiably read-only. We use a best-effort check of tool names and descriptions to tell read-only tools from tools that change things, so some genuinely read-only tools may not get full credit. Names that start with a read verb (get, list, read, search and similar) and accurate readOnlyHint annotations help. Meet that to earn full credit, or require authorisation. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Partial
- HTTPS enforcement could not be verified: the plaintext port answered with HTTP 405, which proves neither a plaintext path nor enforcement. View diagnostics → Unverified
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability72
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 704 tokens (~176/item across 4 items; 4 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management30
- Stability observed for 9 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 4 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 5 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Checks we ran (12)
- TLS certificate
- Authorization
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Checks we could not complete (1)
These are gaps on our side, not findings about this hosted endpoint. We only credit what we can confirm, so a category made up entirely of them scores 0.
- HTTPS in Endpoint SecurityHTTPS enforcement could not be verified: the plaintext port answered with HTTP 405, which proves neither a plaintext path nor enforcement.
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 20 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 23 to 27. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 7 days of observed history at the previous scan, 8 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 17 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 13 to 17. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 4 days of observed history at the previous scan, 5 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 15 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 7 to 10. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 2 days of observed history at the previous scan, 3 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 13 Nov 26 0
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Tool “list_empty_token_accounts” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “scan_wallet” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Schema quality: 136 → 176 ▼ functional
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- Server version: 1.0.0 → 1.1.0 functional
- New tool “check_transaction” functional
- Tool “list_empty_token_accounts” changed its title: List empty token accounts and the SOL in them → List the SOL a wallet can take back cosmetic
- 12 Nov 26 67
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://guard.2cstudio.app/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=2cstudio.app | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 11 Nov 2026 | 9 Feb 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | 39e03bf3c755b1113cd72349060617b |
| SANs: 2cstudio.app, guard.2cstudio.app, *.guard.2cstudio.app | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of guard.2cstudio.app. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| app. | DS published | 23684 | 8 | Verified |
| 2cstudio.app. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://guard.2cstudio.app/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://guard.2cstudio.app/mcp | Inconclusive | 405 |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
check_transaction Check a Solana transaction before signing ~224
Before a wallet signs a Solana transaction, simulates it on mainnet and says whether it would hand anything over: the wallet account itself, a token account's owner, a standing approval on its tokens, a close authority, stake or nonce authorities. Also lists the SOL and token amounts that would leave and arrive, flags durable nonces (a signed transaction that can be sent much later) and programs SealGuard doesn't know. Verdict: do_not_sign, review or no_red_flags. Read-only: nothing is signed or sent. Paid: needs a SealGuard API key (Authorization: Bearer sgk_…); new keys come with 20 free checks, then US$0.01 a check, or 1,000 a month included with the SealGuard guard. Keys at https://guard.2cstudio.app/mcp-key
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| signer | string | – | The wallet about to sign. Defaults to the fee payer (the first signer). |
| transaction | string | yes | The serialized transaction, base64 (base58 also accepted). Unsigned is fine. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_empty_token_accounts List the SOL a wallet can take back ~153
Lists the SOL a Solana wallet could take back: empty token accounts (left behind by sold or sent tokens) with the rent in each and which ones SealGuard suggests closing (accounts for tokens the owner will likely receive again, or used in the last 30 days, are marked to keep, with the reason); pump.fun and PumpSwap deposits; small balances worth under US$1 that could be sold for SOL through Jupiter; and NFTs whose burn would return their rent. Selling and burning are never suggested by default: they're the owner's call. Read-only; returns a link where the owner can do it.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | The Solana wallet address (base58 public key) to check. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_token_approvals List open token approvals ~85
Lists every token approval (delegate) on a Solana wallet: which address can still move which token, and how much. Also lists Token-2022 permanent delegates, which holders can't revoke. Read-only; returns a link where the owner can revoke approvals for free.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | The Solana wallet address (base58 public key) to check. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
scan_wallet Check a Solana wallet ~129
Checks a Solana wallet for risks and gives a 0-100 safety score: open token approvals, phishing airdrops, Token-2022 permanent delegates and transfer restrictions, stake and nonce accounts controlled by someone else, and whether the wallet account itself has been taken over. Also totals the SOL the wallet could take back: empty token accounts, pump.fun deposits, small balances it could sell, and NFTs it could burn. Read-only; returns a link where the owner can fix what was found.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | The Solana wallet address (base58 public key) to check. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the SealGuard MCP server?
SealGuard is a hosted endpoint at https://guard.2cstudio.app/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · guard.2cstudio.app
claude mcp add --transport http 2cstudiodev-web-sealguard 'https://guard.2cstudio.app/mcp'
What is the SealGuard MCP server?
SealGuard is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.2cstudiodev-web/sealguard. Check Solana wallets and transactions for risky approvals and scam tokens; find SOL to take back. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://guard.2cstudio.app/mcp).
Is the SealGuard MCP server safe to use?
SealGuard scores 70 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the SealGuard MCP server expose?
SealGuard exposes 4 tools: scan_wallet, list_empty_token_accounts, list_token_approvals, check_transaction. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 591 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the SealGuard MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to SealGuard without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the SealGuard MCP server still maintained?
SealGuard is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the SealGuard MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 12 checks on SealGuard, covering TLS certificate, Authorization, HSTS header, DNSSEC and 8 more. One item could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about SealGuard: HTTPS. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.