# Diogenes Web3, DeFi & 402 Security MCP (remote · diogenes-micro-gateway.corinth.workers.dev)

Smart contract audit oracles, Solana risk analysis, MEV defense & HTTP 402 verifiers.

- Trust score: 62/100 (medium)
- Registry status: active
- Liveness: live
- Owner verified: no
- Last scored: 2026-10-23

## Components

- remote · `diogenes-micro-gateway.corinth.workers.dev`: 62/100 (this document), [markdown](https://verifymcp.io/servers/stand-out-of-my-sun-diogenes-web3-security-mcp/mcp-web3-security.md), [page](https://verifymcp.io/servers/stand-out-of-my-sun-diogenes-web3-security-mcp/mcp-web3-security)

## Channel facts

- Endpoint: `https://diogenes-micro-gateway.corinth.workers.dev/mcp/web3-security`
- Transports: `streamable-http`
- Auth: `none`
- Version: `1.0.0`

## Trust breakdown

How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. Scores are 0–100 per category. Scoring method: https://verifymcp.io/docs/scoring (what has changed: https://verifymcp.io/docs/scoring/changelog)

Scored 2026-10-23.

- **Endpoint Security**: 63/100
  - The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key.
  - No authorisation is required to call this server. Every tool declares its destructiveHint and none is destructive, so open access doesn't expose one.
  - HTTPS check failed: the endpoint is reachable over plaintext HTTP.
  - HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent.
  - DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC.
- **Transport & Reachability**: 100/100
  - Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake.
- **Schema Quality & AI Usability**: 68/100
  - AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).
  - Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 2874 tokens (~191/item across 15 items; 15 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params.
  - Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples.
- **Stability & Change Management**: 0/100
  - Stability check failed: schema churn in the 3 days we've observed: 13 tool removals, 0 breaking changes, 0 auth/transport breaks, 15 additions.
- **Tool Coverage**: 100/100
  - 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).
  - 100% of tool parameters carry a description.
  - Structured output schemas are declared (100% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.
- **Tool Safety**: 100/100
  - No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.
  - We read all 15 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.
  - An AI judge read all 15 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.
- **Capabilities**: 20/100
  - Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2024-11-05; the latest is 2026-07-28.

## Install

### How do I install the Diogenes Web3, DeFi & 402 Security MCP server?

Diogenes Web3, DeFi & 402 Security MCP is a hosted endpoint at https://diogenes-micro-gateway.corinth.workers.dev/mcp/web3-security, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.

### Claude

```bash
claude mcp add --transport http stand-out-of-my-sun-diogenes-web3-security-mcp 'https://diogenes-micro-gateway.corinth.workers.dev/mcp/web3-security'
```

### Cursor

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "stand-out-of-my-sun-diogenes-web3-security-mcp": {
      "url": "https://diogenes-micro-gateway.corinth.workers.dev/mcp/web3-security"
    }
  }
}
```

### VS Code

```json
{
  "servers": {
    "stand-out-of-my-sun-diogenes-web3-security-mcp": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://diogenes-micro-gateway.corinth.workers.dev/mcp/web3-security"
    }
  }
}
```

### Codex

```toml
[mcp_servers.stand-out-of-my-sun-diogenes-web3-security-mcp]
url = "https://diogenes-micro-gateway.corinth.workers.dev/mcp/web3-security"
```

### opencode

```json
{
  "$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
  "mcp": {
    "stand-out-of-my-sun-diogenes-web3-security-mcp": {
      "type": "remote",
      "url": "https://diogenes-micro-gateway.corinth.workers.dev/mcp/web3-security",
      "enabled": true
    }
  }
}
```

### OpenClaw

```bash
openclaw mcp add stand-out-of-my-sun-diogenes-web3-security-mcp --url 'https://diogenes-micro-gateway.corinth.workers.dev/mcp/web3-security' --transport streamable-http
```

### Hermes

```yaml
mcp_servers:
  stand-out-of-my-sun-diogenes-web3-security-mcp:
    url: "https://diogenes-micro-gateway.corinth.workers.dev/mcp/web3-security"
```

### Netclaw

```json
{
  "McpServers": {
    "stand-out-of-my-sun-diogenes-web3-security-mcp": {
      "Transport": "http",
      "Url": "https://diogenes-micro-gateway.corinth.workers.dev/mcp/web3-security"
    }
  }
}
```

### Vellum

```bash
assistant mcp add stand-out-of-my-sun-diogenes-web3-security-mcp -t streamable-http -u 'https://diogenes-micro-gateway.corinth.workers.dev/mcp/web3-security'
```

### Other

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "stand-out-of-my-sun-diogenes-web3-security-mcp": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://diogenes-micro-gateway.corinth.workers.dev/mcp/web3-security"
    }
  }
}
```

The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.

## Changelog

Every change recorded for this component, newest first. Days that predate change tracking, or that we cannot explain, say so: "we were watching and nothing happened" and "we were not watching" are different claims.

### 2026-10-22 (score 62, +3)

- [security regression] Stability: 0.03 → fail
- [security regression] A breaking change shipped without a version bump: still 2.5.0
- [security regression] Tool “contract_audit” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “crypto_address_poisoning_check” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “crypto_bridge_quote” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “crypto_eip712_permit_decoder” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “crypto_utxo_consolidation_planner” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “http402_challenge_verifier” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “mempool_fee” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “mev_risk” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “solana_risk” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “swap_rate” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “x402_solana_priority_fee_oracle” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “x402_token_meta” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “x402_whale_radar” was removed
- [functional regression] Schema quality: pass → fail
- [functional improvement] Tool coverage: 50% → 100%
- [functional] First check of Tool coverage: 100
- [functional] Schema quality: fair → excellent
- [functional] New tool “audit_smart_contract_code”
- [functional] New tool “calculate_spot_swap_rate”
- [functional] New tool “compare_crosschain_bridge_routes”
- [functional] New tool “decode_eip712_permit_signature”
- [functional] New tool “detect_address_poisoning_scam”
- [functional] New tool “estimate_bitcoin_mempool_fees”
- [functional] New tool “estimate_solana_priority_fees”
- [functional] New tool “evaluate_dex_mev_risk”
- [functional] New tool “evaluate_solana_token_risk”
- [functional] New tool “inspect_solana_token_liquidity”
- [functional] New tool “plan_bitcoin_utxo_consolidation”
- [functional] New tool “scan_solana_cpi_reentrancy”
- [functional] New tool “simulate_evm_transaction_calldata”
- [functional] New tool “track_solana_whale_flows”
- [functional] New tool “verify_http402_payment_challenge”

### 2026-10-21 (score 59, 0)

- [functional improvement] Stability: unverified → 0.03

### 2026-10-20 (score 59)

First indexed and scored.

## MCP tools (15)

### `audit_smart_contract_code` (~188 tokens)

EVM & Move Smart Contract Honeypot, Tax & Reentrancy Auditor

Statically audits Solidity, Vyper, or Move smart contract source code for honeypot transfer taxes, hidden mint backdoors, proxy upgrade traps, and reentrancy. Use when auditing smart contract source code or bytecode before deploying or interacting with a protocol; for scanning Solana Anchor/Rust programs specifically for Cross-Program Invocation (CPI) signer/account vulnerabilities, use scan_solana_cpi_reentrancy instead. Read-only edge call (32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'code_or_address' ('chain' defaults to 'evm_solidity'), uses '?demo=true' or L402 (250 sats); HTTP 400 if invalid.

Input parameters:

- `chain` (string): Target blockchain VM architecture; defaults to 'evm_solidity' when omitted.
- `code_or_address` (string, required): Smart contract source code snippet, ABI, or contract address to audit.

Output parameters:

- `is_honeypot` (boolean): True if transfer restrictions or excessive sell taxes (>10%) are present.
- `risk_level` (string): Severity classification ('LOW', 'MEDIUM', 'HIGH', or 'CRITICAL').
- `security_score` (integer): Composite contract safety score from 0 (critical exploit) to 100 (verified safe).
- `vulnerabilities` (array): Specific vulnerability findings and line-level remediation advice.

### `scan_solana_cpi_reentrancy` (~190 tokens)

Solana Anchor & Rust Cross-Program Invocation (CPI) Vulnerability Scanner

Scans Solana Anchor and native Rust program instructions for unverified Cross-Program Invocation (CPI) program IDs, missing signer checks, and PDA bump seed canonicalization bugs. Use when auditing Solana Rust/Anchor source code or instruction account structs for CPI privilege escalation; for checking live SPL token mint/freeze authorities and rug-pull risk by mint address, use evaluate_solana_token_risk instead. Read-only edge call (32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'rust_source_or_idl' ('framework' defaults to 'anchor'), uses '?demo=true' or L402 (160 sats); HTTP 400 if invalid.

Input parameters:

- `framework` (string): Solana program framework used; defaults to 'anchor' when omitted.
- `rust_source_or_idl` (string, required): Solana Rust/Anchor source code or IDL JSON string to scan for CPI vulnerabilities.

Output parameters:

- `arbitrary_cpi_detected` (boolean): True if invoke/invoke_signed is called without validating the target program account.
- `audit_verdict` (string): Overall Solana program verdict ('SAFE_ANCHOR_PROGRAM' or 'CRITICAL_CPI_VULNERABILITY').
- `missing_signer_checks` (array): Accounts mutated without enforcing Signer<'info> or has_one constraints.
- `pda_bump_safe` (boolean): True when canonical bump seeds are enforced on all PDA derivations.

### `evaluate_solana_token_risk` (~191 tokens)

Solana SPL Token Mint/Freeze Authority & Rug-Pull Risk Evaluator

Evaluates a Solana SPL token's rug-pull probability by checking active mint authority, freeze authority, mutable metadata, and top-holder concentration. Use when making a pre-trade security decision on whether a Solana SPL token is safe to buy; for retrieving SPL token symbol, decimals, and DEX liquidity pool metadata via x402, use inspect_solana_token_liquidity instead. Stateless read-only edge call (max 32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'token_address' ('risk_profile' defaults to 'strict_decentralized'), supports '?demo=true' or L402 (100 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid.

Input parameters:

- `risk_profile` (string): Tolerance policy for centralized freeze authorities; defaults to 'strict_decentralized' when omitted.
- `token_address` (string, required): Base58-encoded Solana SPL token mint address (32–44 characters).

Output parameters:

- `freeze_authority_present` (boolean): True if an active authority can freeze holder token accounts.
- `risk_score` (number): Rug-pull risk score from 0.0 (renounced/safe) to 1.0 (critical danger).
- `should_transact` (boolean): True when the token passes authority and concentration safety checks.
- `valid_base58` (boolean): True when the provided address is a valid Base58 Solana public key.

### `inspect_solana_token_liquidity` (~204 tokens)

Solana SPL Token Metadata, Decimals & Authority Registry Lookup

Retrieves canonical Solana SPL token metadata including name, ticker symbol, decimal precision, and current mint/freeze authority addresses. Use when resolving SPL token decimals, ticker symbols, and registry metadata for portfolio or swap formatting; for computing a composite security risk score and binary should_transact verdict, use evaluate_solana_token_risk instead. Stateless read-only edge call (max 32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'mint' ('network' defaults to 'mainnet-beta'), supports '?demo=true' or x402 (200 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid.

Input parameters:

- `mint` (string, required): Base58-encoded Solana SPL token mint address (e.g. 'EPjFWdd5AufqSSqeM2qN1xzybapC8G4wEGGkZwyTDt1v').
- `network` (string): Solana cluster to query; defaults to 'mainnet-beta' when omitted.

Output parameters:

- `authorities_renounced` (boolean): True when both mint_authority and freeze_authority are null.
- `decimals` (integer): Token decimal precision used for raw lamport/atomic unit conversion.
- `mint` (string): Queried Base58 SPL token mint address.
- `symbol` (string): Canonical token ticker symbol (e.g. 'USDC', 'SOL', 'JUP').

### `track_solana_whale_flows` (~172 tokens)

Solana Whale Wallet Net-Flow & Insider Cluster Tracker

Tracks 24-hour net accumulation or distribution flows across top Solana whale wallets and flags coordinated insider wallet clusters for a given SPL token. Use when analyzing on-chain smart-money order flow and holder clustering on Solana; for checking static SPL contract mint/freeze authority permissions, use evaluate_solana_token_risk instead. Stateless read-only edge call (max 32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'token' ('window' defaults to '1h'), supports '?demo=true' or x402 (500 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid.

Input parameters:

- `token` (string, required): Base58 Solana SPL token mint address or ticker symbol to track whale flows for.
- `window` (string): Aggregation lookback window for net whale flow; defaults to '24h' when omitted.

Output parameters:

- `insider_cluster_detected` (boolean): True if synchronized funding patterns indicate an insider wallet cluster.
- `net_flow_24h_usd` (string): Signed 24-hour net whale flow denominated in USD.
- `signal` (string): Order-flow classification ('ACCUMULATION' or 'DISTRIBUTION').
- `token` (string): Tracked Solana token identifier.

### `estimate_solana_priority_fees` (~177 tokens)

Solana Compute-Unit Priority Fee & Jito MEV Tip Estimator

Calculates optimal Solana compute-unit (CU) microlamport priority fees and Jito bundle tip lamports to achieve target block-inclusion probability. Use when setting SetComputeUnitPrice and Jito tips before broadcasting a Solana transaction; for querying Bitcoin L1 sat/vB mempool fee rates, use estimate_bitcoin_mempool_fees instead. Stateless read-only edge call (max 32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'priority_level' ('tx_type' defaults to 'simple_transfer'), supports '?demo=true' or x402 (50 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid.

Input parameters:

- `priority_level` (string, required): Target inclusion urgency tier on Solana mainnet-beta.
- `tx_type` (string): Transaction category used to estimate compute unit limit; defaults to 'dex_swap' when omitted.

Output parameters:

- `estimated_landing_probability` (number): Projected next-block inclusion probability (0.0 to 1.0).
- `recommended_compute_unit_limit` (integer): Suggested ComputeBudget compute unit ceiling.
- `recommended_jito_tip_lamports` (integer): Recommended Jito block-engine tip in lamports for MEV-protected landing.
- `recommended_micro_lamports_per_cu` (integer): Recommended priority fee in microlamports per compute unit.

### `decode_eip712_permit_signature` (~205 tokens)

EIP-712 Typed Data & Uniswap Permit2 Phishing Signature Decoder

Decodes EIP-712 and Uniswap Permit2 off-chain typed-data payloads to verify spender identity, detect unlimited (uint256.max) token approvals, and flag expired deadlines. Use when inspecting an off-chain eth_signTypedData_v4 or Permit2 payload before signing; for decoding raw on-chain hex transaction calldata (0x...) for eth_sendTransaction, use simulate_evm_transaction_calldata instead. Stateless read-only edge call (max 32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'typed_data_json' ('chain_id' defaults to '1'), supports '?demo=true' or L402 (100 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid.

Input parameters:

- `chain_id` (string): EVM chain ID used to verify canonical router spender addresses; defaults to '8453' (Base) when omitted.
- `typed_data_json` (string, required): JSON string or object containing the EIP-712 / Permit2 message (spender, amount, deadline).

Output parameters:

- `signing_verdict` (string): Safety recommendation ('SAFE_BOUNDED_PERMIT' or 'CRITICAL_UNLIMITED_APPROVAL_UNVERIFIED_SPENDER').
- `spender_address` (string): Normalized lowercase EVM address of the permit spender.
- `spender_identity` (string): Identified protocol router label or 'Unknown Third-Party Spender'.
- `unlimited_approval_detected` (boolean): True if the approval value equals uint256.max / uint160.max.

### `simulate_evm_transaction_calldata` (~216 tokens)

Pre-Sign EVM Hex Calldata Selector Decoder & Drain Simulator

Decodes raw EVM hexadecimal transaction calldata (0x...) by 4-byte function selector to expose hidden ERC-20 approve/transferFrom calls, setApprovalForAll drains, and multicall bundles. Use when auditing raw hex transaction data (to, value, data) before broadcasting an on-chain EVM transaction; for inspecting off-chain EIP-712 JSON typed-data signatures, use decode_eip712_permit_signature instead. Stateless read-only edge call (max 32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'calldata_hex' ('network' defaults to 'base_mainnet'), supports '?demo=true' or L402 (90 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid.

Input parameters:

- `calldata_hex` (string, required): Hexadecimal EVM transaction data string starting with '0x' (e.g. '0x095ea7b3000000000000000000000000...').
- `network` (string): Target EVM network for simulation context; defaults to 'base_mainnet' when omitted.

Output parameters:

- `approval_or_drain_risk` (boolean): True if the call grants token/NFT allowances or transfers assets to an untrusted target.
- `decoded_method` (string): Human-readable ABI function signature matched to the selector.
- `selector_hex` (string): Extracted 4-byte function selector (e.g. '0x095ea7b3').
- `simulation_verdict` (string): Pre-sign safety recommendation ('SAFE_CALLDATA' or 'HIGH_RISK_APPROVAL_DETECTED').

### `evaluate_dex_mev_risk` (~193 tokens)

Pre-Swap DEX MEV Sandwich & Frontrunning Risk Evaluator

Evaluates decentralized exchange (DEX) swap parameters against pool depth and mempool visibility to quantify MEV sandwich risk and compute optimal slippage tolerance in basis points. Use when configuring slippage tolerance and private-RPC routing before executing an on-chain DEX token swap; for comparing cross-chain bridge settlement routes across different L1 blockchains, use compare_crosschain_bridge_routes instead. Read-only edge call (32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'pair' ('execution_venue' defaults to 'uniswap_v3_public'), uses '?demo=true' or L402 (150 sats); HTTP 400 if invalid.

Input parameters:

- `execution_venue` (string): Target DEX protocol or RPC relay; defaults to 'uniswap_v3_public' when omitted.
- `pair` (string, required): Trading pair symbol or pool identifier (e.g. 'ETH/USDC' or 'SOL/USDC').

Output parameters:

- `frontrunning_detected` (boolean): True if public mempool broadcast exposes the swap to predatory bots.
- `optimal_slippage_bps` (integer): Recommended maximum slippage tolerance in basis points (1 bps = 0.01%).
- `recommended_rpc` (string): Suggested MEV-protected broadcast endpoint.
- `sandwich_risk` (string): Assessed MEV extraction risk tier ('LOW', 'MEDIUM', or 'HIGH').

### `detect_address_poisoning_scam` (~171 tokens)

Counterparty Address Poisoning & Vanity Prefix/Suffix Spoof Detector

Compares a target recipient wallet address against recent transaction history to detect vanity prefix/suffix lookalike spoofing and zero-value dusting attacks. Use when verifying a recipient EVM or Solana wallet address before sending funds; for decoding hex smart contract calldata payloads, use simulate_evm_transaction_calldata instead. Stateless read-only edge call (max 32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'target_address' ('address_standard' defaults to 'auto_detect'), supports '?demo=true' or L402 (100 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid.

Input parameters:

- `address_standard` (string): Address encoding format; defaults to 'auto_detect' when omitted.
- `target_address` (string, required): Candidate recipient EVM (0x...) or Solana Base58 wallet address to verify.

Output parameters:

- `poisoning_detected` (boolean): True if a prefix/suffix collision with a different middle body is found.
- `prefix_suffix_collision_score` (number): Similarity score (0.0 to 1.0) against known counterparty addresses.
- `target_address` (string): Audited recipient address.
- `verdict` (string): Transfer safety decision ('SAFE_VERIFIED' or 'DANGER_POISONING_ATTACK').

### `verify_http402_payment_challenge` (~202 tokens)

Pre-Payment HTTP 402 (L402 / x402 / MPP) Invoice & Macaroon Fraud Verifier

Decodes inbound HTTP 402 Payment Required challenges (L402 BOLT11 + Macaroon, x402 Solana USDC, MPP Base intents) to verify cryptographic payment-hash binding and block overcharge fraud. Use when auditing a 402 challenge header before an autonomous agent pays a Lightning invoice or USDC transfer; for checking on-chain Bitcoin L1 mempool feerates, use estimate_bitcoin_mempool_fees instead. Stateless read-only edge call (max 32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'www_authenticate' ('protocol_hint' defaults to 'L402'), supports '?demo=true' or L402 (60 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid.

Input parameters:

- `protocol_hint` (string): Expected HTTP 402 payment protocol; defaults to 'L402' when omitted.
- `www_authenticate` (string, required): Raw WWW-Authenticate or Payment-Required HTTP header string from a 402 response.

Output parameters:

- `macaroon_payment_hash_matches_bolt11` (boolean): True when the macaroon caveat hash matches the BOLT11 invoice payment hash.
- `overcharge_detected` (boolean): True if the invoice amount exceeds the declared endpoint price ceiling.
- `payment_safety_verdict` (string): Authorization recommendation ('SAFE_TO_PAY' or 'REJECT_HASH_MISMATCH').
- `protocol_detected` (string): Identified 402 settlement protocol ('L402', 'x402', or 'MPP').

### `estimate_bitcoin_mempool_fees` (~162 tokens)

Bitcoin Mainnet Mempool Feerate Estimator (sat/vB)

Fetches real-time Bitcoin mainnet mempool feerate recommendations in satoshis per virtual byte (sat/vB) across fastest, half-hour, hour, and economy confirmation tiers. Use when checking current Bitcoin L1 network congestion before broadcasting an on-chain BTC transaction; for calculating exact SegWit/Taproot UTXO batch consolidation vByte weights and dust thresholds, use plan_bitcoin_utxo_consolidation instead. Stateless read-only edge call (max 32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'confirmation_target', supports '?demo=true' or L402 (50 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid.

Input parameters:

- `confirmation_target` (string): Target confirmation speed tier; defaults to 'half_hour' when omitted.

Output parameters:

- `economyFee` (integer): Low-priority feerate in sat/vB for non-urgent batch sweeps.
- `fastestFee` (integer): Recommended feerate in sat/vB for next-block (~10 min) inclusion.
- `halfHourFee` (integer): Recommended feerate in sat/vB for ~30-minute confirmation.
- `hourFee` (integer): Recommended feerate in sat/vB for ~60-minute confirmation.

### `plan_bitcoin_utxo_consolidation` (~234 tokens)

Bitcoin SegWit/Taproot UTXO Dust Consolidation & Fee-Window Planner

Analyzes a set of Bitcoin UTXO balances in satoshis to compute exact vByte transaction weight, identify uneconomical dust inputs, and recommend whether to consolidate now or hold. Use when optimizing on-chain Bitcoin treasury UTXO sets to minimize long-term miner fee drag; for fetching current live Bitcoin mempool sat/vB feerates alone, use estimate_bitcoin_mempool_fees instead. Stateless read-only edge call (max 32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'utxos_sats_json' ('script_type' defaults to 'p2wpkh_segwit'), supports '?demo=true' or L402 (80 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid.

Input parameters:

- `script_type` (string): Bitcoin input script type determining vByte weight per input; defaults to 'p2wpkh_segwit' when omitted.
- `utxos_sats_json` (string, required): JSON array or comma-separated list of UTXO values in satoshis (e.g. '[1200, 45000, 85000]').

Output parameters:

- `estimated_consolidation_vbytes` (integer): Total virtual byte (vB) size of the consolidation transaction.
- `high_fee_dust_utxos` (integer): Count of UTXOs whose input weight costs more than 3% of their value.
- `recommended_action` (string): Execution timing advice ('CONSOLIDATE_NOW' or 'HOLD_UNTIL_SUB_15_SAT_VB').
- `utxo_count` (integer): Number of UTXO inputs analyzed.

### `calculate_spot_swap_rate` (~165 tokens)

Cross-Asset Spot Exchange Rate & Satoshi Conversion Calculator

Calculates instantaneous spot exchange rates and equivalent USD, BTC, and satoshi values across BTC, ETH, SOL, SUI, and USDC. Use when converting a token amount into USD or satoshis for invoice pricing or accounting; for quoting executable non-KYC cross-chain bridge routes with bridge fees and settlement times, use compare_crosschain_bridge_routes instead. Stateless read-only edge call (max 32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'currency' ('amount' defaults to 'standard'), supports '?demo=true' or L402 (100 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid.

Input parameters:

- `amount` (number): Quantity of the source asset to convert; defaults to 100 when omitted.
- `currency` (string, required): Source asset ticker symbol to convert from.

Output parameters:

- `equivalent_sats` (integer): Equivalent value denominated in Bitcoin satoshis.
- `source_amount` (number): Input asset quantity.
- `source_currency` (string): Input asset symbol converted.
- `total_usd_value` (number): Equivalent spot value in US Dollars (USD).

### `compare_crosschain_bridge_routes` (~204 tokens)

Non-KYC Cross-Chain Bridge Route & Settlement Fee Comparator

Compares non-custodial, non-KYC cross-chain swap routes (THORChain native L1 swaps, Maya Protocol, Blockstream Liquid) by basis-point fee, net output sats, and settlement time. Use when routing cross-chain treasury settlements (e.g. Solana USDC or Base ETH into native Bitcoin); for calculating mid-market spot exchange rates without bridge routing fees, use calculate_spot_swap_rate instead. Stateless read-only edge call (max 32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'from_asset' ('to_asset' defaults to 'BTC_NATIVE'), supports '?demo=true' or L402 (100 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid.

Input parameters:

- `amount` (number): Input asset amount to quote; defaults to 100.0 when omitted.
- `from_asset` (string, required): Origin chain asset identifier to bridge from.
- `to_asset` (string): Destination chain asset identifier; defaults to 'BTC_NATIVE' when omitted.

Output parameters:

- `best_route` (string): Optimal non-KYC bridge protocol selected (e.g. 'THORCHAIN_NATIVE_SWAP').
- `estimated_output_sats` (integer): Net settled output denominated in Bitcoin satoshis.
- `fee_bps` (integer): Total protocol and slip fee in basis points.
- `kyc_required` (boolean): Always false; only non-custodial permissionless routes are returned.

## Diagnostics

Captured diagnostic sections: TLS, DNSSEC, Authorisation, Transports. The full working is on the page: https://verifymcp.io/servers/stand-out-of-my-sun-diogenes-web3-security-mcp/mcp-web3-security#diagnostics

## Score history

- 2026-10-23: 62
- 2026-10-22: 62
- 2026-10-21: 59
- 2026-10-20: 59

## Common questions

### What is the Diogenes Web3, DeFi & 402 Security MCP server?

Diogenes Web3, DeFi & 402 Security MCP is listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.stand-out-of-my-sun/diogenes-web3-security-mcp. Smart contract audit oracles, Solana risk analysis, MEV defense & HTTP 402 verifiers. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://diogenes-micro-gateway.corinth.workers.dev/mcp/web3-security).

### Is the Diogenes Web3, DeFi & 402 Security MCP server safe to use?

Diogenes Web3, DeFi & 402 Security MCP scores 62 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.

### What tools does the Diogenes Web3, DeFi & 402 Security MCP server expose?

Diogenes Web3, DeFi & 402 Security MCP exposes 15 tools: audit_smart_contract_code, scan_solana_cpi_reentrancy, evaluate_solana_token_risk, inspect_solana_token_liquidity, track_solana_whale_flows, and 10 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 2,874 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.

### Does the Diogenes Web3, DeFi & 402 Security MCP server require authentication?

No. We connected to Diogenes Web3, DeFi & 402 Security MCP without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.

### Is the Diogenes Web3, DeFi & 402 Security MCP server still maintained?

Diogenes Web3, DeFi & 402 Security MCP is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 23 October 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.

## Links

- Remote endpoint: https://diogenes-micro-gateway.corinth.workers.dev/mcp/web3-security
- Repository: https://github.com/stand-out-of-my-sun/diogenes-web3-security-mcp
- Website: https://diogenes-micro-gateway.corinth.workers.dev/
- Changelog RSS feed: https://verifymcp.io/servers/stand-out-of-my-sun-diogenes-web3-security-mcp/mcp-web3-security.xml
- Changelog JSON feed: https://verifymcp.io/servers/stand-out-of-my-sun-diogenes-web3-security-mcp/mcp-web3-security.json
- HTML version of this page: https://verifymcp.io/servers/stand-out-of-my-sun-diogenes-web3-security-mcp/mcp-web3-security