Reversecore MCP
OCI · GHCR.IO/SJKIM1127/REVERSECORE_MCP · 2 COMPONENTS
Security-first MCP server for reverse engineering, malware analysis, forensics, and SAST.
Available components
Last scanned (13 hours ago)
Scores higher than 93% of OCI servers
Category Security
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically from public evidence about the published package, including repeated runs of it in an isolated sandbox, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Supply Chain Security0
- No malware scan is available for this kind of package: the supply-chain vendors we use do not cover it. This is a permanent gap in our coverage, not a finding about the package.Unverified
- Known CVEs could not be checked: this image's dependency list comes from an SBOM its publisher attached, which nothing verifies, so we will not report it as a clean result. View diagnostics → Unverified
- Install-script risk not yet assessed.Unverified
- Dependency health could not be checked: this image's dependency list comes from an SBOM its publisher attached. It names packages and versions but not whether each is deprecated, still maintained or linked to its source, so there is nothing we can fairly grade.Unverified
Provenance & Transparency48
- Source repository is publicly reachable at the declared URL. View diagnostics → Pass
- Provenance check failed: no build-provenance attestation is published. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- Clear OSI-approved license (MIT).Pass
- Actively maintained (last published 38 days ago).Pass
- Publishes a security disclosure policy (SECURITY.md).Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability82
- 100% of prompts and resources have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the item's name).Pass
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 18370 tokens (~118/item across 155 items; 151 tools + 4 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage97
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 90% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
- Structured output schemas are declared (99% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.Pass
Tool Safety75
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- 0 of 3 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation; "cve_fuzz_target" implies "execute" and declares no destructiveHint at all, which the MCP spec reads as destructive by default. See how to fix → Fail
- An AI judge read all 152 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Unverified: 1 category
A category scored 0 because we could not verify it: a data source with nothing on this package, evidence we could not reach, or a check we could not run. We only credit what we can confirm.
Checks we ran (12)
- Source repository
- Provenance
- License
- Maintenance
- Security disclosure
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Checks we could not complete (4)
These are gaps on our side, not findings about this package. We only credit what we can confirm, so a category made up entirely of them scores 0.
- Malware scan in Supply Chain Security (scores 0 for this)No malware scan is available for this kind of package: the supply-chain vendors we use do not cover it. This is a permanent gap in our coverage, not a finding about the package.
- Known CVEs in Supply Chain Security (scores 0 for this)Known CVEs could not be checked: this image's dependency list comes from an SBOM its publisher attached, which nothing verifies, so we will not report it as a clean result.
- Install scripts in Supply Chain Security (scores 0 for this)Install-script risk not yet assessed.
- Dependency health in Supply Chain Security (scores 0 for this)Dependency health could not be checked: this image's dependency list comes from an SBOM its publisher attached. It names packages and versions but not whether each is deprecated, still maintained or linked to its source, so there is nothing we can fairly grade.
Does not apply to this package (2)
- Endpoint SecurityScored on hosted endpoints only. A package has no live endpoint of its own for us to probe.
- Transport & ReachabilityScored on hosted endpoints only. A package has no live endpoint of its own for us to probe.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 28 Oct 26 +1
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 26 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 90 to 93. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 27 days of observed history at the previous scan, 28 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 24 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 83 to 87. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 25 days of observed history at the previous scan, 26 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 22 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 77 to 80. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 23 days of observed history at the previous scan, 24 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 20 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 70 to 73. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 21 days of observed history at the previous scan, 22 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 18 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 63 to 67. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 19 days of observed history at the previous scan, 20 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 17 Oct 26 +8
- Stability: unverified → 0.63 ▲ functional
- 28 Sept 26 0
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 5 Nov 2026 · Analysed oci/ghcr.io/sjkim1127/reversecore_mcp@3.0.5
Provenance No attestation
The registry publishes no build provenance for this version, so there is nothing to verify.
| Result | No attestation |
|---|---|
| Ecosystem | oci |
| Reason | No attestation published |
Background: How many MCP packages publish verified provenance →
Vulnerabilities 180 ungraded findings
From the publisher's SBOM, not graded. These advisories match packages listed in the SBOM the publisher attached to this image. A publisher naming a vulnerable package in their own image is credible, so we show them. Nothing verifies that SBOM, though, so the Known CVEs signal does not grade the image from it.
| ID | CVE | Severity | Vector | Fix available |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GHSA-6v38-4h7w-rj9h | CVE-2026-96760 | critical | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N | yes |
| GHSA-7vr2-2fgp-9w7p | CVE-2026-114615 | high | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N | yes |
| GHSA-8m4g-j4wp-wgcg | CVE-2026-114616 | high | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N | yes |
| GHSA-c5mf-xmp2-59rc | CVE-2026-114617 | medium | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N | yes |
| GHSA-c73q-w75p-j82v | CVE-2026-116672 | high | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | yes |
| GHSA-fch4-3c6x-j4gc | CVE-2026-114618 | medium | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N | yes |
| GHSA-jj7h-c3hg-m23x | CVE-2026-114614 | low | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N | yes |
| GHSA-q686-2qmg-hqc7 | CVE-2026-114619 | medium | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N | yes |
| GHSA-x4rv-c3wx-4cr8 | CVE-2026-114620 | medium | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N | yes |
| PYSEC-2026-4354 | CVE-2026-114614 | low | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N | yes |
| PYSEC-2026-4355 | CVE-2026-114615 | critical | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N | yes |
| PYSEC-2026-4356 | CVE-2026-114616 | critical | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N | yes |
| PYSEC-2026-4357 | CVE-2026-114617 | medium | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N | yes |
| PYSEC-2026-4358 | CVE-2026-114618 | medium | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N | yes |
| PYSEC-2026-4359 | CVE-2026-114619 | medium | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N | yes |
| PYSEC-2026-4360 | CVE-2026-114620 | medium | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N | yes |
| GHSA-3cm8-v4mc-gppg | CVE-2022-4510 | high | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | no |
| PYSEC-2026-787 | CVE-2022-4510 | high | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | yes |
| GHSA-cg8m-r9f2-5wm2 | CVE-2026-114134 | high | yes | |
| GHSA-6q48-6c7w-9gw2 | critical | yes | ||
| PYSEC-2026-4320 | none | yes | ||
| GHSA-45c3-73f7-pv4m | CVE-2026-114605 | high | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | yes |
| GHSA-7xgj-8392-5q4r | medium | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N | yes | |
| GHSA-23mf-xhv8-69c2 | CVE-2026-110859 | high | yes | |
| GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w | CVE-2026-100689 | medium | yes | |
| GHSA-83vg-56qc-22m7 | CVE-2026-114145 | high | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | yes |
| GHSA-f9j4-qggq-h239 | CVE-2026-110858 | high | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | yes |
| GHSA-fx3j-rwgx-fr94 | CVE-2026-110855 | medium | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N | yes |
| GHSA-gq48-pqfc-9p58 | CVE-2026-110860 | medium | yes | |
| GHSA-m64x-33q8-m5h7 | CVE-2026-110856 | high | yes | |
| GHSA-w8jc-g24h-crhw | CVE-2026-110857 | high | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | yes |
| GHSA-9pg5-8c7x-5hfx | CVE-2026-119284 | medium | yes | |
| GHSA-jpxq-7h8p-2q76 | CVE-2026-119283 | high | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | yes |
| GHSA-5639-2j2p-m4mx | CVE-2026-102991 | medium | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | yes |
| PYSEC-2026-4243 | CVE-2026-102991 | medium | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | yes |
| GHSA-5h93-6whr-6q8j | CVE-2026-116685 | medium | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N | yes |
| GHSA-84m7-p3x7-pcfv | CVE-2026-59951 | high | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | yes |
| GHSA-rwrf-2pqf-9j8j | CVE-2026-116686 | medium | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | yes |
| GHSA-w4fh-qvv9-3v23 | CVE-2026-116684 | medium | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N | yes |
| GHSA-6v7p-g79w-8964 | CVE-2026-57585 | high | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | yes |
| GHSA-j586-36cw-2gc2 | CVE-2026-114613 | high | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | yes |
| PYSEC-2026-3625 | CVE-2026-57585 | high | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | yes |
| GHSA-xcq7-p3pf-p88h | CVE-2026-114603 | medium | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L | yes |
| GHSA-22hg-r758-rrw9 | CVE-2026-112390 | high | yes | |
| GHSA-24rc-8hj2-v98c | CVE-2026-96638 | medium | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | yes |
| GHSA-254f-3936-288h | CVE-2026-112391 | medium | yes | |
| GHSA-27h8-gf7j-v5hc | CVE-2026-112392 | high | yes | |
| GHSA-332p-7hrc-92wf | CVE-2026-112393 | critical | yes | |
| GHSA-3j72-p6qg-6xp7 | CVE-2026-96642 | high | yes | |
| GHSA-4558-3h8r-v8xp | CVE-2026-112394 | medium | yes |
Showing 50 of 180 vulnerabilities.
Background: What a vulnerability scan can and cannot prove →
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
Radare2_get_current_address ~34
Show the current seek position and function name.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| file_path | string | yes | Path to the binary file |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
Radare2_get_function_prototype ~46
Retrieve the function signature at the specified address.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | Address of the function |
| file_path | string | yes | Path to the binary file |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
Radare2_list_all_strings ~75
Scan the entire binary for strings with optional regex filter. More thorough than list_strings, but slower.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| cursor | – | – | Pagination cursor |
| file_path | string | yes | Path to the binary file |
| filter | – | – | Regular expression to filter results |
| page_size | integer | – | Number of lines per page |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
Radare2_list_classes ~53
List class names from various languages (C++, ObjC, Swift, Java, Dalvik).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| file_path | string | yes | Path to the binary file |
| filter | – | – | Regular expression to filter results |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
Radare2_list_decompilers ~34
Show all available decompiler backends.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| file_path | string | yes | Path to the binary file |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
Radare2_list_entrypoints ~35
Display program entrypoints, constructors and main function.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| file_path | string | yes | Path to the binary file |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
Radare2_list_functions ~58
List all functions discovered during analysis.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| file_path | string | yes | Path to the binary file |
| filter | – | – | Regular expression to filter results |
| only_named | boolean | – | If true, exclude functions with numeric suffixes |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
Radare2_list_functions_tree ~34
List functions and their successors (call tree).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| file_path | string | yes | Path to the binary file |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
Radare2_list_imports ~52
List imported symbols. Note: Use list_symbols for addresses with sym.imp. prefix.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| file_path | string | yes | Path to the binary file |
| filter | – | – | Regular expression to filter results |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
Radare2_list_libraries ~34
List all shared libraries linked to the binary.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| file_path | string | yes | Path to the binary file |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
Radare2_list_methods ~48
List all methods belonging to the specified class.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| classname | string | yes | Name of the class to list methods for |
| file_path | string | yes | Path to the binary file |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
Radare2_list_sections ~33
Display memory sections and segments from the binary.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| file_path | string | yes | Path to the binary file |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
Radare2_list_strings ~82
List strings from data sections with optional regex filter.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| cursor | – | – | Pagination cursor (line number to start from) |
| file_path | string | yes | Path to the binary file |
| filter | – | – | Regular expression to filter results |
| page_size | integer | – | Number of lines per page (default: 1000, max: 10000) |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
Radare2_list_symbols ~47
Show all symbols (functions, variables, imports) with addresses.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| file_path | string | yes | Path to the binary file |
| filter | – | – | Regular expression to filter results |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
Radare2_open_file ~66
Opens a binary file with radare2 for analysis. Call this tool before any other r2mcp tool. Use an absolute file_path.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| arch | – | – | – |
| bits | – | – | – |
| file_path | string | yes | Absolute path to the binary file to analyze |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
Radare2_rename_flag ~71
Rename a flag (variable or data reference) at the specified address.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | Address of the flag |
| file_path | string | yes | Path to the binary file |
| name | string | yes | Current flag name |
| new_name | string | yes | New flag name |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
Radare2_rename_function ~56
Rename the function at the specified address.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | Address of the function to rename |
| file_path | string | yes | Path to the binary file |
| name | string | yes | New function name |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
Radare2_run_command ~62
Execute a raw radare2 command directly. NOTE: Only analysis commands are allowed. Write and shell commands are blocked.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| command | string | yes | The radare2 command to execute |
| file_path | string | yes | Path to the binary file |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
Radare2_set_comment ~52
Add a comment at the specified address.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | Address to add comment |
| file_path | string | yes | Path to the binary file |
| message | string | yes | Comment text |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
Radare2_set_function_prototype ~62
Set the function signature (return type, name, arguments).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | Address of the function |
| file_path | string | yes | Path to the binary file |
| prototype | string | yes | Function signature in C-like syntax |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
Radare2_show_function_details ~45
Display detailed information about a function.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | – | – | Function address (uses current if not specified) |
| file_path | string | yes | Path to the binary file |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
Radare2_show_headers ~31
Display binary headers and file information.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| file_path | string | yes | Path to the binary file |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
Radare2_use_decompiler ~54
Select which decompiler backend to use.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| file_path | string | yes | Path to the binary file |
| name | string | yes | Decompiler name (ghidra, r2dec, pdc) |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
Radare2_xrefs_to ~72
Find all code references TO the specified address.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | Address to check for cross-references (hex or symbol name) |
| file_path | string | yes | Path to the binary file |
| limit | integer | – | Maximum number of xrefs to return (default: 50) |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
recall_memory_item ~98
Search and recall memories from past analyses. Use this when you need to remember something from earlier, or when the user asks about previous findings.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | integer | – | Maximum number of results (default 10) |
| memory_type | – | – | Filter by type ('finding', 'pattern', 'instruction', 'context') |
| query | string | yes | Search query (keywords or phrases) |
| session_id | – | – | Limit search to specific session (optional) |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
resolve_api_hashes ~188
Detect dynamic PEB/TEB walking and resolve 32-bit API hashes to Windows export symbols. Matches constants found in instructions or data sections against precomputed hash tables (ROR13, CRC32, MurmurHash3, FNV-1a, DJB2, SDBM) for standard Windows libraries (ntdll, kernel32, user32, advapi32, ws2_32, wininet, winhttp, etc.).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| algorithm | – | – | Hash algorithm name ('ror13', 'crc32', 'djb2', 'fnv1a', etc.) or 'auto'. |
| custom_hashes | – | – | Optional custom mapping of hash strings (e.g. '0x7c0dfcaa') to API names. |
| file_path | string | yes | Path to the binary file to analyze. |
| timeout | – | – | Maximum execution time in seconds. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | – | yes | – |
No examples provided.
resume_memory_session ~67
Resume a previous analysis session with full context restoration. Use this when the user says "continue where we left off" or "resume yesterday's analysis".
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| binary_name | – | – | Find latest session for this binary (optional) |
| session_id | – | – | Specific session ID to resume (optional) |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
run_binwalk ~49
Analyze binaries for embedded content using binwalk.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| depth | integer | – | – |
| file_path | string | yes | – |
| max_output_size | integer | – | – |
| timeout | integer | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | – | yes | – |
No examples provided.
run_binwalk_extract ~257
Extract embedded files and file systems from a binary using binwalk. This tool performs deep extraction of embedded content, including: - Compressed archives (gzip, bzip2, lzma, xz) - File systems (squashfs, cramfs, jffs2, ubifs) - Firmware images and bootloaders - Nested/matryoshka content (files within files) **Use Cases:** - **Firmware Analysis**: Extract file systems from router/IoT firmware - **Malware Unpacking**: Extract payloads from packed/embedded malware - **Forensics**: Recover embedded files from disk images - **CTF Challenges**: Extract hidden data from challenge files
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| depth | integer | – | Maximum extraction depth for nested content (default: 8) |
| file_path | string | yes | Path to the binary file to extract |
| matryoshka | boolean | – | Enable recursive extraction (files within files) |
| max_output_size | integer | – | Maximum output size in bytes |
| output_dir | – | – | Directory to extract files to (default: creates temp dir) |
| timeout | integer | – | Extraction timeout in seconds (default: 600 for large files) |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | – | yes | – |
No examples provided.
run_capa ~105
Analyze binary capabilities using CAPA (Mandiant FLARE). CAPA identifies capabilities in executable files and provides high-level behavioral information such as: - "encrypt data using AES" - "delete files" - "communicate via HTTP" - "create persistence via registry"
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| file_path | string | yes | Path to the binary file to analyze |
| output_format | string | – | Output format - "summary" (default), "detailed", or "json" |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | – | yes | – |
No examples provided.
run_capa_quick ~69
Quick CAPA scan returning only high-risk capabilities. Faster than full run_capa, focuses on: - Anti-analysis techniques - Persistence mechanisms - C2 communication - Data exfiltration - Impact capabilities
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| file_path | string | yes | Path to the binary file |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | – | yes | – |
No examples provided.
run_deobfuscation_pipeline ~115
Run all deobfuscation engines concurrently and assemble a unified intelligence report. Executes stack string recovery, emulated loop decryption, API hash resolution, and opaque predicate dead code elimination, producing a comprehensive report with threat tags and detected malware capabilities.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| file_path | string | yes | Path to the binary file to analyze. |
| options | – | – | Optional configuration dictionary (e.g. {'algorithm': 'ror13', 'function_address': 'main'}). |
| timeout | – | – | Maximum execution time in seconds. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | – | yes | – |
No examples provided.
run_file ~34
Identify file metadata using the ``file`` CLI utility.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| file_path | string | yes | – |
| timeout | integer | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | – | yes | – |
No examples provided.
run_fuzzing_campaign ~464
Run a real AFL++ fuzzing campaign and automatically triage all crashes. This tool bridges ``generate_fuzzing_harness`` and ``triage_crash`` into a complete, automated fuzzing pipeline: 1. **Setup**: Creates a temporary seed corpus and output directory. 2. **Fuzz**: Runs ``afl-fuzz`` for ``timeout_seconds``, sending inputs via ``@@`` file substitution or stdin depending on ``use_stdin``. 3. **Collect**: Gathers all unique crash files from the AFL++ output directory, deduplicated by content signature. 4. **Triage**: Runs ``triage_crash`` (GDB) on each unique crash to assess exploitability (CONFIRMED / LIKELY / POSSIBLE / UNKNOWN). 5. **Report**: Returns a structured report with crash statistics, triage results sorted by severity, and actionable next steps.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| afl_extra_args | string | – | Space-separated extra arguments for afl-fuzz (e.g., ``"-D"`` for deterministic mode, ``"-p exploit"`` for exploit schedule). |
| file_path | string | yes | Workspace-relative or absolute path to the target binary. |
| fuzzer_type | string | – | The type of harness to generate (default: "qiling"). |
| max_crashes_to_triage | integer | – | Maximum number of unique crashes to triage with GDB. Higher values give more coverage but take longer. Default: 20. |
| seed_corpus | – | – | Optional path to a directory containing seed input files. If ``None``, a minimal corpus (empty file + single byte) is created. |
| target_function_or_addr | – | – | If provided, automatically generates a fuzzing harness for this target function or address before fuzzing. |
| timeout_seconds | integer | – | How long to run the fuzzer in seconds. Default: 300 (5 min). For meaningful coverage, use at least 3600 (1 hour) in production. |
| use_stdin | boolean | – | If ``True``, crash files are fed via stdin for triage. Set to ``False`` if the binary expects a file path as argv[1]. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | – | yes | – |
No examples provided.
run_radare2 ~54
Execute vetted radare2 commands for binary triage.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| file_path | string | yes | – |
| max_output_size | integer | – | – |
| r2_command | string | yes | – |
| timeout | integer | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | – | yes | – |
No examples provided.
run_strings ~68
Extract printable strings using the ``strings`` CLI.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| _bypass_queue | boolean | – | – |
| file_path | string | yes | – |
| max_output_size | integer | – | – |
| min_length | integer | – | – |
| run_async | boolean | – | – |
| timeout | integer | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | – | yes | – |
No examples provided.
run_yara ~70
Scan binaries against YARA rules via ``yara-python`` with modular namespace support.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| _bypass_queue | boolean | – | – |
| category | – | – | – |
| file_path | string | yes | – |
| rule_file | – | – | – |
| run_async | boolean | – | – |
| timeout | integer | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | – | yes | – |
No examples provided.
save_memory_item ~209
Save important information to long-term memory. Use this to remember: - Function addresses and their purposes - Vulnerability patterns discovered - API call sequences - User instructions and preferences - Interesting strings or structures
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| category | – | – | Optional category: - 'function': Function-related info - 'vulnerability': Security issues - 'string': Important strings - 'structure': Data structures - 'api': API usage patterns |
| content | string | yes | The actual content to remember (text or JSON string) |
| importance | integer | – | Importance level 1-10 (default 5, higher = more important) |
| memory_type | string | yes | Type of memory: - 'finding': Analysis discoveries - 'pattern': Code/behavior patterns - 'instruction': User preferences/instructions - 'context': General context information |
| session_id | string | yes | Session ID from create_memory_session |
| user_prompt | – | – | The user's prompt when this was discovered (optional) |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
save_pattern ~134
Save a code/behavior pattern for cross-session similarity search. Use this when you discover a notable pattern that might appear in other samples. This enables "Hey, this looks similar to before!"
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| description | – | – | Human-readable description of the pattern |
| pattern_signature | string | yes | Normalized pattern signature for matching Example: "VirtualAlloc,WriteProcessMemory,CreateRemoteThread" |
| pattern_type | string | yes | Type of pattern: - 'api_sequence': Sequence of API calls - 'code_pattern': Assembly/code pattern - 'behavior': Behavioral pattern |
| session_id | string | yes | Current session ID |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
scan_for_versions ~159
Extract library version strings and CVE clues from a binary. This tool acts as a "Version Detective", scanning the binary for strings that look like version numbers or library identifiers (e.g., "OpenSSL 1.0.2g", "GCC 5.4.0"). It helps identify outdated components and potential CVEs. **Use Cases:** - **SCA (Software Composition Analysis)**: Identify open source components - **Vulnerability Scanning**: Find outdated libraries (e.g., Heartbleed-vulnerable OpenSSL) - **Firmware Analysis**: Determine OS and toolchain versions
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| file_path | string | yes | Path to the binary file |
| timeout | integer | – | Execution timeout in seconds |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | – | yes | – |
No examples provided.
scan_workspace ~181
Batch scan all files in the workspace using multiple tools in parallel. This tool performs a comprehensive scan of the workspace to identify files, analyze binaries, and detect threats. It runs 'run_file', 'parse_binary_with_lief', and 'run_yara' (if rules exist) on all matching files concurrently. **Workflow:** 1. Identify files matching patterns (default: all files) 2. Run 'file' command on all files 3. Run 'LIEF' analysis on executable files 4. Run 'YARA' scan if rules are available 5. Aggregate results into a single report
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| file_patterns | – | – | List of glob patterns to include (e.g., ["*.exe", "*.dll"]). Default is ["*"] (all files). |
| timeout | integer | – | Global timeout for the batch operation in seconds. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | – | yes | – |
No examples provided.
set_severity ~50
Update the severity level of the analysis.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| session_id | string | – | Session ID (uses current if not specified) |
| severity | string | yes | Severity level (low, medium, high, critical) |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
set_timezone ~39
Set the default timezone for timestamps.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| timezone | string | yes | Timezone name (UTC, Asia/Seoul, Asia/Tokyo, etc.) |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
start_report_session ~98
Start a new malware analysis session. Automatically tracks start time, sample hashes, IOCs, and MITRE techniques.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| analyst | string | – | Name of the analyst |
| malware_family | string | – | Known malware family name |
| sample_path | string | – | Path to the malware sample to analyze |
| severity | string | – | Initial severity (low, medium, high, critical) |
| tags | string | – | Comma-separated tags |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
taint_trace ~423
Automatically trace taint paths from user input sources to dangerous sinks. This tool performs automated taint analysis by: 1. **Source discovery**: Finds all calls to user-input functions (``read``, ``fgets``, ``recv``, ``getenv``, ``argv``, etc.) via radare2 xrefs. 2. **Sink discovery**: Finds all calls to dangerous functions (``strcpy``, ``system``, ``execve``, ``sprintf``, etc.) and maps their CWE class. 3. **Path verification** (optional): For each source→sink pair, invokes the angr symbolic execution engine (``angr_worker.py``) to check whether the sink is actually reachable from the source with user-controlled data. If reachable, angr also extracts a **concrete input** that triggers the sink. 4. **Report**: Returns ranked taint paths sorted by severity and reachability.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| file_path | string | yes | Workspace-relative or absolute path to the target binary. |
| max_paths | integer | – | Maximum number of source→sink paths to analyse and return. Default: 10. |
| sinks | – | – | Optional list of sink function names to trace to. If ``None``, uses the full default sink database (``strcpy``, ``system``, ``execve``, etc.). Example: ``["system", "strcpy"]``. |
| sources | – | – | Optional list of source function names to trace from. If ``None``, uses the full default source database (``read``, ``fgets``, ``recv``, ``getenv``, ``argv``, etc.). Example: ``["fgets", "recv"]``. |
| timeout | integer | – | Total analysis timeout in seconds. Default: 300. |
| verify_with_angr | boolean | – | When ``True`` (default), attempts symbolic execution to verify path reachability and extract concrete inputs. Set to ``False`` for fast static-only analysis (no angr). |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | – | yes | – |
No examples provided.
trace_execution_path ~302
Trace function calls backwards from a target function (Sink) to find potential execution paths. This tool helps identify "Exploit Paths" by finding which functions call a dangerous target function (like 'system', 'strcpy', 'execve'). It performs a recursive cross-reference analysis (backtrace) to map out how execution reaches the target. **Use Cases:** - **Vulnerability Analysis**: Check if user input (main/recv) reaches 'system' - **Reachability Analysis**: Verify if a vulnerable function is actually called - **Taint Analysis Helper**: Provide the path for AI to perform manual taint checking **Performance Optimizations (v3.0):** - Reduced default depth (3→2) for faster analysis - Sink-aware pruning: prioritizes paths through dangerous APIs - Dynamic timeout based on file size
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| file_path | string | yes | Path to the binary file |
| max_depth | integer | – | Maximum depth of backtrace (default: 2, reduce for speed) |
| max_paths | integer | – | Maximum number of paths to return (default: 5) |
| prioritize_sinks | boolean | – | Prioritize paths through dangerous sink APIs (default: True) |
| target_function | string | yes | Name or address of the target function (e.g., 'sym.imp.system', '0x401000') |
| timeout | – | – | Execution timeout in seconds (uses dynamic timeout if None) |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | – | yes | – |
No examples provided.
triage_crash ~101
Analyze a crash file against a binary using GDB to determine exploitability.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| binary_path | string | yes | Path to the executable binary. |
| crash_file | string | yes | Path to the crash input file (e.g., from AFL++ crashes/ dir). |
| timeout | integer | – | Maximum execution time in seconds. |
| use_stdin | boolean | – | If True, pipe the crash file to stdin. If False, pass it as an argument. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | – | yes | – |
No examples provided.
update_memory_session_time ~55
Update the cumulative analysis time for a session. Call this periodically to track how long an analysis takes.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| duration_seconds | number | yes | Additional time to add (in seconds) |
| session_id | string | yes | Session ID |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
verify_path_and_get_args ~119
Run symbolic execution using angr to verify path reachability and extract inputs. Allows proving path reachability to a target instruction and extracting concrete inputs.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| avoid_addrs | – | – | Optional list of instruction addresses to avoid. |
| file_path | string | yes | Workspace-relative or absolute path to the binary to analyze. |
| start_addr | – | – | Optional starting instruction address. If omitted, starts from entry point. |
| target_addr | string | yes | The target instruction address to reach (hex or integer). |
| timeout | integer | – | Maximum execution timeout in seconds. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | – | yes | – |
No examples provided.
vt_lookup ~226
Look up IOC reputation using the VirusTotal API v3. Accepts a list of file hashes (MD5/SHA1/SHA256), IP addresses, domain names, and URLs. Returns per-IOC verdict, detection counts, and enrichment data from VirusTotal's 70+ security vendors. **API key required**: Set ``REVERSECORE_VT_API_KEY`` environment variable, or pass the key directly via the ``api_key`` parameter.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| api_key | – | – | VirusTotal API key. If omitted, uses ``REVERSECORE_VT_API_KEY`` environment variable. |
| iocs | array | yes | List of IOCs to look up (max 20 per call). Supported types: - File hashes: MD5 (32 chars), SHA1 (40), SHA256 (64) - IP addresses: IPv4 (e.g. ``8.8.8.8``) - Domain names: (e.g. ``evil.example.com``) -… |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | – | yes | – |
No examples provided.
How do I install the Reversecore MCP server?
Reversecore MCP runs locally as a container image, launched with docker run --rm -i ghcr.io/sjkim1127/reversecore_mcp:3.0.5. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 3 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
oci · ghcr.io/sjkim1127/reversecore_mcp
claude mcp add sjkim1127-reversecore-mcp -- docker run --rm -i ghcr.io/sjkim1127/reversecore_mcp:3.0.5
What is the Reversecore MCP server?
Reversecore MCP is listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.sjkim1127/reversecore-mcp. Security-first MCP server for reverse engineering, malware analysis, forensics, and SAST. This page covers its container image (ghcr.io/sjkim1127/reversecore_mcp).
Is the Reversecore MCP server safe to use?
Reversecore MCP scores 55 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. The SBOM its publisher attached lists packages with 180 known advisories as of 5 November 2026. We do not grade that SBOM, as nothing verifies it. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Reversecore MCP server expose?
Reversecore MCP exposes 151 tools: generate_advanced_yara_rule, diff_binaries, analyze_variant_changes, match_libraries, patch_diff_1day, and 146 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 18,314 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Is the Reversecore MCP server still maintained?
Reversecore MCP is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 5 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What licence is the Reversecore MCP server under?
Reversecore MCP declares the MIT licence, which is OSI-approved. That covers the source only, and says nothing about the cost of any service it calls.
What did VerifyMCP test on the Reversecore MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 12 checks on Reversecore MCP, covering Source repository, Provenance, License, Maintenance and 8 more. 4 items could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about Reversecore MCP: Malware scan, Known CVEs, Install scripts and Dependency health. One category scores 0 for that reason, because we only credit what we can confirm. Endpoint Security and Transport & Reachability do not apply to a container image, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.