Reversecore MCP
OCI · GHCR.IO/SJKIM1127/REVERSECORE_MCP:3.0.3 · 2 COMPONENTS · SCANNED AUG 22
Security-first MCP server for reverse engineering, malware analysis, forensics, and SAST.
Available components
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically from public evidence about the published package, including repeated runs of it in an isolated sandbox, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score →
Supply Chain Security0
- Malware scan not yet available for this package.Unverified
- Known CVEs could not be checked: this artifact ships no SBOM, so there is no dependency list to read. Publishing one would let us assess it.Unverified
- Install-script risk not yet assessed.Unverified
- Dependency health could not be checked: this artifact ships no SBOM, so there is no dependency list to read. Publishing one would let us assess it.Unverified
Provenance & Transparency48
- Source repository is publicly reachable at the declared URL. View diagnostics → Pass
- Provenance check failed: no build-provenance attestation is published. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- Clear OSI-approved license (MIT).Pass
- Actively maintained (last published 8 days ago).Pass
- Publishes a security disclosure policy (SECURITY.md).Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability82
- 100% of prompts and resources have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the item's name).Pass
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 15131 tokens (~117/item across 129 items; 125 tools + 4 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management30
- Stability observed for 9 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage97
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 88% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
- Structured output schemas are declared (97% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Unverified: 1 category
A category scored 0 because we could not verify it: a data source with nothing on this package, evidence we could not reach, or a check we could not run. We only credit what we can confirm.
Add this component to your MCP client. Where a client-specific snippet is available, pick your client below and copy it straight into your config; otherwise use the connection detail shown.
oci · ghcr.io/sjkim1127/reversecore_mcp:3.0.3
claude mcp add sjkim1127-reversecore-mcp -- docker run --rm -i ghcr.io/sjkim1127/reversecore_mcp:3.0.3
codex mcp add sjkim1127-reversecore-mcp -- docker run --rm -i ghcr.io/sjkim1127/reversecore_mcp:3.0.3
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"sjkim1127-reversecore-mcp": {
"type": "local",
"command": [
"docker",
"run",
"--rm",
"-i",
"ghcr.io/sjkim1127/reversecore_mcp:3.0.3"
],
"enabled": true
}
}
} mcp_servers:
sjkim1127-reversecore-mcp:
command: "docker"
args: ["run", "--rm", "-i", "ghcr.io/sjkim1127/reversecore_mcp:3.0.3"] {
"mcpServers": {
"sjkim1127-reversecore-mcp": {
"command": "docker",
"args": [
"run",
"--rm",
"-i",
"ghcr.io/sjkim1127/reversecore_mcp:3.0.3"
]
}
}
} Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 22 Aug 26 +4
- Stability: unverified → 0.30 ▲ functional
- 13 Aug 26 41
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 22 Aug 2026 · Analysed oci/ghcr.io/sjkim1127/reversecore_mcp:3.0.3
Provenance No attestation
The registry publishes no build provenance for this version, so there is nothing to verify.
| Result | No attestation |
|---|---|
| Ecosystem | oci |
| Reason | No attestation published |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability.
Radare2_show_headers ~31
Display binary headers and file information.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| file_path | string | yes | Path to the binary file |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
Radare2_use_decompiler ~54
Select which decompiler backend to use.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| file_path | string | yes | Path to the binary file |
| name | string | yes | Decompiler name (ghidra, r2dec, pdc) |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
Radare2_xrefs_to ~53
Find all code references TO the specified address.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | Address to check for cross-references (hex or symbol name) |
| file_path | string | yes | Path to the binary file |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
recall_memory_item ~98
Search and recall memories from past analyses. Use this when you need to remember something from earlier, or when the user asks about previous findings.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | integer | – | Maximum number of results (default 10) |
| memory_type | – | – | Filter by type ('finding', 'pattern', 'instruction', 'context') |
| query | string | yes | Search query (keywords or phrases) |
| session_id | – | – | Limit search to specific session (optional) |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
resume_memory_session ~67
Resume a previous analysis session with full context restoration. Use this when the user says "continue where we left off" or "resume yesterday's analysis".
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| binary_name | – | – | Find latest session for this binary (optional) |
| session_id | – | – | Specific session ID to resume (optional) |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
run_binwalk ~49
Analyze binaries for embedded content using binwalk.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| depth | integer | – | – |
| file_path | string | yes | – |
| max_output_size | integer | – | – |
| timeout | integer | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | – | yes | – |
No examples provided.
run_binwalk_extract ~257
Extract embedded files and file systems from a binary using binwalk. This tool performs deep extraction of embedded content, including: - Compressed archives (gzip, bzip2, lzma, xz) - File systems (squashfs, cramfs, jffs2, ubifs) - Firmware images and bootloaders - Nested/matryoshka content (files within files) **Use Cases:** - **Firmware Analysis**: Extract file systems from router/IoT firmware - **Malware Unpacking**: Extract payloads from packed/embedded malware - **Forensics**: Recover embedded files from disk images - **CTF Challenges**: Extract hidden data from challenge files
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| depth | integer | – | Maximum extraction depth for nested content (default: 8) |
| file_path | string | yes | Path to the binary file to extract |
| matryoshka | boolean | – | Enable recursive extraction (files within files) |
| max_output_size | integer | – | Maximum output size in bytes |
| output_dir | – | – | Directory to extract files to (default: creates temp dir) |
| timeout | integer | – | Extraction timeout in seconds (default: 600 for large files) |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | – | yes | – |
No examples provided.
run_capa ~105
Analyze binary capabilities using CAPA (Mandiant FLARE). CAPA identifies capabilities in executable files and provides high-level behavioral information such as: - "encrypt data using AES" - "delete files" - "communicate via HTTP" - "create persistence via registry"
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| file_path | string | yes | Path to the binary file to analyze |
| output_format | string | – | Output format - "summary" (default), "detailed", or "json" |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
run_capa_quick ~69
Quick CAPA scan returning only high-risk capabilities. Faster than full run_capa, focuses on: - Anti-analysis techniques - Persistence mechanisms - C2 communication - Data exfiltration - Impact capabilities
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| file_path | string | yes | Path to the binary file |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
run_file ~34
Identify file metadata using the ``file`` CLI utility.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| file_path | string | yes | – |
| timeout | integer | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | – | yes | – |
No examples provided.
run_fuzzing_campaign ~464
Run a real AFL++ fuzzing campaign and automatically triage all crashes. This tool bridges ``generate_fuzzing_harness`` and ``triage_crash`` into a complete, automated fuzzing pipeline: 1. **Setup**: Creates a temporary seed corpus and output directory. 2. **Fuzz**: Runs ``afl-fuzz`` for ``timeout_seconds``, sending inputs via ``@@`` file substitution or stdin depending on ``use_stdin``. 3. **Collect**: Gathers all unique crash files from the AFL++ output directory, deduplicated by content signature. 4. **Triage**: Runs ``triage_crash`` (GDB) on each unique crash to assess exploitability (CONFIRMED / LIKELY / POSSIBLE / UNKNOWN). 5. **Report**: Returns a structured report with crash statistics, triage results sorted by severity, and actionable next steps.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| afl_extra_args | string | – | Space-separated extra arguments for afl-fuzz (e.g., ``"-D"`` for deterministic mode, ``"-p exploit"`` for exploit schedule). |
| file_path | string | yes | Workspace-relative or absolute path to the target binary. |
| fuzzer_type | string | – | The type of harness to generate (default: "qiling"). |
| max_crashes_to_triage | integer | – | Maximum number of unique crashes to triage with GDB. Higher values give more coverage but take longer. Default: 20. |
| seed_corpus | – | – | Optional path to a directory containing seed input files. If ``None``, a minimal corpus (empty file + single byte) is created. |
| target_function_or_addr | – | – | If provided, automatically generates a fuzzing harness for this target function or address before fuzzing. |
| timeout_seconds | integer | – | How long to run the fuzzer in seconds. Default: 300 (5 min). For meaningful coverage, use at least 3600 (1 hour) in production. |
| use_stdin | boolean | – | If ``True``, crash files are fed via stdin for triage. Set to ``False`` if the binary expects a file path as argv[1]. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | – | yes | – |
No examples provided.
run_radare2 ~54
Execute vetted radare2 commands for binary triage.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| file_path | string | yes | – |
| max_output_size | integer | – | – |
| r2_command | string | yes | – |
| timeout | integer | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | – | yes | – |
No examples provided.
run_strings ~68
Extract printable strings using the ``strings`` CLI.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| _bypass_queue | boolean | – | – |
| file_path | string | yes | – |
| max_output_size | integer | – | – |
| min_length | integer | – | – |
| run_async | boolean | – | – |
| timeout | integer | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | – | yes | – |
No examples provided.
run_yara ~63
Scan binaries against YARA rules via ``yara-python``.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| _bypass_queue | boolean | – | – |
| file_path | string | yes | – |
| rule_file | string | yes | – |
| run_async | boolean | – | – |
| timeout | integer | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | – | yes | – |
No examples provided.
save_memory_item ~209
Save important information to long-term memory. Use this to remember: - Function addresses and their purposes - Vulnerability patterns discovered - API call sequences - User instructions and preferences - Interesting strings or structures
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| category | – | – | Optional category: - 'function': Function-related info - 'vulnerability': Security issues - 'string': Important strings - 'structure': Data structures - 'api': API usage patterns |
| content | string | yes | The actual content to remember (text or JSON string) |
| importance | integer | – | Importance level 1-10 (default 5, higher = more important) |
| memory_type | string | yes | Type of memory: - 'finding': Analysis discoveries - 'pattern': Code/behavior patterns - 'instruction': User preferences/instructions - 'context': General context information |
| session_id | string | yes | Session ID from create_memory_session |
| user_prompt | – | – | The user's prompt when this was discovered (optional) |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
save_pattern ~134
Save a code/behavior pattern for cross-session similarity search. Use this when you discover a notable pattern that might appear in other samples. This enables "Hey, this looks similar to before!"
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| description | – | – | Human-readable description of the pattern |
| pattern_signature | string | yes | Normalized pattern signature for matching Example: "VirtualAlloc,WriteProcessMemory,CreateRemoteThread" |
| pattern_type | string | yes | Type of pattern: - 'api_sequence': Sequence of API calls - 'code_pattern': Assembly/code pattern - 'behavior': Behavioral pattern |
| session_id | string | yes | Current session ID |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
scan_for_versions ~159
Extract library version strings and CVE clues from a binary. This tool acts as a "Version Detective", scanning the binary for strings that look like version numbers or library identifiers (e.g., "OpenSSL 1.0.2g", "GCC 5.4.0"). It helps identify outdated components and potential CVEs. **Use Cases:** - **SCA (Software Composition Analysis)**: Identify open source components - **Vulnerability Scanning**: Find outdated libraries (e.g., Heartbleed-vulnerable OpenSSL) - **Firmware Analysis**: Determine OS and toolchain versions
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| file_path | string | yes | Path to the binary file |
| timeout | integer | – | Execution timeout in seconds |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | – | yes | – |
No examples provided.
scan_workspace ~197
Batch scan all files in the workspace using multiple tools in parallel. This tool performs a comprehensive scan of the workspace to identify files, analyze binaries, and detect threats. It runs 'run_file', 'parse_binary_with_lief', and 'run_yara' (if rules exist) on all matching files concurrently. **Workflow:** 1. Identify files matching patterns (default: all files) 2. Run 'file' command on all files 3. Run 'LIEF' analysis on executable files 4. Run 'YARA' scan if rules are available 5. Aggregate results into a single report
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ctx | – | – | FastMCP Context for progress reporting (auto-injected) |
| file_patterns | – | – | List of glob patterns to include (e.g., ["*.exe", "*.dll"]). Default is ["*"] (all files). |
| timeout | integer | – | Global timeout for the batch operation in seconds. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | – | yes | – |
No examples provided.
taint_trace ~423
Automatically trace taint paths from user input sources to dangerous sinks. This tool performs automated taint analysis by: 1. **Source discovery**: Finds all calls to user-input functions (``read``, ``fgets``, ``recv``, ``getenv``, ``argv``, etc.) via radare2 xrefs. 2. **Sink discovery**: Finds all calls to dangerous functions (``strcpy``, ``system``, ``execve``, ``sprintf``, etc.) and maps their CWE class. 3. **Path verification** (optional): For each source→sink pair, invokes the angr symbolic execution engine (``angr_worker.py``) to check whether the sink is actually reachable from the source with user-controlled data. If reachable, angr also extracts a **concrete input** that triggers the sink. 4. **Report**: Returns ranked taint paths sorted by severity and reachability.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| file_path | string | yes | Workspace-relative or absolute path to the target binary. |
| max_paths | integer | – | Maximum number of source→sink paths to analyse and return. Default: 10. |
| sinks | – | – | Optional list of sink function names to trace to. If ``None``, uses the full default sink database (``strcpy``, ``system``, ``execve``, etc.). Example: ``["system", "strcpy"]``. |
| sources | – | – | Optional list of source function names to trace from. If ``None``, uses the full default source database (``read``, ``fgets``, ``recv``, ``getenv``, ``argv``, etc.). Example: ``["fgets", "recv"]``. |
| timeout | integer | – | Total analysis timeout in seconds. Default: 300. |
| verify_with_angr | boolean | – | When ``True`` (default), attempts symbolic execution to verify path reachability and extract concrete inputs. Set to ``False`` for fast static-only analysis (no angr). |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | – | yes | – |
No examples provided.
trace_execution_path ~302
Trace function calls backwards from a target function (Sink) to find potential execution paths. This tool helps identify "Exploit Paths" by finding which functions call a dangerous target function (like 'system', 'strcpy', 'execve'). It performs a recursive cross-reference analysis (backtrace) to map out how execution reaches the target. **Use Cases:** - **Vulnerability Analysis**: Check if user input (main/recv) reaches 'system' - **Reachability Analysis**: Verify if a vulnerable function is actually called - **Taint Analysis Helper**: Provide the path for AI to perform manual taint checking **Performance Optimizations (v3.0):** - Reduced default depth (3→2) for faster analysis - Sink-aware pruning: prioritizes paths through dangerous APIs - Dynamic timeout based on file size
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| file_path | string | yes | Path to the binary file |
| max_depth | integer | – | Maximum depth of backtrace (default: 2, reduce for speed) |
| max_paths | integer | – | Maximum number of paths to return (default: 5) |
| prioritize_sinks | boolean | – | Prioritize paths through dangerous sink APIs (default: True) |
| target_function | string | yes | Name or address of the target function (e.g., 'sym.imp.system', '0x401000') |
| timeout | – | – | Execution timeout in seconds (uses dynamic timeout if None) |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | – | yes | – |
No examples provided.
triage_crash ~101
Analyze a crash file against a binary using GDB to determine exploitability.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| binary_path | string | yes | Path to the executable binary. |
| crash_file | string | yes | Path to the crash input file (e.g., from AFL++ crashes/ dir). |
| timeout | integer | – | Maximum execution time in seconds. |
| use_stdin | boolean | – | If True, pipe the crash file to stdin. If False, pass it as an argument. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | – | yes | – |
No examples provided.
update_memory_session_time ~55
Update the cumulative analysis time for a session. Call this periodically to track how long an analysis takes.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| duration_seconds | number | yes | Additional time to add (in seconds) |
| session_id | string | yes | Session ID |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
verify_path_and_get_args ~119
Run symbolic execution using angr to verify path reachability and extract inputs. Allows proving path reachability to a target instruction and extracting concrete inputs.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| avoid_addrs | – | – | Optional list of instruction addresses to avoid. |
| file_path | string | yes | Workspace-relative or absolute path to the binary to analyze. |
| start_addr | – | – | Optional starting instruction address. If omitted, starts from entry point. |
| target_addr | string | yes | The target instruction address to reach (hex or integer). |
| timeout | integer | – | Maximum execution timeout in seconds. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | – | yes | – |
No examples provided.
vt_lookup ~226
Look up IOC reputation using the VirusTotal API v3. Accepts a list of file hashes (MD5/SHA1/SHA256), IP addresses, domain names, and URLs. Returns per-IOC verdict, detection counts, and enrichment data from VirusTotal's 70+ security vendors. **API key required**: Set ``REVERSECORE_VT_API_KEY`` environment variable, or pass the key directly via the ``api_key`` parameter.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| api_key | – | – | VirusTotal API key. If omitted, uses ``REVERSECORE_VT_API_KEY`` environment variable. |
| iocs | array | yes | List of IOCs to look up (max 20 per call). Supported types: - File hashes: MD5 (32 chars), SHA1 (40), SHA256 (64) - IP addresses: IPv4 (e.g. ``8.8.8.8``) - Domain names: (e.g. ``evil.example.com``) -… |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | – | yes | – |
No examples provided.
vulnerability_hunter ~273
Automated vulnerability discovery combining multiple analysis techniques. This tool performs a comprehensive security analysis: 1. Scans for dangerous API calls (buffer overflow, command injection, etc.) 2. Traces back to find how each dangerous call is reached 3. Identifies if inputs are user-controllable (light taint analysis) 4. Generates vulnerability report with YARA detection rules
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| _bypass_queue | boolean | – | – |
| auto_dynamic_verify | boolean | – | If True and angr finds a concrete input, automatically run it in GDB to verify exploitability (default: True) |
| file_path | string | yes | Path to the binary file to analyze |
| generate_yara | boolean | – | Generate YARA rules for detected vulnerabilities (default: True) |
| max_depth | integer | – | Maximum backtrace depth for call chain analysis (default: 3) |
| run_async | boolean | – | If True, run task in background and return job ID immediately (default: False) |
| severity_filter | string | – | Filter by severity - "all", "critical", "high", "medium" (default: "all") |
| timeout | integer | – | Analysis timeout in seconds (default: 300) |
| use_symbolic_execution | boolean | – | Enable angr to verify paths and extract concrete values (default: True) |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | – | yes | – |
No examples provided.