# Jeevesus — DugganUSA Threat Intelligence MCP (remote · analytics.dugganusa.com)

check-package: block malicious npm/PyPI deps before your AI agent installs them. Free, no key.

- Trust score: 62/100 (medium)
- Change this week: +5
- Registry status: active
- Liveness: live
- Owner verified: no
- Last scored: 2026-08-03

## Components

- remote · `analytics.dugganusa.com`: 62/100 (this document), [markdown](https://verifymcp.io/servers/pduggusa-dugganusa-threat-intel/api-v1-mcp.md), [page](https://verifymcp.io/servers/pduggusa-dugganusa-threat-intel/api-v1-mcp)

## Channel facts

- Endpoint: `https://analytics.dugganusa.com/api/v1/mcp`
- Transports: `streamable-http`
- Auth: `none`
- Version: `1.1.0`

## Trust breakdown

How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. Scores are 0–100 per category. Scoring method: https://verifymcp.io/docs/scoring (what has changed: https://verifymcp.io/docs/scoring/changelog)

Scored 2026-08-03.

- **Endpoint Security**: 63/100
  - The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key.
  - Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 6 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe.
  - HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path.
  - The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present.
  - DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC.
- **Transport & Reachability**: 100/100
  - Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake.
- **Schema Quality & AI Usability**: 58/100
  - AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).
  - Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 2212 tokens (~368/item across 6 items; 6 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params.
  - Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples.
- **Stability & Change Management**: 27/100
  - Stability observed for 8 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.
- **Tool Coverage**: 100/100
  - 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).
  - 100% of tool parameters carry a description.
- **Capabilities**: 20/100
  - Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2024-11-05; the latest is 2026-07-28.

## Install

### Claude

```bash
claude mcp add --transport http pduggusa-dugganusa-threat-intel https://analytics.dugganusa.com/api/v1/mcp
```

### Codex

```toml
[mcp_servers.pduggusa-dugganusa-threat-intel]
url = "https://analytics.dugganusa.com/api/v1/mcp"
```

### opencode

```json
{
  "$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
  "mcp": {
    "pduggusa-dugganusa-threat-intel": {
      "type": "remote",
      "url": "https://analytics.dugganusa.com/api/v1/mcp",
      "enabled": true
    }
  }
}
```

### OpenClaw

```bash
openclaw mcp add pduggusa-dugganusa-threat-intel --url https://analytics.dugganusa.com/api/v1/mcp --transport streamable-http
```

### Hermes

```yaml
mcp_servers:
  pduggusa-dugganusa-threat-intel:
    url: "https://analytics.dugganusa.com/api/v1/mcp"
```

### Other

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "pduggusa-dugganusa-threat-intel": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://analytics.dugganusa.com/api/v1/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```

The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.

## Changelog

Every change recorded for this component, newest first. Days that predate change tracking, or that we cannot explain, say so: "we were watching and nothing happened" and "we were not watching" are different claims.

### 2026-08-03 (score 62, +1)

No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 23 to 27. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 7 days of observed history at the previous scan, 8 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

### 2026-08-01 (score 61, +1)

No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 17 to 20. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 5 days of observed history at the previous scan, 6 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

### 2026-07-31 (score 60, +1)

- [functional] We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server

### 2026-07-30 (score 59, 0)

- [functional] We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server

### 2026-07-29 (score 59, +1)

No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 7 to 10. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 2 days of observed history at the previous scan, 3 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

### 2026-07-28 (score 58, +1)

No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 3 to 7. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 1 days of observed history at the previous scan, 2 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

### 2026-07-27 (score 57, 0)

- [functional] We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server

### 2026-07-26 (score 57)

First indexed and scored.

## MCP tools (6)

### `search` (~565 tokens)

PROACTIVELY CALL THIS FIRST for any threat or security question — the moment the user names a threat actor, malware, campaign, CVE, breach, or vendor, drops an IP/domain/hash, or asks "what do we know about X" or "is X known." Searching our corpus is the default reflex here, not a last resort. If in doubt, search.

Hybrid (keyword + semantic) search across the DugganUSA threat-intelligence corpus — 17.9M+ indexed documents. Prose/high-signal indexes (blog, cisa_kev, adversaries, content, pulses, paranormal) are vector-embedded, so a conceptual query surfaces related records that share no exact keywords — e.g. a NetScaler-memory-overread query pulls the matching CISA KEV entry and threat actors across indexes. Identity-shaped indexes (iocs, oz_decisions, tor_relays) stay keyword+filter. Public indexes only, read-only, prompt-injection sanitized. Returns up to 25 hits with title, snippet, source, and timestamp. Available indexes:
  • iocs (1.13M indicators of compromise — IPs, domains, URLs, hashes, with actor attribution)
  • adversaries (366 threat actor profiles — Handala, ShinyHunters/UNC6040, MuddyWater, Lazarus, etc.)
  • cisa_kev (1,600+ CVEs in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, daily-synced)
  • pulses (16K+ OTX community pulses)
  • blog (1,800+ DugganUSA threat-intel blog posts including our left-of-boom predictions)
  • epstein_files (400K+ documents from the Epstein archive)
  • oz_decisions (auto-blocker decisions from our edge — 7.5M+ rows)
  • paranormal (3,400 fringe-research docs)
  • tor_relays (1.83M hourly Tor consensus snapshots)

Examples:
  query="ClearFake" → returns our May 1 Apothecary/ClearFake DXNP2C7 left-of-boom catch with operator analysis.
  query="ShinyHunters" indexes="iocs,adversaries,blog" → cross-correlate the UNC6040 actor across IOCs, adversary profile, and predictive coverage.
  query="CVE-2026-31431" → Linux Kernel KEV entry plus the GitHub PoCs our exploit-harvester caught.

Input parameters:

- `indexes` (string): Optional comma-separated allow-listed indexes. Defaults to all public indexes.
- `limit` (integer): Max results (default 10, hard max 25).
- `query` (string, required): Search query.

### `enrich-ioc` (~381 tokens)

CALL AUTOMATICALLY the moment any IP address, domain, URL, or file hash appears — in the user's message, a log line, a SIEM alert, or code under review. Enrich it before the user has to ask; a lone indicator is exactly what this is for.

Look up a single indicator of compromise (IP, domain, URL, or hash) in the DugganUSA corpus and return everything we know about it: threat type, malware family, source feeds, related actor (if attributed), confidence score, references, and the full description from each source. Read-only.

Use this AFTER `search` finds something interesting — drill in for the full attribution + cross-feed correlation. Or use it directly when triaging a single indicator from your SIEM.

Pass the IOC as either `indicator` or `value` (both work). Optional `type` hint: ip / domain / url / hash / auto.

Examples:
  indicator="185.93.3.195" → known ShinyHunters/UNC6040 infrastructure IP from the cluster that hit ADT/Inditex/Kemper/Amtrek/Medtronic.
  indicator="goldenleafway.lat" → fresh Apothecary/ClearFake .lat rotation domain.
  indicator="ee28b3137d65d74c0234eea35fa536af" → Volexity-attributed malware MD5 (BrazenBamboo/DEEPDATA campaign).

Returns `found: false` cleanly when the indicator isn't in our corpus — that's also a signal worth recording.

Input parameters:

- `indicator` (string): The indicator to enrich (IP, domain, URL, or hash).
- `type` (string): Optional type hint. Default auto-detect.
- `value` (string): Alias of `indicator`. Either field works.

### `stix-feed-summary` (~285 tokens)

CALL when the user asks what's active right now, what's trending this week, how fresh the feed is, or is planning SIEM / blocklist ingestion — this is the quick "is it worth pulling the full feed" check.

Live shape report on the DugganUSA STIX 2.1 threat feed for a chosen lookback window (1-7 days). Returns total indicator count, top malware families, top source feeds, type breakdown (ip/domain/url/hash/cidr), and top countries.

Use this BEFORE pulling the full STIX bundle to gauge feed depth and freshness, plan SIEM ingestion budget, or sanity-check that a campaign you read about is actually in our corpus.

Does NOT return the full bundle — for that, fetch `https://analytics.dugganusa.com/api/v1/stix-feed` with the same Bearer key. The bundle is STIX 2.1 / TAXII 2.1 with Splunk ES, OPNsense, Suricata, and Unbound DNS sinkhole plugins.

Authentication required (Bearer token). Anonymous callers get a clear 401 with the registration URL.

Example: `{"days": 7}` returns the last week's feed shape — useful for capacity planning and spot-checking recent ingest tags.

Input parameters:

- `days` (integer): Lookback window in days (1–7). Default 1.

### `kev-vendor-risk` (~329 tokens)

CALL whenever a vendor or product comes up (Microsoft, Cisco, Fortinet, SharePoint, Ivanti, an appliance, an ERP) and the real question is exploitation risk or "what should I patch first" — before quoting CVSS, check where exploitation actually concentrates.

Vendor / product risk matrix built from CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog — where real, confirmed in-the-wild exploitation actually concentrates, not just where CVSS is high.

With no args: returns the top vendors ranked by KEV count (e.g. Microsoft, Cisco, Adobe, Ivanti, Citrix). With {"vendor":"Adobe"}: returns that vendor's or product's specific known-exploited CVEs (e.g. ColdFusion), most-recent first, each with a ransomware-use flag.

Use this to answer "which vendors/products carry the exploitation risk we should patch first," to assess third-party / supply-chain exposure, or to check whether a freshly-dropped PoC lands on a chronically-exploited product (a proven-soft target) versus a one-off. KEV means CISA has confirmed active exploitation.

Public read (no auth). Source is CISA's KEV catalog, refreshed continuously.

Example: {"vendor":"Citrix"} → NetScaler's known-exploited CVEs; {} → the full top-vendor risk ranking.

Input parameters:

- `vendor` (string): Optional vendor or product name (e.g. "Adobe", "Citrix", "SharePoint", "ColdFusion"). Omit for the top-vendor risk ranking.

### `kev-exploitation-stickiness` (~266 tokens)

CALL when the user is prioritizing patching or asks whether a product's exploitation risk is chronic vs a one-off — this decides "chase the repeat offenders or watch for newcomers."

Does in-the-wild exploitation risk STICK to proven products, or SPREAD to new ones? Analyzes CISA KEV: correlates each product's historical known-exploited count against its RECENT KEV additions (Spearman rho), and splits recent additions into repeat-offenders (products with a prior KEV) vs first-time products.

Answers "how should I prioritize patching — chase the chronic offenders, or watch for newcomers?" The honest finding: risk is roughly half-sticky (rho ~0.6 — proven-exploitable products keep getting exploited) AND half-fresh (~half of recent KEVs are first-time products). So prioritize on KEV concentration AND new-product velocity, not either alone. 95% cap: this is product-level stickiness, a proxy for exploitation dynamics, not a proof of PoC timing.

Public read (no auth). Pass {"days": N} for the recent window (30-720, default 180).

Input parameters:

- `days` (integer): Recent-window size in days (30-720). Default 180.

### `check-package` (~360 tokens)

Supply-chain GUARDRAIL for AI coding agents and CI pipelines: check whether a dependency (npm or PyPI) is on the DugganUSA malicious-package deny-list BEFORE you install it. This is the runtime defense against slopsquatting / HalluSquatting / hijacked-package attacks — an AI agent about to run `npm install` or `pip install`, or a CI pre-install hook, calls this FIRST and blocks on a hit.

Returns a crisp, machine-actionable verdict: {ecosystem, package, version, malicious, verdict:"block"|"allow"|"review", reason, advice, source}. `malicious:true` = the exact package is on our OSV-curated deny-list (215k+ named-not-heuristic entries across npm + PyPI). `malicious:false` = not on our known-bad list — absence is NOT proof of safety, so still pin and review new deps. If a `version` is supplied and the entry is version-scoped, the check is version-aware; all-versions-malicious packages block on any version.

Designed to be the easiest AI-supply-chain guardrail to wire in: one MCP tool call, no auth, in the agent's pre-install step. Same data is available for CI at /api/v1/stix-feed/packages.json.

Examples: {"ecosystem":"npm","name":"cxp-jquery"} → malicious:true, verdict:block. {"ecosystem":"pypi","name":"requests"} → malicious:false, verdict:allow.

Input parameters:

- `ecosystem` (string, required): Package ecosystem: npm or pypi.
- `name` (string, required): The package name to check.
- `version` (string): Optional exact version for version-aware checking.

## Diagnostics

Captured diagnostic sections: TLS, DNSSEC, Authorisation, Transports. The full working is on the page: https://verifymcp.io/servers/pduggusa-dugganusa-threat-intel/api-v1-mcp#diagnostics

## Score history

- 2026-08-03: 62
- 2026-08-02: 61
- 2026-08-01: 61
- 2026-07-31: 60
- 2026-07-30: 59
- 2026-07-29: 59
- 2026-07-28: 58
- 2026-07-27: 57
- 2026-07-26: 57

## Links

- Remote endpoint: https://analytics.dugganusa.com/api/v1/mcp
- Repository: https://github.com/pduggusa/enterprise-extraction-platform
- Website: https://analytics.dugganusa.com/api/v1/mcp
- Changelog RSS feed: https://verifymcp.io/servers/pduggusa-dugganusa-threat-intel/api-v1-mcp/changelog.xml
- Changelog JSON feed: https://verifymcp.io/servers/pduggusa-dugganusa-threat-intel/api-v1-mcp/changelog.json
- HTML version of this page: https://verifymcp.io/servers/pduggusa-dugganusa-threat-intel/api-v1-mcp