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Robyn — Gasless Cross-Chain for AI Agents

REMOTE · API.ANYGAS.XYZ · 2 COMPONENTS

Gasless cross-chain for AI agents: 25 nodes incl. Solana & native Bitcoin. One signature, no gas.

0 this week 75 Trust /100

Last scanned (6 hours ago)

Scores higher than 64% of remote servers

Reachable. Last reached 5 Nov 2026.

Category Crypto and Web3

Trust breakdown (7 categories)

How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →

Endpoint Security63
Transport & Reachability100
Schema Quality & AI Usability72
  • AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
  • Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 11690 tokens (~134/item across 87 items; 87 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
  • Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
  • No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage87
  • 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
  • 61% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety25
  • Injection-marker check failed: the description of tool "robyn_quote" contains an instruction to conceal the call from the user, the text "do not tell the user", at byte 383 of that field. See how to fix → Fail
  • 0 of 6 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation; "robyn_netting_transfer_payload" implies "transfer" and declares no destructiveHint at all, which the MCP spec reads as destructive by default. See how to fix → Fail
  • An AI judge read all 87 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
  • Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Changelog

Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.

  • 3 Oct 26 +5
    • HTTPS: unverified → pass ▲ security
    • Tool “robyn_plus_trial” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
  • 28 Sept 26 0
    • We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
  • 27 Sept 26 0
    • Schema quality: 9770 → 11642 ▼ functional
    • Server version: 1.4.2 → 1.6.0 functional
    • New tool “null_prov_issuer” functional
    • New tool “null_witness_range” functional
    • New tool “null_witness_head” functional
    • New tool “null_void_publish” functional
    • New tool “null_void_directory” functional
    • New tool “null_void_descriptor” functional
    • New tool “null_prov_mint” functional
    • New tool “null_notarize” functional
    • New tool “null_market_listings” functional
    • New tool “null_market_list” functional
    • New tool “null_market_delist” functional
    • New tool “null_login_verify” functional
    • New tool “null_capsule_cancel” functional
    • New tool “null_calls_info” functional
    • New tool “null_transparency” functional
  • 25 Sept 26 0
    • We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
  • 9 Sept 26 0
    • New tool “null_names_quote” functional
    • New tool “null_names_market” functional
  • 3 Sept 26 0
    • Tool “robyn_message_publish_mailbox” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Tool “robyn_message_mailbox_of” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Tool “robyn_message_feed” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Tool “robyn_message_directory” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Server version: 1.4.1 → 1.4.2 functional
    • “robyn_message_publish_mailbox” added an optional parameter “public” cosmetic
    • “robyn_message_publish_mailbox” added an optional parameter “handle” cosmetic
    • “robyn_message_feed” added an optional parameter “after” cosmetic
    • “robyn_message_mailbox_of” reworded the description of “addressOrName” cosmetic
  • 2 Sept 26 0
    • Schema quality: 8354 → 9343 ▼ functional
    • Server version: 1.3.1 → 1.4.1 functional
    • New tool “null_balance” functional
    • New tool “null_ecosystem” functional
    • New tool “null_prekeys_fetch” functional
    • New tool “null_prekeys_publish” functional
    • New tool “null_agent_guide” functional
  • 26 Aug 26 0
    • We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
Diagnostics

Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.

Captured 5 Nov 2026 · Probed https://api.anygas.xyz/mcp

TLS valid

Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .

Subject Issuer Valid from Valid until Key Signature Serial
CN=anygas.xyz CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US 10 Sept 2026 9 Dec 2026 ECDSA 256 ECDSA-SHA256 a38eb472ef66b707133b94c22dc11d1c
SANs: anygas.xyz, *.anygas.xyz
CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US 13 Dec 2023 20 Feb 2029 ECDSA 256 ECDSA-SHA384 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3
CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE 15 Nov 2023 28 Jan 2028 ECDSA 384 SHA256-RSA 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b

Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →

DNSSEC insecure

Validation of api.anygas.xyz. — Not signed

Zone DS Keys Algorithms Outcome
. trust_anchor 20326, 38696 8, 8 Verified
xyz. present 3599, 18130 8, 8 Verified
anygas.xyz. absent Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation
Authentication No authorisation required

The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.

Result No authorisation required
HTTP status 200
Header Value
strict-transport-security max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
content-security-policy default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'wasm-unsafe-eval'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self' data:; img-src 'self' data: https:; connect-src 'self' https://anygas.xyz https://api.anygas.xyz https://relay.nightferry.net https://snowpiercer.me; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self'; frame-ancestors 'self'
x-content-type-options nosniff
x-frame-options SAMEORIGIN
referrer-policy strict-origin-when-cross-origin
permissions-policy geolocation=(), microphone=(), camera=()

Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →

Transports 2 probes
Transport URL Outcome Status Location
streamable-http https://api.anygas.xyz/mcp Verified 200
http (plaintext) http://api.anygas.xyz/mcp HTTPS enforced 301 https://api.anygas.xyz/mcp
MCP tools · 87 exposed · ~11,690 tokens

The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →

Tool Tokens
robyn_netting_account ~76

Whether an address is enrolled (and therefore custodied), its internal balance, recent history, and `nextNonce` — which you MUST use when signing the next transfer or withdrawal. An address that never enrolled is reported as not custodied. Read-only.

NameTypeReqDescription
addressstringyesEVM address (0x…)

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

robyn_netting_enroll_payload ~155

Returns the EXACT message the account must sign with its OWN key to open a custodial balance. This endpoint holds no key and enrols nobody — it returns the text; the user signs it, then POST {address, signature} to /api/netting/enroll. CUSTODIAL — this is the ONE part of Robyn that holds your balance; every other tool here moves funds without Robyn ever holding them. Tell the user that plainly before they enrol. Show the user the full consent text before they sign it: it states that the balance is held by Robyn, is not insured, and could be lost.

NameTypeReqDescription
addressstringyesthe address that will own the netting account

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

robyn_netting_info ~111

Explains the opt-in netting ledger: transfers between two ENROLLED accounts settle as a book entry — no chain, no gas, no fee, instant, at ANY size including amounts below every per-chain cost floor. CUSTODIAL — this is the ONE part of Robyn that holds your balance; every other tool here moves funds without Robyn ever holding them. Tell the user that plainly before they enrol. Read-only. Returns the caps, the published limits and the fee model.

Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

robyn_netting_preview ~165

Free and read-only. Given an amount, ranks EVERY exit chain by what actually arrives after the destination payout cost is deducted. Those costs differ by more than 1000x (Avalanche delivers ~$0.99994 of a dollar; Linea ~$0.927), so which chain you leave on is a real decision. Pass toChain to price one chain and learn whether it would succeed at all. Internal transfers between netting accounts remain free at any size — this cost applies only to leaving for a real on-chain balance.

NameTypeReqDescription
amountstringyesamount in USDC base units (6dp), e.g. "1000000" = $1.00
toChainnumber|string–price a single chain instead of ranking all

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

robyn_netting_reserves ~78

Publishes what Robyn OWES across all netting accounts against the real relayer float backing it, per chain. Solvency is checkable rather than asserted. Deposits are refused if they would push liabilities above a safe share of the float. Read-only — a user considering a custodial balance should be shown this.

Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

robyn_netting_statement ~109

Internal transfers produce NO transaction hash because no transaction occurs — this append-only journal is their only record. Never truncated; page with `before` (a seq number). Use this when a user asks to verify or dispute an internal payment, since there is no chain to check.

NameTypeReqDescription
addressstringyesEVM address (0x…)
beforestring–return entries with seq below this, for paging
limitnumber–max entries (default 200)

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

robyn_netting_transfer_payload ~150

Returns the exact string to sign, with the correct next nonce, for a free instant transfer between two ENROLLED accounts. Signs nothing and moves nothing — the sender signs the returned message, then POSTs {from,to,amount,nonce,signature} to /api/netting/transfer. BOTH parties must already be enrolled: Robyn will not hold a balance for a recipient who never consented, so to pay an unenrolled address use the ordinary non-custodial route instead.

NameTypeReqDescription
amountstringyesUSDC base units (6dp)
fromstringyessender (must be enrolled)
tostringyesrecipient (must ALSO be enrolled)

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

robyn_payment_request_prepare ~151

Build a canonical payment request (payee, chain, token, amount, memo, expiry) and return the digest for THE PAYEE to sign with their own wallet. Robyn does not sign these and holds no payee keys — a request signed by Robyn would prove nothing about the payee. Use this when an agent needs to ASK another agent for money in a way the payer can actually check.

NameTypeReqDescription
amountstringyesbase units
chainnumber|stringyesdestination chain id or name
expiresInSecnumber––
memostring––
payeestringyesaddress that should be paid
tokenstring––

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

robyn_payment_request_settlement ~95

After paying, prove it: re-checks the transfer against the DESTINATION CHAIN and confirms the payee was paid at least the amount requested. Returns paid=true only on a verified on-chain result; paid=null means undetermined, which is NOT evidence you satisfied the request.

NameTypeReqDescription
requestobjectyes–
signaturestringyes–
transferIdstringyesthe transfer that paid it

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

robyn_payment_request_verify ~134

ALWAYS run this before paying a request you received. It confirms the payee address, chain, token and amount were signed by whoever controls the payee address, and that the request has not expired. If `signedByPayee` is false, DO NOT PAY — that is what an altered payee address looks like, and address substitution is the most common theft in this space. A valid signature proves AUTHENTICITY, not that the payment is owed and not that the payee is trustworthy.

NameTypeReqDescription
requestobjectyesthe canonical request object
signaturestringyesthe payee signature

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

robyn_plan ~132

Validate a WHOLE multi-step workflow up front instead of one hop at a time. Fees and durations accumulate across steps. Evaluation stops at the first unroutable step rather than reporting speculative results behind it. If the plan cannot work, the response names the BINDING CONSTRAINT and the value that would work (`bindingConstraint`, `whatWouldMakeThisWork`) — use that to adjust rather than retrying blindly. READ-ONLY: nothing is signed, reserved or moved. Use this before spending on step one.

NameTypeReqDescription
constraintsobject––
stepsarrayyesthe hops, in order

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

robyn_plus_claim ~111

Submit BLINDED tokens (base64, from plus-sdk blindTokens()) with the payment txHash. Payment is verified on-chain (recipient, amount, confirmation; one tx pays one invoice), then each blinded token is signed blind. Unblind locally (plus-sdk claim() does all of this). This tool never sees an unblinded pass.

NameTypeReqDescription
blindedarrayyes–
invoiceIdstringyes–
txHashstring–EVM payment tx; omit for btc

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

robyn_plus_info ~123

Plus sells capacity (rate-limit-exempt sends), funded cover rows and signed/anchored Merkle proofs — never a "more private lane" (that would be a smaller crowd). Paid in ETH (Robinhood Chain, Ethereum, Arbitrum, Base), USDC (Base, Arbitrum) or BTC (Chainflip). Redeemed with RFC 9474 blind passes the server cannot link to any payment. Returns products, assets, the mint public key (JWK) and honest what-we-learn / what-we-do-not. Read-only.

Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

robyn_plus_invoice ~104

Creates an invoice for one bundle (500 passes, $3 quoted in the chosen asset). Returns {invoiceId, payTo, amount (base units), human, chainId, expires}. Pay from any wallet; then blind tokens locally with the SDK and call robyn_plus_claim. For btc pass refundAddress (your BTC address) — the invoice returns a Chainflip deposit address.

NameTypeReqDescription
assetstringyes–
refundAddressstring–btc only

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

robyn_plus_invoice_status ~33

Status, remaining passes and payment details for an invoice. Read-only.

NameTypeReqDescription
invoiceIdstringyes–

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

robyn_plus_trial ~132

Try Plus before paying: submit up to 20 BLINDED tokens (base64, from plus-sdk blindTokens()) and receive blind signatures — identical BLINDED passes to paid ones (the server never sees a pass; unlinkable to the claim only once the Plus mint key is pinned in the witness-chained head, K3, and only to the IP if the claim rides Tor — claims use the direct lane). One trial per day per caller. Unblind locally (plus-sdk trial() does all of this). This tool never sees an unblinded pass.

NameTypeReqDescription
blindedarrayyes–

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

robyn_preflight ~256

Run this before robyn_prepare/robyn_submit. Returns decision GO or NO_GO plus typed `blockers` (each with a `fix`) and `warnings`. It catches, for free, the failures that otherwise cost gas: a fixed corridor fee that would consume the whole amount so nothing arrives, a recipient in the wrong address family, a corridor that can price but not settle, and a transfer above the instant lane's capacity that would silently pay a dearer bridge. Read-only — signs nothing, moves nothing. Pass fromAddress so membership (free micro-transfers) is recognised.

NameTypeReqDescription
amountstringyesamount in fromToken base units (e.g. "5000000" = 5 USDC)
fromAddressstring–sender — determines membership and therefore fee tier
fromChainnumber|stringyessource chain id, or "solana"/"stellar"/"tron"/"bitcoin"
fromTokenstring–symbol or address; omit for the chain default
toAddressstring–recipient — validated against the destination chain family
toChainnumber|stringyesdestination chain id or non-EVM name
toTokenstring––

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

robyn_preflight_full ~205

ONE call combining serviceability, routing competitiveness, cheaper alternatives, delivery basis and mandate budget into a single go/no-go. Call this before executing rather than making five separate checks. BLOCKERS AND WARNINGS ARE DIFFERENT. `blockers` WILL fail — do not attempt the transfer. `warnings` are things to tell the user or act on first; they do not prevent execution. Never present a warning as a failure or a blocker as advice. Anything in `unavailable` means a check could NOT run: treat it as unknown, not fine. `proceed:true` means nothing known blocks it — it is not a guarantee of success.

NameTypeReqDescription
amountstringyes–
fromChainnumber|stringyes–
fromTokenstring––
mandateIdstring–check the spend against this budget too
toAddressstring––
toChainnumber|stringyes–
toTokenstring––

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

robyn_prepare ~160

Turn a plain-language or structured intent into a concrete plan plus the EXACT payload to sign. Costs nothing, moves nothing, needs no key. Returns status:"sign" with signRequest, or status:"quoted" if something is still missing.

NameTypeReqDescription
amountstring–base units, overrides amountHuman
amountHumannumber–human units, e.g. 25 for 25 USDC
fromChainnumber|string––
intentstring–plain language, e.g. "send 25 USDC to 0xabc... on arbitrum"
toAddressstring––
toChainnumber|string––
tokenstring–USDC, USDT, ETH, ...

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

robyn_privacy_posture ~149

ONE read that tells you, for a chain and for the lane you reached Robyn on, exactly what stays private (relay lane, PQ transport, private mempool / sequencer) and what is still public (on-chain settlement, stealth is not PQ), the live mode of every privacy feature (messaging v2, Plus, netting-set shadow/live, cover rows), and how to raise your quota WITHOUT an identity (a blind Plus pass instead of an API key). Call it first when planning; it reads live flags, never a brochure.

NameTypeReqDescription
chainIdnumber|string–chain to assess (e.g. 1, 8453, 42161)

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

robyn_quote ~258

Best gasless route to move a token from one Robyn chain to another. Returns estimated output, the bridge used, duration, and the Robyn fee. Read-only — moves nothing. IMPORTANT: check `quoteOnly` on the response. If it is true the corridor can be PRICED but NOT settled — execute will refuse it with UNSUPPORTED_DIRECTION — so present that quote as a price comparison only and do not tell the user it can be sent. `quoteOnlyReason` says why. Absent/false means executable.

NameTypeReqDescription
amountstringyesamount in fromToken base units (e.g. "25000000" = 25 USDC)
fromAddressstring–sender — determines membership (fee tier) AND whether a free netting path is available between these two accounts
fromChainnumber|stringyessource chain id, or "stellar"
fromTokenstringyestoken address on the source chain (0x0000…0000 for native)
toAddressstring–recipient on the destination chain
toChainnumber|stringyesdestination chain id, or "stellar"
toTokenstringyestoken address / symbol on the destination

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

robyn_receipt_deliver ~135

Hands a relayer-signed settlement receipt (from robyn_settle / a completed route) to the counterparty's sealed messaging-v2 mailbox, so they get verifiable proof (terms honored, authorized, clean provenance) WITHOUT ever contacting Robyn. Same wire shape as any message; content-hash idempotent. Only receipts signed by this relayer are accepted.

NameTypeReqDescription
pass––optional Plus pass {preparedMsg,sig} to skip the lane rate limit
receipt––the signed receipt object
tostringyescounterparty address or Robyn name with a v2 mailbox

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

robyn_receipt_verify ~44

Checks digest + relayer signature + signed terms of a receipt you received (e.g. opened from your v2 mailbox). Read-only.

NameTypeReqDescription
receipt–––

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

robyn_recipes ~123

Ordered playbooks for real goals: pay-someone-safely, prove-what-i-spent, spend-within-a-budget, handle-failures-well, stay-current. CALL THIS BEFORE IMPROVISING A SEQUENCE. Each step says what it answers, what to do with the answer, whether it is optional, and what skipping it costs. Steps marked optional:false should not be skipped — `skippingCosts` explains the concrete harm, not a style preference.

NameTypeReqDescription
namestring–a specific recipe, or omit for all

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

robyn_refusal_verify ~128

Check a signed refusal receipt. Send header `x-anygas-receipt: 1` on any request and, IF Robyn refuses it, the error response carries a signed `refusalReceipt` recording what was asked, when, and why. This matters because when a provider says no, the AGENT gets the blame — a receipt lets you prove to your principal that you were blocked externally rather than simply failing. It proves the refusal HAPPENED; it does not claim the refusal was correct.

NameTypeReqDescription
receiptobjectyesthe full refusalReceipt object as returned

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

robyn_route_status ~39

Status of an in-flight route by id (BRIDGING → DONE), with the destination tx once delivered.

NameTypeReqDescription
idstringyes–

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

robyn_sandbox_do ~98

Runs the identical path end to end against the sandbox: no key, no funds, no broadcast. Use this to prove an integration works before touching real money.

NameTypeReqDescription
amountstring––
amountHumannumber––
fromChainnumber|string––
intentstring––
toAddressstring––
toChainnumber|string––
tokenstring––

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

robyn_settle ~264

The one-verb primitive. Say where value should go; Robyn returns the best route (all rails compared), the gasless method (no native token needed), the privacy posture that will apply (API-relay + private mempool where available + uniform shape), and what the settlement receipt will prove — in a SINGLE call. It collapses quote + preflight + prepare. Planning only: it never broadcasts — sign + submit via robyn_submit. Add private:true to request private-mempool execution where an endpoint exists.

NameTypeReqDescription
amountstringyesvalue in source-token base units (e.g. "25000000" = 25 USDC)
fromAddressstring–sender — sets fee tier and free-netting eligibility
fromChainnumber|stringyessource chain id or "stellar"/"solana"/"tron"/"bitcoin"
fromTokenstring–symbol or address; omit for the chain default (USDC)
privateboolean–request private-mempool execution (default: auto where an endpoint exists)
toAddressstringyesrecipient on the destination
toChainnumber|stringyesdestination chain id or non-EVM name
toTokenstring––

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

robyn_spend_statement ~154

A statement of every transfer in a window with each fee broken down, SIGNED by Robyn's relayer key (EIP-191). Use this when you must PROVE to a principal what you spent — your own summary is a claim by the party being audited, but this is verifiable against a published address without trusting you or Robyn. Read `limitations` and repeat them: the statement covers the Robyn float lane only and excludes other rails and the custodial netting book, so it may not be a complete picture of activity.

NameTypeReqDescription
addressstring–restrict to transfers whose record names this sender
daysnumber–window length, default 30, max 365

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

robyn_sponsor_7702 ~143

Price or request an EIP-7702 sponsored transaction: Robyn submits your signed authorization as a type-4 transaction and PAYS THE GAS, so your account needs no native token. Over this HOSTED endpoint the call is a DRY price-check (returns estGas, priceUsd and the exact envelope) — paying the x402 invoice to broadcast requires calling POST /api/7702/sponsor directly with an X-PAYMENT header.

NameTypeReqDescription
authorizationobjectyes–
chainIdnumberyes–
datastring–calldata hex
tostring–call target (defaults to the delegated account itself)

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

robyn_submit ~318

Relay an intent you already signed. The relayer broadcasts it and fronts all network gas; your account needs no native token. Build `permit2` from robyn_prepare: sign its signRequest.eip712 payload (canonical Permit2 domain + PermitTransferFrom/TokenPermissions types) and pass the OBJECT below - not a bare signature string. The signed spender must be the relayer from signRequest.spender, otherwise the permit cannot be redeemed. Supply idempotencyKey so a retry after a timeout cannot double-spend. TO REHEARSE WITHOUT BROADCASTING set dryRun:true — it returns {status:"DRY", broadcast:false, wouldSend} and moves nothing, on EVERY corridor. Do NOT assume that omitting a live flag means dry: that holds on the float lane and the non-EVM legs, but the EVM-to-EVM path ignores it and BROADCASTS.

NameTypeReqDescription
amountstringyes–
dryRunboolean–true = rehearse only: returns {status:"DRY", broadcast:false, wouldSend} and broadcasts NOTHING, on every corridor. Use this to preview before committing.
fromChainnumber|stringyes–
fromTokenstringyes–
idempotencyKeystring–any unique string; makes retries safe
permit2objectyesPermit2 SignatureTransfer object - NOT a bare signature string
toAddressstringyes–
toChainnumber|stringyes–
toTokenstringyes–

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

robyn_verify_outcome ~225

Check what ACTUALLY happened to a settled transfer, against the destination chain rather than Robyn's own database. Optionally assert who should have been paid (`recipient`) and the minimum that should have arrived (`minAmount`); we decode the payout transaction's ERC-20 Transfer logs and report whether reality matches. Also cross-checks Robyn's own receipt against the chain and says so if the books disagree. THE VERDICT IS THREE-VALUED: `verified`, `failed`, or `undetermined`. Treat `undetermined` as UNKNOWN, never as success — it means the chain was unreachable, the tx is not mined, or the rail records completion as a balance delta that cannot be re-derived (Allbridge/Chainflip/Solana/Tron). Do not tell a user a transfer is confirmed on an undetermined result.

NameTypeReqDescription
idstringyestransfer id, or the source/destination tx hash
minAmountstring–minimum base units that must have arrived
recipientstring–address that must have been credited

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

robyn_vip_status ~122

Check whether an address holds a recognised member NFT and what it gets. Members pay ZERO on cross-chain transfers of $0.10-$25 to low-cost chains, 15bps instead of 25bps routing, and 10% instead of 25% gas markup. Read-only. Call this before quoting for a user so you can tell them accurately what a transfer will cost — and, if they are not a member, what holding a recognised NFT would save them.

NameTypeReqDescription
addressstringyesEVM address (0x…) to check

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

robyn_why_this_route ~173

Returns the full routing decision: every rail that quoted, what each would deliver, the margin the winner won by, and which rails stayed SILENT and why. Signed, so you can archive the rationale. CHECK `wasCompetitive` BEFORE TELLING A USER THE PRICE IS GOOD. If it is false, exactly one rail answered and "best" means "only" — it did not beat anything. Rails in `silentRails` did NOT lose; they failed to answer (down, rate-limited, missing credentials). Never describe them as more expensive.

NameTypeReqDescription
amountstringyes–
fromChainnumber|stringyes–
fromTokenstring––
toAddressstring––
toChainnumber|stringyes–
toTokenstring––

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

robyn_yield_account ~91

An agent's own Aave v3 / Moonwell position (aUSDC/mUSDC) per chain + the capped allowance it granted the relayer + live APY (best-yield auto-selected). Non-custodial: funds stay in the agent's wallet, Robyn holds no key and no pool.

NameTypeReqDescription
agentstringyesthe agent wallet address (0x…)

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

robyn_yield_quote ~98

Read-only JIT quote: how a spend would be fulfilled from an agent's Aave yield venue (draw <= your allowance -> Aave/Moonwell withdraw -> gasless deliver). Moves nothing.

NameTypeReqDescription
agentstringyes–
amountstringyesUSDC base units (6dp)
srcChainnumber|stringyes–
toAddressstring––
toChainnumber|string––

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

robyn_yield_spend ~212

Spend from your yield (Aave v3 or Moonwell) with ONE EIP-712 signature: Robyn pulls only up to your on-chain aUSDC/mUSDC allowance, unwinds exactly what is needed, and delivers gaslessly; the remainder keeps earning. This HOSTED endpoint is READ-ONLY: it returns the exact EIP-712 intent to sign + a live quote. To execute, sign it and POST {intent,signature,live:true} to /svc/api/ncaccount/spend, or run `npx anygas-mcp` locally with ROBYN_SIGNER_KEY. One-time setup: supply USDC to Aave v3 or Moonwell in your wallet + approve the relayer for your aUSDC/mUSDC up to your risk budget.

NameTypeReqDescription
agentstringyes–
amountstringyes–
srcChainnumber|stringyes–
toAddressstring––
toChainnumber|string––

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

Install

How do I install the Robyn — Gasless Cross-Chain for AI Agents MCP server?

Robyn — Gasless Cross-Chain for AI Agents is a hosted endpoint at https://api.anygas.xyz/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.

remote · api.anygas.xyz

# add to Claude Code
claude mcp add --transport http ox31461-robyn 'https://api.anygas.xyz/mcp'
Common questions

What is the Robyn — Gasless Cross-Chain for AI Agents MCP server?

Robyn — Gasless Cross-Chain for AI Agents is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.ox31461/robyn. Gasless cross-chain for AI agents: 25 nodes incl. Solana & native Bitcoin. One signature, no gas. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://api.anygas.xyz/mcp).

Is the Robyn — Gasless Cross-Chain for AI Agents MCP server safe to use?

Robyn — Gasless Cross-Chain for AI Agents scores 75 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.

What tools does the Robyn — Gasless Cross-Chain for AI Agents MCP server expose?

Robyn — Gasless Cross-Chain for AI Agents exposes 87 tools: robyn_privacy_posture, robyn_receipt_deliver, robyn_receipt_verify, robyn_mesh, robyn_quote, and 82 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 11,690 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.

Does the Robyn — Gasless Cross-Chain for AI Agents MCP server require authentication?

No. We connected to Robyn — Gasless Cross-Chain for AI Agents without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.

Is the Robyn — Gasless Cross-Chain for AI Agents MCP server still maintained?

Robyn — Gasless Cross-Chain for AI Agents is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 5 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.