pdfnative MCP — PDF generation, PAdES signing & introspection
NPM · PDFNATIVE-MCP · SCANNED SEP 21
PDF MCP server: generate PDF/A, sign & verify PAdES (LTV), forms, merge, split, encrypt. 28 tools
Available components
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically from public evidence about the published package, including repeated runs of it in an isolated sandbox, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Supply Chain Security100
- No malware found by supply-chain analysis.Pass
- No known CVEs affecting this package version or its production dependencies.Pass
- No install/post-install scripts declared.Pass
- 0 of 4 dependencies flagged as unhealthy. View diagnostics → Pass
Provenance & Transparency100
- Source repository is publicly reachable at the declared URL. View diagnostics → Pass
- Cryptographically verified build provenance (signed, bound to Nizoka/pdfnative-mcp). View diagnostics → Pass
- Clear OSI-approved license (MIT).Pass
- Actively maintained (last published 28 days ago).Pass
- Publishes a security disclosure policy (SECURITY.md).Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability72
- 100% of prompts and resources have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the item's name).Pass
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 19177 tokens (~684/item across 28 items; 28 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management97
- Stability observed for 29 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
- Structured output schemas are declared (100% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- All 1 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 29 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a current MCP spec version (2026-07-28).Pass
How do I install the pdfnative MCP — PDF generation, PAdES signing… server?
pdfnative MCP — PDF generation, PAdES signing… runs locally as an npm package, launched with npx -y pdfnative-mcp. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
npm · pdfnative-mcp
claude mcp add nizoka-pdfnative-mcp -- npx -y pdfnative-mcp
{
"mcpServers": {
"nizoka-pdfnative-mcp": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"pdfnative-mcp"
]
}
}
} {
"servers": {
"nizoka-pdfnative-mcp": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"pdfnative-mcp"
]
}
}
} codex mcp add nizoka-pdfnative-mcp -- npx -y pdfnative-mcp
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"nizoka-pdfnative-mcp": {
"type": "local",
"command": [
"npx",
"-y",
"pdfnative-mcp"
],
"enabled": true
}
}
} openclaw mcp add nizoka-pdfnative-mcp --command npx --arg -y --arg pdfnative-mcp
mcp_servers:
nizoka-pdfnative-mcp:
command: "npx"
args: ["-y", "pdfnative-mcp"] {
"McpServers": {
"nizoka-pdfnative-mcp": {
"Transport": "stdio",
"Command": "npx",
"Arguments": [
"-y",
"pdfnative-mcp"
]
}
}
} assistant mcp add nizoka-pdfnative-mcp -t stdio -c npx -a -y pdfnative-mcp
{
"mcpServers": {
"nizoka-pdfnative-mcp": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"pdfnative-mcp"
]
}
}
} Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 21 Sept 26 +2
- Security disclosure: unverified → pass ▲ functional
- 20 Sept 26 −1
- Security disclosure: pass → unverified ▼ functional
- 19 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 87 to 90. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 26 days of observed history at the previous scan, 27 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 17 Sept 26 −2
- Stability: pass → 0.83 functional
- 16 Sept 26 +1
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- Security disclosure: unverified → pass ▲ functional
- 15 Sept 26 0
- Security disclosure: pass → unverified ▼ functional
- 13 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 87 to 90. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 26 days of observed history at the previous scan, 27 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 11 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 80 to 83. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 24 days of observed history at the previous scan, 25 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 21 Sept 2026 · Analysed npm/pdfnative-mcp@1.6.0
Provenance Verified
A signed build attestation was found and verified, binding this exact artifact to the source repository it claims to come from.
| Result | Verified |
|---|---|
| Ecosystem | npm |
| Reason | Verified |
| Discovered via | Registry attestation endpoint |
| Source repo | Nizoka/pdfnative-mcp |
| Certificate issuer | https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com |
| Certificate SAN | https://github.com/Nizoka/pdfnative-mcp/.github/workflows/publish.yml@refs/tags/v1.6.0 |
| Rekor log index | 2573844352 |
| Predicate type | https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 |
| Subject digest | sha512:81eb005adac501c634c683f2e4be3bc59d82b45138efc92321fb355772a6a59c9bdec78d43411b2956f6ac5910d471f8a866a583ddbf4a796ced4eaa9 |
Background: How many MCP packages publish verified provenance →
Dependencies 4 packages
| Packages resolved | 4 |
|---|---|
| Tree resolution | Complete |
Background: SBOMs and build attestations, explained →
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
timestamp_pdf Add a document timestamp (PAdES B-LTA) ~337
PAdES B-LTA: append an RFC 3161 document timestamp (/DocTimeStamp, ETSI.RFC3161) over the whole document. Ladder step 4 after add_ltv; re-run before the TSA certificate expires. fieldName omitted → DocTimeStamp1, 2, …; a fieldName colliding with a signed field fails. Uses the OPERATOR TSA (PDFNATIVE_MCP_TSA_URL; TSA_NOT_CONFIGURED otherwise, no network without it). The token's status, imprint and nonce are checked before embedding (its own signature is verified by verify_pdf). Unencrypted PDFs only.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| fieldName | string | – | Signature field name for the timestamp. Omit it to get 'DocTimeStamp1', 'DocTimeStamp2', … auto-suffixed on each re-timestamp; an explicit name that collides with an existing signed field fails. |
| outputMode | string | – | 'base64' (default) returns the PDF inline; 'file' writes it inside the PDFNATIVE_MCP_OUTPUT_DIR sandbox (SECURITY_VIOLATION when the sandbox is not configured). |
| outputPath | string | – | Relative path inside PDFNATIVE_MCP_OUTPUT_DIR (required when outputMode='file'). |
| pdfBase64 | string | yes | Base64-encoded PDF (unencrypted). Typically already signed (+ add_ltv) — a document timestamp on an unsigned PDF is allowed but proves only existence at that time. |
| placeholderBytes | integer | – | Room reserved for the TimeStampToken (default 12288). Raise it for TSAs that return large certificate chains. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| diagnostics | array | – | PDF/A diagnostics (when includeDiagnostics=true). |
| filePath | string | – | Sandboxed absolute path (file mode). |
| mode | string | yes | – |
| sizeBytes | integer | yes | – |
| summary | object | – | Tool-specific summary, when produced. |
No examples provided.
update_metadata Update document metadata ~317
Rewrite /Info (title, author, subject, keywords) of an EXISTING PDF as an incremental update; XMP stays in sync on PDF/A documents; /ModDate is refreshed (pin `modDate` for reproducible bytes on the same host TZ). Earlier revisions and signatures stay byte-identical — the new revision is unsigned (sign_pdf / timestamp_pdf again if needed). Encrypted sources → ENCRYPTED_SOURCE. For metadata at generation time use the `metadata` option of the document tools.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| author | string | – | New /Info /Author (XMP dc:creator). |
| keywords | string | – | New /Info /Keywords (XMP pdf:Keywords). |
| modDate | string | – | ISO-8601 modification instant for /ModDate and xmp:ModifyDate. Defaults to now; pin it for reproducible output. |
| outputMode | string | – | 'base64' (default) returns the PDF inline; 'file' writes it inside the PDFNATIVE_MCP_OUTPUT_DIR sandbox (SECURITY_VIOLATION when the sandbox is not configured). |
| outputPath | string | – | Relative path inside PDFNATIVE_MCP_OUTPUT_DIR (required when outputMode='file'). |
| pdfBase64 | string | yes | Base64-encoded PDF to update (unencrypted). |
| subject | string | – | New /Info /Subject (XMP dc:description). |
| title | string | – | New /Info /Title (mirrored to XMP dc:title when the document carries XMP). |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| diagnostics | array | – | PDF/A diagnostics (when includeDiagnostics=true). |
| filePath | string | – | Sandboxed absolute path (file mode). |
| mode | string | yes | – |
| sizeBytes | integer | yes | – |
| summary | object | – | Tool-specific summary, when produced. |
No examples provided.
validate_pdf Validate PDF/UA structure ~239
Read-only PDF/UA-1 (ISO 14289-1) structural gate for Tagged PDF: /MarkInfo /Marked, /StructTreeRoot (+ /ParentTree), XMP /Metadata, /Lang, per-page MCID uniqueness. Result { standard:'pdf-ua-1', valid, errors[], warnings[], summary }. Fast and structural only — NOT a reference validator (veraPDF): fonts, colour and rendering are not checked. Unparsable input → PDF_PARSE_FAILED. Generate tagged input with pdfA (e.g. 'pdfa2u') first.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| fields | array | – | Optional dot-path projection applied to the structured result (e.g. ['valid']). Composes after verbosity. Unknown paths are omitted. |
| pdfBase64 | string | yes | Base64-encoded PDF bytes to validate for PDF/UA (ISO 14289-1) structural conformance. |
| verbosity | string | – | Response verbosity. 'full' (default) returns errors[] and warnings[]; 'summary' returns a token-frugal verdict { standard, valid, errorCount, warningCount, summary } and drops the message arrays. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| errorCount | integer | – | summary only: number of errors. |
| errors | array | – | Blocking PDF/UA conformance violations. Empty when valid is true. |
| standard | string | – | Conformance standard checked (ISO 14289-1). |
| summary | string | – | Human-readable one-line summary of the result. |
| valid | boolean | – | True when no blocking structural violations were found. |
| warningCount | integer | – | summary only: number of warnings. |
| warnings | array | – | Non-blocking best-practice recommendations. |
No examples provided.
verify_pdf Verify PDF signatures ~454
Read-only verification of every signature: ByteRange digest vs CMS messageDigest (integrity), CMS signatureValue vs the embedded signer certificate (RSA-SHA256/384/512, ECDSA P-256), chain trust when trustedRootsDerBase64 is given ('self-signed' | 'unverified' | 'trusted' otherwise). /DocTimeStamp entries are verified as RFC 3161 tokens and count in allValid like any signature. Result: { allValid, signatureCount, summary, signatures:[{ valid, integrity, signerSubject, signingTime, chainTrust, errors[] }] }. `ltv:true` adds the PAdES view: per-signature profile, timestamp, revocation (read from embedded /DSS only — responder signatures are not re-verified) and ltvLevel B-B / B-T / B-LT / B-LTA with explicit caveats. Token-frugal: verbosity:'summary', fields:['allValid'].
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| fields | array | – | Optional dot-path projection applied to the structured result (e.g. ['allValid'] or ['signatures.valid']). Composes after verbosity. Unknown paths are omitted. |
| ltv | boolean | – | Add the PAdES view: per signature profile, timestamp, revocation (embedded /DSS only), ltvLevel (B-B / B-T / B-LT / B-LTA); document-level dss, ltvLevel, caveats. |
| password | string | – | Password (user or owner) of an encrypted source. Never logged or echoed. |
| pdfBase64 | string | yes | Base64-encoded PDF bytes to verify. |
| trustedRootsDerBase64 | array | – | Optional list of base64-encoded X.509 root certificates (DER). When supplied, each signer certificate is validated against these roots; otherwise chainTrust is reported as self-signed or unverified. |
| verbosity | string | – | Response verbosity. 'full' (default) returns the per-signature signatures[] array; 'summary' returns a token-frugal verdict { signatureCount, allValid, invalid, summary } (+ ltvLevel when ltv:true) a… |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| allValid | boolean | – | true when the document carries at least one signature and every entry of signatures[] — CMS signatures and /DocTimeStamp tokens alike — is valid (integrity + signature check + chain trust when truste… |
| caveats | array | – | ltv only. Fixed statements about what the LTV evaluation does not cover. |
| dss | object|null | – | ltv only. Document Security Store summary, or null when the catalog has no /DSS. |
| invalid | integer | – | summary only: number of invalid signatures. |
| ltvLevel | string | – | ltv only. Minimum level across non-timestamp signatures ('B-B' when there are none). |
| signatureCount | integer | – | – |
| signatures | array | – | – |
| summary | string | – | – |
No examples provided.
What is the pdfnative MCP — PDF generation, PAdES signing… server?
pdfnative MCP — PDF generation, PAdES signing… is listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.Nizoka/pdfnative-mcp. PDF MCP server: generate PDF/A, sign & verify PAdES (LTV), forms, merge, split, encrypt. 28 tools. This page covers its npm package (pdfnative-mcp).
Is the pdfnative MCP — PDF generation, PAdES signing… server safe to use?
pdfnative MCP — PDF generation, PAdES signing… scores 95 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. We found no known CVEs affecting it as of 21 September 2026. It declares no install or post-install scripts. Its build provenance is signed and verified. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the pdfnative MCP — PDF generation, PAdES signing… server expose?
pdfnative MCP — PDF generation, PAdES signing… exposes 28 tools: generate_basic_pdf, add_barcode, sign_pdf, add_international_text, add_table, and 23 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 17,553 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Is the pdfnative MCP — PDF generation, PAdES signing… server still maintained?
pdfnative MCP — PDF generation, PAdES signing… is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 September 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What licence is the pdfnative MCP — PDF generation, PAdES signing… server under?
pdfnative MCP — PDF generation, PAdES signing… declares the MIT licence, which is OSI-approved. That covers the source only, and says nothing about the cost of any service it calls.