pdfnative MCP — PDF generation, PAdES signing & introspection
NPM · PDFNATIVE-MCP
PDF MCP server: PDF/A, PDF/X-4, PAdES (LTV), forms, 32 scripts, JPEG 2000, spot colours. 28 tools
Available components
Last scanned (10 hours ago)
Scores higher than 98% of npm servers
Category Documents and Files
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically from public evidence about the published package, including repeated runs of it in an isolated sandbox, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Supply Chain Security100
- No malware found by supply-chain analysis.Pass
- No known CVEs affecting this package version or its production dependencies.Pass
- No install/post-install scripts declared.Pass
- 0 of 4 dependencies flagged as unhealthy. View diagnostics → Pass
Provenance & Transparency100
- Source repository is publicly reachable at the declared URL. View diagnostics → Pass
- Cryptographically verified build provenance (signed, bound to Nizoka/pdfnative-mcp). View diagnostics → Pass
- Clear OSI-approved license (MIT).Pass
- Actively maintained (last published 3 days ago).Pass
- Publishes a security disclosure policy (SECURITY.md).Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability71
- 100% of prompts and resources have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the item's name).Pass
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 24812 tokens (~827/item across 30 items; 28 tools + 2 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
- Structured output schemas are declared (100% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- All 1 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 30 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a current MCP spec version (2026-07-28).Pass
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 1 Nov 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → unverified ▼ security
- Tool safety: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- Schema quality: 21992 → 24812 ▼ functional
- Capabilities: pass → unverified ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- Schema quality: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- Package version: 1.7.0 → 1.8.0 functional
- 31 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 93 to 97. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 28 days of observed history at the previous scan, 29 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 30 Oct 26 −1
- Stability: pass → 0.93 functional
- 20 Oct 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 19 Oct 26 0
- Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
- 17 Oct 26 +2
- Stability: 0.87 → pass security
- 15 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 80 to 83. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 24 days of observed history at the previous scan, 25 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 14 Oct 26 −3
- Stability: pass → 0.80 functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 5 Nov 2026 · Analysed npm/pdfnative-mcp@1.8.0
Provenance Verified
A signed build attestation was found and verified, binding this exact artifact to the source repository it claims to come from.
| Result | Verified |
|---|---|
| Ecosystem | npm |
| Reason | Verified |
| Discovered via | Registry attestation endpoint |
| Source repo | Nizoka/pdfnative-mcp |
| Certificate issuer | https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com |
| Certificate SAN | https://github.com/Nizoka/pdfnative-mcp/.github/workflows/publish.yml@refs/tags/v1.8.0 |
| Rekor log index | 3633521714 |
| Predicate type | SLSA build provenance https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 |
| Subject digest | sha512:9d23fa5c909c3a76a11e0ce1cd0c96191f68b0eae152ec299bb9d783dd9479b273e2f2031c990e3f2bbc03a4f2c97617d149ca3133fe305bd259a1e06 |
Background: How many MCP packages publish verified provenance →
Dependencies 4 packages
| Packages resolved | 4 |
|---|---|
| Tree resolution | Complete |
Background: SBOMs and build attestations, explained →
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
read_form_fields Read AcroForm fields ~212
Read-only list of an existing PDF's AcroForm fields: fully-qualified name, type (text | checkbox | radio | dropdown | listbox | button | signature | unknown), value, flags (readOnly / required / multiline), options, widget placements. Call it BEFORE fill_form to learn the names. Encrypted sources: `password`. Token-frugal: verbosity:'summary' → { fieldCount }.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| fields | array | – | Optional dot-path projection applied to the structured result (e.g. ['fields.name','fields.type']). Composes after verbosity. Unknown paths are omitted. |
| password | string | – | Password (user or owner) of an encrypted source. Never logged or echoed. |
| pdfBase64 | string | yes | Base64-encoded PDF bytes whose AcroForm fields should be enumerated. |
| verbosity | string | – | Response verbosity. 'full' (default) returns the fields[] array; 'summary' returns a token-frugal { fieldCount } and drops the array. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| fieldCount | integer | – | – |
| fields | array | – | – |
No examples provided.
sign_pdf Sign PDF (RSA / ECDSA, PAdES) ~1,116
CMS / PAdES signature in ONE call: a missing /Sig placeholder is auto-injected (prepare_signature_placeholder is optional). Inputs: pdfBase64, algorithm (rsa-sha256/384/512, ecdsa-sha256 P-256), certDerBase64 (+ certChainDerBase64 intermediates) and the DER key (rsaKeyPkcs1DerBase64 for rsa-*, ecPrivateKeyDerBase64 or ecPrivateScalarHex for ECDSA; PEM is rejected with the openssl remedy). `profile:'pades'` (ETSI EN 319 142-1 baseline) is the right choice when add_ltv / timestamp_pdf follow; `timestamp:true` = PAdES B-T through the operator TSA (TSA_NOT_CONFIGURED otherwise, no network without it). signerName/reason/location/contactInfo/signingTime are baked into the placeholder THIS call injects (a pre-built placeholder keeps its own). Several unsigned placeholders → pass fieldName (PLACEHOLDER_AMBIGUOUS); `allowMultiple:true` + a new fieldName adds a further signature. Verify with verify_pdf.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| algorithm | string | yes | Signature algorithm. 'rsa-sha384' / 'rsa-sha512' (pdfnative 1.7) upgrade the whole CMS digest chain. ECDSA only supports P-256 with SHA-256. |
| allowMultiple | boolean | – | Add a NEW signature next to existing (already signed) fields instead of signing the first placeholder. Requires fieldName. Each signature is an incremental revision; earlier signatures stay valid. |
| autoInjectPlaceholder | boolean | – | When true (default) and the input PDF has no /Sig widget, pdfnative.addSignaturePlaceholder is called before signing — enabling single-call signing of any PDF. |
| certChainDerBase64 | array | – | Optional intermediate CA certificates (DER base64) embedded in the CMS so verifiers and add_ltv can build the chain without fetching caIssuers. |
| certDerBase64 | string | yes | Base64 of the signer X.509 certificate in DER form. Convert from PEM with: openssl x509 -in cert.pem -outform DER | openssl base64 -A |
| contactInfo | string | – | /Sig /ContactInfo — baked into the placeholder when this call injects it. |
| ecPrivateKeyDerBase64 | string | – | Base64 of an ECDSA P-256 private key in SEC1 (RFC 5915) or PKCS#8 (RFC 5208) DER form. Convert from PEM with: openssl pkey -in key.pem -outform DER | openssl base64 -A Mutually exclusive with ecPriv… |
| ecPrivateScalarHex | string | – | Hex-encoded P-256 private scalar `d` (exactly 64 lowercase or uppercase hex chars, no 0x prefix). Mutually exclusive with ecPrivateKeyDerBase64; either is accepted for ECDSA. |
| fieldName | string | – | Name of the signature field to sign (required when several unsigned placeholders exist) and of the placeholder injected by this call. |
| location | string | – | /Sig /Location — baked into the placeholder when this call injects it. |
| outputMode | string | – | 'base64' (default) returns the PDF inline; 'file' writes it inside the PDFNATIVE_MCP_OUTPUT_DIR sandbox (SECURITY_VIOLATION when the sandbox is not configured). |
| outputPath | string | – | Required when outputMode='file'. Relative path inside the sandbox; must end with .pdf (no absolute paths, no '..'). |
| pdfBase64 | string | yes | Base64-encoded PDF bytes. When the PDF already contains an unsigned /Sig placeholder it is signed in place; otherwise the placeholder is auto-injected (set autoInjectPlaceholder=false to opt out). |
| profile | string | – | 'pkcs7' (default, adbe.pkcs7.detached) or 'pades' (ETSI EN 319 142-1 baseline; ETSI.CAdES.detached when the placeholder is injected here). Use 'pades' before timestamp / add_ltv / timestamp_pdf. |
| reason | string | – | /Sig /Reason — baked into the placeholder when this call injects it. |
| rsaKeyPkcs1DerBase64 | string | – | Base64 of the RSA private key in DER form — PKCS#1 RSAPrivateKey (openssl rsa -in key.pem -outform DER -traditional | openssl base64 -A) or PKCS#8 PrivateKeyInfo (openssl pkey -in key.pem -outform DE… |
| signerName | string | – | /Sig /Name — baked into the placeholder when this call injects it. |
| signingTime | string | – | ISO-8601 signing instant → /Sig /M (only when THIS call injects the placeholder) and the CMS signing-time (pkcs7 profile). Default: now. Not trusted time — use timestamp:true for that. |
| timestamp | boolean | – | PAdES B-T: request an RFC 3161 signature timestamp from the operator-configured TSA (PDFNATIVE_MCP_TSA_URL). Fails with TSA_NOT_CONFIGURED when no TSA is configured — the server never contacts the ne… |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| diagnostics | array | – | Engine diagnostics (when includeDiagnostics=true). |
| filePath | string | – | Sandboxed absolute path (file mode). |
| mode | string | yes | – |
| sizeBytes | integer | yes | – |
| summary | object | – | Tool-specific summary, when produced. |
| url | string | – | Public URL of the file (file mode, only when PDFNATIVE_MCP_OUTPUT_BASE_URL is set): base URL + sandbox-relative path, percent-encoded. |
No examples provided.
split_pdf Split PDF into ranges ~378
Split one PDF into several documents, one per `ranges[]` entry ({ start, end? }, 0-based inclusive; end defaults to start). Multi-output result: base64 mode returns one embedded resource per part; file mode writes indexed siblings ('out.pdf' → 'out-1.pdf', 'out-2.pdf', …). Same page-tree caveats as merge_pdfs (signatures/AcroForm/XMP dropped; boxes kept). Encrypted sources: `password`. Need ONE document from a page subset? Use extract_pages.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| dropAnnotations | boolean | – | When true, drop ALL annotations. Default keeps self-contained URI link annotations. |
| encrypt | object | – | Re-encrypt the output (Standard Security Handler; AES-128 default or AES-256; RC4 never emitted). Applied to every produced range. |
| maxOutputSizeBytes | integer | – | Maximum size, in bytes, of each produced PDF. Defaults to 268435456 (256 MiB). |
| outputMode | string | – | 'base64' (default) returns the PDF inline; 'file' writes it inside the PDFNATIVE_MCP_OUTPUT_DIR sandbox (SECURITY_VIOLATION when the sandbox is not configured). |
| outputPath | string | – | Base output path (file mode). Each PDF is written to an indexed sibling: 'out.pdf' → 'out-1.pdf', 'out-2.pdf', … |
| password | string | – | Password (user or owner) of an encrypted source. Never logged or echoed. |
| pdfBase64 | string | yes | Base64-encoded source PDF. Pass `password` for an encrypted source. |
| ranges | array | yes | Page ranges to extract, one output PDF per range. 0-based, inclusive; `end` defaults to `start` (a single page). |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| count | integer | yes | – |
| mode | string | yes | – |
| parts | array | yes | – |
| totalBytes | integer | yes | – |
No examples provided.
timestamp_pdf Add a document timestamp (PAdES B-LTA) ~337
PAdES B-LTA: append an RFC 3161 document timestamp (/DocTimeStamp, ETSI.RFC3161) over the whole document. Ladder step 4 after add_ltv; re-run before the TSA certificate expires. fieldName omitted → DocTimeStamp1, 2, …; a fieldName colliding with a signed field fails. Uses the OPERATOR TSA (PDFNATIVE_MCP_TSA_URL; TSA_NOT_CONFIGURED otherwise, no network without it). The token's status, imprint and nonce are checked before embedding (its own signature is verified by verify_pdf). Unencrypted PDFs only.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| fieldName | string | – | Signature field name for the timestamp. Omit it to get 'DocTimeStamp1', 'DocTimeStamp2', … auto-suffixed on each re-timestamp; an explicit name that collides with an existing signed field fails. |
| outputMode | string | – | 'base64' (default) returns the PDF inline; 'file' writes it inside the PDFNATIVE_MCP_OUTPUT_DIR sandbox (SECURITY_VIOLATION when the sandbox is not configured). |
| outputPath | string | – | Relative path inside PDFNATIVE_MCP_OUTPUT_DIR (required when outputMode='file'). |
| pdfBase64 | string | yes | Base64-encoded PDF (unencrypted). Typically already signed (+ add_ltv) — a document timestamp on an unsigned PDF is allowed but proves only existence at that time. |
| placeholderBytes | integer | – | Room reserved for the TimeStampToken (default 12288). Raise it for TSAs that return large certificate chains. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| diagnostics | array | – | Engine diagnostics (when includeDiagnostics=true). |
| filePath | string | – | Sandboxed absolute path (file mode). |
| mode | string | yes | – |
| sizeBytes | integer | yes | – |
| summary | object | – | Tool-specific summary, when produced. |
| url | string | – | Public URL of the file (file mode, only when PDFNATIVE_MCP_OUTPUT_BASE_URL is set): base URL + sandbox-relative path, percent-encoded. |
No examples provided.
update_metadata Update document metadata ~312
Rewrite /Info (title, author, subject, keywords) of an EXISTING PDF as an incremental update; XMP stays in sync on PDF/A documents; /ModDate is refreshed (pin `modDate` for reproducible bytes). Earlier revisions and signatures stay byte-identical — the new revision is unsigned (sign_pdf / timestamp_pdf again if needed). Encrypted sources → ENCRYPTED_SOURCE. For metadata at generation time use the `metadata` option of the document tools.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| author | string | – | New /Info /Author (XMP dc:creator). |
| keywords | string | – | New /Info /Keywords (XMP pdf:Keywords). |
| modDate | string | – | ISO-8601 modification instant for /ModDate and xmp:ModifyDate. Defaults to now; pin it for reproducible output. |
| outputMode | string | – | 'base64' (default) returns the PDF inline; 'file' writes it inside the PDFNATIVE_MCP_OUTPUT_DIR sandbox (SECURITY_VIOLATION when the sandbox is not configured). |
| outputPath | string | – | Relative path inside PDFNATIVE_MCP_OUTPUT_DIR (required when outputMode='file'). |
| pdfBase64 | string | yes | Base64-encoded PDF to update (unencrypted). |
| subject | string | – | New /Info /Subject (XMP dc:description). |
| title | string | – | New /Info /Title (mirrored to XMP dc:title when the document carries XMP). |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| diagnostics | array | – | Engine diagnostics (when includeDiagnostics=true). |
| filePath | string | – | Sandboxed absolute path (file mode). |
| mode | string | yes | – |
| sizeBytes | integer | yes | – |
| summary | object | – | Tool-specific summary, when produced. |
| url | string | – | Public URL of the file (file mode, only when PDFNATIVE_MCP_OUTPUT_BASE_URL is set): base URL + sandbox-relative path, percent-encoded. |
No examples provided.
validate_pdf Validate PDF structure (PDF/UA, PDF/X-4) ~424
Read-only structural gate; `standard` picks the rule set. 'pdf-ua-1' (default, ISO 14289-1) for Tagged PDF: /MarkInfo /Marked, /StructTreeRoot (+ /ParentTree), XMP /Metadata, /Lang, per-page MCID uniqueness — generate tagged input with pdfA (e.g. 'pdfa2u') first. 'pdf-x-4' (ISO 15930-7) for print exchange: /GTS_PDFX OutputIntent with a prtr ICC profile, TrimBox or ArtBox, every font embedded, no annotation / JavaScript / embedded file / transfer function — generate it with pdfx:'pdfx4'. Result { standard, valid, errors[], warnings[], summary } (+ caveats[] for PDF/X). Fast and structural only — NOT a reference validator or a certified preflight: fonts, colour and rendering are not checked (veraPDF for PDF/A and PDF/UA; callas pdfToolbox or Acrobat Preflight for PDF/X). Unparsable input → PDF_PARSE_FAILED.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| fields | array | – | Optional dot-path projection applied to the structured result (e.g. ['valid']). Composes after verbosity. Unknown paths are omitted. |
| pdfBase64 | string | yes | Base64-encoded PDF bytes to validate for structural conformance. |
| standard | string | – | Rule set. 'pdf-ua-1' (default): PDF/UA accessibility structure (ISO 14289-1). 'pdf-x-4': PDF/X-4 print exchange (ISO 15930-7) — OutputIntent + prtr ICC profile, TrimBox, embedded fonts, no annotation… |
| verbosity | string | – | Response verbosity. 'full' (default) returns errors[] and warnings[]; 'summary' returns a token-frugal verdict { standard, valid, errorCount, warningCount, summary } and drops the message arrays. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| caveats | array | – | standard 'pdf-x-4' only: what a valid verdict does NOT establish. |
| errorCount | integer | – | summary only: number of errors. |
| errors | array | – | Blocking conformance violations. Empty when valid is true. |
| standard | string | – | Conformance standard checked (ISO 14289-1 or ISO 15930-7). |
| summary | string | – | Human-readable one-line summary of the result. |
| valid | boolean | – | True when no blocking structural violations were found. |
| warningCount | integer | – | summary only: number of warnings. |
| warnings | array | – | Non-blocking best-practice recommendations. |
No examples provided.
verify_pdf Verify PDF signatures ~454
Read-only verification of every signature: ByteRange digest vs CMS messageDigest (integrity), CMS signatureValue vs the embedded signer certificate (RSA-SHA256/384/512, ECDSA P-256), chain trust when trustedRootsDerBase64 is given ('self-signed' | 'unverified' | 'trusted' otherwise). /DocTimeStamp entries are verified as RFC 3161 tokens and count in allValid like any signature. Result: { allValid, signatureCount, summary, signatures:[{ valid, integrity, signerSubject, signingTime, chainTrust, errors[] }] }. `ltv:true` adds the PAdES view: per-signature profile, timestamp, revocation (read from embedded /DSS only — responder signatures are not re-verified) and ltvLevel B-B / B-T / B-LT / B-LTA with explicit caveats. Token-frugal: verbosity:'summary', fields:['allValid'].
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| fields | array | – | Optional dot-path projection applied to the structured result (e.g. ['allValid'] or ['signatures.valid']). Composes after verbosity. Unknown paths are omitted. |
| ltv | boolean | – | Add the PAdES view: per signature profile, timestamp, revocation (embedded /DSS only), ltvLevel (B-B / B-T / B-LT / B-LTA); document-level dss, ltvLevel, caveats. |
| password | string | – | Password (user or owner) of an encrypted source. Never logged or echoed. |
| pdfBase64 | string | yes | Base64-encoded PDF bytes to verify. |
| trustedRootsDerBase64 | array | – | Optional list of base64-encoded X.509 root certificates (DER). When supplied, each signer certificate is validated against these roots; otherwise chainTrust is reported as self-signed or unverified. |
| verbosity | string | – | Response verbosity. 'full' (default) returns the per-signature signatures[] array; 'summary' returns a token-frugal verdict { signatureCount, allValid, invalid, summary } (+ ltvLevel when ltv:true) a… |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| allValid | boolean | – | true when the document carries at least one signature and every entry of signatures[] — CMS signatures and /DocTimeStamp tokens alike — is valid (integrity + signature check + chain trust when truste… |
| caveats | array | – | ltv only. Fixed statements about what the LTV evaluation does not cover. |
| dss | object|null | – | ltv only. Document Security Store summary, or null when the catalog has no /DSS. |
| invalid | integer | – | summary only: number of invalid signatures. |
| ltvLevel | string | – | ltv only. Minimum level across non-timestamp signatures ('B-B' when there are none). |
| signatureCount | integer | – | – |
| signatures | array | – | – |
| summary | string | – | – |
No examples provided.
How do I install the pdfnative MCP — PDF generation, PAdES signing… server?
pdfnative MCP — PDF generation, PAdES signing… runs locally as an npm package, launched with npx -y pdfnative-mcp. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
npm · pdfnative-mcp
claude mcp add nizoka-pdfnative-mcp -- npx -y pdfnative-mcp
What is the pdfnative MCP — PDF generation, PAdES signing… server?
pdfnative MCP — PDF generation, PAdES signing… is listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.Nizoka/pdfnative-mcp. PDF MCP server: PDF/A, PDF/X-4, PAdES (LTV), forms, 32 scripts, JPEG 2000, spot colours. 28 tools. This page covers its npm package (pdfnative-mcp).
Is the pdfnative MCP — PDF generation, PAdES signing… server safe to use?
pdfnative MCP — PDF generation, PAdES signing… scores 95 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. We found no known CVEs affecting it as of 5 November 2026. It declares no install or post-install scripts. Its build provenance is signed and verified. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the pdfnative MCP — PDF generation, PAdES signing… server expose?
pdfnative MCP — PDF generation, PAdES signing… exposes 28 tools: generate_basic_pdf, add_barcode, sign_pdf, add_international_text, add_table, and 23 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 22,672 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Is the pdfnative MCP — PDF generation, PAdES signing… server still maintained?
pdfnative MCP — PDF generation, PAdES signing… is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 5 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What licence is the pdfnative MCP — PDF generation, PAdES signing… server under?
pdfnative MCP — PDF generation, PAdES signing… declares the MIT licence, which is OSI-approved. That covers the source only, and says nothing about the cost of any service it calls.