# Mnemom — Trust Ratings for AI Agents (remote · api.mnemom.ai)

Trust infrastructure for AI agents: read a verifiable Trust Rating, claim an identity, earn a badge.

- Trust score: 69/100 (medium)
- Change this week: +3
- Registry status: active
- Liveness: live
- Owner verified: no
- Last scored: 2026-08-03

## Components

- remote · `api.mnemom.ai`: 69/100 (this document), [markdown](https://verifymcp.io/servers/mnemom-mnemom/api.md), [page](https://verifymcp.io/servers/mnemom-mnemom/api)

## Channel facts

- Endpoint: `https://api.mnemom.ai/mcp?profile=directory`
- Transports: `streamable-http`
- Auth: `none`
- Version: `1.0.2`

## Trust breakdown

How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. Scores are 0–100 per category. Scoring method: https://verifymcp.io/docs/scoring (what has changed: https://verifymcp.io/docs/scoring/changelog)

Scored 2026-08-03.

- **Endpoint Security**: 66/100
  - The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key.
  - Authorisation check failed: no authorisation is required to call this server, and it exposes a tool marked destructive (put_alignment_by_agent).
  - HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path.
  - The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present.
  - DNSSEC is configured correctly; the domain's records validate against the full chain to the root.
- **Transport & Reachability**: 100/100
  - Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake.
- **Schema Quality & AI Usability**: 76/100
  - 100% of prompts and resources have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the item's name).
  - AI-judged instruction clarity (good).
  - Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 3198 tokens (~118/item across 27 items; 16 tools + 11 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params.
  - Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples.
- **Stability & Change Management**: 27/100
  - Stability observed for 8 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.
- **Tool Coverage**: 100/100
  - 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).
  - 100% of tool parameters carry a description.
  - Structured output schemas are declared (100% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.
- **Capabilities**: 60/100
  - Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2025-06-18; the latest is 2026-07-28.

## Install

### Claude

```bash
claude mcp add --transport http mnemom-mnemom https://api.mnemom.ai/mcp?profile=directory
```

### Codex

```toml
[mcp_servers.mnemom-mnemom]
url = "https://api.mnemom.ai/mcp?profile=directory"
```

### opencode

```json
{
  "$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
  "mcp": {
    "mnemom-mnemom": {
      "type": "remote",
      "url": "https://api.mnemom.ai/mcp?profile=directory",
      "enabled": true
    }
  }
}
```

### OpenClaw

```bash
openclaw mcp add mnemom-mnemom --url https://api.mnemom.ai/mcp?profile=directory --transport streamable-http
```

### Hermes

```yaml
mcp_servers:
  mnemom-mnemom:
    url: "https://api.mnemom.ai/mcp?profile=directory"
```

### Other

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "mnemom-mnemom": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://api.mnemom.ai/mcp?profile=directory"
    }
  }
}
```

The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.

## Changelog

Every change recorded for this component, newest first. Days that predate change tracking, or that we cannot explain, say so: "we were watching and nothing happened" and "we were not watching" are different claims.

### 2026-08-03 (score 69, +1)

No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 23 to 27. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 7 days of observed history at the previous scan, 8 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

### 2026-08-01 (score 68, +1)

No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 17 to 20. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 5 days of observed history at the previous scan, 6 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

### 2026-07-31 (score 67, +1)

- [functional] We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server

### 2026-07-30 (score 66, −2)

- [functional] We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server

### 2026-07-29 (score 68, +1)

No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 7 to 10. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 2 days of observed history at the previous scan, 3 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

### 2026-07-28 (score 67, +1)

No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 3 to 7. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 1 days of observed history at the previous scan, 2 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

### 2026-07-27 (score 66, 0)

- [functional] We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server

### 2026-07-26 (score 66)

First indexed and scored.

## MCP tools (16)

### `claim_agent` (~159 tokens)

Claim a verifiable identity — bind an agent to your organization so its trust and accountability record is provably yours. No human in the loop.

Input parameters:

- `agent_id` (string, required): Agent identifier (e.g. smolt-abc123)
- `hash_proof` (string, required): Agent possession proof: the full 64-hex SHA-256 digest of `${apiKey}|${agentName}` (or `${apiKey}` for an unnamed singleton agent).
- `org_id` (string): Optional. The organization to claim the agent into (e.g. `org-...` or `pers-...`). The caller must be a member of this org (role floor: member). If omitted, the agent is claimed into the caller's per…

Output parameters:

- `agent_id` (string)
- `claimed` (boolean)
- `claimed_at` (string)
- `org_id` (string): The organization the agent was claimed into (echoes the resolved org — the supplied `org_id`, or the caller's personal org when omitted).

### `get_agent` (~51 tokens)

Look up an agent's public identity and trust state by ID — the accountable record other agents and humans can rely on.

Input parameters:

- `agent_id` (string, required): Agent identifier (e.g. smolt-abc123)

Output parameters:

- `agent_hash` (string): First 16 hex chars of `SHA256(apiKey + '|' + agentName)` for named agents, or `SHA256(apiKey)` for unnamed singleton agents. The gateway computes the same value on each request and uses it as the loo…
- `agent_proof_captured_at` (string|null)
- `agent_proof_hash` (string|null): Owner projection: captured hash_proof of the bound key (mig 263).
- `aip_enforcement_mode` (string|null)
- `avatar_url` (string|null)
- `billing_account_id` (string|null)
- `caller` (string): Self-describing caller context for THIS response. `org_member` callers receive the full owner record (all fields here); `anonymous`/`authenticated` (non-member) callers receive the reduced public pro…
- `claimed` (boolean): Public projection only: whether the agent has been claimed by a user.
- `claimed_at` (string|null)
- `claimed_by` (string|null): Owner projection: user id that claimed the agent.
- `containment_status` (string|null): Containment state of the agent (ADR-053).
- `created_at` (string)
- `created_by` (string|null): Owner projection: user id that created the agent (provenance).
- `deleted_at` (string|null): Owner projection: soft-delete timestamp (null when live).
- `email` (string|null)
- `groups` (array): Active groups this agent belongs to, name-ordered; `[]` when none. Present on org-fleet rows (GET /v1/orgs/{org_id}/agents). Archived groups are excluded.
- `id` (string)
- `key_prefix` (string|null): First 8 chars of the bound API key hash — useful for key-rotation debugging.
- `last_seen` (string|null)
- `name` (string|null): Agent name (2-32 chars, alphanumeric + hyphens). Present on all list and get responses.
- `org_id` (string|null): Owner projection: the agent's org binding (ADR-062 authz boundary).
- `public` (boolean): Identity-record visibility axis — whether the agent's IDENTITY RECORD is publicly discoverable. This is DISTINCT from reputation visibility: every registered agent's reputation is public by accountab…
- `status` (string)
- `user_id` (string|null)

### `get_reputation` (~104 tokens)

Look up an AI agent's published Trust Rating — Mnemom's portable reliability signal for autonomous software, computed from the agent's own verified activity record. Returns the rating plus the technical factors behind it. Free, public, read-only: every registered agent's rating is published by standard (the `visibility` field is the reputation-publication axis, distinct from identity-record visibility).

Input parameters:

- `agent_id` (string, required): Agent identifier (e.g. smolt-abc123)

Output parameters:

- `a2a_trust_extension` (object): A2A trust extension for interop. Only present on `GET /reputation/{agent_id}` (not on batch/compare rows).
- `agent_id` (string)
- `agent_name` (string|null)
- `checkpoint_accounting` (object|null): Structured breakdown of how checkpoints were counted toward the score. `analyzed` is the scoring population; `excluded` buckets are mutually exclusive and `analyzed + synthetic + insufficient_thinkin…
- `checkpoint_count` (integer)
- `claimed` (boolean)
- `components` (array)
- `computed_at` (string|null)
- `confidence` (string)
- `grade` (string|null): AAA–D or NR.
- `is_eligible` (boolean)
- `next_compute_at` (string|null): Next scheduled recompute — the 00/06/12/18 UTC cron slot strictly after `computed_at` (`floor(computed_at/6h)*6h + 6h`). Null when `computed_at` is null.
- `score` (integer|null)
- `tier` (string|null)
- `trend_30d` (number|null)
- `visibility` (string): Reputation-publication axis — whether this agent's Trust Rating is published. Every registered agent's reputation is `public` by accountability standard (the default; that is the whole point of a por…

### `get_reputation_badge` (~63 tokens)

Get an embeddable Trust Rating badge for an agent — returns the badge image URL plus ready-to-paste Markdown and HTML snippets for a README or agent card.

Input parameters:

- `agent_id` (string, required): Agent identifier (e.g. smolt-abc123)

Output parameters:

- `agent_id` (string): The agent the badge is for (echoed from the request).
- `badge_url` (string): Canonical SVG Trust Rating badge image URL (always on api.mnemom.ai).
- `html_embed` (string): Paste-ready HTML badge snippet.
- `markdown_embed` (string): Paste-ready Markdown badge snippet.
- `profile_url` (string): Human-readable reputation profile page (on www.mnemom.ai).
- `verified_url` (string): Public cryptographic verification URL for the rating.

### `get_started` (~103 tokens)

Zero-auth, no-args orientation: who Mnemom is, the surface map, how to authenticate and what it unlocks, and the value tools to try right now (headlining scan_trust + the reputation reads).

Input parameters:

- `token` (string): Optional Dojo try-me invite token. When supplied and valid, returns the token-gated dojo briefing manifest (the same content as GET /v1/dojo/try-me/resolve); omit for public orientation.

Output parameters:

- `authenticate` (object): How to authenticate and what auth unlocks.
- `developer_path` (object): The developer hero on-ramp: the npx one-liner plus the intent-named MCP prompt-skills (try-me, onboard_an_agent, become_sovereign). Advertisement only — no functional dependency on those prompts exis…
- `doctrine` (string)
- `showcase_agent` (object): A real Mnemom-owned agent the try_now reputation reads target, so the loop runs verbatim.
- `skill_path` (object): The two-step on-ramp to declaring and advertising capabilities as A2A skills in a signed, portable AgentCard.
- `sovereignty_path` (object): The five-step on-ramp to becoming a sovereign, accountable agent, composed from existing tools. Walked end to end by the become_sovereign MCP prompt.
- `surface_map` (object): Stable links to the canonical read-only surfaces.
- `try_now` (array): Zero-auth value tools to call right now.
- `value_prop` (string): What Mnemom does for an agent.
- `verify` (string): How to verify signed artifacts in-band (verify, don't trust).
- `visibility_model` (object): Disambiguates the two axes that share the word 'public': reputation-publication visibility (public by standard) vs identity-record visibility (agent.public), plus the caller-context self-description.
- `what_we_keep_private_and_why` (string)
- `who` (string): One-line positioning.

### `list_agents` (~55 tokens)

List your agents — List all agents owned by the authenticated user. Supports pagination.

Input parameters:

- `limit` (integer): Maximum number of agents to return (max 100)
- `offset` (integer): Number of agents to skip for pagination

Output parameters:

- `agents` (array)
- `scope` (string): Echoes the resolved listing scope.

### `preview_compose_alignment_by_agent` (~190 tokens)

Preview composed alignment (dry run) — Composes the cascade against a hypothetical body at the agent layer and returns conflicts + the composed view. No DB writes. Used by the dashboard editor for live conflict markers.

Input parameters:

- `agent_id` (string, required): Agent identifier (e.g. smolt-abc123)
- `body` (object): Unified alignment card (ADR-008/ADR-039). Authored in YAML or JSON; composed server-side with platform defaults, org template, and active exemptions before storage. This schema matches the runtime va…

Output parameters:

- `coherence_violations` (object)
- `conflicts` (object)
- `effective` (object)
- `full_report` (object)
- `ok` (boolean)
- `summary` (boolean)
- `tool` (string)
- `what_changed` (string)
- `what_to_do_next` (string)
- `what_would_break` (string)

### `preview_compose_protection_by_agent` (~152 tokens)

Preview composed protection (dry run) — Composes the cascade against a hypothetical body at the agent layer and returns conflicts + the composed view. No DB writes. Used by the dashboard editor for live conflict markers.

Input parameters:

- `agent_id` (string, required): Agent identifier (e.g. smolt-abc123)
- `body` (object): Unified protection card (ADR-037). Safe House thresholds + trusted-source policy for a single agent. Shape matches src/composition/types.ts::UnifiedProtectionCard (canonical) and what the runtime val…

Output parameters:

- `conflicts` (object)
- `effective` (object)
- `full_report` (object)
- `ok` (boolean)
- `summary` (boolean)
- `tool` (string)
- `what_changed` (string)
- `what_to_do_next` (string)
- `what_would_break` (string)

### `put_alignment_by_agent` (~209 tokens)

Publish or replace the alignment manifest — Accepts YAML (`text/yaml`, `application/yaml`) or JSON. Body is the full `UnifiedAlignmentCard`; server-side composition merges it across the platform → org → team → agent cascade and writes the canonical composed card. Requires `Idempotency-Key`. Honor...

Input parameters:

- `agent_id` (string, required): Agent identifier (e.g. smolt-abc123)
- `body` (object): Unified alignment card (ADR-008/ADR-039). Authored in YAML or JSON; composed server-side with platform defaults, org template, and active exemptions before storage. This schema matches the runtime va…

Output parameters:

- `_composition`
- `agent_id` (string): Target agent id. On PUT, server overwrites to match the URL path.
- `audit` (object)
- `autonomy` (object)
- `autonomy_mode` (string): ADR-039 master switch for the action-policing pipeline (autonomy constraints). Required at the top level post-cutover; the legacy `enforcement.mode` location is rejected.
- `capabilities` (object)
- `card_id` (string): Card row id. Server-assigned on PUT (`ac-{uuid}`).
- `card_version` (string): Card schema version (required, non-empty). Current canonical value: `unified/2026-04-26`.
- `conscience` (object)
- `content_hash` (string): Response-only: content hash of the composed card (`sha256:<hex>`), injected by the GET/PUT response. Server-assigned — do not send on a PUT.
- `enforcement` (object): Optional ADR-039 Decision-3 user-facing knobs for unmapped-tool handling. The legacy `mode`, `unmapped_tool_action` and `fail_open` keys are REJECTED by the validator (mode → top-level autonomy_mode;…
- `expires_at` (string|null)
- `extensions` (object)
- `integrity_mode` (string): ADR-039 master switch for the values/conscience pipeline (integrity constraints). Required at the top level post-cutover; the legacy `integrity.enforcement_mode` location is rejected.
- `issued_at` (string)
- `principal` (object): Required object describing whose authority the agent acts under (ADR-039 Decision 10).
- `values` (object)
- `version` (integer): Response-only: monotonic card version, injected by the GET/PUT response. Server-assigned — do not send on a PUT.

### `put_protection_by_agent` (~171 tokens)

Publish or replace the protection manifest — Accepts YAML (`text/yaml`, `application/yaml`) or JSON. Body is the full `UnifiedProtectionCard`; server-side composition merges it across the platform → org → team → agent cascade and writes the canonical composed card. Requires `Idempotency-Key`. Hon...

Input parameters:

- `agent_id` (string, required): Agent identifier (e.g. smolt-abc123)
- `body` (object): Unified protection card (ADR-037). Safe House thresholds + trusted-source policy for a single agent. Shape matches src/composition/types.ts::UnifiedProtectionCard (canonical) and what the runtime val…

Output parameters:

- `_composition`
- `agent_id` (string)
- `card_id` (string)
- `card_version` (string)
- `content_hash` (string): Response-only: content hash of the composed card (`sha256:<hex>`), injected by the GET/PUT response. Server-assigned — do not send on a PUT.
- `expires_at` (string|null)
- `extensions` (object): Free-form extension slot for non-canonical fields. Ignored by the composer; preserved on read for tooling that needs an audit-tail metadata bag.
- `issued_at` (string)
- `mode` (string): Strictest-wins composition: enforce > nudge > observe > off.
- `protected_surface` (object): Org-declared protected surface policy (MNE-830). Strengthen-only UNION across platform → org → team → agent: each scope may add entries; none may remove. The composer always emits this block; callers…
- `review` (object): Review-hold policy (Safe House Review, Slice 2a — MNE-920 design). gate_on is the minimum verdict band per surface that escalates to a review-hold. Composition is strictest-wins; on_timeout defaults…
- `screen_surfaces` (object): Which request surfaces Safe House inspects. Composed across scopes by OR-per-field (any scope requiring inspection wins).
- `thresholds` (object): Score bands. Must satisfy warn <= quarantine <= block; each value in [0, 1].
- `trusted_sources` (object): Sources for which detectors short-circuit (each match logged in the trace). Composed as platform->agent intersection (compliance ceiling) with org+agent union inside that ceiling — an agent cannot wi…
- `version` (integer): Response-only: monotonic card version, injected by the GET/PUT response. Server-assigned — do not send on a PUT.

### `report_recipe_fn_fp` (~185 tokens)

Submit a false-positive / false-negative correction for one of Mnemom's automated detection rules (a 'recipe') — technical feedback that improves detection accuracy, like filing a bug report against a spam filter.

Input parameters:

- `agent_id` (string): Optional. Customer's agent id, when the report concerns a specific agent.
- `checkpoint_id` (string): Optional. Related integrity_checkpoints id (helps the reviewer correlate).
- `evidence` (string): Optional raw payload / log excerpt the admin reviewer can inspect.
- `recipeId` (string, required): The detection_recipes id the report is filed against (the recipe that misfired or failed to fire).
- `summary` (string, required): Customer's description of what happened.
- `type` (string, required): 'fn' (false negative — recipe should have fired) or 'fp' (false positive — recipe fired on legitimate behaviour).

Output parameters:

- `candidate_id` (string)
- `ok` (boolean)
- `related_recipe_id` (string)
- `type` (string)

### `scan_trust` (~202 tokens)

Scan a website's agent-trust-readiness and return a signed scorecard (Trust, plus an Access axis on newer rubrics). Zero-auth. Results are CACHED for up to 24h — check `cached` and `scannedAt` on the result; pass `fresh: true` to force a re-scan (rate-limited). Proxies to the SSRF-locked isittrustready scanner; the Ed25519 signature + permalink are preserved verbatim. Rubric + docs: https://www.isittrustready.ai/rubric and https://docs.mnemom.ai/.

Input parameters:

- `fresh` (boolean): Force a fresh re-scan instead of the cached result (results are cached up to 24h; the engine rate-limits re-scans). Equivalent to the scanner's rescan flag.
- `url` (string, required): Domain or URL to scan, e.g. "example.com" or "https://example.com".

Output parameters:

- `access` (object): The independent Access/discoverability axis (never blended with Trust). Present from the two-axis rubric (0.3.0+).
- `cached` (boolean): True when served from the scanner's 24h cache rather than a fresh scan.
- `categories` (array): Trust-axis categories with per-category scores + checks.
- `grade` (string): Trust letter grade (A+…F).
- `permalink` (string): Shareable /r/ permalink (only on /r/ responses; transport field).
- `rubricVersion` (string): Rubric version (e.g. "0.4.0").
- `scannedAt` (string): When this scorecard was produced. Results are cached up to 24h — pass fresh:true to scan_trust to force a re-scan.
- `schema` (string): iitr-scan schema version string (e.g. "iitr-scan/v0.N").
- `score` (number): 0–100 weighted overall TRUST score.
- `signature` (object): Ed25519 signature over the canonical result (transport field; stripped before verify).
- `target` (string): Normalized host that was scanned.
- `verification` (object): Self-describing in-band verification block {alg, kid, jwks, canonicalization} — how to verify this scorecard's signature. Self-describing, so signed-EXCLUDED (stripped before verify).

### `search_reputation_directory` (~199 tokens)

Resolve an agent name or id-prefix to a real agent_id over the PUBLIC reputation directory (only agents whose reputation visibility is public). Zero-auth. The arriving-agent entry point: discover a concrete agent_id, then call get_reputation / verify_reputation on it.

Input parameters:

- `confidence` (string): Filter to agents at a given reputation-confidence level (driven by how much evidence backs the score).
- `grade` (string): Filter to one grade (e.g. `AAA`, `B`, `NR`).
- `page` (integer): 1-based page number for pagination. Default 1.
- `per_page` (integer): Number of results per page. 1–100, default 20.
- `q` (string): Name search (ilike) or agent-id prefix match.
- `sort` (string): Result ordering. Default "score" (highest-rated first); other supported keys order by recency or name.

Output parameters:

- `agents` (array)
- `page` (integer)
- `per_page` (integer)
- `total` (integer)

### `verify_agent_binding` (~93 tokens)

Verify that an API key is bound to this agent — confirms the holder is the accountable owner (anti-impersonation), hashing the key client-side.

Input parameters:

- `agent_id` (string, required): Agent identifier (e.g. smolt-abc123)
- `key_hash` (string, required): First 16 hex chars of SHA256(apiKey) or SHA256(apiKey + '|' + agentName) for named agents.

Output parameters:

- `bound` (boolean): True if the submitted hash matches the registered key.
- `caller` (string): Self-describing caller context. `key_prefix` is present iff `caller` is `org_member`; `anonymous` and `authenticated` (non-member) callers receive `{ bound, caller }` only. This is BY DESIGN, not a p…
- `key_prefix` (string|null): First 16 chars of the registered key (or null if not yet captured). Returned ONLY to callers who are members of the agent's org (`caller` === `org_member`); omitted for anonymous / cross-org callers.

### `verify_reputation` (~104 tokens)

Attest an agent's Trust Rating — returns a Merkle-root + hash-chain attestation (hash_chain_valid) proving the rating derives from an unbroken, append-only checkpoint chain, plus a pointer to the signed integrity certificate. This is a chain-integrity attestation, NOT an in-band Ed25519 signature check (that parity is verify_scan, for website scorecards).

Input parameters:

- `agent_id` (string, required): Agent identifier (e.g. smolt-abc123)

Output parameters:

- `agent_id` (string)
- `computed_at` (string)
- `grade` (string)
- `score` (number)
- `verification` (object|null)

### `verify_scan` (~182 tokens)

Verify a website scan scorecard's Ed25519 signature IN-BAND (verify, don't trust). Pass a `scan` (a scorecard from scan_trust) or a `url` to re-scan; returns {verified, key_id, canonicalization} checked against the public key at mnemom://iitr/jwks. Zero-auth. Spec + rubric: https://www.isittrustready.ai/rubric and https://docs.mnemom.ai/.

Input parameters:

- `scan` (object): A scan scorecard previously returned by scan_trust (or iitr's /r/ JSON), passed back verbatim to verify. Same shape as scan_trust's result; the signature is checked against mnemom://iitr/jwks.
- `url` (string): Alternatively, a domain/URL to re-scan and then verify.

Output parameters:

- `algorithm` (string): Always "Ed25519".
- `canonicalization` (string): The exact canonicalization used (so the verdict is reproducible).
- `key_id` (string|null): The signing key id (kid) checked.
- `reason` (string): Why verification failed or could not be evaluated (absent when verified).
- `scorecard` (object): The scorecard verified (present when re-scanned via `url`).
- `verified` (boolean): True iff the signature verifies against the in-band JWKS.

## Diagnostics

Captured diagnostic sections: TLS, DNSSEC, Authorisation, Transports. The full working is on the page: https://verifymcp.io/servers/mnemom-mnemom/api#diagnostics

## Score history

- 2026-08-03: 69
- 2026-08-02: 68
- 2026-08-01: 68
- 2026-07-31: 67
- 2026-07-30: 66
- 2026-07-29: 68
- 2026-07-28: 67
- 2026-07-27: 66
- 2026-07-26: 66

## Links

- Remote endpoint: https://api.mnemom.ai/mcp?profile=directory
- Repository: https://github.com/mnemom/mcp
- Website: https://www.mnemom.ai/
- Changelog RSS feed: https://verifymcp.io/servers/mnemom-mnemom/api/changelog.xml
- Changelog JSON feed: https://verifymcp.io/servers/mnemom-mnemom/api/changelog.json
- HTML version of this page: https://verifymcp.io/servers/mnemom-mnemom/api