MFIT Personal
REMOTE · API.MCP.AI
Client, workout, body composition, retention and finance management for personal trainers.
Available components
Last scanned (15 hours ago)
Scores higher than 53% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.
Category CRM and Sales
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security46
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: this server exposes a tool marked destructive (mfit_client_files_delete) and its handshake is open, but we could not confirm whether a tool call is gated, so we do not assert it is callable unauthenticated. View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS enforcement could not be verified: the plaintext port answered with HTTP 406, which proves neither a plaintext path nor enforcement. View diagnostics → Unverified
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability64
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 8623 tokens (~172/item across 50 items; 50 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage67
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 0% of tool parameters carry a description.Fail
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- All 4 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 51 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Checks we ran (11)
- TLS certificate
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Checks we could not complete (2)
These are gaps on our side, not findings about this hosted endpoint. We only credit what we can confirm, so a category made up entirely of them scores 0.
- Authorization in Endpoint SecurityAuthorisation not fully verified: this server exposes a tool marked destructive (mfit_client_files_delete) and its handshake is open, but we could not confirm whether a tool call is gated, so we do not assert it is callable unauthenticated.
- HTTPS in Endpoint SecurityHTTPS enforcement could not be verified: the plaintext port answered with HTTP 406, which proves neither a plaintext path nor enforcement.
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 21 Nov 26 0
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Server version: 0.9.460 → 0.9.467 functional
- 20 Nov 26 0
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Server version: 0.9.459 → 0.9.460 functional
- 19 Nov 26 0
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Server version: 0.9.454 → 0.9.459 functional
- 18 Nov 26 0
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Server version: 0.9.452 → 0.9.454 functional
- 17 Nov 26 0
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Server version: 0.9.450 → 0.9.452 functional
- 16 Nov 26 0
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Server version: 0.9.449 → 0.9.450 functional
- 15 Nov 26 0
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Server version: 0.9.442 → 0.9.449 functional
- 14 Nov 26 0
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Server version: 0.9.429 → 0.9.442 functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://api.mcp.ai/p_mfit
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=mcp.ai | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 28 Sept 2026 | 27 Dec 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | 1bf4d405299e078a0e62ff16cded599b |
| SANs: mcp.ai, *.mcp.ai | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of api.mcp.ai. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| ai. | DS published | 1814 | 8 | Verified |
| mcp.ai. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://api.mcp.ai/p_mfit | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://api.mcp.ai/p_mfit | Inconclusive | 406 |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
report_bug ~50
Report a bug, missing feature, or send feedback. Include the conversation array with recent messages for reproduction.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| context | string | – | – |
| conversation | string | – | – |
| message | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
show_version ~17
Show the current MCP platform and adapter versions.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
toolkit_info ~37
Returns the current toolkit state: installed MCPs, their connection status, the accounts connected to each one, and how many catalog tools each exposes.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the MFIT Personal MCP server?
MFIT Personal is a hosted endpoint at https://api.mcp.ai/p_mfit, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · api.mcp.ai
claude mcp add --transport http mcp-dir-mfit-mcp 'https://api.mcp.ai/p_mfit'
What is the MFIT Personal MCP server?
MFIT Personal is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.mcp-dir/mfit-mcp. Client, workout, body composition, retention and finance management for personal trainers. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://api.mcp.ai/p_mfit).
Is the MFIT Personal MCP server safe to use?
MFIT Personal scores 69 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the MFIT Personal MCP server expose?
MFIT Personal exposes 50 tools: mfit_list_accounts, mfit_get_profile, mfit_client_list, mfit_client_get, mfit_client_list_groups, and 45 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 8,494 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the MFIT Personal MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to MFIT Personal without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the MFIT Personal MCP server still maintained?
MFIT Personal is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the MFIT Personal MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 11 checks on MFIT Personal, covering TLS certificate, HSTS header, DNSSEC, Transport and 7 more. 2 items could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about MFIT Personal: Authorization and HTTPS. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.