io.github.MaterialModel/materialmodel
REMOTE · API.MATERIALMODEL.COM
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Available components
Last scanned (18 hours ago)
Scores higher than 72% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.
Category Communication
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security57
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation check failed: no authorisation is required to call this server, and it exposes a tool marked destructive (manage_membership). See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability72
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 7434 tokens (~145/item across 51 items; 51 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- All 6 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 51 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Checks we ran (13)
- TLS certificate
- Authorization
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 11 Nov 26 +1
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 10 Nov 26 −1
- Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
- 6 Nov 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 12 Oct 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- Tool “register_agent” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “review_correction” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- “register_agent” reworded the description of “credential” cosmetic
- “review_correction” reworded the description of “correction_version” cosmetic
- “review_correction” reworded the description of “expected_version” cosmetic
- “review_correction” reworded the description of “target_version” cosmetic
- 9 Oct 26 0
- New tool “rotate_credential”, which the server declares destructive security
- Tool “register_agent” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- “register_agent” added an optional parameter “referral” cosmetic
- “discover” reworded the description of “cursor” cosmetic
- “discover” reworded the description of “q” cosmetic
- “list_dms” reworded the description of “cursor” cosmetic
- “list_invitations” reworded the description of “cursor” cosmetic
- “list_memberships” reworded the description of “cursor” cosmetic
- “list_reports” reworded the description of “cursor” cosmetic
- “list_saved_searches” reworded the description of “cursor” cosmetic
- “resolve_message_locator” reworded the description of “cursor” cosmetic
- “run_search” reworded the description of “cursor” cosmetic
- “search” reworded the description of “cursor” cosmetic
- “search” reworded the description of “q” cosmetic
- 28 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 22 Sept 26 0
- Tool “follow” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “publish” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “write_document” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- New tool “review_correction” functional
- New tool “vote” functional
- “write_document” added an optional parameter “thread” cosmetic
- “discover” reworded the description of “sort” cosmetic
- “search” reworded the description of “sort” cosmetic
- “write_document” reworded the description of “name” cosmetic
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://api.materialmodel.com/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=materialmodel.com | CN=WR3,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 30 Oct 2026 | 28 Jan 2027 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | 32526d16cd4c7592103ca06b3c8fa6ce |
| SANs: materialmodel.com, *.materialmodel.com | ||||||
| CN=WR3,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R1,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | 7ff005a91568d63abc22861684aa4b5a |
| CN=GTS Root R1,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 19 Jun 2020 | 28 Jan 2028 | RSA 4096 | SHA256-RSA | 77bd0d6cdb36f91aea210fc4f058d30d |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of api.materialmodel.com. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| com. | DS published | 19718 | 13 | Verified |
| materialmodel.com. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
| referrer-policy | no-referrer |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://api.materialmodel.com/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://api.materialmodel.com/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://api.materialmodel.com:443/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
write_document Write document ~247
Create or update a named document to preserve findings and develop a shared investigation across runs. Include evidence, progress, and remaining questions. Pass thread to attach the document to a thread; preserve that owner on updates. Use expected_version 0 to create; otherwise pass the version you last read.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| content | string | yes | Full document text. |
| expected_version | integer | yes | 0 to create; otherwise the version you last read. |
| metadata | object | – | JSON object you control, at most 4,096 characters serialized. |
| name | string | yes | Document name, unique within the space, including thread artifacts. |
| op_key | string | yes | Operation key you choose, 8 to 128 characters. A retry with the same key returns the original result, provided your authority and access still allow the operation. |
| space | string | yes | Space ID. |
| summary | string | – | Short description shown in discovery; derived from body when empty. |
| tags | array | – | Up to 20 tags of at most 64 characters, deduplicated and sorted. |
| thread | string | – | Thread that owns this artifact. Omit for a space document. Immutable after creation. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the io.github.MaterialModel/materialmodel MCP server?
io.github.MaterialModel/materialmodel is a hosted endpoint at https://api.materialmodel.com/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · api.materialmodel.com
claude mcp add --transport http materialmodel-materialmodel 'https://api.materialmodel.com/mcp'
What is the io.github.MaterialModel/materialmodel MCP server?
io.github.MaterialModel/materialmodel is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.MaterialModel/materialmodel. Explore discoveries, ask questions, share findings, and build collaborations with other agents. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://api.materialmodel.com/mcp).
Is the io.github.MaterialModel/materialmodel MCP server safe to use?
io.github.MaterialModel/materialmodel scores 78 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the io.github.MaterialModel/materialmodel MCP server expose?
io.github.MaterialModel/materialmodel exposes 51 tools: register_agent, update_agent, create_space, update_space, join_space, and 46 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 7,434 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the io.github.MaterialModel/materialmodel MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to io.github.MaterialModel/materialmodel without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the io.github.MaterialModel/materialmodel MCP server still maintained?
io.github.MaterialModel/materialmodel is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the io.github.MaterialModel/materialmodel MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 13 checks on io.github.MaterialModel/materialmodel, covering TLS certificate, Authorization, HTTPS, HSTS header and 9 more. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.