Poacher
REMOTE · APP.POACHER.IO
Listing alerts: preview searches, create and approve alerts, read results and manage channels.
Available components
Last scanned (23 hours ago)
Scores higher than 57% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.
Category Search and Retrieval
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security63
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation check failed: no authorisation is required to call this server, and it exposes a tool marked destructive (edit_alert). See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability85
- 100% of prompts and resources have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the item's name).Pass
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 7315 tokens (~106/item across 69 items; 65 tools + 4 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management23
- Stability observed for 7 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 99% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
- Structured output schemas are declared (100% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- All 3 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 67 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a current MCP spec version (2026-07-28).Pass
- Supports UI / widget rendering.Pass
Checks we ran (14)
- TLS certificate
- Authorization
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
- Capabilities
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 21 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 20 to 23. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 6 days of observed history at the previous scan, 7 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 20 Nov 26 0
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Tool “approve_preview” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “get_preview” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “list_sources” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “start_alert_in_app” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- New resource “preview-card” functional
- New resource “approval-card” functional
- Server version: 1.18.0 → 1.19.0 functional
- Server version: 1.17.0 → 1.18.0 functional
- Server version: 1.16.0 → 1.17.0 functional
- 19 Nov 26 0
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- New tool “approve_alert_creation”, which the server declares destructive security
- New tool “approve_alert_update”, which the server declares destructive security
- New tool “approve_monitoring”, which the server declares destructive security
- New tool “cancel_alert_creation”, which the server declares destructive security
- New tool “cancel_alert_update”, which the server declares destructive security
- New tool “decide_repair”, which the server declares destructive security
- New tool “remove_channel”, which the server declares destructive security
- New tool “resume_alert”, which the server declares destructive security
- New tool “revoke_monitoring”, which the server declares destructive security
- New tool “stop_shared_channel”, which the server declares destructive security
- New tool “stop_sharing”, which the server declares destructive security
- Tool “approve_check” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “approve_monitoring” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “approve_preview” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “edit_alert” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “get_preview” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “list_results” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “quote_preview” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “start_alert_in_app” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “approve_preview” no longer declares itself destructive security
- Schema quality: pass → fail ▼ functional
- First check of Capabilities: pass functional
- New resource “results-card” functional
- Server version: 1.15.0 → 1.16.0 functional
- Server version: 1.10.2 → 1.15.0 functional
- New tool “answer_invitation” functional
- New tool “answer_preview_questions” functional
- New tool “choose_shared_channel” functional
- New tool “confirm_shared_channel” functional
- New tool “get_alert_creation” functional
- New tool “get_alert_delivery” functional
- New tool “get_alert_update” functional
- New tool “get_channel_defaults” functional
- New tool “get_monitoring” functional
- New tool “get_result” functional
- New tool “get_shared_alert” functional
- New tool “list_notification_connections” functional
- New tool “list_repairs” functional
- New tool “list_shared_with_me” functional
- New tool “list_shares” functional
- New tool “mark_results_seen” functional
- New tool “quote_alert_creation” functional
- New tool “quote_alert_update” functional
- New tool “quote_copy_preview” functional
- New tool “quote_edit_preview” functional
- New tool “quote_monitoring” functional
- New tool “quote_resume” functional
- New tool “rate_result” functional
- New tool “read_billing” functional
- New tool “read_payment” functional
- New tool “read_statement” functional
- New tool “set_alert_delivery” functional
- New tool “set_channel_defaults” functional
- New tool “set_channel_on” functional
- New tool “set_shared_delivery” functional
- New tool “share_alert” functional
- “quote_preview” reworded the description of “maximum_charge_micros” cosmetic
- “quote_preview” made “maximum_charge_micros” optional cosmetic
- Tool “approve_preview” changed its title: Approve a paid preview → Run a quoted preview cosmetic
- Tool “get_preview” changed its title: Read a preview and its charge → Read a preview and its receipt cosmetic
- Tool “quote_preview” changed its title: Quote a paid preview → Quote a preview cosmetic
- 18 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 10 to 13. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 3 days of observed history at the previous scan, 4 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 16 Nov 26 +1
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Tool “add_channel” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “read_account” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “set_alert_channels” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “add_channel” is now declared destructive security
- Tool “resend_channel_code” is now declared destructive security
- Tool “set_alert_channels” is now declared destructive security
- Server version: 1.10.1 → 1.10.2 functional
- “quote_check” reworded the description of “maximum_charge_micros” cosmetic
- 15 Nov 26 0
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- 14 Nov 26 69
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://app.poacher.io/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=app.poacher.io | CN=YR1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 24 Oct 2026 | 22 Jan 2027 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | 6fb1b924c997408aebfd3540d449b46edc8 |
| SANs: app.poacher.io | ||||||
| CN=YR1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YR,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | a20253f15f2691c05dc1ce13b9bcca4e |
| CN=Root YR,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | RSA 4096 | SHA256-RSA | f24b6d17f9d9ad7cb1c9fea78782699f |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of app.poacher.io. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| io. | DS published | 38690 | 8 | Verified |
| poacher.io. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=63072000 |
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://app.poacher.io/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://app.poacher.io/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 308 | https://app.poacher.io/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
read_payment Read a payment receipt ~53
Read one card payment and its refunds, as on its receipt in the app. Read-only; refunds are requested in the app. Permission: account:read.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| payment_id | string | yes | Payment ID from read_statement. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| data | object|null | – | – |
No examples provided.
read_statement Read a monthly statement ~79
Read one month’s statement, as on the app’s Usage & receipts page: usage by alert and source, minimums, the platform fee, and card payments with their status. Read-only. Permission: account:read.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| period | string | yes | Month as YYYY-MM, in the account’s time zone (this_month.period in read_billing). |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| data | object|null | – | – |
No examples provided.
remove_channel Remove a channel ~88
Remove a Slack, Discord, ntfy, browser or text-message channel, the same as Remove in the app. It leaves every alert and the defaults at once, and a phone number’s text consent ends. Adding it back needs a new confirmation code. The account email can be paused, not removed. Permission: channels:manage.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| channel_id | integer | yes | Channel ID from list_channels. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| data | object|null | – | – |
No examples provided.
resend_channel_code Send a new confirmation code ~53
Send a new code to a channel that is waiting for one. Earlier codes stop working. Up to 8 codes an hour per account. Permission: channels:manage.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| channel_id | integer | yes | Channel ID. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| data | object|null | – | – |
No examples provided.
resume_alert Resume an alert ~126
Turn a paused alert back on, the same as Resume in the app. It runs until someone pauses it, with no end date; checks are charged from the balance, the monthly minimum applies while it is on, and the account’s monthly cap still applies. Call only after the person agrees to what quote_resume showed. Pause again with edit_alert. Permission: monitoring:manage. Ask the person before calling.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| alert_id | integer | yes | Paused alert ID. |
| request_hash | string | yes | The exact request_hash from the quote. Approval fails if anything changed since the quote. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| data | object|null | – | – |
No examples provided.
revoke_monitoring Stop monitoring ~69
Stop further paid checks under this permission and pause the alert if it is the current one. Work already sent can finish and is charged. Works even while new monitoring is switched off. Permission: monitoring:manage.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| monitoring_id | string | yes | The monitoring ID returned when it was quoted or created. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| data | object|null | – | – |
No examples provided.
set_alert_channels Choose where an alert sends results ~85
Replace the confirmed channels an alert sends results to. [] keeps results in Poacher only. Starts no paid work; a text-message channel is charged per message when results arrive (price in get_capabilities, channels.sms). Permission: channels:manage.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| alert_id | integer | yes | Alert ID. |
| channel_ids | array | yes | Confirmed channel IDs. [] for none. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| data | object|null | – | – |
No examples provided.
set_alert_delivery Choose how an alert sends results ~172
Works like Delivery style in the app. `adaptive`: the first immediate_per_hour results in a rolling hour go out at once (default 3), the rest wait for an hourly summary. `instant`: every result as soon as it is ready. `hourly`: one summary per hour. Results always stay in Poacher. Keeps the alert’s channels. Permission: channels:manage.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| alert_id | integer | yes | Alert ID. |
| delivery_mode | string | yes | `adaptive`, `instant` or `hourly`. `legacy` only keeps an alert’s earlier limits; it cannot be chosen again. |
| immediate_per_hour | integer | – | `adaptive` (or `legacy`): results sent immediately per rolling hour. |
| minimum_gap_seconds | – | – | `legacy` only: minimum seconds between messages. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| data | object|null | – | – |
No examples provided.
set_channel_defaults Choose default channels ~64
Choose the confirmed channels new alerts start with. Existing alerts keep their own channels (change those with set_alert_channels). [] means new alerts notify nobody outside Poacher. Permission: channels:manage.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| channel_ids | array | yes | Confirmed channel IDs. [] for none. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| data | object|null | – | – |
No examples provided.
set_channel_on Pause or turn on a channel ~86
Pause a confirmed channel or turn it back on, the same as the app’s Notifications page. A paused channel stays on its alerts but receives nothing until it is turned on. Works for the account email too. Permission: channels:manage.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| channel_id | integer | yes | Channel ID from list_channels. |
| enabled | boolean | yes | true turns the channel on; false pauses it. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| data | object|null | – | – |
No examples provided.
set_shared_delivery Choose how a shared alert sends results ~125
Choose how a confirmed channel receives a shared alert: `adaptive` (the first immediate_per_hour results in a rolling hour at once, default 3, then an hourly summary), `instant` or `hourly`. Permission: channels:manage.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| delivery_mode | string | yes | `adaptive`, `instant` or `hourly`. |
| destination_id | string | yes | Destination ID from get_shared_alert. |
| immediate_per_hour | integer | – | `adaptive`: results sent at once per rolling hour. |
| share_id | string | yes | Share ID from list_shared_with_me. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| data | object|null | – | – |
No examples provided.
share_alert Share an alert with someone ~134
Create an invitation link for one email address, the same as Share in the app. Poacher emails no one: give the person the invitation_url and they send it themselves. Only that email address can accept, within 7 days. The recipient sees new results on channels they confirm; the owner keeps paying and the recipient cannot see the criteria, billing or settings. Read the email address back to the person and get their agreement before calling. Permission: alerts:write.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| alert_id | integer | yes | Alert ID. |
| string | yes | The email address of the person to invite, exactly as the person gave it. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| data | object|null | – | – |
No examples provided.
start_alert_in_app Open a new alert in Poacher ~137
Make a link that opens Poacher’s alert builder with a search already filled in. Prefer creating the alert here in the conversation (see the server instructions); use this link only when the person asks to finish in Poacher, or has no Poacher account yet. The link saves and charges nothing until the person finishes in Poacher.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| brief | string | – | What the person wants, in their words: item, condition, price ceiling, place. Poacher uses this to judge matches. |
| source_url | string | – | The public search or listing page to watch, for example an eBay or AbeBooks search results URL. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| data | object | – | – |
No examples provided.
stop_shared_channel Stop a shared alert on one channel ~67
Stop sending a shared alert’s results to one channel. The share itself stays; choose another channel at any time. Permission: channels:manage.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| destination_id | string | yes | Destination ID from get_shared_alert. |
| share_id | string | yes | Share ID from list_shared_with_me. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| data | object|null | – | – |
No examples provided.
stop_sharing Stop sharing an alert ~76
End a share or withdraw an invitation, the same as Stop sharing in the app. Works for the owner, and for a recipient leaving an alert shared with them. Messages already on their way may still arrive. Permission: alerts:write.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| share_id | string | yes | Share ID from list_shares or list_shared_with_me. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| data | object|null | – | – |
No examples provided.
How do I install the Poacher MCP server?
Poacher is a hosted endpoint at https://app.poacher.io/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · app.poacher.io
claude mcp add --transport http io-poacher-poacher 'https://app.poacher.io/mcp'
What is the Poacher MCP server?
Poacher is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.poacher/poacher. Listing alerts: preview searches, create and approve alerts, read results and manage channels. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://app.poacher.io/mcp).
Is the Poacher MCP server safe to use?
Poacher scores 72 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Poacher MCP server expose?
Poacher exposes 65 tools: list_sources, get_capabilities, start_alert_in_app, read_account, read_billing, and 60 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 6,549 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Poacher MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to Poacher without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the Poacher MCP server still maintained?
Poacher is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the Poacher MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 14 checks on Poacher, covering TLS certificate, Authorization, HTTPS, HSTS header and 10 more. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.