DPO2U compliance
REMOTE · MCP.DPO2U.COM
Check before you pay: counterparty compliance verdicts for AI agents, paid per call via x402.
Available components
Last scanned (15 hours ago)
Scores higher than 67% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.
Category Security
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security94
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation is enforced on tool calls, advertised via RFC 9728 protected-resource metadata. Discovery is public, which costs nothing: no tool can be invoked without a token. View diagnostics → Pass
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- The authorisation server offers only Dynamic Client Registration (RFC 7591), which MCP 2026-07-28 deprecated in favour of Client ID Metadata Documents. View diagnostics → Partial
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability58
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 16100 tokens (~193/item across 83 items; 83 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management17
- Stability observed for 5 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage96
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 88% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety75
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- 0 of 4 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation; "submit_consent_revoke" implies "revoke" and declares no destructiveHint at all, which the MCP spec reads as destructive by default. See how to fix → Fail
- An AI judge read all 83 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Checks we ran (13)
- TLS certificate
- Authorization
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 21 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 13 to 17. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 4 days of observed history at the previous scan, 5 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 19 Nov 26 +1
- Tool “generate_lgpd_kit” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “homomorphic_analytics” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “simulate_breach” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “validate_cvm_token_rules” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “verify_compliance_proof” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “verify_consent” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- “validate_cvm_token_rules” reworded the description of “ruleSet” cosmetic
- 18 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 3 to 7. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 1 days of observed history at the previous scan, 2 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 17 Nov 26 0
- Tool “encrypted_reporting” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “fhe_executive_dashboard” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “private_benchmark” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “secure_data_sharing” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “zk_compliance_proof” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- 16 Nov 26 74
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://mcp.dpo2u.com/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=mcp.dpo2u.com | CN=YR2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 24 Sept 2026 | 23 Dec 2026 | RSA 4096 | SHA256-RSA | 6305576da8cf971cd157c08de3384fb0d22 |
| SANs: mcp.dpo2u.com | ||||||
| CN=YR2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YR,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | 4ebd24947e24d394802d84a52fd5b319 |
| CN=Root YR,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | RSA 4096 | SHA256-RSA | f24b6d17f9d9ad7cb1c9fea78782699f |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of mcp.dpo2u.com. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| com. | DS published | 19718 | 13 | Verified |
| dpo2u.com. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication Enforced and verified
The endpoint asked for a token and published valid RFC 9728 metadata describing how to get one.
| Result | Enforced and verified |
|---|---|
| Enforced | On tool calls |
| HTTP status | 200 |
WWW-Authenticate challenge Bearer error="invalid_token", error_description="Missing Authorization header", scope="mcp:tools", resource_metadata="https://mcp.dpo2u.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp"
Bearer error="invalid_token", error_description="Missing Authorization header", scope="mcp:tools", resource_metadata="https://mcp.dpo2u.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp" | Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains |
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
| x-frame-options | SAMEORIGIN |
| referrer-policy | no-referrer |
Protected resource metadata
| Document | https://mcp.dpo2u.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp |
|---|---|
| Retrieved | Yes |
| Resource | https://mcp.dpo2u.com/mcp |
| Authorisation server | https://mcp.dpo2u.com/ |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://mcp.dpo2u.com/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://mcp.dpo2u.com/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://mcp.dpo2u.com/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
generate_terms_of_use ~120
Gera Termos de Uso completos e personalizados conforme LGPD
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| collectsChildrenData | boolean | – | Coleta dados de crianças? |
| companyName | string | yes | Nome da empresa |
| companyType | string | – | Tipo de empresa |
| contactEmail | string | yes | Email de contato |
| dpoEmail | string | – | Email do DPO |
| dpoName | string | – | Nome do DPO |
| dpoPhone | string | – | Telefone do DPO |
| services | array | – | Serviços oferecidos |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
homomorphic_analytics ~134
SIMULAÇÃO: valores sintéticos gerados pela própria tool para demonstração. Não usa dados da sua organização, não executa criptografia homomórfica real e não serve como evidência de conformidade. Perform privacy-preserving analytics on encrypted data without ever decrypting sensitive information
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| analysis_type | string | yes | Type of homomorphic analysis to perform |
| data_source | string | yes | Source system or dataset identifier |
| encrypt_input | boolean | – | Encrypt input data before analysis |
| multi_party | boolean | – | Enable multi-party computation |
| parties | array | – | Organizations participating in multi-party analysis |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
issue_pipa_zk_identity ~309
Emite uma ZK identity attestation no pipa_korea_zk_identity program (PIPA Korea Art. 24 — i-PIN replacement). Requer SP1 v6 Groth16 proof real (356 bytes) + public_inputs (96 bytes) onde public_inputs[32..64] = subject_commitment. 4 kinds: 1=age_gate_19, 2=korean_resident, 3=kyc_verified, 4=domestic_representative.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| attributeKind | number | yes | 1=age_gate_19, 2=korean_resident, 3=kyc_verified, 4=domestic_representative. |
| attributeMetadataHashHex | string | yes | 32-byte hex sha256 dos metadados off-chain (issuance details, validity). |
| expiresAt | number | – | Unix timestamp opcional de expiração. |
| proofHex | string | yes | 356-byte hex SP1 v6 Groth16 proof. Gerar via mesma pipeline que compliance-registry / consent-manager. |
| publicInputsHex | string | yes | 96-byte hex ABI-encoded PublicValuesStruct. public_inputs[32..64] DEVE ser igual a subjectCommitmentHex. |
| storageUri | string | – | URI off-chain (max 128 bytes). |
| subjectCommitmentHex | string | yes | 32-byte hex commitment (Poseidon ou sha256 de identity_secret + salt). Sem PII. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
map_data_flow ~121
Mapeia fluxo de dados com diagrama Mermaid e identificação de riscos
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| countries | array | – | Países de destino |
| dataSources | array | – | Fontes de dados |
| internationalTransfer | boolean | – | Transferência internacional? |
| processingActivities | array | – | Atividades de processamento |
| retentionPeriod | string | – | Período de retenção |
| systemDescription | string | – | Descrição do sistema |
| systemName | string | yes | Nome do sistema |
| thirdParties | array | – | Terceiros compartilhados |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
multi_jurisdiction_compliance_check ~991
Fan-out de check_compliance para N jurisdições em uma chamada. Aggregate scores cross-border + identifica common gaps (que aparecem em ≥2 jurisdições) + jurisdiction-specific gaps + dedup recommendations. Use case: audit de empresa multinacional que opera sob LGPD+GDPR+CCPA+APPI+PIPA simultaneamente. Reutiliza article-by-article checklist do check_compliance por jurisdição (LGPD/GDPR full + outras 13 via keyArticles + boolean overlay).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| aggregateBy | string | – | Estratégia de agregação do score (default: average). min é mais conservador (pior caso); max é otimista; average é balanceado. |
| auditScope | string | – | Escopo da auditoria |
| auditorName | string | – | – |
| auditorRole | string | – | – |
| cnpj | string | – | CNPJ (opcional, contexto BR) |
| company | string | yes | Nome da empresa |
| hasADMOptOut | boolean | – | – |
| hasAccessControls | boolean | – | – |
| hasAuditProgram | boolean | – | – |
| hasBackup | boolean | – | – |
| hasCASPAuthorization | boolean | – | MiCA Art. 60-61 — CASP authorisation from competent authority |
| hasCASPComplaintsHandling | boolean | – | MiCA Art. 71 — complaints procedure |
| hasCASPConflictsManagement | boolean | – | MiCA Art. 72 — conflicts of interest |
| hasCASPCustodyRegister | boolean | – | MiCA Art. 75 — custody register + quarterly statements |
| hasCASPGovernance | boolean | – | MiCA Art. 68 — robust governance + organisational structure |
| hasCASPICTRiskMgmt | boolean | – | MiCA Art. 74 + DORA — ICT resilience |
| hasCASPMarketAbuseProgram | boolean | – | MiCA Art. 86-92 — market-abuse monitoring |
| hasCASPOutsourcingPolicy | boolean | – | MiCA Art. 73 — outsourcing oversight |
| hasCASPPostTradeTransparency | boolean | – | MiCA Art. 78 — execution transparency |
| hasCASPPreTradeTransparency | boolean | – | MiCA Art. 77 — bid/offer transparency |
| hasCASPSegregation | boolean | – | MiCA Art. 75 — client-asset segregation + daily reconciliation |
| hasCASPTradingRules | boolean | – | MiCA Art. 76 — trading-platform operating rules |
| hasCapitalBuffer | boolean | – | – |
| hasChildrenDataSafeguards | boolean | – | – |
| hasConsentManager | boolean | – | – |
| hasCookieConsent | boolean | – | – |
| hasCrossBorderSafeguards | boolean | – | – |
| hasDPIA | boolean | – | – |
| hasDPO | boolean | – | – |
| hasDataBreachProtocol | boolean | – | – |
| hasDataMapping | boolean | – | – |
| hasDataPortability | boolean | – | – |
| hasDataProcessingAgreement | boolean | – | – |
| hasDataRetentionPolicy | boolean | – | – |
| hasEncryption | boolean | – | – |
| hasErasureMechanism | boolean | – | – |
| hasIncidentResponsePlan | boolean | – | – |
| hasLawfulBasisRegister | boolean | – | – |
| hasMicarWhitePaper | boolean | – | – |
| hasPrivacyPolicy | boolean | – | – |
| hasRedemptionPolicy | boolean | – | – |
| hasReserveManagement | boolean | – | – |
| hasVelocityCap | boolean | – | – |
| internationalTransfer | boolean | – | – |
| issuesART | boolean | – | Project issues Asset-Referenced Tokens (MiCA Title III). When false AND issuesEMT false, MICAR Title III articles are marked Not Applicable instead of gaps. |
| issuesEMT | boolean | – | Project issues E-Money Tokens (MiCA Title IV). Same scoping effect as issuesART. |
| jurisdictions | array | yes | Array de codes ou aliases (LGPD/GDPR/APPI/JP/JAPAN/etc.). Min 2. Codes válidos: LGPD, GDPR, DPDP, MICAR, MICAR-CASP, PDPA, UAE, POPIA, NDPA, CCPA, PIPEDA, LAW25, PIPA, PDP, APPI, MEXICO, VIETNAM, MAL… |
| operatesCASP | boolean | – | Project operates any of the 10 CASP services (Title V). When true, the tool auto-adds MICAR-CASP to the jurisdiction set if not already requested. When explicitly false, MICAR-CASP articles are marke… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
private_benchmark ~141
SIMULAÇÃO: valores sintéticos gerados pela própria tool para demonstração. Não usa dados da sua organização, não executa criptografia homomórfica real e não serve como evidência de conformidade. Compare organizational metrics against industry peers without revealing sensitive data using secure multi-party computation
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| anonymity_level | string | – | Anonymity protection level |
| benchmark_type | string | yes | Type of benchmark comparison |
| comparison_metrics | array | yes | Specific metrics to compare |
| include_positioning | boolean | – | Include competitive positioning analysis |
| industry_sector | string | yes | Industry sector for comparison |
| organization_size | string | yes | Organization size category |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
record_pipeda_consent ~296
Registra consent granular conforme PIPEDA Schedule 1 (Canadá). Inclui consent_form (express/implied/opt-out — Princípio 4.3.6), bitmap principles_evidenced (1-10), opcional cross_border_destination (ISO-3166 alpha-2, Princípio 4.1.3). Para flag RROSH (DPA 2018 §10.1) use tool separada.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| consentForm | number | yes | 1=express, 2=implied (reasonable expectation), 3=opt-out (limited circumstances). |
| crossBorderDestination | string | – | ISO-3166-1 alpha-2 country code (e.g. "US"). Omitir se não há transferência. |
| principlesEvidenced | number | yes | Bitmap u16 — bit N (1-indexed) = Princípio N evidenciado. Comum: 0xFE (P2-P8), 0x3FE (P2-P9). |
| purposeCode | number | yes | Código u16 da finalidade (taxonomia off-chain). |
| purposeText | string | yes | Texto humano da finalidade — sha256-hashed pra purpose_hash on-chain. |
| storageUri | string | – | URI off-chain pro consent form assinado. Max 128 bytes. |
| subject | string | yes | Pubkey do sujeito (base58). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
register_ccpa_optout ~232
Registra um opt-out CCPA §1798.135 (Califórnia) no ccpa_optout_registry program. 3 kinds: 1=sale, 2=share, 3=sensitive. PDA usa hash do consumidor (não pubkey direta) — ledger sem PII, conforme CCPA §1798.100(c) data minimization.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| consumerCommitmentHashHex | string | – | 32-byte hex do commitment do consumidor (alternativa a consumerId). |
| consumerId | string | – | ID opaco do consumidor (NÃO wallet pubkey). Será sha256-hashed. |
| optoutKind | number | yes | 1=sale (§1798.120), 2=share (CPRA cross-context), 3=sensitive (§1798.121). |
| storageUri | string | – | URI off-chain pra evidência (form, GPC header). Max 128 bytes. |
| viaGpc | boolean | yes | Se foi disparado pelo Global Privacy Control signal (Cal. Code Regs. tit. 11 §7025). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
register_popia_io ~185
Registra um Information Officer formal no popia_info_officer_registry program (POPIA §55, África do Sul). Server wallet assina como Responsible Party. Retorna tx signature + appointment PDA. Para produção use SDK; tool é pra validação dev/devnet.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| contactHashHex | string | yes | sha256 hex (32 bytes) dos contatos do IO — kept off-chain for POPIA Condition 4 minimization. |
| informationOfficer | string | yes | Pubkey do Information Officer (base58). |
| organizationId | string | – | ID da organização (e.g., CIPC company number). Será sha256-hashed on-chain. |
| organizationIdHashHex | string | – | 32-byte hash hex da organização (alternativa a organizationId). |
| storageUri | string | – | URI off-chain pra evidência da nomeação. Max 128 bytes. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
register_retention_policy_onchain ~152
Registra on-chain (dpo2u-solana compliance-registry) uma política de retenção previamente gerada. Âncora CID Lighthouse + content hash como Attestation PDA. Usa create_attestation (sem ZK) porque retention policies são públicas.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| cid | string | yes | CID Lighthouse da policy |
| cluster | string | – | Target cluster |
| contentHash | string | yes | sha256 hex de 64 chars (32 bytes) |
| expiresAt | number | – | Unix timestamp de expiração (opcional) |
| schemaId | string | – | Schema pubkey base58 (opcional) |
| subjectPubkey | string | – | Company pubkey base58 (default: issuer) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
report_ai_incident ~273
Estrutura um AI incident report aligned com AIAAIC Repository / AI Incident Database (referenciado pelo CAIDP no UN Global Dialogue submission). Categorias: discrimination, safety_failure, privacy_breach, misinformation, agentic_misbehavior, children_harm, gender_based_violence, other. Severidade 1-5. Recomenda escalation para UN Special Rapporteur on AI/Human Rights se severity≥4 + harmClassification=rights_violation. Não publica em registries externos — produz report estruturado pronto pra submission manual pelo DPO.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| affectedCount | number | – | Número estimado de pessoas afetadas (use 0 se desconhecido) |
| aiSystemId | string | yes | sha256 hex (32B) ou opaque ID do sistema AI |
| evidenceUri | string | – | URI (IPFS/https/ar://) de evidence bundle |
| harmClassification | string | yes | – |
| incidentType | string | yes | – |
| jurisdiction | string | – | Jurisdição primária do incidente |
| occurredAt | string | – | ISO 8601 timestamp |
| severity | number | yes | 1=baixo, 5=crítico (CAIDP threshold ≥4 → UN SR escalation) |
| summary | string | yes | Resumo factual em 1-3 frases |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
resolve_legal_citation ~261
Resolve uma citação legal (URN LexML, número de lei, ou trecho do título) contra o corpus oficial sincronizado pelo dpo2u-legal-worker. Retorna o documento normalizado + content_hash + aggregate_hash da jurisdição para uso em attestations on-chain.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| citation | string | yes | A citação a buscar. Pode ser: (a) URN LexML completo (`urn:lex:br:federal:lei:2018-08-14;13709`), (b) número de lei (`13709` ou `Lei 13.709`), (c) trecho do título (`Plano Nacional de Educação`). |
| includeText | boolean | – | Se true (default), retorna o texto completo do documento. Se false, retorna apenas metadados + content_hash (resposta ~100x menor). |
| jurisdiction | string | yes | Código DPO2U da jurisdição (LGPD, GDPR, MICAR, DPDP, APPI, PIPA, PDP-ID, Malaysia-PDPA, Vietnam-Decree-13, PDPA-SG, PIPEDA, CCPA, LFPDPPP, POPIA, PDPL-UAE, BriberyAct-UK). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
revoke_compliance_attestation ~128
Revoga uma attestation LGPD/GDPR on-chain (compliance-registry.revoke_attestation). Apenas o issuer original pode revogar — usa server wallet por default; passe altSignerBase58 se a attestation foi criada por outro signer.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| altSignerBase58 | string | – | Secret key base58 opcional. Se a attestation foi criada com signer ≠ server wallet, passar aqui. |
| attestationPda | string | yes | PDA da attestation (base58). |
| reason | string | yes | Motivo da revogação (≤64 bytes). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
revoke_composed_attestation ~218
Revoke compressed attestation via Squads v4 proposal. Cria proposal no vault[3] Compliance Authority chamando compliance-registry-pinocchio::revoke_compressed (selector 0x04). Aguarda 2-of-3 approve + 24h time-lock antes de execute. Retorna proposal PDA pra members assinarem em squads-cli.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| expectedOldLeafHashHex | string | yes | 32-byte leaf hash do oldLeaf (retornado por fetch_composed_attestation). |
| oldLeafHex | string | yes | 252-byte AttestationLeaf serializado (hex). Buscar via fetch_composed_attestation primeiro. |
| revokeReason | number | yes | Reason code 0..255 (mapping em docs/GOVERNANCE.md). Ex: 1=fraud detected, 2=user request LGPD Art. 18. |
| squadsMultisigPubkey | string | yes | Squads v4 multisig PDA (vault[3] Compliance Authority) — lookup em scripts/squads-config.json. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
secure_data_sharing ~134
SIMULAÇÃO: valores sintéticos gerados pela própria tool para demonstração. Não usa dados da sua organização, não executa criptografia homomórfica real e não serve como evidência de conformidade. Enable secure multi-party data sharing for compliance without exposing sensitive organizational information
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| data_categories | array | yes | Categories of data to be shared securely |
| organizations | array | yes | Organizations participating in data sharing |
| purpose | string | yes | Purpose and legal basis for data sharing |
| retention_days | number | – | Data retention period in days |
| sharing_type | string | yes | Type of secure data sharing |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
setup_company ~173
Setup company for LGPD compliance with DPO registration
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| addressCity | string | yes | City |
| addressState | string | yes | State |
| addressStreet | string | yes | Street address |
| addressZipCode | string | yes | ZIP code |
| cnpj | string | yes | CNPJ (14 digits) |
| companyName | string | yes | Company name |
| companySize | string | yes | Company size |
| dpoEmail | string | yes | DPO email |
| dpoName | string | yes | DPO full name |
| dpoPhone | string | yes | DPO phone |
| string | yes | Company email | |
| lgpdChecklist | object | – | – |
| phone | string | yes | Company phone |
| sector | string | yes | Business sector |
| website | string | – | Company website |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
simulate_breach ~71
Simulação de incidente por regra simples: o impacto vem só de affectedRecords (até 1.000 baixo, até 100.000 médio, acima alto). Não analisa sua infraestrutura.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| affectedRecords | number | – | Number of affected records |
| scenario | string | – | Breach scenario type |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
submit_attestation_stellar ~167
Submete uma atestação de conformidade on-chain na Stellar/Soroban via o Pilot Gateway (POST /api/v1/attestation/submit). Caminho dual-chain — para Solana use submit_compliance_attestation. Use cases B2B: compliance_attestation_v1, lgpd_compliance_v1, gdpr_compliance_v1, zk_compliance_v1, etc.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| evidence | object | yes | Objeto de evidência do use case (flags de controle, jurisdição, etc.). |
| request_id | string | yes | ID idempotente da requisição (replay com mesmo body → mesma atestação). |
| use_case_id | string | yes | ID do use case configurado no contrato (ex.: compliance_attestation_v1). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
submit_compliance_attestation ~199
Submete uma attestation LGPD/GDPR on-chain no compliance-registry program (create_attestation legacy path, sem ZK). Server wallet assina como issuer. Para ZK-verified use submit_verified_compliance_attestation.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| commitmentHex | string | – | Commitment de 32 bytes (hex, 64 chars). Se omitido, usa sha256(commitmentText). |
| commitmentText | string | – | Texto a ser hashed via sha256 pra gerar o commitment. Usar OU commitmentHex OU commitmentText. |
| expiresAt | number | – | Unix timestamp de expiração (opcional). |
| schemaIdBase58 | string | – | Schema ID opcional (Pubkey). Default: PublicKey.default. |
| storageUri | string | – | URI off-chain pra o documento (DPIA/audit report). Max 128 bytes. |
| subject | string | yes | Subject pubkey base58 (empresa/DID controller). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
submit_composed_attestation ~421
Composed Stack: submete attestation compressed atomicamente — Shadow Drive upload (immutable) + SP1 verify CPI + Light Protocol leaf insert + Squads vault authority gating. ~$0.03/op vs $0.34 LOCKED rent do flow regular. Requer SP1 proof v6 (356 bytes), public_inputs (96 bytes), payload arbitrário (uploaded a Shadow Drive). Authority é Squads vault[3] Compliance Authority PDA (pode revocar via revoke_composed_attestation).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| authorityPubkey | string | yes | Squads vault[3] Compliance Authority PDA (pode revocar). Lookup em scripts/squads-config.json. |
| commitmentHex | string | yes | 32-byte ZK commitment hex (deve bater com publicInputs[32..64]). |
| expiresAt | number | – | Unix timestamp expiração; omitir = no expiry (i64::MAX). |
| jurisdiction | string | yes | Jurisdição (mapeada pra code 0..14 no leaf). |
| payloadBase64 | string | yes | Payload completo (DPIA PDF, evidence JSON, etc.) em base64. Será uploaded a Shadow Drive imutável. |
| payloadFilename | string | yes | Filename pro Shadow Drive (deve incluir extensão, ex: dpia-q2-2026.pdf). |
| proofHex | string | yes | 356-byte SP1 v6 Groth16 proof (hex). |
| publicInputsHex | string | yes | 96-byte ABI-encoded PublicValuesStruct (hex). |
| shdwStorageAccount | string | yes | Shadow Drive storage account pubkey (alocado via scripts/init-shdw-storage-account.ts). |
| stateQueuePubkey | string | yes | Light Protocol State Queue pubkey paired with stateTreePubkey. |
| stateTreePubkey | string | yes | Light Protocol State Tree pubkey (alocada via scripts/init-cmt.ts; lookup em scripts/cmt-config.json). |
| subject | string | yes | Subject pubkey base58 (a quem a attestation se refere). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
submit_consent_record ~217
Submete uma transação real on-chain no consent-manager program (DPDP India §6) — record_consent. Server wallet assina como data fiduciary; o user (data principal) precisa ser uma pubkey válida. Retorna tx signature + PDA. Para produção, use o SDK client-sdk com seu próprio keystore; esta tool é para validação/dev.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| expiresAt | number | – | Unix timestamp (segundos) de expiração opcional. Omitir para consent sem expiração. |
| purposeCode | number | yes | Código numérico u16 da finalidade (0-65535). Taxonomia é definida off-chain. |
| purposeText | string | yes | Texto humano da finalidade (ex: "marketing_communications"). Será hashed via sha256 para obter o purpose_hash on-chain. |
| storageUri | string | – | URI off-chain opcional apontando pro termo de consent assinado. Max 128 bytes. |
| user | string | yes | User (data principal) Solana pubkey em base58. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
submit_consent_revoke ~185
Revoga um consent event on-chain (DPDP §6(4) — direito de retirada). CRÍTICO: o programa exige `require_keys_eq!(rec.user, signer)` — então o caller DEVE passar userSignerBase58 (a secret key base58 do próprio user, 64 bytes). Sem isso, a tx falha. Pra produção, use o SDK; esta tool é para validation.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| consentPda | string | yes | PDA do consent record a revogar (base58). |
| reason | string | yes | Motivo da revogação (≤64 bytes). Ex: "DPDP_SEC12_REQUEST_2026-04-22". |
| userSignerBase58 | string | yes | Secret key base58 do USER que criou o consent. Obrigatório — apenas o user pode revogar seu próprio consent (enforçado on-chain). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
submit_hiroshima_icoc_attestation ~218
Submete atestação on-chain de compromisso com Hiroshima International Code of Conduct (G7 voluntary code). Wrapper SDK pro programa Solana hiroshima_ai_process_attestation. Retorna tx signature + PDA. Atestação tem peso simbólico (voluntary code, não enforce statutory). Status atual: programa em deploy devnet (Sprint E Fase 3). Tool retorna program_not_deployed se SDK ainda não inicializado.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| aiSystemId | string | yes | sha256 hex (32B) ou opaque ID do sistema AI |
| attestationType | string | yes | Tipo de atestação. caio=DS-920 CAIO appointment, icoc=Hiroshima 11 principles commitment, etc. |
| evidenceHashHex | string | yes | sha256 hex (32B) de bundle de evidence off-chain |
| storageUri | string | – | IPFS/ar:// URI da evidence bundle. Max 128 bytes. |
| validUntil | number | – | Unix timestamp opcional de expiração |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
submit_lgpd_attestation ~345
SÓ OPERADOR. Atesta no Midnight (preview) e/ou na Avalanche Fuji (testnet) o resultado da revisão de um manifesto LGPD (dpo2u/lgpd-evidence/v1): recalcula o relatório do pack lgpd@1.1.0 (o reportId precisa bater), calcula o hash canônico do manifesto (JSON canônico + sha256) e grava hash do manifesto, versão do pack, veredito, data e hash do revisor. Só hashes e veredito ficam públicos. A atestação afirma o fato verificável ("estes artefatos, com estes hashes, foram revisados por um operador nomeado com este veredito"), não "conforme LGPD".
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| chain | string | – | Onde gravar (só redes de teste): midnight (preview), avalanche (Fuji) ou both (padrão) |
| dryRun | boolean | – | Só monta o payload, sem gravar on-chain |
| manifest | object | yes | Manifesto dpo2u/lgpd-evidence/v1 revisado |
| reportId | string | yes | reportId devolvido por validate_lgpd_evidence para este manifesto |
| reviewerName | string | yes | Nome do operador revisor (vira hash; não vai a público) |
| subject | string | – | Hash hex de 32 bytes do sujeito, fornecido pelo operador (ex.: H(CNPJ) ou H(CAIP-10/DID)). Nunca o identificador cru. Sem ele, usa H(repo|commit) do manifesto e avisa. |
| verdict | string | yes | Veredito do revisor |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
submit_verified_compliance_attestation ~202
Submete uma attestation ZK-verified no compliance-registry (create_verified_attestation). Faz CPI ao SP1 verifier program antes de gravar. commitmentHex deve equalar a subject_commitment (bytes[32..64] do publicInputs). Requer proof SP1 v6 (356 bytes) + public_inputs (96 bytes).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| commitmentHex | string | yes | 32 bytes hex (deve bater com bytes[32..64] do publicInputs). |
| expiresAt | number | – | Unix timestamp expiração. |
| proofHex | string | yes | 356-byte SP1 v6 Groth16 proof (hex). |
| publicInputsHex | string | yes | 96-byte ABI-encoded PublicValuesStruct (hex). |
| schemaIdBase58 | string | – | Schema ID opcional. |
| storageUri | string | – | URI off-chain (max 128 bytes). |
| subject | string | yes | Subject pubkey base58. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
validate_cvm_token_rules ~159
Valida uma operação de investimento em token contra regras da CVM. Hoje só a RCVM 88 (limite anual de BRL 20 mil para varejo) está implementada; sem ruleSet="RCVM88" responde nao-avaliado (isCompliant=null).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| investmentAmount | number | yes | Valor pretendido de investimento em BRL |
| investorProfile | string | yes | Perfil do investidor segundo a CVM |
| issuerCnpj | string | – | CNPJ do emissor |
| ruleSet | string | – | Conjunto de regras. Implementado: "RCVM88". Qualquer outro valor devolve nao-avaliado. |
| tokenName | string | yes | Nome ou símbolo do token |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
validate_lgpd_evidence ~216
Valida um manifesto de evidências LGPD (schema dpo2u/lgpd-evidence/v1, gerado pela skill lgpd-attest) e roda o pack lgpd@1.1.0 (20 regras: base legal, encarregado, incidente em 3 dias úteis (Res. CD/ANPD 15/2024), registro 5 anos, ATPP, cláusulas-padrão (Res. 19/2024), Art. 9º, DSAR 15 dias, consentimento, retenção, ECA Digital). Devolve relatório por regra (citação, severidade, pass/fail/not_applicable/needs_review, motivo), score 0–100, gaps, manifestHash e reportId. Somente leitura; não é parecer jurídico e não afirma conformidade.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| manifest | object | yes | Conteúdo de .lgpd/manifest.json (dpo2u/lgpd-evidence/v1). Sem código e sem dados pessoais de titulares. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
verify_agent_repo_zk_proof ~281
Verifica uma prova Zero-Knowledge (SP1/Groth16) que atesta que o repositório de um Agente de IA cumpre a política estabelecida sem revelar seu código-fonte. Verificação REAL on-chain via ComplianceChainClient (SolanaDriver → SP1 verifier) — não é mais um stub.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agentDid | string | yes | DID (Decentralized Identifier) do Agente |
| allowMock | boolean | – | Se true, aceita verificação mock (cadeia inalcançável) como válida — APENAS para dev/test. Default false. |
| proofPayload | string | yes | Prova serializada. Aceita: (a) JSON de um ProofBundle {circuit, public_values(b64), proof_serialized(b64), vkeyHash} — o mesmo formato emitido por zk_compliance_attest action=generate; ou (b) base64/… |
| publicValues | string | – | Public values (base64) — obrigatório quando proofPayload são apenas os bytes crus da prova. |
| repoCommitHash | string | yes | Hash do commit do repositório avaliado |
| vkeyHash | string | – | Hash da verification key do circuito (opcional; identidade do circuito). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
verify_compliance_proof ~77
Confere só o FORMATO de um hash de prova (0x + 32 bytes). NÃO verifica a prova: responde verified=null e formatValid. Para verificação real use submit_verified_compliance_attestation.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| cid | string | yes | CID IPFS do documento |
| proofHash | string | yes | Hash da prova |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
verify_consent ~72
INDISPONÍVEL: não há fonte de consentimentos ligada a esta tool; responde nao-avaliado. Para um consentimento registrado on-chain use fetch_consent_record.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| consentType | string | – | Type of consent to verify |
| userId | string | – | User ID for consent verification |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
verify_corpus_manifest_onchain ~172
Cross-checks the legal-worker corpus output against the on-chain legal_source_manifest PDA for a given jurisdiction. Detects tampering / drift between the off-chain corpus and the on-chain hash anchor. Returns verdict in {in-sync, drift, not-anchored, no-corpus}. Closes the chain-of-custody loop for resolve_legal_citation.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| jurisdiction | string | yes | Worker jurisdiction code (LGPD, GDPR, MICAR, POPIA, DPDP, APPI, PIPA, PDP-ID, Malaysia-PDPA, Vietnam-Decree-13, PDPA-SG, PIPEDA, CCPA, LFPDPPP, PDPL-UAE, BriberyAct-UK). Internally maps to ≤16-byte o… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
zk_compliance_attest ~158
Zero-knowledge compliance attestation (DPO2U + Solana). Default action="full" runs prove→verify→register end-to-end and returns unified receipt with real on-chain tx sigs. Use generate/verify/register for step-by-step control.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| action | string | – | Pipeline stage (default: full) |
| companyId | string | yes | DID or CNPJ of the subject (alias: company, subject) |
| metrics | object | – | Private metrics; averaged to produce score if score not provided |
| proofData | string | – | Serialized ProofBundle (action=verify|register) |
| score | number | – | Compliance score 0..100 |
| threshold | number | – | Policy threshold, default 70 |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
zk_compliance_proof ~157
SIMULAÇÃO: valores sintéticos gerados pela própria tool para demonstração. Não usa dados da sua organização, não executa criptografia homomórfica real e não serve como evidência de conformidade. Generate cryptographic zero-knowledge proofs of compliance without revealing sensitive organizational data
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| claim_statement | string | yes | Compliance claim to prove cryptographically |
| evidence_categories | array | yes | Categories of evidence supporting the claim |
| proof_scheme | string | – | Cryptographic proof scheme to use |
| proof_type | string | yes | Type of zero-knowledge proof to generate |
| regulations | array | yes | Relevant regulations (e.g., LGPD, GDPR) |
| verification_level | string | – | Verification level for the proof |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the DPO2U compliance MCP server?
DPO2U compliance is a hosted endpoint at https://mcp.dpo2u.com/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · mcp.dpo2u.com
claude mcp add --transport http fredericosanntana-dpo2u 'https://mcp.dpo2u.com/mcp'
What is the DPO2U compliance MCP server?
DPO2U compliance is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.fredericosanntana/dpo2u. Check before you pay: counterparty compliance verdicts for AI agents, paid per call via x402. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://mcp.dpo2u.com/mcp).
Is the DPO2U compliance MCP server safe to use?
DPO2U compliance scores 77 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the DPO2U compliance MCP server expose?
DPO2U compliance exposes 83 tools: compliance_query, generate_dpia, generate_dpia_stored, generate_audit_checklist, generate_audit_stored, and 78 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 16,100 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the DPO2U compliance MCP server require authentication?
Yes. DPO2U compliance asked us for credentials when we connected, so you will need to authorise it in your MCP client before it can do anything.
Is the DPO2U compliance MCP server still maintained?
DPO2U compliance is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the DPO2U compliance MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 13 checks on DPO2U compliance, covering TLS certificate, Authorization, HTTPS, HSTS header and 9 more. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.