# EdgeScreen x402 Security Screening (remote · aso-x402-screen.asostudio.workers.dev)

Free MCP hooks + x402 security scans; MCP manifest and SKILL.md audits cost $0.003 Base USDC.

- Trust score: 66/100 (medium)
- Change this week: +1
- Registry status: active
- Liveness: live
- Owner verified: no
- Last scored: 2026-11-21

## Components

- remote · `aso-x402-screen.asostudio.workers.dev`: 66/100 (this document), [markdown](https://verifymcp.io/servers/dev-workers-asostudio-aso-x402-screen-edgescreen/aso-x402-screen.md), [page](https://verifymcp.io/servers/dev-workers-asostudio-aso-x402-screen-edgescreen/aso-x402-screen)

## Channel facts

- Endpoint: `https://aso-x402-screen.asostudio.workers.dev/mcp`
- Transports: `streamable-http`
- Auth: `none`
- Version: `2.2.0`

## Trust breakdown

How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. Scores are 0–100 per category. Scoring method: https://verifymcp.io/docs/scoring (what has changed: https://verifymcp.io/docs/scoring/changelog)

Scored 2026-11-21.

- **Endpoint Security**: 69/100
  - The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key.
  - No authorisation is required to call this server. Nothing on it is marked destructive, but we can't show that an anonymous caller can only read: full credit needs the server to list at least one tool and every tool to be verifiably read-only. We use a best-effort check of tool names and descriptions to tell read-only tools from tools that change things, so some genuinely read-only tools may not get full credit. Names that start with a read verb (get, list, read, search and similar) and accurate readOnlyHint annotations help. Meet that to earn full credit, or require authorisation.
  - HTTPS enforcement could not be verified: the plaintext port answered with HTTP 405, which proves neither a plaintext path nor enforcement.
  - The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present.
  - DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC.
- **Transport & Reachability**: 100/100
  - Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake.
- **Schema Quality & AI Usability**: 59/100
  - AI-judged instruction clarity (good).
  - Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 3689 tokens (~217/item across 17 items; 17 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params.
  - Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples.
- **Stability & Change Management**: 14/100
  - Stability check failed: schema churn in the 8 days we've observed: 1 tool removals, 0 breaking changes, 0 auth/transport breaks, 10 additions.
- **Tool Coverage**: 96/100
  - 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).
  - 88% of tool parameters carry a description.
- **Tool Safety**: 100/100
  - No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.
  - We read all 17 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.
  - An AI judge read all 17 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.
- **Capabilities**: 60/100
  - Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2025-06-18; the latest is 2026-07-28.

## Install

### How do I install the EdgeScreen x402 Security Screening MCP server?

EdgeScreen x402 Security Screening is a hosted endpoint at https://aso-x402-screen.asostudio.workers.dev/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.

### Claude

```bash
claude mcp add --transport http dev-workers-asostudio-aso-x402-screen-edgescreen 'https://aso-x402-screen.asostudio.workers.dev/mcp'
```

### Cursor

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "dev-workers-asostudio-aso-x402-screen-edgescreen": {
      "url": "https://aso-x402-screen.asostudio.workers.dev/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```

### VS Code

```json
{
  "servers": {
    "dev-workers-asostudio-aso-x402-screen-edgescreen": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://aso-x402-screen.asostudio.workers.dev/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```

### Codex

```toml
[mcp_servers.dev-workers-asostudio-aso-x402-screen-edgescreen]
url = "https://aso-x402-screen.asostudio.workers.dev/mcp"
```

### opencode

```json
{
  "$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
  "mcp": {
    "dev-workers-asostudio-aso-x402-screen-edgescreen": {
      "type": "remote",
      "url": "https://aso-x402-screen.asostudio.workers.dev/mcp",
      "enabled": true
    }
  }
}
```

### OpenClaw

```bash
openclaw mcp add dev-workers-asostudio-aso-x402-screen-edgescreen --url 'https://aso-x402-screen.asostudio.workers.dev/mcp' --transport streamable-http
```

### Hermes

```yaml
mcp_servers:
  dev-workers-asostudio-aso-x402-screen-edgescreen:
    url: "https://aso-x402-screen.asostudio.workers.dev/mcp"
```

### Netclaw

```json
{
  "McpServers": {
    "dev-workers-asostudio-aso-x402-screen-edgescreen": {
      "Transport": "http",
      "Url": "https://aso-x402-screen.asostudio.workers.dev/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```

### Vellum

```bash
assistant mcp add dev-workers-asostudio-aso-x402-screen-edgescreen -t streamable-http -u 'https://aso-x402-screen.asostudio.workers.dev/mcp'
```

### Other

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "dev-workers-asostudio-aso-x402-screen-edgescreen": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://aso-x402-screen.asostudio.workers.dev/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```

The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.

## Changelog

Every change recorded for this component, newest first. Days that predate change tracking, or that we cannot explain, say so: "we were watching and nothing happened" and "we were not watching" are different claims.

### 2026-11-20 (score 66, +1)

No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 8 to 11.

### 2026-11-18 (score 65, +1)

No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 1 to 4.

### 2026-11-16 (score 64, −1)

- [security regression] Stability: 0.07 → fail
- [security regression] Tool “edgescreen_x402_quickstart” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “free_mcp_manifest_quickcheck” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “free_punycode_decode” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “free_secret_prefix_lint” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “free_x402_challenge_quickcheck” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “health_check” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “screen_x402_payment_challenge” was removed
- [security] Tool “screen_batch” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “screen_domain” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “screen_impersonation” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [functional improvement] Tool coverage: 80% → 88%
- [functional] Server version: 2.1.0 → 2.2.0
- [functional] New tool “get_service_health”
- [functional] New tool “get_x402_quickstart”
- [functional] New tool “preview_mcp_manifest”
- [functional] New tool “preview_punycode_decode”
- [functional] New tool “preview_secret_lint”
- [functional] New tool “preview_x402_challenge”
- [functional] New tool “screen_x402_challenge”
- [functional] New tool “verify_audit_receipt”

### 2026-11-15 (score 65, 0)

- [functional regression] Tool coverage: 100% → 80%
- [functional improvement] Schema quality: 261 → 230
- [functional] Server version: 2.0.0 → 2.1.0
- [functional] Server version: 1.9.0 → 2.0.0
- [functional] Server version: 1.8.1 → 1.9.0
- [functional] New tool “free_x402_challenge_quickcheck”
- [functional] New tool “screen_x402_payment_challenge”
- [functional] New tool “free_mcp_manifest_quickcheck”
- [functional] New tool “screen_mcp_manifest”

### 2026-11-14 (score 65, +3)

- [security improvement] HSTS header: fail → pass
- [security] Tool “screen_address” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “screen_batch” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “screen_diff” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “screen_domain” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “screen_prompt” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “screen_secret” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “screen_url” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [functional regression] Schema quality: 2217 → 3139
- [functional regression] Schema quality: 2217 → 2736
- [functional improvement] Stability: unverified → 0.03
- [functional] Server version: 1.8.0 → 1.8.1
- [functional] Server version: 1.7.0 → 1.8.0
- [functional] Server version: 1.6.0 → 1.7.0
- [functional] Server version: 1.4.0 → 1.6.0
- [functional] New tool “edgescreen_x402_quickstart”
- [functional] New tool “free_punycode_decode”
- [functional] New tool “free_secret_prefix_lint”
- [functional] New tool “screen_impersonation”
- [cosmetic] “screen_address” added an optional parameter “chain”
- [cosmetic] “screen_batch” added an optional parameter “chain”
- [cosmetic] “screen_batch” added an optional parameter “target”
- [cosmetic] “screen_batch” added an optional parameter “targets”
- [cosmetic] “screen_prompt” added an optional parameter “text”

### 2026-11-13 (score 62)

First indexed and scored.

## MCP tools (17)

### `verify_audit_receipt` (~106 tokens)

Verify an EdgeScreen Ed25519 signed audit receipt or PAYMENT-REFERRAL-RECEIPT for $0.00, without a wallet. Returns valid, receiptType, signerPublicKey, payloadSummary and verifiedAt using trusted server public keys. Unknown keys or tampering return valid=false; no payment or payout confirmation.

Input parameters:

- `signedReceipt` (string, required): Base64url signedReceipt from an audit or PAYMENT-REFERRAL-RECEIPT header.

### `preview_x402_challenge` (~120 tokens)

Free zero-wallet x402 challenge quickcheck: verdict, top_finding and upgrade_hint. Inspects supplied JSON or headers only; no DNS, chain lookups or payload logging.

Input parameters:

- `advertised_price_usd` (string): Optional advertised USD price for comparison.
- `challenge` (required): Supplied x402 JSON or base64 PAYMENT-REQUIRED; URLs are never fetched.
- `micro_call` (boolean): Assert a micro-call ceiling of $1.00 USD.
- `openapi`: Optional JSON OpenAPI operation or document; never fetched.

### `screen_x402_challenge` (~179 tokens)

Inspect x402 v1/v2 challenges for spoofed stablecoins, decimal inflation, price mismatch, unsafe recipients and SSRF URLs. Pinned mainnet tokens on Base, Ethereum, Arbitrum, Optimism, Polygon and Solana. Returns all findings, nominal USD estimate and Ed25519 receipt. $0.002 (2000 atomic) Base USDC.

Input parameters:

- `accepts` (array)
- `advertised_price_usd`
- `body`
- `challenge`
- `headers` (object)
- `micro_call` (boolean): Assert a micro-call ceiling of $1.00 USD.
- `openapi`: Optional JSON OpenAPI operation or document; never fetched.
- `payment_required` (string)
- `www_authenticate` (string)
- `x402Version` (integer)

### `preview_mcp_manifest` (~106 tokens)

Free, zero-wallet deterministic MCP manifest or SKILL.md quickcheck: risk, severity, findingCount and manifestPinSha256. No external lookups or payload storage. Full findings, remediation and signed receipt: screen_mcp_manifest ($0.003 Base USDC).

Input parameters:

- `expectedPinSha256` (string): Previously approved pin; compare without storing the manifest.
- `manifest`
- `text` (string): Raw SKILL.md or serialized MCP JSON. Never executed.

### `screen_mcp_manifest` (~114 tokens)

Scan MCP manifests and SKILL.md for poisoning, hidden Unicode, cross-tool overrides, mutable executables and credential exfiltration. Returns findings, remediated output, SHA-256 pin and Ed25519 audit receipt. Requires $0.003 (3000 atomic) Base USDC via x402.

Input parameters:

- `expectedPinSha256` (string): Previously approved pin; compare without storing the manifest.
- `manifest`
- `text` (string): Raw SKILL.md or serialized MCP JSON. Never executed.

### `preview_punycode_decode` (~151 tokens)

FREE ($0.00, zero wallet required): Decode IDN xn-- punycode and inspect mixed Unicode scripts on 1 domain or @handle (0 brand-corpus lookup). Returns upgrade_hint to paid screen_impersonation ($0.002 Base USDC) for 61-brand Levenshtein/typosquat/subdomain spoofing detection.

Input parameters:

- `domain` (string): Optional alias for target.
- `handle` (string): Optional alias for target.
- `target` (string, required): Single domain or @handle (1-256 chars) to decode IDN xn-- punycode and inspect mixed Unicode scripts (free, $0.00, 0 brand-corpus lookup).

### `preview_secret_lint` (~144 tokens)

FREE ($0.00, zero wallet required): Lint up to 500 chars for obvious high-risk secret prefixes (AKIA, sk_live_, sk-proj-/sk-ant-, -----BEGIN, ghp_/github_pat_, xoxb-) without full entropy, offsets, or surgical redaction. Returns upgrade_hint to paid screen_secret / screen_diff ($0.002-$0.005 Base USDC).

Input parameters:

- `text` (string, required): Snippet up to 500 chars to lint for obvious high-risk secret prefixes (AKIA, sk_live_, -----BEGIN, ghp_, xoxb-) without full entropy/redaction (free, $0.00).

### `get_x402_quickstart` (~106 tokens)

FREE ($0.00, zero wallet required): Return turnkey copy-paste @x402/mcp and @x402/fetch setup snippets (Cursor, Claude Code, TypeScript viem, Python) plus the live Base USDC pricing ladder so an agent can wire x402 payments in 30 seconds.

Input parameters:

- `client` (string): Optional client filter (all, cursor, claude-code, typescript, python) for copy-paste x402 setup snippets.

### `screen_batch` (~946 tokens)

Run a multi-item single-payment pipeline for up to 25 total items: crypto addresses, domains/handles, prompts, URLs, text snippets and git diffs. Returns combined deterministic findings after one $0.005 (5000 atomic) Base USDC x402 payment.

Input parameters:

- `address` (string): Single crypto address shorthand (EVM 0x..., Bitcoin 1.../3.../bc1..., TRON T...) to screen against OFAC SDN.
- `addresses` (array): Crypto addresses (EVM 0x..., Bitcoin 1.../3.../bc1..., TRON T...) to screen against OFAC SDN.
- `brand`: Target brand for deterministic homoglyph, Punycode, and typosquatting comparison.
- `candidate` (string): Single candidate domain or social handle shorthand to auto-classify and inspect.
- `candidates` (array): Mixed candidate domains or social handles to auto-classify and inspect.
- `chain` (string): Optional chain hint for address screening (e.g. base, ethereum, btc, tron).
- `diff` (string): Single unified git diff or PR patch shorthand (up to 16384 chars) to audit for leaked secrets, destructive shell/SQL, CI injection, malicious lifecycle hooks, SSRF/private IPs, auth/TLS bypass, Troja…
- `diffs` (array): Unified git diffs or PR patches (up to 16384 chars each) to pre-screen before git apply / PR merge.
- `domain` (string): Single candidate domain shorthand (ASCII, Unicode IDN, or Punycode xn--...) to inspect.
- `domains` (array): Candidate domains (ASCII, Unicode IDN, or Punycode xn--...) to inspect.
- `handle` (string): Single candidate social handle shorthand (@handle or bare handle) to inspect.
- `handles` (array): Candidate social handles (@handle or bare handle) to inspect.
- `officialDomains` (array): Optional list of verified official domains for the target brand.
- `officialHandles` (array): Optional list of verified official social handles for the target brand.
- `patch` (string): Alias for `diff`: single unified git diff or patch snippet (up to 16384 chars) to audit.
- `patches` (array): Alias for `diffs`: array of unified git diffs or patch snippets (up to 16384 chars each) to audit.
- `prompt` (string): Single untrusted prompt, MCP tool description, or fetched text (up to 4096 chars) to scan.
- `prompts` (array): Untrusted prompts, MCP tool descriptions, or fetched texts (up to 4096 chars each) to scan for prompt injection, tool poisoning, Unicode tag smuggling, and secret exfiltration.
- `secret` (string): Single text/log/diff/webhook payload shorthand (up to 8192 chars) to scan & redact for leaked API keys, private keys, JWTs, and Bearer tokens.
- `secrets` (array): Text snippets, PR bodies, logs, or webhook payloads (up to 8192 chars each) to scan & redact for leaked API keys (OpenAI, Anthropic, AWS, GitHub, Stripe, Slack, Google), PEM/hex private keys, JWTs, a…
- `target` (string): Single candidate domain, URL, or @handle to screen for brand impersonation, IDN punycode, Unicode confusables, and typosquats.
- `targets` (array): Candidate domains, URLs, or @handles (up to 25) to screen for brand impersonation and homographs.
- `text` (string): Alias for `secret`: single text/log/PR snippet (up to 8192 chars) to scan & redact for leaked secrets.
- `texts` (array): Alias for `secrets`: array of text snippets (up to 8192 chars each) to scan & redact for leaked secrets.
- `url` (string): Single URL shorthand (up to 2048 chars) to inspect for SSRF, private/metadata IPs, dangerous schemes, credentials, IDN homoglyphs, and open redirects.
- `urls` (array): URLs (up to 2048 chars each) to pre-screen before fetch for SSRF (loopback, RFC1918, CGNAT, IPv6 mapped/local, cloud metadata, hex/octal/decimal IP encodings), non-HTTP(S) schemes, credentials, punyc…

### `screen_address` (~169 tokens)

OFAC SDN crypto wallet sanctions screening for EVM, Bitcoin, and TRON addresses. Requires $0.002 (2000 atomic) Base USDC on eip155:8453 via @x402/mcp _meta["x402/payment"] or PAYMENT-SIGNATURE header.

Input parameters:

- `address` (string): Single crypto address shorthand (EVM 0x..., Bitcoin 1.../3.../bc1..., TRON T...) to screen against OFAC SDN.
- `addresses` (array): Crypto addresses (EVM 0x..., Bitcoin 1.../3.../bc1..., TRON T...) to screen against OFAC SDN.
- `chain` (string): Optional chain hint for address screening (e.g. base, ethereum, btc, tron).

### `screen_domain` (~276 tokens)

Screen one hostname for DNS/IDN/punycode/TLS infrastructure naming risks: Unicode UTS #39 confusables and brand typosquatting. Static hostname analysis only; no DNS resolution or TLS certificate probe. Returns lookalike findings. Requires $0.002 Base USDC via x402. Use screen_impersonation for the 61-brand DeFi/AI handle corpus.

Input parameters:

- `brand` (required): Target brand for deterministic homoglyph, Punycode, and typosquatting comparison.
- `candidate` (string): Single candidate domain or social handle shorthand to auto-classify and inspect.
- `candidates` (array): Mixed candidate domains or social handles to auto-classify and inspect.
- `domain` (string): Single candidate domain shorthand (ASCII, Unicode IDN, or Punycode xn--...) to inspect.
- `domains` (array): Candidate domains (ASCII, Unicode IDN, or Punycode xn--...) to inspect.
- `handle` (string): Single candidate social handle shorthand (@handle or bare handle) to inspect.
- `handles` (array): Candidate social handles (@handle or bare handle) to inspect.
- `officialDomains` (array): Optional list of verified official domains for the target brand.
- `officialHandles` (array): Optional list of verified official social handles for the target brand.

### `screen_impersonation` (~265 tokens)

Screen a handle or lookalike against the 61-brand DeFi/AI corpus: Unicode homographs, Levenshtein-1 typosquats, rn/m swaps and fake support/airdrop lures. Returns risk_score, verdict, signals and canonical_comparison. Requires $0.002 Base USDC via x402. Use screen_domain for single-hostname infrastructure naming checks.

Input parameters:

- `brand`: Target brand for deterministic homoglyph, Punycode, and typosquatting comparison.
- `domain` (string): Single candidate domain shorthand (ASCII, Unicode IDN, or Punycode xn--...) to inspect.
- `handle` (string): Single candidate social handle shorthand (@handle or bare handle) to inspect.
- `officialDomains` (array): Optional list of verified official domains for the target brand.
- `officialHandles` (array): Optional list of verified official social handles for the target brand.
- `target` (string): Single candidate domain, URL, or @handle to screen for brand impersonation, IDN punycode, Unicode confusables, and typosquats.
- `targets` (array): Candidate domains, URLs, or @handles (up to 25) to screen for brand impersonation and homographs.

### `screen_prompt` (~180 tokens)

Deterministic prompt-injection, MCP tool-poisoning, Unicode tag smuggling, and secret exfiltration firewall. Requires $0.002 (2000 atomic) Base USDC on eip155:8453 via @x402/mcp _meta["x402/payment"] or PAYMENT-SIGNATURE header.

Input parameters:

- `prompt` (string): Single untrusted prompt, MCP tool description, or fetched text (up to 4096 chars) to scan.
- `prompts` (array): Untrusted prompts, MCP tool descriptions, or fetched texts (up to 4096 chars each) to scan for prompt injection, tool poisoning, Unicode tag smuggling, and secret exfiltration.
- `text` (string): Alias for `prompt`: untrusted prompt, MCP tool description, or text (up to 4096 chars) to scan.

### `screen_url` (~232 tokens)

Deterministic pre-fetch URL & SSRF firewall detecting loopback, RFC1918, CGNAT, IPv6 mapped/unique-local/link-local, AWS/GCP/Azure/Alibaba metadata endpoints, hex/octal/decimal IP encodings, dangerous schemes, embedded credentials, punycode homoglyphs, and open redirects. Requires $0.002 (2000 atomic) Base USDC on eip155:8453 via @x402/mcp _meta["x402/payment"] or PAYMENT-SIGNATURE header.

Input parameters:

- `url` (string): Single URL shorthand (up to 2048 chars) to inspect for SSRF, private/metadata IPs, dangerous schemes, credentials, IDN homoglyphs, and open redirects.
- `urls` (array): URLs (up to 2048 chars each) to pre-screen before fetch for SSRF (loopback, RFC1918, CGNAT, IPv6 mapped/local, cloud metadata, hex/octal/decimal IP encodings), non-HTTP(S) schemes, credentials, punyc…

### `screen_secret` (~292 tokens)

Deterministic pre-publish secret leak detector & redactor for PRs, logs, and webhooks (OpenAI, Anthropic, AWS, GitHub, Stripe, Slack, Google keys, PEM & 64-hex private keys, JWTs, Bearer tokens -> safe, riskScore, masked findings, redactedText). Requires $0.002 (2000 atomic) Base USDC on eip155:8453 via @x402/mcp _meta["x402/payment"] or PAYMENT-SIGNATURE header.

Input parameters:

- `secret` (string): Single text/log/diff/webhook payload shorthand (up to 8192 chars) to scan & redact for leaked API keys, private keys, JWTs, and Bearer tokens.
- `secrets` (array): Text snippets, PR bodies, logs, or webhook payloads (up to 8192 chars each) to scan & redact for leaked API keys (OpenAI, Anthropic, AWS, GitHub, Stripe, Slack, Google), PEM/hex private keys, JWTs, a…
- `text` (string): Alias for `secret`: single text/log/PR snippet (up to 8192 chars) to scan & redact for leaked secrets.
- `texts` (array): Alias for `secrets`: array of text snippets (up to 8192 chars each) to scan & redact for leaked secrets.

### `screen_diff` (~270 tokens)

Deterministic pre-merge git diff & PR patch auditor detecting leaked secrets in added lines, destructive shell/SQL commands, GitHub Actions/CI workflow injection, malicious package lifecycle hooks, SSRF & cloud metadata endpoints, auth/TLS verification bypasses, Trojan Source BiDi Unicode smuggling, and corrupt hunk counts. Requires $0.002 (2000 atomic) Base USDC on eip155:8453 via @x402/mcp _meta["x402/payment"] or PAYMENT-SIGNATURE header.

Input parameters:

- `diff` (string): Single unified git diff or PR patch shorthand (up to 16384 chars) to audit for leaked secrets, destructive shell/SQL, CI injection, malicious lifecycle hooks, SSRF/private IPs, auth/TLS bypass, Troja…
- `diffs` (array): Unified git diffs or PR patches (up to 16384 chars each) to pre-screen before git apply / PR merge.
- `patch` (string): Alias for `diff`: single unified git diff or patch snippet (up to 16384 chars) to audit.
- `patches` (array): Alias for `diffs`: array of unified git diffs or patch snippets (up to 16384 chars each) to audit.

### `get_service_health` (~33 tokens)

Inspect EdgeScreen health, version, active OFAC snapshot size, and x402 pricing (free, no payment required).

## Diagnostics

Captured diagnostic sections: TLS, DNSSEC, Authorisation, Transports. The full working is on the page: https://verifymcp.io/servers/dev-workers-asostudio-aso-x402-screen-edgescreen/aso-x402-screen#diagnostics

## Score history

- 2026-11-21: 66
- 2026-11-20: 66
- 2026-11-19: 65
- 2026-11-18: 65
- 2026-11-17: 64
- 2026-11-16: 64
- 2026-11-15: 65
- 2026-11-14: 65
- 2026-11-13: 62

## Common questions

### What is the EdgeScreen x402 Security Screening MCP server?

EdgeScreen x402 Security Screening is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as dev.workers.asostudio.aso-x402-screen/edgescreen. Free MCP hooks + x402 security scans; MCP manifest and SKILL.md audits cost $0.003 Base USDC. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://aso-x402-screen.asostudio.workers.dev/mcp).

### Is the EdgeScreen x402 Security Screening MCP server safe to use?

EdgeScreen x402 Security Screening scores 66 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.

### What tools does the EdgeScreen x402 Security Screening MCP server expose?

EdgeScreen x402 Security Screening exposes 17 tools: verify_audit_receipt, preview_x402_challenge, screen_x402_challenge, preview_mcp_manifest, screen_mcp_manifest, and 12 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 3,689 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.

### Does the EdgeScreen x402 Security Screening MCP server require authentication?

No. We connected to EdgeScreen x402 Security Screening without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.

### Is the EdgeScreen x402 Security Screening MCP server still maintained?

EdgeScreen x402 Security Screening is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.

### What did VerifyMCP test on the EdgeScreen x402 Security Screening MCP server?

VerifyMCP ran 12 checks on EdgeScreen x402 Security Screening, covering TLS certificate, Authorization, HSTS header, DNSSEC and 8 more. One item could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about EdgeScreen x402 Security Screening: HTTPS. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.

## Links

- Remote endpoint: https://aso-x402-screen.asostudio.workers.dev/mcp
- Website: https://aso-x402-screen.asostudio.workers.dev/
- Changelog RSS feed: https://verifymcp.io/servers/dev-workers-asostudio-aso-x402-screen-edgescreen/aso-x402-screen.xml
- Changelog JSON feed: https://verifymcp.io/servers/dev-workers-asostudio-aso-x402-screen-edgescreen/aso-x402-screen/changelog.json
- Trust report (JSON): https://verifymcp.io/servers/dev-workers-asostudio-aso-x402-screen-edgescreen/aso-x402-screen.json
- HTML version of this page: https://verifymcp.io/servers/dev-workers-asostudio-aso-x402-screen-edgescreen/aso-x402-screen
