# Mark (remote · mark.tatastu.dev)

Mark: stamp files with a signed, timestamped provenance record. Hash locally; verify free.

- Trust score: 57/100 (low)
- Registry status: active
- Liveness: live
- Owner verified: no
- Last scored: 2026-10-18

## Components

- remote · `mark.tatastu.dev`: 57/100 (this document), [markdown](https://verifymcp.io/servers/dev-tatastu-proof/mark.md), [page](https://verifymcp.io/servers/dev-tatastu-proof/mark)

## Channel facts

- Endpoint: `https://mark.tatastu.dev/mcp`
- Transports: `streamable-http`
- Auth: `none`
- Version: `1.1.1`

## Trust breakdown

How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. Scores are 0–100 per category. Scoring method: https://verifymcp.io/docs/scoring (what has changed: https://verifymcp.io/docs/scoring/changelog)

Scored 2026-10-18.

- **Endpoint Security**: 46/100
  - The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key.
  - Authorisation check failed: no authorisation is required to call this server, and it exposes a tool marked destructive (revoke_proof).
  - HTTPS enforcement could not be verified: the plaintext port answered with HTTP 405, which proves neither a plaintext path nor enforcement.
  - HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent.
  - DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC.
- **Transport & Reachability**: 100/100
  - Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake.
- **Schema Quality & AI Usability**: 68/100
  - AI-judged instruction clarity (good).
  - Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 1069 tokens (~152/item across 7 items; 7 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params.
  - Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples.
- **Stability & Change Management**: 3/100
  - Stability observed for 1 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.
- **Tool Coverage**: 98/100
  - 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).
  - 94% of tool parameters carry a description.
- **Tool Safety**: 100/100
  - No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.
  - All 1 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation.
  - An AI judge read all 8 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.
- **Capabilities**: 60/100
  - Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2025-06-18; the latest is 2026-07-28.

## Install

### How do I install the Mark MCP server?

Mark is a hosted endpoint at https://mark.tatastu.dev/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.

### Claude

```bash
claude mcp add --transport http dev-tatastu-proof 'https://mark.tatastu.dev/mcp'
```

### Cursor

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "dev-tatastu-proof": {
      "url": "https://mark.tatastu.dev/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```

### VS Code

```json
{
  "servers": {
    "dev-tatastu-proof": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://mark.tatastu.dev/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```

### Codex

```toml
[mcp_servers.dev-tatastu-proof]
url = "https://mark.tatastu.dev/mcp"
```

### opencode

```json
{
  "$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
  "mcp": {
    "dev-tatastu-proof": {
      "type": "remote",
      "url": "https://mark.tatastu.dev/mcp",
      "enabled": true
    }
  }
}
```

### OpenClaw

```bash
openclaw mcp add dev-tatastu-proof --url 'https://mark.tatastu.dev/mcp' --transport streamable-http
```

### Hermes

```yaml
mcp_servers:
  dev-tatastu-proof:
    url: "https://mark.tatastu.dev/mcp"
```

### Netclaw

```json
{
  "McpServers": {
    "dev-tatastu-proof": {
      "Transport": "http",
      "Url": "https://mark.tatastu.dev/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```

### Vellum

```bash
assistant mcp add dev-tatastu-proof -t streamable-http -u 'https://mark.tatastu.dev/mcp'
```

### Other

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "dev-tatastu-proof": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://mark.tatastu.dev/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```

The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.

## Changelog

Every change recorded for this component, newest first. Days that predate change tracking, or that we cannot explain, say so: "we were watching and nothing happened" and "we were not watching" are different claims.

### 2026-10-18 (score 57, 0)

- [functional improvement] Stability: unverified → 0.03

### 2026-10-17 (score 57)

First indexed and scored.

## MCP tools (7)

### `create_account` (~152 tokens)

Provision a persistent API key with no human, browser, or email in the loop. Call this once, store the returned `secret` (shown only this one time), and use it as the Authorization header on every later call: create_proof, verify_proof (no auth needed but fine to send), list_proofs, revoke_proof. The account receives one lifetime sample stamp under a fresh creator id, with no identity attached. Rate-limited to 3 accounts per IP per day; for higher volume or a human-owned account, direct a person to mark.tatastu.dev/account instead.

Input parameters:

- `label` (string): Optional label to recognize this key later, e.g. the agent or project name

### `create_proof` (~428 tokens)

Stamp content with a permanent provenance record. Pass the sha256 hash of the content (hash it locally; the content itself is never uploaded). Returns an instant signed receipt: attach its verifyUrl, byline, badgeEmbed, and qrUrl to the published artifact. The receipt's `publisher` field carries the account's verified identity (domain/handle) or null. If you have no key, call create_account, store its one-time secret, and retry this same call with `Authorization: Bearer <secret>` to use the account's lifetime sample. Prepaid packs never expire: 5 for $1.00, 10 for $1.50, 50 for $5.00, 100 for $8.00, 500 for $35.00, 1,000 for $65.00, 2,000 for $120.00. If the response is `payment_required`, sign one advertised x402 requirement and retry the identical call with its `PAYMENT-SIGNATURE` header. The optional disclosure fields (aiDisclosure, usageNote, location) only show on `visibility: public` stamps and are unsigned metadata, not part of the cryptographic proof. The stamp asserts provenance from a signer at a time, not authorship truth.

Input parameters:

- `aiDisclosure` (string): Optional, honest disclosure of AI involvement. Shown on the public record card.
- `canonicalSlug` (string): Optional stable slug for a canonical latest-version pointer
- `contentHash` (string, required): sha256 hex of the exact content bytes (64 chars)
- `contentType` (string): MIME type, e.g. text/markdown
- `location` (string): Optional, creator-opt-in only: where this was made
- `previousProofId` (string): For a new version of already-stamped content: the prior proof id
- `title` (string): Optional human-readable title
- `usageNote` (string): Optional usage/license line, e.g. "Free to share, with credit"
- `visibility` (string): Default private

### `verify_proof` (~154 tokens)

Verify content against all existing stamps. Pass a sha256 hash; matching is EXACT-BYTES-ONLY. Read the verdict fields: `exact` (these bytes are stamped), each proof's `publisher` (the verified identity: domain/handle + tier, or null meaning an unverified account, never trust a name that isn't in `publisher`), and `conflict` (2+ distinct signers claimed the same bytes; earliest anchored is listed first). A no-match on a re-encoded/screenshotted copy is EXPECTED and is not evidence of fakery: fetch the original and verify that. Free, no auth required.

Input parameters:

- `contentHash` (string, required): sha256 hex of the content bytes

### `list_proofs` (~31 tokens)

List your recent stamps (requires API key).

Input parameters:

- `limit` (number): Max results, default 20

### `revoke_proof` (~47 tokens)

Revoke a stamp you created (forward-only: anchored history stays verifiable, but the proof is marked revoked from now on). Requires API key.

Input parameters:

- `proofId` (string, required)

### `grant_access` (~86 tokens)

Grant a specific identity the ability to decrypt escrowed content. Only available for proofs created with content escrow opted in (not yet available — stamps are hash-only today). Returns a capability token the grantee uses with reveal.

Input parameters:

- `granteeId` (string, required): Identity (did:web: or key fingerprint) to grant
- `proofId` (string, required): The proof to grant access to

### `reveal` (~83 tokens)

Retrieve escrowed content for a proof you have been granted access to. Only available for proofs created with content escrow opted in (not yet available — stamps are hash-only today). The service re-checks H(content) == stampedHash before returning.

Input parameters:

- `capabilityToken` (string, required): Capability token from grant_access
- `proofId` (string, required): The proof whose content to reveal

## Diagnostics

Captured diagnostic sections: TLS, DNSSEC, Authorisation, Transports. The full working is on the page: https://verifymcp.io/servers/dev-tatastu-proof/mark#diagnostics

## Score history

- 2026-10-18: 57
- 2026-10-17: 57

## Common questions

### What is the Mark MCP server?

Mark is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as dev.tatastu/proof. Mark: stamp files with a signed, timestamped provenance record. Hash locally; verify free. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://mark.tatastu.dev/mcp).

### Is the Mark MCP server safe to use?

Mark scores 57 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.

### What tools does the Mark MCP server expose?

Mark exposes 7 tools: create_account, create_proof, verify_proof, list_proofs, revoke_proof, and 2 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 981 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.

### Does the Mark MCP server require authentication?

No. We connected to Mark without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.

### Is the Mark MCP server still maintained?

Mark is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 18 October 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.

## Links

- Remote endpoint: https://mark.tatastu.dev/mcp
- Website: https://mark.tatastu.dev/
- Changelog RSS feed: https://verifymcp.io/servers/dev-tatastu-proof/mark.xml
- Changelog JSON feed: https://verifymcp.io/servers/dev-tatastu-proof/mark.json
- HTML version of this page: https://verifymcp.io/servers/dev-tatastu-proof/mark