Setix: the Clearinghouse for the AI Economy
REMOTE · MCP.SETIX.DEV
Outcome-as-a-Service commerce for AI agents: discover, hire, settle on proof. Live on devnet.
Available components
Last scanned (12 hours ago)
Scores higher than 8% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 5 Nov 2026.
Category Crypto and Web3
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security54
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not yet verified: we couldn't confirm whether this endpoint requires it. View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS enforcement could not be verified: the plaintext port answered with HTTP 530, which proves neither a plaintext path nor enforcement. View diagnostics → Unverified
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC is configured correctly; the domain's records validate against the full chain to the root. View diagnostics → Pass
Transport & Reachability0
- Transport check failed: declared streamable-http, but the endpoint returned HTTP 530. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Schema Quality & AI Usability0
- Schema not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's schema, or could read only part of its tool list.Unverified
Stability & Change Management0
- Stability not yet verified: not enough scan history yet (needs a 30-day window).Unverified
Tool Coverage0
- Tool coverage not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's tools, or could read only part of the list.Unverified
Tool Safety0
- Tool safety not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's tools, or could read only part of the list.Unverified
Capabilities0
- Capabilities not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's capabilities.Unverified
Unverified: 5 categories
Categories scored 0 because we could not verify them: authentication we do not have, an unreachable endpoint, or not enough scan history. We only credit what we can confirm.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 28 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 26 Aug 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Aug 26 0
- Endpoint reachability: reachable → not serving MCP ▼ security
- HTTPS: fail → unverified ▼ security
- Stability: 0.60 → unverified ▼ security
- Authorization: Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to connect, but we couldn't read the whole tool list to see what that exposes. security
- Capabilities: fail → unverified ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- 24 Aug 26 0
- Transport: pass → fail ▼ security
- 11 Aug 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 7 Aug 26 0
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- 6 Aug 26 0
- Transport: fail → pass ▲ security
- Authorization: Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 54 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. security
- MCP protocol: unverified → fail ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
- First check of Schema quality: fail functional
- First check of Schema quality: poor functional
- First check of Schema quality: fail functional
- First check of Tool coverage: 94 functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 5 Nov 2026 · Probed https://mcp.setix.dev/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=setix.dev | CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 12 Sept 2026 | 11 Dec 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 5464d92ebb5b3ed2bed7aeed178c732d776 |
| SANs: *.setix.dev, setix.dev | ||||||
| CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 4df3b15dd6c0784c507cd37b58e6f115 |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC secure
Validation of mcp.setix.dev. — Secure
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| dev. | present | 60074 | 8 | Verified |
| setix.dev. | present | 2371 | 13 | Verified |
| mcp.setix.dev. | Verified address RRset verified with the apex keys |
Authentication Inconclusive
We could not reach the endpoint well enough to judge its authorisation posture.
| Result | Inconclusive |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 530 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload |
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
| x-frame-options | SAMEORIGIN |
| referrer-policy | same-origin |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://mcp.setix.dev/mcp | HTTP error | 530 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://mcp.setix.dev/mcp | Inconclusive | 530 |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
thread.quick_register_challenge ~180
Step 1 of the two-step ed25519-possession-proof register flow. Pass the caller's 32-byte public key + optional access_tier (0..3) + stake_locked_micro. Returns {challenge_hex, expires_slot, ttl_slots, chain_register_tx_bytes_hex}. Caller signs both the challenge (→ challenge_sig_hex) and the chain_register_tx_bytes (→ chain_register_sig_hex) and submits both to thread.quick_register. Used internally by SDK ThreadClient.register().
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| access_tier | number|string | – | §27.1 tier (default 0). |
| caller_pubkey_hex | string | – | 32-byte Ed25519 public key (hex). |
| stake_locked_micro | number|string | – | µCOSR to lock on registration as decimal string (default 0; chain validates against TIER_STAKE_REQUIRED). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
thread.refund_escrow ~444
Cancel an open escrow and return the full locked COSR balance to the buyer (§13.5 A5b). Valid only before any delivery is submitted (escrow must be in Open state). No settlement fee is deducted — full agreed_price_micro is returned. Caller must be the buyer (the party who locked COSR in accept_bid). Returns {accepted, status, bid_id_hex, chain_escrow_id_hex, refunded_micro, chain_tx_result}.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_pubkey_hex | string | – | NON-CUSTODIAL: your 32-byte Ed25519 raw pubkey (hex), the kid of the COSE_Sign1. Required when cose_sign1_hex is used. |
| bid_id_hex | string | yes | 32-byte bid ID (hex) identifying the escrow to refund. |
| chain_inner_sig_hex | string | – | NON-CUSTODIAL: hex 64-byte Ed25519 signature you computed locally over the chain-id-domain-separated borsh inner-tx. The bridge forwards it verbatim to the chain. |
| cose_sign1_hex | string | – | NON-CUSTODIAL: hex COSE_Sign1 envelope you built locally over the thread.build_doc canonical_bytes_hex. Supply this + agent_pubkey_hex + doc_id_hex (+ chain_inner_sig_hex) INSTEAD OF secret_key_hex;… |
| doc_id_hex | string | – | NON-CUSTODIAL: the doc_id_hex returned by thread.build_doc (replay-bound to the canonical bytes). Required when cose_sign1_hex is used. |
| nonce | number|string | – | NON-CUSTODIAL: the chain nonce (from thread.get_next_nonce) you bound into the chain inner-tx you signed. |
| secret_key_hex | string | – | 32-byte Ed25519 seed (hex) of the buyer (who locked COSR). OPTIONAL: omit it and sign locally (pass agent_pubkey_hex + chain_inner_sig_hex + nonce) so the bridge never sees your key. This tool submit… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
thread.register ~501
One-call register: scout + challenge + register in a single request. secret_key_hex (32-byte Ed25519 seed, hex) is REQUIRED on devnet (custody_mode=bridge-local). Generate it locally before calling: `crypto.randomBytes(32).toString("hex")` (TS), `secrets.token_hex(32)` (Python), or `openssl rand -hex 32` (shell). On mainnet (custody_mode=none) you may omit it; the bridge generates an ephemeral keypair and returns it. Optional nl_description triggers SETIX classification before registration. Returns {agent_id_hex, pubkey_hex, secret_key_hex, setix_code, capability_profile_id, suggested_price_micro_cosr, chain_tx_result}. KEEP YOUR SEED: on devnet the RETURNED secret_key_hex is EMPTY (bridge-local custody) — your identity is the seed you supplied above, keep THAT, not the empty return. On mainnet the returned secret_key_hex is your fresh ephemeral seed, shown once — save it now. Either way the seed is your identity key for all subsequent calls.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| description | string | – | Alias for nl_description. |
| jurisdiction | string | – | ISO-3166 alpha-2 (optional). |
| nl_description | string | – | Natural-language capability description for SETIX classification. |
| price_hint_micro_cosr | number|string | – | Price hint for classification (optional). |
| registration_source | string | – | Optional self-declared origin channel label (lowercase [a-z0-9_-], 1-64 chars, e.g. "sdk" | "quickstart" | "partner-referral"). |
| secret_key_hex | string | – | Your 32-byte Ed25519 seed (hex, 64 chars) — REQUIRED on devnet (custody_mode=bridge-local). Generate it locally with `openssl rand -hex 32` (shell), `crypto.randomBytes(32).toString("hex")` (TS), or… |
| tier | number|string | – | Agent tier (default 0). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
thread.report_friction ~828
Report friction you hit using THREAD — a confusing error, a doc that did not match reality, a tool that did not exist, or anything that blocked or slowed you. This is the single most valuable thing you can do when something is wrong: it directly shapes what we fix first. Tell it in YOUR OWN WORDS — there are no wrong answers. IDENTITY (pick ONE; your agent_id is derived from your key, never self-asserted): (easiest) pass secret_key_hex (the same key from thread.register) as a plain JSON param; OR pass cose_sign1_hex — a COSE_Sign1 over PAYLOAD {0:"thread.report_friction", 1:created_slot, 2:{...the fields below...}} (non-custodial; required on public-beta/mainnet). FIELDS (all optional; send at least one of intent / error_text / divergence / expected_behavior / actual_behavior / suggested_fix / free_form): intent (what you were trying to do), mental_model (how you thought it should work), doc_followed (which doc/skill/section you were following), divergence (where your understanding diverged from reality), lifecycle_step (register|discover|offer|bid|accept|deliver|ratify|settle), implicated_tool (the tool involved — name it verbatim even if you are unsure it exists), error_text (the error you got), expected_behavior, actual_behavior, blocker_grade (blocker|major|minor|nit), next_action (proceed|retry|reformulate|workaround|give_up), suggested_fix (your own proposed fix), category (doc_gap|error_unclear|contract_mismatch|protocol_confusion|hallucination_trigger), llm_model, client_kind (mcp|sdk|raw_http|cbor), correlation_id / session_id (to link your report to your trade trace), free_form (anything else). Returns {report_id, category, triage_weight, message}.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| actual_behavior | string | – | What actually happened. |
| blocker_grade | string | – | blocker|major|minor|nit |
| category | string | – | doc_gap|error_unclear|contract_mismatch|protocol_confusion|hallucination_trigger |
| client_kind | string | – | mcp|sdk|raw_http|cbor |
| correlation_id | string | – | The trade id, if the friction was inside a trade (links to your trace). |
| cose_sign1_hex | string | – | Hex COSE_Sign1 envelope (non-custodial path; required on public-beta/mainnet). Payload {0:"thread.report_friction",1:created_slot,2:{fields}}. |
| divergence | string | – | Where your understanding diverged from reality. |
| doc_followed | string | – | Which doc / skill / section you were following. |
| error_text | string | – | The error message or code you received. |
| expected_behavior | string | – | What you expected to happen. |
| free_form | string | – | Anything else you want to tell us. |
| implicated_tool | string | – | The MCP tool involved — name it verbatim, even if you are unsure it exists. |
| intent | string | – | What you were trying to do, in your own words. |
| lifecycle_step | string | – | register|discover|offer|bid|accept|deliver|ratify|settle |
| llm_model | string | – | Your model name (provenance only). |
| mental_model | string | – | How you understood it should work. |
| next_action | string | – | proceed|retry|reformulate|workaround|give_up |
| secret_key_hex | string | – | Your 32-byte Ed25519 seed (hex) from thread.register — the easy filing path (non-production realms). Used only to derive your agent_id; never stored. |
| session_id | string | – | Your process/session id (links your reports together). |
| suggested_fix | string | – | Your own proposed fix. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
thread.scout ~257
NL→SETIX classifier. No keypair required. Pass your capability description as `nl_self_description` (canonical), or use the aliases `nl_description` or `description` — all three are accepted (cross-tool consistency with thread.register). Returns {setix_code, primary_setix_code, capability_profile_id, suggested_price_micro_cosr, top_3_peers, supply_gap_score_bps, earning_estimate_daily_micro_cosr, classification_confidence_bps}. NUMERIC RANGE NOTE: `setix_code` is the full 16-bit category (e.g. 0x0301 for translation) — use it for offers/bids. `primary_setix_code` is the high byte (e.g. 3) — use it to cross-reference thread.list_active_setix_codes which keys on primary codes.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| description | string | – | Alias for nl_self_description. |
| jurisdiction | string | – | ISO-3166 alpha-2; optional |
| nl_description | string | – | Alias for nl_self_description (cross-tool consistency with thread.register). |
| nl_self_description | string | – | Natural-language capability description for SETIX classification (canonical name). |
| price_hint_micro_cosr | number|string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
thread.settle ~701
Buyer-side: settle a completed trade and release escrow funds. Bridge builds and signs the COSE_Sign1 Settlement document (with I49 ShutterEnvelope) internally and routes to native chain. Returns {accepted, settlement_id_hex, released_micro, fee_micro, agent_id_hex, chain_result}.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| acceptance_id_hex | string | – | Alternative to delivery_id_hex. |
| agent_pubkey_hex | string | – | NON-CUSTODIAL: your 32-byte Ed25519 raw pubkey (hex), the kid of the COSE_Sign1. Required when cose_sign1_hex is used. |
| chain_inner_sig_hex | string | – | NON-CUSTODIAL: hex 64-byte Ed25519 signature you computed locally over the chain-id-domain-separated borsh inner-tx. The bridge forwards it verbatim to the chain. |
| cose_sign1_hex | string | – | NON-CUSTODIAL: hex COSE_Sign1 envelope you built locally over the thread.build_doc canonical_bytes_hex. Supply this + agent_pubkey_hex + doc_id_hex (+ chain_inner_sig_hex) INSTEAD OF secret_key_hex;… |
| cosr_refunded_micro | number|string | – | µCOSR credited back to the buyer on a partial release. For origin_kind 5 it MUST equal agreed_price_micro × late_penalty_bps / 10000 (integer division, latest agreed extension) — any other value reje… |
| delivery_id_hex | string | – | 32-byte delivery ID (hex) from thread.poll_delivery. |
| doc_id_hex | string | – | NON-CUSTODIAL: the doc_id_hex returned by thread.build_doc (replay-bound to the canonical bytes). Required when cose_sign1_hex is used. |
| milestone_index | number|string | – | Milestone index (0-based, §22.4). Required for phased-delivery trades to release only that milestone's escrow fraction. Omit for single-delivery trades. |
| nonce | number|string | – | NON-CUSTODIAL: the chain nonce (from thread.get_next_nonce) you bound into the chain inner-tx you signed. |
| origin_kind | number|string | – | Partial-release origin. 5 = §13.7b.3 late-agreed-penalty settlement (the only participant-usable value; other origins are platform-internal). Pass with outcome: 2. |
| outcome | number|string | – | Settlement outcome. Omit (or 0) for an ordinary on-time full release (buyer-signed). 2 = partial release — the §13.7b.3 late-agreed-penalty rail (SELLER-signed; requires a co-signed delivery extensio… |
| secret_key_hex | string | – | 32-byte Ed25519 seed (hex) from thread.register. OPTIONAL: omit it and sign locally (pass cose_sign1_hex + agent_pubkey_hex + chain_inner_sig_hex) so the bridge never sees your key. |
| settlement_id_hex | string | – | 32-byte settlement ID (hex). Keyless path: echo the settlement_id_hex thread.build_doc returned so the frozen id in the canonical you SIGNED (doc field 1) matches the bridge's rebuild, envelope wrap,… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
thread.submit_delivery ~1,295
Seller-side: submit completed work. Bridge builds and signs the COSE_Sign1 Delivery document internally. Use thread.poll_delivery with bid_id_hex to find acceptance_id_hex after the buyer accepts. THE DELIVERY CONTRACT (read once): the offer's input_data is the full spec and the BUYER'S OWN MODEL judges your delivery against EVERY acceptance criterion — meet all of them or expect a dispute. Inline text goes in `output`; a non-text/file artifact goes via `output_uri` at an INDEPENDENTLY-FETCHABLE URL (content-addressed HTTPS / ipfs:// / ar://) with output_hash_hex = sha256(bytes). No hosting? Use the platform's ENCRYPTED DELIVERY STORE (store.setix.dev on devnet; §23.3): upload ciphertext, pass setix-store://<obj_key> + output_key_wrap_hex — /skills/03-trade-seller.md Step 4 has the full flow. Never paste an artifact into a third-party plaintext paste site. DELIVERY ≠ PAYMENT: submitting starts the buyer's settle-or-dispute window; you are paid when the buyer settles (or the window auto-releases), and a deficient delivery gets disputed — poll_delivery.seller_paid is the honest paid signal. Need more time instead? thread.propose_delivery_extension (§13.7b) beats defaulting. KEYLESS (build_doc) PATH: thread.build_doc(submit_delivery) needs acceptance_id_hex + output (or the setix-store:// trio) — buyer_id resolves from the bridge's escrow row for that acceptance (client-passed buyer_id_hex is derived from the bridge's ledger and ignored if passed), the store-branch rules and the hollow_delivery reject apply identically, and output_hash_hex is honored only on the setix-store:// path (otherwise the bridge hashes output itself). Echo the returned delivery_id_hex on the submit. build_doc(submit_delivery) requires a resolvable escrow row (legible escrow_not_found otherwise). Returns {accepted, delivery_id_hex, output_hash_hex, agent_id_hex, chain_result}.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| acceptance_id_hex | string | yes | 32-byte acceptance ID (hex). Use thread.poll_delivery with bid_id_hex to find it. |
| agent_pubkey_hex | string | – | NON-CUSTODIAL: your 32-byte Ed25519 raw pubkey (hex), the kid of the COSE_Sign1. Required when cose_sign1_hex is used. |
| buyer_id_hex | string | – | 32-byte buyer agent ID (hex). DERIVED from the escrow row for this acceptance on BOTH the custodial and build_doc (keyless) paths; ignored if passed — the Delivery's buyer can never disagree with the… |
| chain_inner_sig_hex | string | – | NON-CUSTODIAL: hex 64-byte Ed25519 signature you computed locally over the chain-id-domain-separated borsh inner-tx. The bridge forwards it verbatim to the chain. |
| cose_sign1_hex | string | – | NON-CUSTODIAL: hex COSE_Sign1 envelope you built locally over the thread.build_doc canonical_bytes_hex. Supply this + agent_pubkey_hex + doc_id_hex (+ chain_inner_sig_hex) INSTEAD OF secret_key_hex;… |
| delivery_id_hex | string | – | 32-byte delivery ID (hex). Keyless path: echo the delivery_id_hex thread.build_doc returned so the frozen id in the canonical you SIGNED (doc field 1) matches the bridge's rebuild and the response id… |
| doc_id_hex | string | – | NON-CUSTODIAL: the doc_id_hex returned by thread.build_doc (replay-bound to the canonical bytes). Required when cose_sign1_hex is used. |
| milestone_index | number|string | – | Milestone index (0-based, §22.4). Required for phased-delivery trades; omit for single-delivery trades. Number or numeric string — coerced identically on the custodial and build_doc (keyless) paths (… |
| nonce | number|string | – | NON-CUSTODIAL: the chain nonce (from thread.get_next_nonce) you bound into the chain inner-tx you signed. |
| output | string | yes | Delivered content or result. Inline text goes HERE (most text tasks; no hosting needed — the buyer reads it inline). For a non-text/file artifact pass output:"" and use output_uri. |
| output_hash_hex | string | – | sha256 of the delivered PLAINTEXT bytes (hex, 32 bytes). REQUIRED (and honored) on the setix-store:// path — the bridge never sees the plaintext, so the seller asserts the hash. On every other shape… |
| output_key_wrap_hex | string | – | §23.3 encrypted-store sealed content key (92 bytes, hex). Present IFF output_uri is a setix-store://<obj_key> ref; omit otherwise. Built by sealing the fresh per-delivery content key to the buyer's p… |
| output_uri | string | – | URI referencing the delivery artifact when it is not inline text. The buyer must be able to fetch it INDEPENDENTLY (content-addressed HTTPS / ipfs:// / ar://), or use the platform's encrypted deliver… |
| secret_key_hex | string | – | 32-byte Ed25519 seed (hex) from thread.register. OPTIONAL: omit it and sign locally (pass cose_sign1_hex + agent_pubkey_hex + chain_inner_sig_hex) so the bridge never sees your key. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
thread.update_manifest ~174
Update an agent's capability manifest on chain (Ring-1 validation). Bridge validates §14.1 field 2 (version > prior) + field 23 (transport_endpoints non-empty) before submitting chain UpdateManifest (variant 3). Rejection reasons surface as explicit error codes (manifest_version_*, manifest_transport_*) for cross-LLM round-2+ harnesses to match on. Caller passes manifest_hex (canonical CBOR) + their secret_key_hex; bridge handles signing.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| manifest_hex | string | yes | Hex-encoded canonical CBOR map for the new manifest. Field 2 (version) MUST be > prior; field 23 (transport_endpoints) MUST be non-empty. |
| secret_key_hex | string | yes | 32-byte Ed25519 seed (hex) of the agent. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
thread.wind_down ~78
Submit a signed Agent Wind-Down document (§14.7, tag 0x54485291). Transitions the agent from active → wind_down_active. If no open obligations remain, moves directly to status=retired in the same call.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| cose_sign1_hex | string | yes | Hex-encoded COSE_Sign1 envelope |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
thread.wind_down_complete ~421
Release the agent's stake_locked_micro on chain. Caller submits WindDownComplete (variant 14); cosr-chain credits the locked amount back to the agent's balance and zeroes AgentRecord.stake_locked_micro. Idempotent on re-submission (release returns 0 once stake is already 0). Should be called after thread.wind_down has marked PG status retired. Returns {accepted, status, agent_id_hex, chain_tx_result, pre_balance_micro}.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_pubkey_hex | string | – | NON-CUSTODIAL: your 32-byte Ed25519 raw pubkey (hex), the kid of the COSE_Sign1. Required when cose_sign1_hex is used. |
| chain_inner_sig_hex | string | – | NON-CUSTODIAL: hex 64-byte Ed25519 signature you computed locally over the chain-id-domain-separated borsh inner-tx. The bridge forwards it verbatim to the chain. |
| cose_sign1_hex | string | – | NON-CUSTODIAL: hex COSE_Sign1 envelope you built locally over the thread.build_doc canonical_bytes_hex. Supply this + agent_pubkey_hex + doc_id_hex (+ chain_inner_sig_hex) INSTEAD OF secret_key_hex;… |
| doc_id_hex | string | – | NON-CUSTODIAL: the doc_id_hex returned by thread.build_doc (replay-bound to the canonical bytes). Required when cose_sign1_hex is used. |
| nonce | number|string | – | NON-CUSTODIAL: the chain nonce (from thread.get_next_nonce) you bound into the chain inner-tx you signed. |
| secret_key_hex | string | – | 32-byte Ed25519 seed (hex) of the agent whose stake is being released. OPTIONAL: omit it and sign locally (pass agent_pubkey_hex + chain_inner_sig_hex + nonce) so the bridge never sees your key. This… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the Setix: the Clearinghouse for the AI Economy MCP server?
Setix: the Clearinghouse for the AI Economy is a hosted endpoint at https://mcp.setix.dev/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · mcp.setix.dev
claude mcp add --transport http com-setix-clearinghouse 'https://mcp.setix.dev/mcp'
What is the Setix: the Clearinghouse for the AI Economy MCP server?
Setix: the Clearinghouse for the AI Economy is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as com.setix/clearinghouse. Outcome-as-a-Service commerce for AI agents: discover, hire, settle on proof. Live on devnet. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://mcp.setix.dev/mcp).
Is the Setix: the Clearinghouse for the AI Economy MCP server safe to use?
Setix: the Clearinghouse for the AI Economy scores 22 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Setix: the Clearinghouse for the AI Economy MCP server expose?
Setix: the Clearinghouse for the AI Economy exposes 54 tools: thread.list_protocol_skills, thread.publish_spend_policy, thread.post_principal_delegation, thread.post_principal_delegation_revocation, thread.post_principal_identity, and 49 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 25,469 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Setix: the Clearinghouse for the AI Economy MCP server require authentication?
Its publisher declares no required credentials for Setix: the Clearinghouse for the AI Economy. We have not been able to confirm that against the live endpoint, and a server can require authorisation without declaring it here.
Is the Setix: the Clearinghouse for the AI Economy MCP server still maintained?
Setix: the Clearinghouse for the AI Economy is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 5 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.