# Agent safety checks: prompt-injection scan, honeypot check, x402 preflight + crypto data (USDC/x402) (remote · angel.oroboros-design.com)

Checks before an agent acts: prompt-injection scan, honeypot check, x402 preflight. 3 free calls.

- Trust score: 61/100 (medium)
- Change this week: +1
- Registry status: active
- Liveness: live
- Owner verified: no
- Last scored: 2026-11-21

## Components

- remote · `angel.oroboros-design.com`: 61/100 (this document), [markdown](https://verifymcp.io/servers/com-oroboros-design-angel-tradesignal/agenten-signal-mcp.md), [page](https://verifymcp.io/servers/com-oroboros-design-angel-tradesignal/agenten-signal-mcp)

## Channel facts

- Endpoint: `https://angel.oroboros-design.com/agenten/signal/mcp`
- Transports: `streamable-http`
- Auth: `none`
- Version: `1.3.0`

## Trust breakdown

How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. Scores are 0–100 per category. Scoring method: https://verifymcp.io/docs/scoring (what has changed: https://verifymcp.io/docs/scoring/changelog)

Scored 2026-11-21.

- **Endpoint Security**: 63/100
  - The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key.
  - Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 2 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe.
  - HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path.
  - The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present.
  - DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC.
- **Transport & Reachability**: 100/100
  - Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake.
- **Schema Quality & AI Usability**: 53/100
  - AI-judged instruction clarity (good).
  - Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 2332 tokens (~333/item across 7 items; 7 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params.
  - Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples.
- **Stability & Change Management**: 0/100
  - Stability check failed: schema churn in the 8 days we've observed: 18 tool removals, 0 breaking changes, 0 auth/transport breaks, 7 additions.
- **Tool Coverage**: 93/100
  - 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).
  - 79% of tool parameters carry a description.
- **Tool Safety**: 75/100
  - No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.
  - 0 of 1 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation; "input_guard" implies "remove" and declares readOnlyHint instead, contradicting what its own name says it does.
  - An AI judge read all 8 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.
- **Capabilities**: 100/100
  - Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.

## Install

### How do I install the Agent safety checks: prompt-injection scan, honeypot… MCP server?

Agent safety checks: prompt-injection scan, honeypot… is a hosted endpoint at https://angel.oroboros-design.com/agenten/signal/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.

### Claude

```bash
claude mcp add --transport http com-oroboros-design-angel-tradesignal 'https://angel.oroboros-design.com/agenten/signal/mcp'
```

### Cursor

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "com-oroboros-design-angel-tradesignal": {
      "url": "https://angel.oroboros-design.com/agenten/signal/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```

### VS Code

```json
{
  "servers": {
    "com-oroboros-design-angel-tradesignal": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://angel.oroboros-design.com/agenten/signal/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```

### Codex

```toml
[mcp_servers.com-oroboros-design-angel-tradesignal]
url = "https://angel.oroboros-design.com/agenten/signal/mcp"
```

### opencode

```json
{
  "$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
  "mcp": {
    "com-oroboros-design-angel-tradesignal": {
      "type": "remote",
      "url": "https://angel.oroboros-design.com/agenten/signal/mcp",
      "enabled": true
    }
  }
}
```

### OpenClaw

```bash
openclaw mcp add com-oroboros-design-angel-tradesignal --url 'https://angel.oroboros-design.com/agenten/signal/mcp' --transport streamable-http
```

### Hermes

```yaml
mcp_servers:
  com-oroboros-design-angel-tradesignal:
    url: "https://angel.oroboros-design.com/agenten/signal/mcp"
```

### Netclaw

```json
{
  "McpServers": {
    "com-oroboros-design-angel-tradesignal": {
      "Transport": "http",
      "Url": "https://angel.oroboros-design.com/agenten/signal/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```

### Vellum

```bash
assistant mcp add com-oroboros-design-angel-tradesignal -t streamable-http -u 'https://angel.oroboros-design.com/agenten/signal/mcp'
```

### Other

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "com-oroboros-design-angel-tradesignal": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://angel.oroboros-design.com/agenten/signal/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```

The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.

## Changelog

Every change recorded for this component, newest first. Days that predate change tracking, or that we cannot explain, say so: "we were watching and nothing happened" and "we were not watching" are different claims.

### 2026-11-20 (score 61, 0)

- [security] Tool “preflight” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [cosmetic] “preflight” added an optional parameter “agent”
- [cosmetic] “preflight” added an optional parameter “budget”
- [cosmetic] “preflight” added an optional parameter “currency”
- [cosmetic] “preflight” added an optional parameter “need”
- [cosmetic] “preflight” added an optional parameter “region”
- [cosmetic] “preflight” reworded the description of “url”
- [cosmetic] “preflight” made “url” optional
- [cosmetic] Tool “preflight” changed its title: Pre-purchase check for any shop, checkout link, payment page, API or x402 endpoint → Pre-purchase check for any shop, checkout link, payment page, API or x402 endpoint — or for a need: find the offer and check it

### 2026-11-19 (score 61, −1)

- [security regression] Tool “buy_signal_pack” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “exchange_route” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “recommend” was removed
- [security] The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads
- [security] Tool “buy_pack_with_card” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “input_guard” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “preflight” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “shield_check” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “stealth_read” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “token_risk” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [functional regression] Schema quality: 280 → 308
- [functional] Destructive annotations: pass → 0
- [functional] Server version: 1.3.0 → 2.0.0
- [cosmetic] “buy_pack_with_card” reworded the description of “email”
- [cosmetic] “input_guard” reworded the description of “bundle_token”
- [cosmetic] “input_guard” reworded the description of “payer_address”
- [cosmetic] “preflight” reworded the description of “bundle_token”
- [cosmetic] “preflight” reworded the description of “payer_address”
- [cosmetic] “shield_check” reworded the description of “bundle_token”
- [cosmetic] “shield_check” reworded the description of “payer_address”
- [cosmetic] “stealth_read” reworded the description of “bundle_token”
- [cosmetic] “stealth_read” reworded the description of “payer_address”
- [cosmetic] “token_risk” reworded the description of “bundle_token”
- [cosmetic] “token_risk” reworded the description of “payer_address”
- [cosmetic] Tool “buy_pack_with_card” changed its title: TradeSignal: pack by card → Angel: 5,000 calls by card
- [cosmetic] Tool “input_guard” changed its title: Prompt-injection scan for untrusted web, email and tool content → Remove hidden content from untrusted text and flag text aimed at the model
- [cosmetic] Tool “stealth_read” changed its title: Read any URL as clean, injection-scrubbed Markdown for an LLM → Read any public page as clean Markdown, with hidden text removed

### 2026-11-17 (score 62, 0)

- [security] The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads
- [functional regression] Schema quality: 1898 → 2800
- [functional] New tool “exchange_route”
- [functional] New tool “recommend”
- [functional] New tool “shield_check”

### 2026-11-16 (score 62, +1)

- [security regression] Stability: 0.07 → fail
- [security regression] A breaking change shipped without a version bump: still 1.3.0
- [security regression] Tool “buy_enterprise” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “buy_subscription” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “correlation_matrix” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “funding_rates” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “gas_window” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “get_now” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “get_registry” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “get_sample_signal” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “get_signal_card” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “get_signals” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “get_swap_route” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “historical_gate” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “liquidations” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “orderflow_imbalance” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “reconciliation” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “regime” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “registry_metrics” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “request_enterprise_pilot” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “send_wish” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “sentiment_gate” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “slippage” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “validate_batch” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “validate_setup” was removed
- [security] The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads
- [security] Tool “buy_pack_with_card” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “buy_signal_pack” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “input_guard” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “preflight” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “token_risk” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [functional regression] Schema quality: 219 → 271
- [functional] Destructive annotations: 0 → pass
- [functional] New tool “stealth_read”

### 2026-11-15 (score 61, +1)

- [functional] New tool “get_swap_route”
- [cosmetic] “preflight” added an optional parameter “partner_link”

### 2026-11-14 (score 60, −1)

- [security] The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads
- [security] Tool “input_guard” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “input_guard_preview” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “preflight” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “registry_metrics” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “token_risk” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “gas_window” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “correlation_matrix” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “funding_rates” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “get_signals” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “historical_gate” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “liquidations” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “orderflow_imbalance” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “reconciliation” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “regime” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “sentiment_gate” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “slippage” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “validate_batch” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “validate_setup” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [functional regression] Schema quality: 3934 → 6078
- [functional regression] Schema quality: 3934 → 5831
- [functional improvement] Stability: unverified → 0.03
- [functional] Destructive annotations: pass → 0
- [functional] Server version: 1.2.0 → 1.3.0
- [functional] New tool “buy_pack_with_card”
- [functional] New tool “get_now”
- [functional] New tool “get_registry”
- [functional] New tool “input_guard”
- [functional] New tool “input_guard_preview”
- [functional] New tool “preflight”
- [functional] New tool “registry_metrics”
- [functional] New tool “request_enterprise_pilot”
- [functional] New tool “send_wish”
- [functional] New tool “token_risk”
- [cosmetic] “preflight” reworded the description of “url”
- [cosmetic] “correlation_matrix” reworded the description of “payer_address”
- [cosmetic] “funding_rates” reworded the description of “payer_address”
- [cosmetic] “gas_window” reworded the description of “payer_address”
- [cosmetic] “get_signals” reworded the description of “payer_address”
- [cosmetic] “historical_gate” reworded the description of “payer_address”
- [cosmetic] “liquidations” reworded the description of “payer_address”
- [cosmetic] “orderflow_imbalance” reworded the description of “payer_address”
- [cosmetic] “reconciliation” reworded the description of “payer_address”
- [cosmetic] “regime” reworded the description of “payer_address”
- [cosmetic] “sentiment_gate” reworded the description of “payer_address”
- [cosmetic] “slippage” reworded the description of “payer_address”
- [cosmetic] “validate_batch” reworded the description of “payer_address”
- [cosmetic] “validate_setup” reworded the description of “payer_address”
- [cosmetic] Tool “correlation_matrix” changed its title: TradeSignal · correlation matrix → Correlation matrix for position sizing and hedging
- [cosmetic] Tool “funding_rates” changed its title: TradeSignal · funding rates → Perpetual funding rates across Binance, Bybit and Hyperliquid
- [cosmetic] Tool “gas_window” changed its title: TradeSignal · gas window → Gas check on Base or Ethereum: send now or wait
- [cosmetic] Tool “get_signals” changed its title: TradeSignal: crypto trade setups → Crypto trade setups: entry, stop, targets now
- [cosmetic] Tool “historical_gate” changed its title: TradeSignal: historical gate → Backtest the signal gate on 30 days for one pair
- [cosmetic] Tool “input_guard” changed its title: TradeSignal · input guard (Klarsicht) → Prompt-injection scan for untrusted web, email and tool content
- [cosmetic] Tool “input_guard_preview” changed its title: Angel: input guard preview (free) → Prompt-injection quick scan (free)
- [cosmetic] Tool “liquidations” changed its title: TradeSignal · liquidations → Liquidation flow on OKX perpetuals: long vs short squeeze
- [cosmetic] Tool “orderflow_imbalance” changed its title: TradeSignal · order-flow imbalance → Order-flow imbalance: buy vs sell pressure on a pair
- [cosmetic] Tool “preflight” changed its title: TradeSignal · x402 preflight → Pre-purchase check for any shop, checkout link, payment page, API or x402 endpoint
- [cosmetic] Tool “reconciliation” changed its title: TradeSignal · USDC reconciliation → Payment-received check: match expected USDC payments on Base
- [cosmetic] Tool “regime” changed its title: TradeSignal · market regime → Market regime per pair: trending, ranging or volatile
- [cosmetic] Tool “registry_metrics” changed its title: TradeSignal · registry verified metrics → Verified reliability stats for an x402 endpoint before relying on it
- [cosmetic] Tool “sentiment_gate” changed its title: TradeSignal · sentiment gate → Risk-on / risk-off gate before opening a position
- [cosmetic] Tool “slippage” changed its title: TradeSignal · slippage estimate → Slippage and price-impact estimate before a market order
- [cosmetic] Tool “token_risk” changed its title: TradeSignal · token risk → Honeypot and rug-pull check for an ERC-20 before swap or approve
- [cosmetic] Tool “validate_batch” changed its title: TradeSignal · validate batch → Batch pre-trade validation of up to 10 crypto setups
- [cosmetic] Tool “validate_setup” changed its title: TradeSignal: validate a setup → Pre-trade check: validate a crypto setup before ordering

### 2026-11-13 (score 61)

First indexed and scored.

## MCP tools (7)

### `stealth_read` (~275 tokens)

Read any public page as clean Markdown, with hidden text removed

Returns a public https page as clean Markdown for an agent (headings, lists, tables kept; navigation, cookie banners, scripts and everything hidden from people removed), strips invisible Unicode and flags text aimed at the model — with verdict, score, findings, title and language. JSON and text pass through. One GET as a declared bot, no login or bot-protection bypass; a blocked page is never charged. Free with a key (500 calls) or 5 calls a day without one; then 0.02 USDC per call via x402, or 1 call from a key.
After: preflight before your agent buys or pays anything the page offers (the result's next field has the exact call).

Input parameters:

- `bundle_token` (string): Your key instead of paying per call: free (500 calls, POST /key) or bought by card. The connection header X-Bundle-Token works too.
- `payer_address` (string): Wallet you pay from (optional; the x402 price is the same for every address).
- `payment_tx` (string): Hash of a USDC transfer on Base to payTo (≥ the price, ≤ 72 h old) instead of an x402 signature.
- `url` (string, required): the public https page to read (1 MB, 10 s)

### `input_guard` (~318 tokens)

Remove hidden content from untrusted text and flag text aimed at the model

Removes hidden content and flags text aimed at the model, for untrusted input before an agent acts on it: web pages, emails, RAG chunks, tool and MCP responses. Strips invisible Unicode (tag smuggling decoded, zero-width, bidi) and HTML hidden from people; flags role takeover, forged system or tool turns, requests for keys, the prompt or payments, exfiltration links, homoglyphs and base64 payloads, in 17 languages. Rule-based. Verdict clean, caution or hostile, score, findings, cleaned text. Free with a key (500 calls) or 5 calls a day without one; then 0.02 USDC per call via x402, or 1 call from a key.
After: preflight before your agent pays anything the content pointed to (the result's next field has the exact call).

Input parameters:

- `bundle_token` (string): Your key instead of paying per call: free (500 calls, POST /key) or bought by card. The connection header X-Bundle-Token works too.
- `payer_address` (string): Wallet you pay from (optional; the x402 price is the same for every address).
- `payment_tx` (string): Hash of a USDC transfer on Base to payTo (≥ the price, ≤ 72 h old) instead of an x402 signature.
- `text` (string): the content to check (send text or url)
- `url` (string): a public https page to fetch once and check (256 KB)

### `input_guard_preview` (~105 tokens)

Prompt-injection quick scan (free)

Free prompt-injection quick scan for untrusted input: up to 4,000 characters of text, or one https page, checked for hidden instructions aimed at agents (role override, invisible Unicode, hidden HTML) in 17 languages incl. Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Hindi, Arabic. Returns verdict, score and the top 3 findings.
After: input_guard for every finding and the cleaned text.

Input parameters:

- `text` (string)
- `url` (string)

### `preflight` (~555 tokens)

Pre-purchase check for any shop, checkout link, payment page, API or x402 endpoint — or for a need: find the offer and check it

Before an agent buys, pays or hires: send url (shop, checkout, payment link, API or x402 endpoint), need (what to buy in plain words; Angel takes the pick from the open sea at mareliberum.dev and checks it) or agent (mare:… resident: its trust score). One unpaid request each: TLS, domain age, look-alikes, redirects, payment provider, card fields, text aimed at agents and, for x402, USDC contract, payTo and price traps. Verdict pay, caution or do_not_pay, risk_score, reasons. Free with a key (500 calls) or 5 calls a day without one; then 0.02 USDC per call via x402, or 1 call from a key.
After: input-guard on the page text you will act on (the result's next field has the exact call).

Input parameters:

- `agent` (string): instead of a url: a resident of the open sea (mareliberum.dev) you want to pay or hire; Angel returns its trust score 0-100 from its work, notes, seals and own endpoint
- `budget` (number): with need: highest price
- `bundle_token` (string): Your key instead of paying per call: free (500 calls, POST /key) or bought by card. The connection header X-Bundle-Token works too.
- `currency` (string): with need: currency of the budget
- `max_price_usd` (number)
- `method` (string)
- `need` (string): instead of a url: what your user wants to buy, in plain words (sizes, budget, place included), e.g. "trail running shoes size 44 under 150 EUR, ships to Germany". Angel takes the pick from the open s…
- `partner_link` (boolean): default true: on verdict pay for a shop with an affiliate program, the answer adds partner_link (same merchant, disclosed: Angel may earn a commission, merchant sets the price); false omits it
- `payer_address` (string): Wallet you pay from (optional; the x402 price is the same for every address).
- `payment_tx` (string): Hash of a USDC transfer on Base to payTo (≥ the price, ≤ 72 h old) instead of an x402 signature.
- `region` (string): with need: country code or name
- `url` (string): the shop, checkout or payment link, API or x402 endpoint to check (public https domain, port 443). Send url or need.

### `token_risk` (~295 tokens)

Honeypot and rug-pull check for an ERC-20 before swap or approve

Honeypot and rug-pull check for an ERC-20 on Base or Ethereum before a swap, approval or signature, read straight from the contract: upgradeable proxy (EIP-1967, beacon, clone), owner powers in the bytecode (mint, pause, blacklist, fee or max-tx setters, trading switch, burn from any address), owner renounced or active and the owner's share of supply; known issuers labeled. Risk low, medium or high with reasons. Signals, not investment advice. Free with a key (500 calls) or 5 calls a day without one; then 0.02 USDC per call via x402, or 1 call from a key.
After: preflight before your agent pays or signs on the site that offers this token (the result's next field has the exact call).

Input parameters:

- `bundle_token` (string): Your key instead of paying per call: free (500 calls, POST /key) or bought by card. The connection header X-Bundle-Token works too.
- `chain` (string)
- `payer_address` (string): Wallet you pay from (optional; the x402 price is the same for every address).
- `payment_tx` (string): Hash of a USDC transfer on Base to payTo (≥ the price, ≤ 72 h old) instead of an x402 signature.
- `token` (string, required)

### `shield_check` (~406 tokens)

Spend firewall: allow, hold or block an agent payment before it happens

Spend firewall for AI agents with a wallet or card, called before every payment: checks your rules (per-payment cap, daily budget reserved atomically, allow/block lists, chains, tokens, approval threshold, new merchants, kill switch), the merchant or checkout URL (preflight), the text that triggered the payment (input-guard: hidden instructions) and non-USDC tokens (token-risk). Returns allow, hold or block with reasons; with a stored policy the amount is reserved until confirm or release. Free with a key (500 calls) or 5 calls a day without one; then 0.02 USDC per call via x402, or 1 call from a key.
After: pay, then POST /shield/confirm with the reservation_id (or /shield/release if you did not pay) (the result's next field has the exact call).

Input parameters:

- `bundle_token` (string): Your key instead of paying per call: free (500 calls, POST /key) or bought by card. The connection header X-Bundle-Token works too.
- `hold_seconds` (integer): how long an allowed amount stays reserved (default 900)
- `idempotency_key` (string): same key = same reservation, never reserved twice
- `payer_address` (string): Wallet you pay from (optional; the x402 price is the same for every address).
- `payment` (object, required)
- `payment_tx` (string): Hash of a USDC transfer on Base to payTo (≥ the price, ≤ 72 h old) instead of an x402 signature.
- `policy` (object): inline rules (stateless); for a daily budget and remembered merchants store them with POST /shield/policy and send policy_id
- `policy_id` (string): a stored policy (needs your key as X-Bundle-Token or bundle_token)
- `trigger` (object): the instruction, message or page that made the agent want to pay

### `buy_pack_with_card` (~118 tokens)

Angel: 5,000 calls by card

For businesses without USDC: 5,000 calls €9.00, one-time, 90 days, businesses only, paid in EUR by card or Link. Returns checkout_url for a person to open; the checkout asks for the company or freelance name. After payment the success page (Accept: application/json) returns the key, and it is e-mailed.
After: any tool with bundle_token.

Input parameters:

- `calls` (integer)
- `email` (string): Where the key is sent (optional; Stripe asks otherwise).

## Diagnostics

Captured diagnostic sections: TLS, DNSSEC, Authorisation, Transports. The full working is on the page: https://verifymcp.io/servers/com-oroboros-design-angel-tradesignal/agenten-signal-mcp#diagnostics

## Score history

- 2026-11-21: 61
- 2026-11-20: 61
- 2026-11-19: 61
- 2026-11-18: 62
- 2026-11-17: 62
- 2026-11-16: 62
- 2026-11-15: 61
- 2026-11-14: 60
- 2026-11-13: 61

## Common questions

### What is the Agent safety checks: prompt-injection scan, honeypot… MCP server?

Agent safety checks: prompt-injection scan, honeypot… is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as com.oroboros-design.angel/tradesignal. Checks before an agent acts: prompt-injection scan, honeypot check, x402 preflight. 3 free calls. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://angel.oroboros-design.com/agenten/signal/mcp).

### Is the Agent safety checks: prompt-injection scan, honeypot… MCP server safe to use?

Agent safety checks: prompt-injection scan, honeypot… scores 61 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.

### What tools does the Agent safety checks: prompt-injection scan, honeypot… MCP server expose?

Agent safety checks: prompt-injection scan, honeypot… exposes 7 tools: stealth_read, input_guard, input_guard_preview, preflight, token_risk, and 2 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 2,072 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.

### Does the Agent safety checks: prompt-injection scan, honeypot… MCP server require authentication?

No. We connected to Agent safety checks: prompt-injection scan, honeypot… without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.

### Is the Agent safety checks: prompt-injection scan, honeypot… MCP server still maintained?

Agent safety checks: prompt-injection scan, honeypot… is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.

### What did VerifyMCP test on the Agent safety checks: prompt-injection scan, honeypot… MCP server?

VerifyMCP ran 12 checks on Agent safety checks: prompt-injection scan, honeypot…, covering TLS certificate, HTTPS, HSTS header, DNSSEC and 8 more. One item could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about Agent safety checks: prompt-injection scan, honeypot…: Authorization. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.

## Links

- Remote endpoint: https://angel.oroboros-design.com/agenten/signal/mcp
- Website: https://angel.oroboros-design.com/docs/prompt-injection-defense/
- Changelog RSS feed: https://verifymcp.io/servers/com-oroboros-design-angel-tradesignal/agenten-signal-mcp.xml
- Changelog JSON feed: https://verifymcp.io/servers/com-oroboros-design-angel-tradesignal/agenten-signal-mcp/changelog.json
- Trust report (JSON): https://verifymcp.io/servers/com-oroboros-design-angel-tradesignal/agenten-signal-mcp.json
- HTML version of this page: https://verifymcp.io/servers/com-oroboros-design-angel-tradesignal/agenten-signal-mcp
