# Prompt Sanitizer — prompt-injection scan for untrusted content (remote · angel.oroboros-design.com)

Scan web pages, mails, PDFs and tool output for prompt injection before your agent reads them.

- Trust score: 65/100 (medium)
- Change this week: +2
- Registry status: active
- Liveness: live
- Owner verified: no
- Last scored: 2026-11-21

## Components

- remote · `angel.oroboros-design.com`: 65/100 (this document), [markdown](https://verifymcp.io/servers/com-oroboros-design-angel-prompt-sanitizer/mcp-prompt-sanitizer.md), [page](https://verifymcp.io/servers/com-oroboros-design-angel-prompt-sanitizer/mcp-prompt-sanitizer)

## Channel facts

- Endpoint: `https://angel.oroboros-design.com/mcp/prompt-sanitizer`
- Transports: `streamable-http`
- Auth: `none`
- Version: `1.0.0`

## Trust breakdown

How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. Scores are 0–100 per category. Scoring method: https://verifymcp.io/docs/scoring (what has changed: https://verifymcp.io/docs/scoring/changelog)

Scored 2026-11-21.

- **Endpoint Security**: 63/100
  - The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key.
  - Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 2 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe.
  - HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path.
  - The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present.
  - DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC.
- **Transport & Reachability**: 100/100
  - Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake.
- **Schema Quality & AI Usability**: 60/100
  - AI-judged instruction clarity (good).
  - Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 940 tokens (~235/item across 4 items; 4 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params.
  - Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples.
- **Stability & Change Management**: 23/100
  - Stability observed for 7 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.
- **Tool Coverage**: 92/100
  - 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).
  - 77% of tool parameters carry a description.
- **Tool Safety**: 75/100
  - No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.
  - 0 of 1 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation; "input_guard" implies "remove" and declares readOnlyHint instead, contradicting what its own name says it does.
  - An AI judge read all 5 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.
- **Capabilities**: 100/100
  - Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.

## Install

### How do I install the Prompt Sanitizer — prompt-injection scan for untrusted… MCP server?

Prompt Sanitizer — prompt-injection scan for untrusted… is a hosted endpoint at https://angel.oroboros-design.com/mcp/prompt-sanitizer, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.

### Claude

```bash
claude mcp add --transport http com-oroboros-design-angel-prompt-sanitizer 'https://angel.oroboros-design.com/mcp/prompt-sanitizer'
```

### Cursor

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "com-oroboros-design-angel-prompt-sanitizer": {
      "url": "https://angel.oroboros-design.com/mcp/prompt-sanitizer"
    }
  }
}
```

### VS Code

```json
{
  "servers": {
    "com-oroboros-design-angel-prompt-sanitizer": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://angel.oroboros-design.com/mcp/prompt-sanitizer"
    }
  }
}
```

### Codex

```toml
[mcp_servers.com-oroboros-design-angel-prompt-sanitizer]
url = "https://angel.oroboros-design.com/mcp/prompt-sanitizer"
```

### opencode

```json
{
  "$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
  "mcp": {
    "com-oroboros-design-angel-prompt-sanitizer": {
      "type": "remote",
      "url": "https://angel.oroboros-design.com/mcp/prompt-sanitizer",
      "enabled": true
    }
  }
}
```

### OpenClaw

```bash
openclaw mcp add com-oroboros-design-angel-prompt-sanitizer --url 'https://angel.oroboros-design.com/mcp/prompt-sanitizer' --transport streamable-http
```

### Hermes

```yaml
mcp_servers:
  com-oroboros-design-angel-prompt-sanitizer:
    url: "https://angel.oroboros-design.com/mcp/prompt-sanitizer"
```

### Netclaw

```json
{
  "McpServers": {
    "com-oroboros-design-angel-prompt-sanitizer": {
      "Transport": "http",
      "Url": "https://angel.oroboros-design.com/mcp/prompt-sanitizer"
    }
  }
}
```

### Vellum

```bash
assistant mcp add com-oroboros-design-angel-prompt-sanitizer -t streamable-http -u 'https://angel.oroboros-design.com/mcp/prompt-sanitizer'
```

### Other

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "com-oroboros-design-angel-prompt-sanitizer": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://angel.oroboros-design.com/mcp/prompt-sanitizer"
    }
  }
}
```

The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.

## Changelog

Every change recorded for this component, newest first. Days that predate change tracking, or that we cannot explain, say so: "we were watching and nothing happened" and "we were not watching" are different claims.

### 2026-11-20 (score 65, +1)

No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 17 to 20. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 5 days of observed history at the previous scan, 6 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

### 2026-11-19 (score 64, −1)

- [security] The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads
- [security] Tool “buy_pack_with_card” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “input_guard” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “stealth_read” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [functional] Destructive annotations: pass → 0
- [cosmetic] “buy_pack_with_card” reworded the description of “email”
- [cosmetic] “input_guard” reworded the description of “bundle_token”
- [cosmetic] “input_guard” reworded the description of “payer_address”
- [cosmetic] “stealth_read” reworded the description of “bundle_token”
- [cosmetic] “stealth_read” reworded the description of “payer_address”
- [cosmetic] Tool “buy_pack_with_card” changed its title: TradeSignal: pack by card → Angel: 5,000 calls by card
- [cosmetic] Tool “input_guard” changed its title: Prompt-injection scan for untrusted web, email and tool content → Remove hidden content from untrusted text and flag text aimed at the model
- [cosmetic] Tool “stealth_read” changed its title: Read any URL as clean, injection-scrubbed Markdown for an LLM → Read any public page as clean Markdown, with hidden text removed

### 2026-11-17 (score 65, +1)

- [security] The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads

### 2026-11-16 (score 64, 0)

- [security] The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads
- [security] Tool “buy_pack_with_card” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [functional regression] Schema quality: 664 → 967
- [functional improvement] Tool coverage: 67% → 77%
- [functional] New tool “stealth_read”

### 2026-11-15 (score 64, +1)

- [security] The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads
- [security] Tool “input_guard” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [functional improvement] Stability: unverified → 0.03

### 2026-11-14 (score 63)

First indexed and scored.

## MCP tools (4)

### `stealth_read` (~275 tokens)

Read any public page as clean Markdown, with hidden text removed

Returns a public https page as clean Markdown for an agent (headings, lists, tables kept; navigation, cookie banners, scripts and everything hidden from people removed), strips invisible Unicode and flags text aimed at the model — with verdict, score, findings, title and language. JSON and text pass through. One GET as a declared bot, no login or bot-protection bypass; a blocked page is never charged. Free with a key (500 calls) or 5 calls a day without one; then 0.02 USDC per call via x402, or 1 call from a key.
After: preflight before your agent buys or pays anything the page offers (the result's next field has the exact call).

Input parameters:

- `bundle_token` (string): Your key instead of paying per call: free (500 calls, POST /key) or bought by card. The connection header X-Bundle-Token works too.
- `payer_address` (string): Wallet you pay from (optional; the x402 price is the same for every address).
- `payment_tx` (string): Hash of a USDC transfer on Base to payTo (≥ the price, ≤ 72 h old) instead of an x402 signature.
- `url` (string, required): the public https page to read (1 MB, 10 s)

### `input_guard` (~318 tokens)

Remove hidden content from untrusted text and flag text aimed at the model

Removes hidden content and flags text aimed at the model, for untrusted input before an agent acts on it: web pages, emails, RAG chunks, tool and MCP responses. Strips invisible Unicode (tag smuggling decoded, zero-width, bidi) and HTML hidden from people; flags role takeover, forged system or tool turns, requests for keys, the prompt or payments, exfiltration links, homoglyphs and base64 payloads, in 17 languages. Rule-based. Verdict clean, caution or hostile, score, findings, cleaned text. Free with a key (500 calls) or 5 calls a day without one; then 0.02 USDC per call via x402, or 1 call from a key.
After: preflight before your agent pays anything the content pointed to (the result's next field has the exact call).

Input parameters:

- `bundle_token` (string): Your key instead of paying per call: free (500 calls, POST /key) or bought by card. The connection header X-Bundle-Token works too.
- `payer_address` (string): Wallet you pay from (optional; the x402 price is the same for every address).
- `payment_tx` (string): Hash of a USDC transfer on Base to payTo (≥ the price, ≤ 72 h old) instead of an x402 signature.
- `text` (string): the content to check (send text or url)
- `url` (string): a public https page to fetch once and check (256 KB)

### `buy_pack_with_card` (~118 tokens)

Angel: 5,000 calls by card

For businesses without USDC: 5,000 calls €9.00, one-time, 90 days, businesses only, paid in EUR by card or Link. Returns checkout_url for a person to open; the checkout asks for the company or freelance name. After payment the success page (Accept: application/json) returns the key, and it is e-mailed.
After: any tool with bundle_token.

Input parameters:

- `calls` (integer)
- `email` (string): Where the key is sent (optional; Stripe asks otherwise).

### `input_guard_preview` (~105 tokens)

Prompt-injection quick scan (free)

Free prompt-injection quick scan for untrusted input: up to 4,000 characters of text, or one https page, checked for hidden instructions aimed at agents (role override, invisible Unicode, hidden HTML) in 17 languages incl. Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Hindi, Arabic. Returns verdict, score and the top 3 findings.
After: input_guard for every finding and the cleaned text.

Input parameters:

- `text` (string)
- `url` (string)

## Diagnostics

Captured diagnostic sections: TLS, DNSSEC, Authorisation, Transports. The full working is on the page: https://verifymcp.io/servers/com-oroboros-design-angel-prompt-sanitizer/mcp-prompt-sanitizer#diagnostics

## Score history

- 2026-11-21: 65
- 2026-11-20: 65
- 2026-11-19: 64
- 2026-11-18: 65
- 2026-11-17: 65
- 2026-11-16: 64
- 2026-11-15: 64
- 2026-11-14: 63

## Common questions

### What is the Prompt Sanitizer — prompt-injection scan for untrusted… MCP server?

Prompt Sanitizer — prompt-injection scan for untrusted… is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as com.oroboros-design.angel/prompt-sanitizer. Scan web pages, mails, PDFs and tool output for prompt injection before your agent reads them. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://angel.oroboros-design.com/mcp/prompt-sanitizer).

### Is the Prompt Sanitizer — prompt-injection scan for untrusted… MCP server safe to use?

Prompt Sanitizer — prompt-injection scan for untrusted… scores 65 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.

### What tools does the Prompt Sanitizer — prompt-injection scan for untrusted… MCP server expose?

Prompt Sanitizer — prompt-injection scan for untrusted… exposes 4 tools: stealth_read, input_guard, buy_pack_with_card, input_guard_preview. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 816 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.

### Does the Prompt Sanitizer — prompt-injection scan for untrusted… MCP server require authentication?

No. We connected to Prompt Sanitizer — prompt-injection scan for untrusted… without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.

### Is the Prompt Sanitizer — prompt-injection scan for untrusted… MCP server still maintained?

Prompt Sanitizer — prompt-injection scan for untrusted… is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.

### What did VerifyMCP test on the Prompt Sanitizer — prompt-injection scan for untrusted… MCP server?

VerifyMCP ran 12 checks on Prompt Sanitizer — prompt-injection scan for untrusted…, covering TLS certificate, HTTPS, HSTS header, DNSSEC and 8 more. One item could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about Prompt Sanitizer — prompt-injection scan for untrusted…: Authorization. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.

## Links

- Remote endpoint: https://angel.oroboros-design.com/mcp/prompt-sanitizer
- Repository: https://github.com/daoudandiaye98-alt/mcp-prompt-sanitizer
- Changelog RSS feed: https://verifymcp.io/servers/com-oroboros-design-angel-prompt-sanitizer/mcp-prompt-sanitizer.xml
- Changelog JSON feed: https://verifymcp.io/servers/com-oroboros-design-angel-prompt-sanitizer/mcp-prompt-sanitizer/changelog.json
- Trust report (JSON): https://verifymcp.io/servers/com-oroboros-design-angel-prompt-sanitizer/mcp-prompt-sanitizer.json
- HTML version of this page: https://verifymcp.io/servers/com-oroboros-design-angel-prompt-sanitizer/mcp-prompt-sanitizer
