# com.oceanalt/aml (remote · oceanalt.com)

Screen a payee address before an AI agent pays: sanctions, mixers, scam lists, on-chain risk.

- Trust score: 67/100 (medium)
- Registry status: active
- Liveness: live
- Owner verified: no
- Last scored: 2026-09-20

## Components

- remote · `oceanalt.com`: 67/100 (this document), [markdown](https://verifymcp.io/servers/com-oceanalt-aml/api-mcp.md), [page](https://verifymcp.io/servers/com-oceanalt-aml/api-mcp)
- npm · `oceanalt-aml-mcp`: 69/100, [markdown](https://verifymcp.io/servers/com-oceanalt-aml/oceanalt-aml-mcp.md), [page](https://verifymcp.io/servers/com-oceanalt-aml/oceanalt-aml-mcp)

## Channel facts

- Endpoint: `https://oceanalt.com/api/mcp`
- Transports: `streamable-http`
- Auth: `none`
- Version: `0.6.1`

## Trust breakdown

How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. Scores are 0–100 per category. Scoring method: https://verifymcp.io/docs/scoring (what has changed: https://verifymcp.io/docs/scoring/changelog)

Scored 2026-09-20.

- **Endpoint Security**: 63/100
  - The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key.
  - Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 10 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe.
  - HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path.
  - The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present.
  - DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC.
- **Transport & Reachability**: 100/100
  - Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake.
- **Schema Quality & AI Usability**: 67/100
  - AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).
  - Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 2118 tokens (~211/item across 10 items; 10 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params.
  - Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples.
- **Stability & Change Management**: 13/100
  - Stability observed for 4 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.
- **Tool Coverage**: 99/100
  - 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).
  - 97% of tool parameters carry a description.
- **Tool Safety**: 100/100
  - No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.
  - We read all 10 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.
  - An AI judge read all 11 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.
- **Capabilities**: 100/100
  - Implements a current MCP spec version (2026-07-28).

## Install

### How do I install the com.oceanalt/aml MCP server?

com.oceanalt/aml is a hosted endpoint at https://oceanalt.com/api/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.

### Claude

```bash
claude mcp add --transport http com-oceanalt-aml 'https://oceanalt.com/api/mcp'
```

### Cursor

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "com-oceanalt-aml": {
      "url": "https://oceanalt.com/api/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```

### VS Code

```json
{
  "servers": {
    "com-oceanalt-aml": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://oceanalt.com/api/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```

### Codex

```toml
[mcp_servers.com-oceanalt-aml]
url = "https://oceanalt.com/api/mcp"
```

### opencode

```json
{
  "$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
  "mcp": {
    "com-oceanalt-aml": {
      "type": "remote",
      "url": "https://oceanalt.com/api/mcp",
      "enabled": true
    }
  }
}
```

### OpenClaw

```bash
openclaw mcp add com-oceanalt-aml --url 'https://oceanalt.com/api/mcp' --transport streamable-http
```

### Hermes

```yaml
mcp_servers:
  com-oceanalt-aml:
    url: "https://oceanalt.com/api/mcp"
```

### Netclaw

```json
{
  "McpServers": {
    "com-oceanalt-aml": {
      "Transport": "http",
      "Url": "https://oceanalt.com/api/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```

### Vellum

```bash
assistant mcp add com-oceanalt-aml -t streamable-http -u 'https://oceanalt.com/api/mcp'
```

### Other

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "com-oceanalt-aml": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://oceanalt.com/api/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```

The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.

## Changelog

Every change recorded for this component, newest first. Days that predate change tracking, or that we cannot explain, say so: "we were watching and nothing happened" and "we were not watching" are different claims.

### 2026-09-19 (score 67, +1)

No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 7 to 10. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 2 days of observed history at the previous scan, 3 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

### 2026-09-17 (score 66, +1)

- [functional improvement] Stability: unverified → 0.03

### 2026-09-16 (score 65)

First indexed and scored.

## MCP tools (10)

### `payment_decision` (~317 tokens)

Decide whether this payment should happen (free)

"Before your agent pays, call OceanAlt once." Pass the payee address the agent is about to pay; get a machine-executable decision: allow | review | decline, plus verifiable evidence and retry semantics — use it as a gate: if the decision is not "allow", do not pay. On allow/review it also returns a verifiable compliance attestation you can attach to the settlement so the payment carries proof it passed OceanAlt's decision. Free, no API key.

Input parameters:

- `amountUsdc` (number): Amount in USDC (optional; recorded, not required for the decision).
- `lang` (string): Language for human-readable fields (signals, note, advice). Defaults to English.
- `maxAmountUsdc` (number): Optional declared per-payment cap in USDC. amountUsdc above it → decline.
- `network` (string): EVM chain for the payee (optional; ignored for Tron).
- `purpose` (string): Short purpose/memo (optional).
- `reasoning` (string): Optional payment intent: why this payee. Instruction-override phrases here route the payment to review.
- `task` (string): Optional payment intent: what this payment is for. Sending task, reasoning or maxAmountUsdc opts into a deterministic intent check; an empty intent is itself a finding (requires_information).
- `to` (string, required): Payee address the agent is about to pay. EVM: 0x + 40 hex. Tron: T + 33 base58.

### `screen_address` (~244 tokens)

Screen a payee address for AML risk (free)

Run an AML compliance screen on a single blockchain address BEFORE paying or receiving from it — the pre-payment check on a counterparty. Checks OFAC sanctions, known mixers, community scam/phishing lists, stablecoin issuer freezes, and on-chain heuristics. Returns a verdict (clear | caution | risky), a 0–100 risk score, a blocked flag, and the matching signals — receipts, not a black-box score. A clear verdict means nothing was found in the data OceanAlt holds; it is not a statement that the address is safe. Depth varies by chain (see coverage.chains at /.well-known/agent-capabilities). Supports EVM (0x…), Tron (T…), Solana (base58). Free, no API key.

Input parameters:

- `address` (string, required): Address to screen. EVM: 0x + 40 hex. Tron: T + 33 base58. Solana: base58 public key.
- `lang` (string): Language for human-readable fields (signals, note, advice). Defaults to English.
- `network` (string): EVM chain (optional; auto-defaults to ethereum; ignored for Tron/Solana).

### `screen_endpoint` (~222 tokens)

Screen a payment endpoint for phishing (free)

Screen a payment ENDPOINT (URL or domain) before calling it — the half that address screening cannot answer. In x402 the agent discovers a URL first, receives a 402, and only then learns where to pay: if that endpoint is spoofed, the payee address it hands back is freshly generated and appears on no sanctions list. Checks the hostname and its parent domains against public phishing databases (MetaMask eth-phishing-detect, ScamSniffer) plus hostname shape signals (bare IP, punycode homograph, deep subdomain nesting, free hosting). Returns clear | caution | risky | unknown with language-independent signal_keys. A clear verdict means no match was found, NOT that the endpoint is safe — freshly registered phishing hosts always precede any list. Use together with screen_address. Free, no API key.

Input parameters:

- `lang` (string): Language for human-readable fields. Defaults to English.
- `url` (string, required): Full URL or bare domain of the payment endpoint, e.g. https://pay.example.com/x402 or pay.example.com

### `counterparty_control_baseline` (~159 tokens)

Check a counterparty's control baseline before paying (free)

Answers a different question from address screening. Screening asks whether an address is risky; this asks how much damage the agent on the other side could do if it were talked into something. Returns that party's self-attestation against the OceanAlt Agent Control Baseline, split into two sets that must NOT be conflated: verified_by_oceanalt (enforced by the gateway on every payment — provable) and self_claimed (what they state about their own side — NOT verified by OceanAlt). Most parties have not attested: found:false means no information, not a bad signal.

Input parameters:

- `agentId` (string): Their agent id, if you have that instead.
- `entity` (string): The counterparty's entity name.

### `attest_control_baseline` (~300 tokens)

File your own control-baseline attestation (free)

File your operator's control-baseline attestation — the counterpart to counterparty_control_baseline. That tool asks what controls the OTHER side runs; this one publishes what YOUR side runs, so payers can see it before settling with you. No account, no key, one call. Gaps are allowed and expected: answer false where a control is not in place and describe how you plan to close it in gapPlan. A filing with declared gaps is worth far more than no filing — it lets a payer decide against a known shape instead of a blank. Get the control ids from the baseline list first. Only file for a party you are actually authorised to speak for.

Input parameters:

- `agentId` (string): Optional. If this party already has an agent registered with OceanAlt, link the attestation to it.
- `answers` (object, required): Map of control id to boolean, e.g. {"ACB-1.1": true, "ACB-2.1": false}. Control ids come from the baseline list (see baseline_controls).
- `contact` (string): Optional contact for follow-up. Not published.
- `entity` (string, required): The accountable party's legal or commonly-used name, e.g. "Acme Robotics Ltd". This is who the attestation is about — not your agent's name.
- `gapPlan` (string): For controls answered false: how and when you plan to close them. Plain text.

### `baseline_controls` (~71 tokens)

List the control-baseline questions (free)

Fetch the OceanAlt Agent Control Baseline: the list of controls an agent operator is expected to run before it is allowed to move money, each answerable yes or no. Call this before attest_control_baseline so you file against real control ids. Each control carries which gate enforces it and why it exists.

### `resolve_agent_identity` (~109 tokens)

Resolve an agent's chain of accountability (free)

Resolves who stands behind a paying agent: agent -> principal -> mandate -> credential -> wallet. Each link reports whether it holds; completeness counts how many do (a factual count, not a score). Wherever the chain breaks is where accountability stops. Publication is opt-in and only posture is exposed (that a ceiling exists, never its value), so found:false means the agent has not published — absence of information, not a bad signal.

Input parameters:

- `agentId` (string, required): The agent id to resolve.

### `recent_flagged` (~58 tokens)

List recently flagged addresses (free)

Return a representative sample of addresses on OceanAlt's reviewed risk list — OFAC-sanctioned, known mixers, and community-reported scam/phishing — each with its source category and reason. Takes no arguments. Free, no API key.

### `verify_payment_requirements` (~230 tokens)

Verify a signed x402 402 response (free)

Before paying an x402 402 response, check that its payment requirements (payTo, amount, asset, network, resource) were signed by the seller and not altered in transit by a proxy, CDN, SDK or another tool. x402 v2 carries the requirements in the PAYMENT-REQUIRED response header (base64 JSON): pass either the decoded JSON or the raw base64 value as body. Optionally pass expect:{payTo, amount} — the address and amount you are about to pay — and the tool also checks they match what was signed. verified:false with reason_code no_signature means the seller does not sign (unprotected, not necessarily malicious); digest_mismatch or signature_invalid means the response was tampered with — do not pay.

Input parameters:

- `body` (required): The decoded PAYMENT-REQUIRED header JSON (object), or the raw base64 header value (string).
- `expect` (object): What you are about to pay; checked against the signed fields.
- `keys_url` (string): Override the seller's public-key URL (defaults to extensions.signedRequirements.keys_url).

### `check_calldata_intent` (~328 tokens)

Decode calldata and compare with declared intent (free)

Anti blind-signing. EVM: decodes what a transaction's calldata will actually do (ERC-20 transfer/approve/permit, setApprovalForAll, ownership transfer, native transfer). Solana: decodes a whole base64 transaction (SPL Token / Token-2022 Transfer, TransferChecked, Approve, SetAuthority, CloseAccount, Burn; System Transfer / Assign; ATA creation). Compares it with what you believe you are doing. EVM: pass intent:{action:'pay', to, amount} plus contract (the transaction's to) and data (hex calldata). Solana: pass network:'solana' and transaction (base64) instead of data. decision match = does what you declared; mismatch = different recipient/amount/asset, or an approval / authority change instead of a payment — do not sign; unknown = could not decode (including address-lookup-table accounts), which is not the same as safe.

Input parameters:

- `contract` (string): EVM only: the transaction's `to` field (token contract for ERC-20 payments, or the recipient for native transfers).
- `data` (string): EVM only: 0x-prefixed hex calldata.
- `intent` (object)
- `network` (string): 'solana' to decode a Solana transaction; EVM chain name or CAIP-2 id otherwise (optional).
- `transaction` (string): Solana only: base64-serialized transaction or message.
- `value` (string): EVM only: native value in wei (optional).

## Diagnostics

Captured diagnostic sections: TLS, DNSSEC, Authorisation, Transports. The full working is on the page: https://verifymcp.io/servers/com-oceanalt-aml/api-mcp#diagnostics

## Score history

- 2026-09-20: 67
- 2026-09-19: 67
- 2026-09-18: 66
- 2026-09-17: 66
- 2026-09-16: 65

## Common questions

### What is the com.oceanalt/aml MCP server?

com.oceanalt/aml is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as com.oceanalt/aml. Screen a payee address before an AI agent pays: sanctions, mixers, scam lists, on-chain risk. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://oceanalt.com/api/mcp).

### Is the com.oceanalt/aml MCP server safe to use?

com.oceanalt/aml scores 67 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.

### What tools does the com.oceanalt/aml MCP server expose?

com.oceanalt/aml exposes 10 tools: payment_decision, screen_address, screen_endpoint, counterparty_control_baseline, attest_control_baseline, and 5 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 2,038 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.

### Does the com.oceanalt/aml MCP server require authentication?

No. We connected to com.oceanalt/aml without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.

### Is the com.oceanalt/aml MCP server still maintained?

com.oceanalt/aml is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 20 September 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.

## Links

- Remote endpoint: https://oceanalt.com/api/mcp
- Website: https://oceanalt.com/en/api-docs
- Changelog RSS feed: https://verifymcp.io/servers/com-oceanalt-aml/api-mcp.xml
- Changelog JSON feed: https://verifymcp.io/servers/com-oceanalt-aml/api-mcp.json
- HTML version of this page: https://verifymcp.io/servers/com-oceanalt-aml/api-mcp