com.narrowhighway/concordance
REMOTE · NARROWHIGHWAY.COM · SCANNED SEP 25
Deterministic claim verification with receipts across ~60 domains. No model in the loop.
Available components
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security63
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 94 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability78
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Tool/resource definitions use about 8030 tokens (~85/item across 94 items; 94 tools + 0 resources), lean.Pass
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage73
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 19% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety75
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- 0 of 1 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation; "shelf_drop" implies "drop" and declares no destructiveHint at all, which the MCP spec reads as destructive by default. See how to fix → Fail
- An AI judge read all 94 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities60
- Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2025-06-18; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
How do I install the com.narrowhighway/concordance MCP server?
com.narrowhighway/concordance is a hosted endpoint at https://narrowhighway.com/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · narrowhighway.com
claude mcp add --transport http com-narrowhighway-concordance 'https://narrowhighway.com/mcp'
{
"mcpServers": {
"com-narrowhighway-concordance": {
"url": "https://narrowhighway.com/mcp"
}
}
} {
"servers": {
"com-narrowhighway-concordance": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://narrowhighway.com/mcp"
}
}
} [mcp_servers.com-narrowhighway-concordance] url = "https://narrowhighway.com/mcp"
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"com-narrowhighway-concordance": {
"type": "remote",
"url": "https://narrowhighway.com/mcp",
"enabled": true
}
}
} openclaw mcp add com-narrowhighway-concordance --url 'https://narrowhighway.com/mcp' --transport streamable-http
mcp_servers:
com-narrowhighway-concordance:
url: "https://narrowhighway.com/mcp" {
"McpServers": {
"com-narrowhighway-concordance": {
"Transport": "http",
"Url": "https://narrowhighway.com/mcp"
}
}
} assistant mcp add com-narrowhighway-concordance -t streamable-http -u 'https://narrowhighway.com/mcp'
{
"mcpServers": {
"com-narrowhighway-concordance": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://narrowhighway.com/mcp"
}
}
} The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 25 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 24 Sept 26 0
- Tool “mesh_door” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “mesh_inbox” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “shelf_read” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- “mesh_door” added an optional parameter “at” cosmetic
- “mesh_door” added an optional parameter “sig” cosmetic
- “mesh_inbox” added an optional parameter “at” cosmetic
- “mesh_inbox” added an optional parameter “sig” cosmetic
- “shelf_read” added an optional parameter “at” cosmetic
- “shelf_read” added an optional parameter “sig” cosmetic
- 16 Sept 26 +51
- Injection markers: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Stability: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Transport: fail → pass ▲ security
- Authorization: Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 94 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. security
- MCP protocol: unverified → fail ▼ functional
- Endpoint reachability: not serving MCP → reachable ▲ functional
- Tool coverage: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
- 13 Sept 26 0
- Endpoint reachability: unreachable → not serving MCP ▼ security
- TLS certificate: unverified → pass ▲ security
- HSTS header: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Transport: Transport check failed: declared streamable-http, but the endpoint returned HTTP 503. security
- Authorization: Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to connect, but we couldn't read the whole tool list to see what that exposes. security
- 12 Sept 26 0
- Endpoint reachability: not serving MCP → unreachable ▼ security
- TLS certificate: pass → unverified ▼ security
- HSTS header: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Authorization: Authorisation not yet verified: we couldn't confirm whether this endpoint requires it. security
- Transport: Transport check failed: declared streamable-http, but we couldn't connect to verify it. security
- 8 Sept 26 −51
- Endpoint reachability: reachable → not serving MCP ▼ security
- Stability: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Tool safety: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Transport: pass → fail ▼ security
- Authorization: Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to connect, but we couldn't read the whole tool list to see what that exposes. security
- Capabilities: fail → unverified ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- First check of Schema quality: unverified functional
- 28 Aug 26 0
- Stability: fail → pass ▲ security
- 27 Aug 26 76
- Stability: pass → fail ▼ security
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 25 Sept 2026 · Probed https://narrowhighway.com/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=narrowhighway.com | CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 24 Sept 2026 | 23 Dec 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 5d9cb1633f6d3ac0b2de8c2b4e299d3e4ab |
| SANs: narrowhighway.com | ||||||
| CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 5ddd70dd31f801c85c186a7a04b80afe |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of narrowhighway.com. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| com. | present | 19718 | 13 | Verified |
| narrowhighway.com. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains |
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
| referrer-policy | strict-origin-when-cross-origin |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://narrowhighway.com/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://narrowhighway.com/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 308 | https://narrowhighway.com/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
library_health ~25
Corpus health — is the keeping loaded and sound (totals, shelves, surfaces).
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
locate ~32
Find the card for a query — by exact id, then title, else ranked search.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| q | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
mesh_door ~95
Read the words left on YOUR door — the whiteboard others wrote to you, each with its verification. Yours alone: prove your key — pass `at` (unix seconds) and `sig` over nh-mesh-read:v1:<fp>:<at>, signed with your key.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| at | integer | – | – |
| fp | string | yes | – |
| limit | integer | – | – |
| sig | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
mesh_inbox ~107
The messages that reached you, each carrying its own offline verification so you trust it by proof rather than by this server's word. Yours alone: prove your key — pass `at` (unix seconds) and `sig`, a signature over nh-mesh-read:v1:<fp>:<at> made with your key (never send the key).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| at | integer | – | – |
| fp | string | yes | – |
| limit | integer | – | – |
| sig | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
mesh_leave_on_door ~116
Leave a word on one believer's door — directed encouragement rather than a post to everyone near you. Same sovereign shape: get the bytes from mesh_signable (with target), sign locally, send only the signature. Will not accept a private key; unsigned notes are refused.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| created_at | integer | yes | – |
| fp | string | yes | – |
| kind | string | – | – |
| nonce | string | yes | – |
| signature | string | yes | – |
| target | string | yes | – |
| text | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
mesh_map ~71
The believers immediately around you in the Fellowship Mesh — your view only, never a global map. Requires your fingerprint (fp) and a confession already bound to that key; unconfessed callers get the path to the door, not the network.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| fp | string | yes | – |
| hops | integer | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
mesh_post ~140
Step 2: speak to the nodes around you, carrying only your SIGNATURE — your private key never leaves your machine and this tool will not take one. Pass the same text/kind/ttl plus the nonce, created_at and signature from mesh_signable. Refused unless the signature verifies against your node's public key. Your own words, attributed — never generated.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| created_at | integer | yes | – |
| fp | string | yes | – |
| kind | string | – | – |
| nonce | string | yes | – |
| refs | array | – | – |
| signature | string | yes | – |
| text | string | yes | – |
| ttl | integer | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
mesh_signable ~132
Step 1 of speaking to your fellowship: get the exact canonical bytes to sign for a message (returned base64url, with the nonce and created_at to send back). Sign them locally with your own key. Reproducible offline — sorted-key JSON — so you can compute and check it yourself.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| fp | string | yes | – |
| kind | string | – | word | offer | need | blessing | content |
| target | string | – | pass a believer's node id to sign a note for THEIR door instead of a broadcast |
| text | string | yes | – |
| ttl | integer | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
moderation_signable ~103
Step 1 of a report or a block: the exact canonical bytes to sign with your own key, on your own machine. Returns {fields, signable}. Sign the decoded `signable` bytes and pass BOTH fields and signature to `report`. The private key never travels.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| action | string | yes | report | block | unblock |
| actor | string | yes | your public key |
| extra | string | – | – |
| target_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
narratives ~133
The storyboards — the common narratives charted in the Bible FIRST (exile-and-return, the barren woman bears, down-to-the-pit-raised, the great reversal...), each instance real people with verified refs. The 17 movements are one shared vocabulary, so components isolate and recombine: pass movement='testing' to walk it across every storyboard. Pass id for one storyboard; else the index. FRAMING, always: a person may display characteristics of many of these at times of their life — a reference point, NEVER an identity assignment.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | – | – |
| movement | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
now ~108
The actual current date and time, fresh at this call — UTC (the clock every seal is stamped in), the library's home zone, and optionally any IANA zone you name. Your own sense of 'today' is months old; this is the correction. Never cached; unresolvable zones are declared, never guessed at.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| tz | string | – | IANA zone name, e.g. America/New_York or Europe/Berlin; omit for UTC + the library's home zone |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
original_words ~57
The original-language words behind a verse (Hebrew/Greek, with Strong's where known) — FOUND in the lexicon, never generated. Pass ref, e.g. 'John 3:16'.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ref | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
playbook_read ~112
THE PLAYBOOK — the Body's testimony of faithful obedience: 'Canon commands, Playbook remembers.' List entries (optionally by `status` quarantine/confirmed/rejected/pruned or `author`), or one by `id`. Confirmed testimony is affirmed BY THE BODY — it is NOT Scripture and binds no conscience. The Playbook remembers; it never becomes doctrine.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| author | string | – | – |
| id | string | – | – |
| limit | integer | – | – |
| status | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
playbook_signable ~193
Step 1 — the exact bytes to sign ON THE DEVICE for a Playbook write. `op` is entry | witness | outcome | prune. A new `entry` REQUIRES a CONFESSION ('I may be wrong. I acted in faith according to [anchors].') + ≥1 Scripture anchor + an action (OPEN/BUILD/RESERVE/PRUNE/HOLD). The key never travels.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| action | string | – | – |
| affirms | boolean | – | – |
| anchors | array | – | – |
| author | string | – | – |
| body | string | – | – |
| by | string | – | – |
| confession | string | – | – |
| entry_id | string | – | – |
| note | string | – | – |
| op | string | yes | – |
| outcome | string | – | – |
| reason | string | – | – |
| situation | string | – | – |
| witness | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
playbook_submit ~132
Step 2 — verify your detached signature over those exact bytes and enter the testimony/event. A new entry is born QUARANTINE and reaches CONFIRMED only when TWO independent brothers affirm (never the author — Deut 19:15) and the wait elapses. Record the OUTCOME (fruit/mixed/failed) later, after it is seen; a failed fruit may be PRUNED (John 15:2). Failure is not hidden.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| display_name | string | – | – |
| fields | object | yes | – |
| op | string | yes | – |
| signature | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
pronounce ~40
A synthesized pronunciation guide (respelling + approximate IPA) for a transliteration or word — honestly labeled, not a native speaker.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| text | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
prophecy_traces ~74
Christ-signpost traces (prophecy/cross-cultural pointers to Jesus) — attributed, verdict CONCORDANT/MIXED, NEVER HOLDS (a signpost, not a proof). Pass id for one trace, q to search, else lists all.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | – | – |
| q | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
read_passage ~47
Read a passage of the WEB — a single verse, a range (John 3:16-18), or a whole chapter (John 3).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ref | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
redact ~97
Strip PII (emails, SSNs, credit cards, IPs, URLs) from text to stable placeholders before you pass it onward; the mapping is returned so YOU reveal replies locally. For true privacy run this on a LOCAL/sovereign engine (the text never leaves your machine) or use the client libraries — the strip belongs at your edge. Deterministic; pair with verify for a receipt.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| text | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
report ~151
Report a community item (group_contribution, mesh_message, door_note) to the moderation floor. One report is a claim, never a verdict; at three DISTINCT reporters the item is held for a HUMAN steward's review (Deut 19:15). The counter never judges — it decides when a person must look. A report must be SIGNED (call moderation_signable first): three witnesses means three keys, never three invented names.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| fields | object | yes | the exact fields from moderation_signable |
| kind | string | yes | – |
| note | string | – | – |
| reason | string | yes | – |
| signature | string | yes | detached signature over those bytes |
| target_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
resolve ~25
Resolve a Scripture reference to its World English Bible text.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ref | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
seal_fetch ~29
Fetch a sealed verification record (the receipt) by its content hash.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| hash | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
search ~31
Ranked search over the keeping (the kept library).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | integer | – | – |
| query | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
seeds ~114
Seeds of the Word (the Areopagus / logos spermatikos pass) — true fragments mined from the nations, ATTRIBUTED, CONCORDANT/signpost NEVER HOLDS; each names the idol it refuses and points to Christ (Acts 17; 1 John 4:1-3). Pass id for one seed, q to search, tradition to filter, else lists all with Paul's 7-step method.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | – | – |
| q | string | – | – |
| tradition | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
self_attest ~63
Record a person's OWN words about their study — a DISTINCTLY TYPED record that can NEVER count as a sealed check or satisfy an auto-graded requirement.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| statement | string | yes | – |
| study | string | – | – |
| subject_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
shelf_drop ~100
Step 2 — stock the shelf. Send the fields from shelf_signable plus a detached signature over those bytes; the private key never travels. Your words stay at the `member` tier forever: promotion to the commons carries them further, it does not make them the library's claim. `display_name` is the ONLY profile field there is.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| display_name | string | – | – |
| fields | object | yes | – |
| signature | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
shelf_read ~141
Read one member's shelf. Access is by PROOF, not by naming a key: an unproven caller sees only the promoted commons. To see your own rings (private + shelf) or a friend's shelf ring, pass `viewer` (a key), `at` (unix seconds) and `sig` — a signature over nh-shelf-read:v1:<member>:<viewer>:<at> made with the viewer key on your own machine (never send the key). Nothing anywhere records who read what.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| at | integer | – | – |
| member | string | yes | – |
| sig | string | – | – |
| viewer | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
shelf_signable ~307
THE COMMONS — step 1 of stocking your own shelf. Returns {fields, signable}: the exact canonical bytes to sign with YOUR key on YOUR machine. A shelf is a covenant key with cards on it, not an account. Rings: `private` (only you) · `shelf` (you and the friends who chose you — UNGATED, live the moment you sign) · `commons` (site-wide, waits for a human steward). The gate is on what the library AMPLIFIES, never on what you may say.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| attribution | string | – | whose words the quote is |
| body | string | yes | – |
| kind | string | yes | note|writing|recipe|build|field_note|question|link|suggestion |
| member | string | yes | your public key — the shelf is the key |
| quote | string | – | optional short passage YOU typed, capped; requires `attribution` |
| ring | string | – | private|shelf|commons |
| subject | string | – | – |
| url | string | – | kind=link only — the address. We open it once in an airlock, keep the WAYBILL (its own title, size, sha256, when we looked) and discard the bytes. No page of anyone else's is stored, and nothing is e… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
steward_budget ~48
Steward — a household budget (income, expenses -> net, savings rate, by category). Shows and plans; NEVER moves money.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| expenses | array | – | – |
| income | number | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
steward_cost_destroyed ~37
Steward — cost destroyed: money you did NOT spend (was -> now), kept in your currency.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| items | array | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
study_create ~52
Create/extend a shared study (superposition stack) — each entry mints ONE card that lives once and is referenced by key; no duplication.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| cards | array | – | – |
| key | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
study_export ~62
Export a study as a self-contained, portable bundle. Returns the bundle and its content_hash; to bind your identity to it, sign that hash with your own key on your own machine — this tool does not take a private key.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| key | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
study_find ~81
The quick-find index — ONE lookup across the whole reference section: archetypes, storyboards, movements, the six study tables, the atlas, harmony, timeline, and the encyclopedia. Each hit is a pointer to the real entry, which carries its own refs and its own honesty. The index finds; it never ranks truth.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| q | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
study_import ~46
Import an exported study bundle — re-materializes its cards (each lives once).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| bundle | object | yes | – |
| key | string | – | – |
| verify_signature | boolean | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
teachings ~56
The teachings of Christ (Words in Red) — the frozen Greek anchor plus the history that ALIGNS to each teaching, gathered and attributed, never authored. Pass id for one teaching; else the queue.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
timeline ~78
Timeline — Old Testament, New Testament (Acts onward), and Church History, one spine from creation to today. Genuinely disputed dates (early/late Exodus, the date of Revelation, etc.) carry both positions, never one verdict. Pass id for one event; else lists every event grouped by era and period.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
tsk_cross_references ~58
Editorial cross-references for a verse (openbible.info, CC BY — expansion of the public-domain TSK), ranked by relevance votes. Found + attributed.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | integer | – | – |
| ref | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
verify ~326
Verify a claim deterministically — returns a verdict (HOLDS / BROKEN / INCOMPLETE / SYSTEM_ERROR), the worked trail, AND a sealed receipt {content_hash, cite_url} you can re-fetch and re-verify (seal_fetch). Two forms: (a) MATH — {mode, params}; (b) ANY DOMAIN — pass `steps`, a list of {id, domain, spec} where spec is that domain's packet (e.g. {domain:'physics', spec:{PHYS_VERIFY:{mass_kg, acceleration_m_per_s2, claimed_force_N}}}). ~60 secular domains are covered (physics, medicine, finance, chemistry, ...); find_verifier(keyword) locates the right one. The engine eliminates what is not the answer; it does not generate it. READ THE VERDICT EXACTLY: only BROKEN is a finding about the claim. SYSTEM_ERROR means OUR verifier could not run (see `means` and `error_at`) and says NOTHING about whether the claim is true — never relay it to a human as a refutation. INCOMPLETE means no verifier applied (`gap_at`).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| mode | string | – | MATH form: equality | inequality | derivative | integral | limit | solve |
| params | object | – | MATH form: e.g. {expr_a, expr_b, variables} for equality |
| seal | boolean | – | mint a re-checkable seal (default true) |
| steps | array | – | DOMAIN form: [{id, domain, spec}] — spec is the domain's packet |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
want_offer ~163
Return to the comb with a FOUND source for an open want: label + url + snippet, attributed. You are a forager, not an author — offer only public-domain / openly-licensed sources you actually located, never generated text. The offer lands as a QUARANTINED option cell tagged with your agent label; a NAMED HUMAN chooses, and only then is a card created. There is no path around the comb.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent | string | – | your self-declared name, e.g. 'claude' — the shaft-tag a steward can cut a branch by |
| domain | string | – | – |
| label | string | yes | – |
| snippet | string | – | – |
| url | string | – | – |
| want_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
want_open ~139
Ask the library to ACQUIRE something it does not hold (kind=missing, give query) or to EXPAND a thin card (kind=expand, give card_id). Opens a want on the AGENT PLANE — held separate on the desk until the next human who looks seconds it by asking for the same thing. Call this only when your principal genuinely needs what the keeping lacks; the same miss asked twice is one want asked twice. No requester identity is stored; queries are scrubbed before storage.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| card_id | string | – | – |
| kind | string | – | – |
| note | string | – | – |
| query | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
wants_list ~52
The library's desiderata desk — open wants, sorted by demand, agent plane marked and separate. Read it to find gaps you could dig for.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| plane | string | – | – |
| state | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
witnesses ~46
Who has borne witness to a record, each signature re-verified as it is read (storage is never trusted). Reports invalid entries rather than hiding them.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| content_hash | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
word_occurrences ~39
Every verse where a Strong's word occurs (the concordance).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| strongs | string | yes | e.g. G26, H2617 |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
word_study ~40
Strong's word study — original-language definition + pronunciation + every occurrence.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| strongs | string | yes | e.g. G26, H2617 |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
What is the com.narrowhighway/concordance MCP server?
com.narrowhighway/concordance is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as com.narrowhighway/concordance. Deterministic claim verification with receipts across ~60 domains. No model in the loop. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://narrowhighway.com/mcp).
Is the com.narrowhighway/concordance MCP server safe to use?
com.narrowhighway/concordance scores 76 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the com.narrowhighway/concordance MCP server expose?
com.narrowhighway/concordance exposes 94 tools: verify, audit, search, seal_fetch, redact, and 89 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 8,030 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the com.narrowhighway/concordance MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to com.narrowhighway/concordance without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the com.narrowhighway/concordance MCP server still maintained?
com.narrowhighway/concordance is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 25 September 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.