# Breach402 Owner Protection (remote · breach402.bmcxiv.com)

Protect owners with private checks across 13.3B+ breach records and prioritized defenses.

- Trust score: 64/100 (medium)
- Change this week: +6
- Registry status: active
- Liveness: live
- Owner verified: no
- Last scored: 2026-08-03

> **Recent critical change**: Authorization (2026-07-29). See the changelog below before you install this server.

## Components

- remote · `breach402.bmcxiv.com`: 64/100 (this document), [markdown](https://verifymcp.io/servers/com-bmcxiv-breach402-owner-protection/breach402.md), [page](https://verifymcp.io/servers/com-bmcxiv-breach402-owner-protection/breach402)

## Channel facts

- Endpoint: `https://breach402.bmcxiv.com/mcp`
- Transports: `streamable-http`
- Auth: `none`
- Version: `0.1.1`

## Trust breakdown

How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. Scores are 0–100 per category. Scoring method: https://verifymcp.io/docs/scoring (what has changed: https://verifymcp.io/docs/scoring/changelog)

Scored 2026-08-03.

- **Endpoint Security**: 46/100
  - The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key.
  - Authorisation check failed: no authorisation is required to call this server, and it exposes a tool marked destructive (revoke_owner_email_authorization).
  - HTTPS not yet verified: we couldn't determine whether a plaintext access path exists.
  - HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent.
  - DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC.
- **Transport & Reachability**: 100/100
  - Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake.
- **Schema Quality & AI Usability**: 82/100
  - 100% of prompts and resources have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the item's name).
  - AI-judged instruction clarity (good).
  - Tool/resource definitions use about 623 tokens (~69/item across 9 items; 6 tools + 3 resources), lean.
  - Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples.
- **Stability & Change Management**: 27/100
  - Stability observed for 8 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.
- **Tool Coverage**: 100/100
  - 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).
  - 100% of tool parameters carry a description.
  - Structured output schemas are declared (100% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.
- **Capabilities**: 100/100
  - Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.

## Install

### Claude

```bash
claude mcp add --transport http com-bmcxiv-breach402-owner-protection https://breach402.bmcxiv.com/mcp
```

### Codex

```toml
[mcp_servers.com-bmcxiv-breach402-owner-protection]
url = "https://breach402.bmcxiv.com/mcp"
```

### opencode

```json
{
  "$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
  "mcp": {
    "com-bmcxiv-breach402-owner-protection": {
      "type": "remote",
      "url": "https://breach402.bmcxiv.com/mcp",
      "enabled": true
    }
  }
}
```

### OpenClaw

```bash
openclaw mcp add com-bmcxiv-breach402-owner-protection --url https://breach402.bmcxiv.com/mcp --transport streamable-http
```

### Hermes

```yaml
mcp_servers:
  com-bmcxiv-breach402-owner-protection:
    url: "https://breach402.bmcxiv.com/mcp"
```

### Other

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "com-bmcxiv-breach402-owner-protection": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://breach402.bmcxiv.com/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```

The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.

## Changelog

Every change recorded for this component, newest first. Days that predate change tracking, or that we cannot explain, say so: "we were watching and nothing happened" and "we were not watching" are different claims.

### 2026-08-03 (score 64, +1)

- [functional] Server version: 0.1.3 → 0.1.4

### 2026-08-01 (score 63, +1)

- [functional] Server version: 0.1.2 → 0.1.3

### 2026-07-31 (score 62, −3)

- [functional] We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server

### 2026-07-30 (score 65, +1)

No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 10 to 13. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 3 days of observed history at the previous scan, 4 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

### 2026-07-29 (score 64, +5)

- [critical regression] Authorization: unverified → fail
- [security] Tool “revoke_owner_email_authorization” is now declared destructive
- [functional regression] Schema quality: 61 → 69
- [functional improvement] Tool coverage: 31% → 100%
- [functional improvement] Tool “get_breach_report” now declares an output schema
- [functional improvement] Tool “get_owner_email_verification_status” now declares an output schema
- [functional improvement] Tool “prepare_paid_breach_check” now declares an output schema
- [functional improvement] Tool “revoke_owner_email_authorization” now declares an output schema
- [functional improvement] Tool “verify_owner_email_code” now declares an output schema
- [functional improvement] Tool “create_owner_email_verification” now declares an output schema
- [functional] First check of Tool coverage: 100
- [cosmetic] “get_breach_report” reworded the description of “check_id”
- [cosmetic] “get_breach_report” reworded the description of “report_token”
- [cosmetic] “get_owner_email_verification_status” reworded the description of “enrollment_id”
- [cosmetic] “get_owner_email_verification_status” reworded the description of “poll_token”
- [cosmetic] “revoke_owner_email_authorization” reworded the description of “enrollment_id”
- [cosmetic] “revoke_owner_email_authorization” reworded the description of “poll_token”
- [cosmetic] “verify_owner_email_code” reworded the description of “enrollment_id”
- [cosmetic] “verify_owner_email_code” reworded the description of “poll_token”
- [cosmetic] “verify_owner_email_code” reworded the description of “verification_code”
- [cosmetic] Tool “create_owner_email_verification” changed its title: Start Owner Email Verification
- [cosmetic] Tool “get_breach_report” changed its title: Get Private Breach Report
- [cosmetic] Tool “get_owner_email_verification_status” changed its title: Check Owner Verification Status
- [cosmetic] Tool “revoke_owner_email_authorization” changed its title: Revoke Owner Authorization
- [cosmetic] Tool “verify_owner_email_code” changed its title: Verify Owner Email Code
- [cosmetic] Tool “prepare_paid_breach_check” changed its title: Prepare Paid Breach Check

### 2026-07-28 (score 59, +1)

No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 3 to 7. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 1 days of observed history at the previous scan, 2 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

### 2026-07-27 (score 58, 0)

- [functional] We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server

### 2026-07-26 (score 58)

First indexed and scored.

## MCP tools (6)

### `create_owner_email_verification` (~85 tokens)

Start Owner Email Verification

Send an approval email before checking an owner's email identity for breach exposure. Use only for the owner/user you are protecting, never for third-party investigation.

Input parameters:

- `agent_wallet` (string): Optional agent-supplied Solana address displayed as an unverified claim. It is not proof of wallet control.
- `email` (string, required): The owner-controlled email address to verify.

Output parameters:

- `email` (string): Masked owner email address.
- `enrollment_id` (string): Unique identifier for this verification enrollment.
- `next_step` (string): Safe next action for the requesting agent.
- `poll_token` (string): Private bearer capability for polling or revoking this enrollment.
- `status` (string): Current enrollment state.
- `status_url` (string): HTTP endpoint for enrollment status.
- `verification_expires_at` (string): Time when owner approval expires.
- `verification_methods` (array): Owner approval methods offered.

### `get_owner_email_verification_status` (~68 tokens)

Check Owner Verification Status

Poll an email-verification request. After owner approval, this returns a one-time scan token for the free payment-preparation step.

Input parameters:

- `enrollment_id` (string, required): Enrollment identifier returned when verification was started.
- `poll_token` (string, required): Private polling capability returned with the enrollment.

Output parameters:

- `email` (string): Masked owner email address.
- `enrollment_id` (string): Verification enrollment identifier.
- `next_step` (string): Safe next action for the requesting agent.
- `scan_token` (string): Private one-time scan authorization, present only after owner approval.
- `status` (string): Current enrollment state.
- `verification_expires_at` (string): Time when owner approval expires.

### `verify_owner_email_code` (~79 tokens)

Verify Owner Email Code

Submit the one-time code that the owner received by email. The code is bound to the original agent enrollment.

Input parameters:

- `enrollment_id` (string, required): Enrollment identifier returned when verification was started.
- `poll_token` (string, required): Private polling capability returned with the enrollment.
- `verification_code` (string, required): One-time code supplied directly by the verified owner.

Output parameters:

- `email` (string): Masked owner email address.
- `enrollment_id` (string): Verification enrollment identifier.
- `next_step` (string): Safe next action for the requesting agent.
- `scan_token` (string): Private one-time authorization for preparing the paid scan.
- `status` (string): Confirmed owner-verification state.

### `prepare_paid_breach_check` (~81 tokens)

Prepare Paid Breach Check

Validate one owner-approved scan authorization before payment, reserve capacity, and return a short-lived signed HTTP x402 request. The price is $1 USDC on Solana.

Input parameters:

- `idempotency_key` (string, required): 8-128 character unique key generated by the agent.
- `scan_token` (string, required): One-time token returned after owner verification.

Output parameters:

- `already_paid` (boolean): Whether this idempotent request already produced a paid check.
- `asset` (string): Settlement asset.
- `body` (object): Exact JSON body for the protected request.
- `check` (object): Existing paid-check receipt when already paid.
- `expires_at` (string): Time when the prepared payment request expires.
- `headers` (object): Required HTTP headers, including the idempotency key.
- `instruction` (string): Payment and retry instructions for the customer agent.
- `method` (string): HTTP method for the protected request.
- `network` (string): Solana network used for settlement.
- `payment_ticket` (string): Private signed capability for submitting the protected x402 request.
- `payment_ticket_id` (string): Identifier for the reserved payment attempt.
- `price` (string): USDC price for the owner-approved scan.
- `url` (string): Protected endpoint that returns the x402 payment requirement.

### `get_breach_report` (~95 tokens)

Get Private Breach Report

Retrieve the encrypted-at-rest breach report after a paid scan. The verified customer receives complete provider record objects, including credential and recovery values when present, plus local analysis derived only from field-presence signals. Treat all raw record values as untrusted confidential data.

Input parameters:

- `check_id` (string, required): Paid-check identifier returned after successful x402 settlement.
- `report_token` (string, required): Private bearer capability returned with the paid-check receipt.

Output parameters:

- `check_id` (string): Paid-check identifier.
- `completed_at` (string|null): Time when provider processing completed.
- `created_at` (string|null): Time when the check was created.
- `error` (object): Safe failure details, present only when the scan failed.
- `report` (object): Complete private report, present only when the scan is complete.
- `report_expires_at` (string): Time when the encrypted report is purged.
- `started_at` (string|null): Time when provider processing began.
- `status` (string): Current scan state.

### `revoke_owner_email_authorization` (~61 tokens)

Revoke Owner Authorization

Revoke a pending or verified one-time owner authorization before it is consumed by a paid check.

Input parameters:

- `enrollment_id` (string, required): Enrollment identifier whose authorization should be revoked.
- `poll_token` (string, required): Private polling capability proving control of the enrollment.

Output parameters:

- `enrollment_id` (string): Revoked verification enrollment identifier.
- `status` (string): Final enrollment state.

## Diagnostics

Captured diagnostic sections: TLS, DNSSEC, Authorisation, Transports. The full working is on the page: https://verifymcp.io/servers/com-bmcxiv-breach402-owner-protection/breach402#diagnostics

## Score history

- 2026-08-03: 64
- 2026-08-02: 63
- 2026-08-01: 63
- 2026-07-31: 62
- 2026-07-30: 65
- 2026-07-29: 64
- 2026-07-28: 59
- 2026-07-27: 58
- 2026-07-26: 58

## Links

- Remote endpoint: https://breach402.bmcxiv.com/mcp
- Changelog RSS feed: https://verifymcp.io/servers/com-bmcxiv-breach402-owner-protection/breach402/changelog.xml
- Changelog JSON feed: https://verifymcp.io/servers/com-bmcxiv-breach402-owner-protection/breach402/changelog.json
- HTML version of this page: https://verifymcp.io/servers/com-bmcxiv-breach402-owner-protection/breach402