# Agentic Finance Graph (remote · agenticfinancegraph.com)

Ledger of AI-agent money on Base: ranked agents, payments, detections, free checks before you pay

- Trust score: 86/100 (high trust)
- Change this week: +3
- Registry status: active
- Liveness: live
- Owner verified: no
- Last scored: 2026-11-05

## Components

- remote · `agenticfinancegraph.com`: 86/100 (this document), [markdown](https://verifymcp.io/servers/com-agenticfinancegraph-agentic-finance-graph/agenticfinancegraph.md), [page](https://verifymcp.io/servers/com-agenticfinancegraph-agentic-finance-graph/agenticfinancegraph)

## Channel facts

- Endpoint: `https://agenticfinancegraph.com/mcp`
- Transports: `streamable-http`
- Auth: `none`
- Version: `1.7.0`

## Trust breakdown

How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. Scores are 0–100 per category. Scoring method: https://verifymcp.io/docs/scoring (what has changed: https://verifymcp.io/docs/scoring/changelog)

Scored 2026-11-05.

- **Endpoint Security**: 83/100
  - The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key.
  - No authorisation is required to call this server. Every tool declares its destructiveHint and none is destructive, so open access doesn't expose one.
  - HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path.
  - The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present.
  - DNSSEC is configured correctly; the domain's records validate against the full chain to the root.
- **Transport & Reachability**: 100/100
  - Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake.
- **Schema Quality & AI Usability**: 74/100
  - 100% of prompts and resources have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the item's name).
  - AI-judged instruction clarity (good).
  - Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 5618 tokens (~193/item across 29 items; 26 tools + 3 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params.
  - Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples.
- **Stability & Change Management**: 97/100
  - Stability observed for 29 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.
- **Tool Coverage**: 96/100
  - 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).
  - 85% of tool parameters carry a description.
  - Structured output schemas are declared (12% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.
- **Tool Safety**: 75/100
  - No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.
  - 0 of 1 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation; "pay_check" implies "pay" and declares readOnlyHint instead, contradicting what its own name says it does.
  - An AI judge read all 28 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.
- **Capabilities**: 100/100
  - Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.

## Install

### How do I install the Agentic Finance Graph MCP server?

Agentic Finance Graph is a hosted endpoint at https://agenticfinancegraph.com/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.

### Claude

```bash
claude mcp add --transport http com-agenticfinancegraph-agentic-finance-graph 'https://agenticfinancegraph.com/mcp'
```

### Cursor

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "com-agenticfinancegraph-agentic-finance-graph": {
      "url": "https://agenticfinancegraph.com/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```

### VS Code

```json
{
  "servers": {
    "com-agenticfinancegraph-agentic-finance-graph": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://agenticfinancegraph.com/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```

### Codex

```toml
[mcp_servers.com-agenticfinancegraph-agentic-finance-graph]
url = "https://agenticfinancegraph.com/mcp"
```

### opencode

```json
{
  "$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
  "mcp": {
    "com-agenticfinancegraph-agentic-finance-graph": {
      "type": "remote",
      "url": "https://agenticfinancegraph.com/mcp",
      "enabled": true
    }
  }
}
```

### OpenClaw

```bash
openclaw mcp add com-agenticfinancegraph-agentic-finance-graph --url 'https://agenticfinancegraph.com/mcp' --transport streamable-http
```

### Hermes

```yaml
mcp_servers:
  com-agenticfinancegraph-agentic-finance-graph:
    url: "https://agenticfinancegraph.com/mcp"
```

### Netclaw

```json
{
  "McpServers": {
    "com-agenticfinancegraph-agentic-finance-graph": {
      "Transport": "http",
      "Url": "https://agenticfinancegraph.com/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```

### Vellum

```bash
assistant mcp add com-agenticfinancegraph-agentic-finance-graph -t streamable-http -u 'https://agenticfinancegraph.com/mcp'
```

### Other

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "com-agenticfinancegraph-agentic-finance-graph": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://agenticfinancegraph.com/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```

The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.

## Changelog

Every change recorded for this component, newest first. Days that predate change tracking, or that we cannot explain, say so: "we were watching and nothing happened" and "we were not watching" are different claims.

### 2026-11-04 (score 86, +1)

- [security] The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads
- [functional] New tool “self_check”

### 2026-11-02 (score 85, +1)

- [security] The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads
- [security] Tool “agent_pass” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “agent_pattern” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “canary_register” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “gate_check” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [cosmetic] Tool “agent_pass” changed its title: The Agent Pass: eight checks on an agent at one moment (free, shadow) → The Agent Pass: eight checks on an agent at one moment (free, signed)
- [cosmetic] Tool “agent_pattern” changed its title: Is an agent's newest payment in character (free, shadow) → Is an agent's newest payment in character (free, advisory)
- [cosmetic] Tool “gate_check” changed its title: Can this agent pay this address, now, this much? (free, log-only) → Can this agent pay this address, now, this much? (free, advisory)

### 2026-10-31 (score 84, +1)

- [functional] Server version: 1.7.0 → 1.8.0

### 2026-10-28 (score 83, +1)

No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 67 to 70. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 20 days of observed history at the previous scan, 21 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

### 2026-10-26 (score 82, +1)

No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 60 to 63. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 18 days of observed history at the previous scan, 19 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

### 2026-10-25 (score 81, 0)

- [security] The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads
- [security] Tool “evidence_pack_quote” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “payee_facts” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [cosmetic] Tool “payee_facts” changed its title: Seven facts about an address before paying it (free) → Nine facts about an address before paying it (free)

### 2026-10-24 (score 81, +1)

- [security] Tool “evidence_pack_quote” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads

### 2026-10-23 (score 80, 0)

- [security regression] Endpoint reachability: reachable → not serving MCP
- [security regression] Authorization: partial → unverified
- [security regression] Tool safety: pass → unverified
- [security regression] Stability: 0.50 → unverified
- [security regression] Transport: pass → fail
- [functional regression] Schema quality: 100 → unverified
- [functional regression] Capabilities: pass → unverified
- [functional regression] Tool coverage: 100 → unverified
- [functional improvement] Endpoint reachability: not serving MCP → reachable

## MCP tools (26)

### `market_state` (~207 tokens)

Machine money: headline figures

The ledger's headline figures for AI-agent money, each with its value, unit, measurement time and definition id. On Base: money agents paid to others after registration (counted), daily spending by the day it was paid (last day, 7-day and 30-day averages), the part that went into positions they still hold, what left their control, the routing hops and pre-registration history excluded, how many agents are ranked (L7+ paid someone, L8 funded, L9 repeat counterparties), agent income, x402 seller inflow, treasuries, concentration, detections and the address-poisoning watch. On other chains: ERC-8004 registrations on seven chains, what registration owners paid on BNB Smart Chain, Ethereum, Arbitrum, OP Mainnet and Polygon, and Solana agent registrations and payments.

Input parameters:

- `compact` (boolean): Leave out the reading notes and the previous-sample block (figures, data quality and licence stay)

Output parameters:

- `as_of` (string)
- `chain` (string)
- `data_quality` (object)
- `days_still_scanning` (object|null)
- `figures` (object)
- `reading` (string)
- `since` (object|null)
- `source` (string)

### `find_agent` (~140 tokens)

Find an agent

Look up an ERC-8004 agent by token id on Base, slug, wallet address (0x...) or the name it declares. Returns whether it is ranked, its liveness level (L0-L9), bound wallet, stablecoin float, payment totals and open incidents. Up to 25 ids at once, separated by commas. A name is matched among ranked agents only, and a declared name is the agent's own claim, not verified.

Input parameters:

- `query` (string, required): Token id (57657), slug (8004-base-57657), wallet (0x...), a declared name, or up to 25 ids separated by commas

### `agent_record` (~67 tokens)

An agent's record

The free record of one ranked agent: rank with evidence, bindings, and its 25 newest payments with counterparties. Unranked ids return not found: an agent never seen paying has no record to sell or show.

Input parameters:

- `id` (string, required): Token id, slug or wallet address

Output parameters:

- `agent` (object): The record: rank with evidence, bindings, the 25 newest payments
- `as_of` (string|null)
- `note` (string)
- `ranked` (boolean): false when the id is not among ranked agents
- `url` (string)

### `ranked_agents` (~156 tokens)

Ranked agents

The top ranked agents (L7 and above: a bound wallet was seen paying money out of the agent's control after registration). Sorted by level first (L9, then L8, then L7), then by lifetime counted USD; sort_by changes the second key to distinct counterparties or number of payments. A high place means a large counted spender at that level, not a working service: read agent_record before relying on one. Free tier: up to 25.

Input parameters:

- `limit` (integer)
- `min_level` (integer): Only agents at or above this liveness level
- `sort_by` (string): Order within each level: lifetime counted USD (default), distinct counterparties, or number of counted payments

Output parameters:

- `agents` (array)
- `as_of` (string)
- `returned` (integer)
- `total_ranked` (integer)
- `withheld_by_tier` (integer)

### `detections` (~181 tokens)

Detections

Anomalies our detectors logged, newest first: drain-shaped payments (each with the share of the wallet's balance it took), retry storms, mint bursts, fleet-funding fan-outs (layering_fan), owner changes under a binding, delegation to unknown code. A detection is a shape with evidence, never a verdict. Filter by agent, kind, severity, time or live incidents only; compact drops the glossaries.

Input parameters:

- `agent` (string): Optional agent id (act_8453_N or token id)
- `compact` (boolean): Leave out the glossaries and tier notes
- `kind` (string)
- `limit` (integer)
- `live_only` (boolean): Only detections that are live incidents
- `severity` (string)
- `since` (string): ISO time; only detections at or after it

### `definition` (~60 tokens)

Metric definition

The frozen definition of a metric: what it counts, the method, what it excludes and what it does not claim. Use the definition ids returned by the other tools.

Input parameters:

- `id` (string, required): Definition id, e.g. pay.usd.total.v1

### `metric_history` (~88 tokens)

Metric history

The history of one measured metric from the ledger's archive (daily points, plus 5-minute points for the last 48 hours). Gaps are real gaps, never filled. An unknown key returns similar keys and the full list of archived keys.

Input parameters:

- `key` (string, required): Metric key, e.g. actors_l7_plus or observed_pay_usd_total
- `range` (string)

### `since_last` (~133 tokens)

A figure beside its previous sample

One measured figure with the stored sample it moved from: current, prior, delta, delta_ratio, both timestamps, definition id, unit, and whether the move is material under the published thresholds. window: sweep (the previous stored sample, the default), 24h, 7d or 30d. No prior sample inside the window returns gap: true and no delta; nothing is interpolated. Accepts a metric key or a definition id.

Input parameters:

- `metric_id` (string, required): Metric key (actors_l7_plus) or definition id (rank.l7plus.v1)
- `window` (string)

### `counterparty_preview` (~132 tokens)

Who paid this address (free preview)

For one receiving address on Base (or an x402 resource URL listed in the Bazaar): how many counted payments registered agents made into it, how many distinct agents and how many at L7 or above, first and last seen, and the routing hops excluded. Counts only; the payer list with levels, binding confidence and transaction hashes is the counterparty pack. An address that only received routing hops is not a payee. Without an address: the endpoints the most ranked agents pay.

Input parameters:

- `address` (string): 0x address on Base, or an x402 resource URL; omit for the top endpoints

### `agent_statement` (~147 tokens)

An agent's latest statement

The latest 3-hour statement for one ranked agent: payments out split into spend, routing hops and payments whose receipt is not read yet; what left its control; income; open flags; the hash of the previous statement; and a Merkle proof against the window's Ed25519-signed root. Check before you pay: refuse if stale, if chain_ok is false, or if flags is not empty; then call find_agent and refuse if open_incidents is above zero. A statement covers a closed 3-hour window and publishes a few hours after it closes, so it cannot show the last few hours.

Input parameters:

- `id` (string, required): Agent token id, slug or bound wallet

### `evidence_pack_quote` (~386 tokens)

Quote an evidence pack

Price and how to buy a dated evidence pack over x402 (USDC on Base, 1 to 30 cents). About one period: edition (the depth file behind a final State of Agent Money edition: every agent and every payee of the period, the edition's figures and the period's book; id = YYYY-MM, YYYY-Qn or latest; 30 cents). About one agent: precheck (the routine check before you pay or hire it: level, last payment, live incidents, statement freshness, and with payto what that address is), liveness, paygraph (where it pays), drain, incidents, peer, builders (which apps build its transactions, ERC-8021), exit (did its wallet empty out: every window in which a new payee took most of its outflow in 72 hours, with where the money went next; candidates, never verdicts), trace (where did the money go: its exits followed live up to three hops, with each hop's issuer freeze, swap out of a freezable token and Tron activity), bundle, reval (a live re-probe) or statement (its last 24 statements with proofs). About one address: counterparty (which ranked agents paid it) or venue (what the address is: label, contract or key, who pays it, poisoning look-alike or not, live 48-hour flow). This tool does not pay; an x402-capable client fetches the returned URL, receives HTTP 402 with the exact price, and retries with a signed payment.

Input parameters:

- `id` (string, required): Agent token id, slug or wallet; for counterparty and venue, the 0x address
- `kind` (string, required)
- `payto` (string): precheck only, optional: the 0x address you are about to pay

### `pay_check` (~147 tokens)

Check an agent before paying it (free)

One free call before your agent pays or hires another: its latest statement (stale, age, chain_ok, flags), live incidents, its detections in the last 72 hours, the token approvals its wallet has given (unlimited ones, and any to a plain account), its last counted payment, and its payments seen after the statement window closed (from its 25 newest payments, so the hours a statement cannot show are not blind). Returns facts and which of the documented refuse conditions are met; the decision stays with you. The paid precheck pack adds what the address you were given to pay is.

Input parameters:

- `agent` (string, required): Agent token id, slug or bound wallet

### `payer_set` (~166 tokens)

Who paid an agent, and whether its reviews come from payers (free)

The wallets observed paying one agent (income into its bound wallets, plus counted payments from other registered agents), up to 250, with payments, USD and first and last paid; and how much of its ERC-8004 feedback is payment-grounded (the reviewer paid the agent before rating it). Pass the addresses as clientAddresses to the Reputation Registry's getSummary to read only reviews from wallets that paid. Observed payers are a lower bound, and payment-grounded is not independent: a payer under the same operator grounds its own reviews.

Input parameters:

- `agent` (string, required): Base ERC-8004 token id, act_8453_N, or a ranked agent's slug or bound wallet
- `limit` (integer): How many payers to list (largest by USD first)

### `agent_stability` (~138 tokens)

How long an agent has behaved the same way (free)

The behaviour clock for one ranked agent: run_days (complete UTC days since the last break in its own payment behaviour, by a CUSUM on payments, USD, payees and new-payee share against its own history), the last break's date and feature, and its heartbeat over 30 days (scheduled, irregular, bursty or sparse, with the dispersion index and the gap CV). A break is a change, not a harm; the measured false-break rate is published in the document. Definitions stability.run_length.v1 and stability.heartbeat.v1.

Input parameters:

- `agent` (string, required): Agent token id, slug or bound wallet

### `agent_independence` (~157 tokens)

Does an agent's rank rest on demand outside its own operator set (free)

For one ranked agent: its independence score (1 if it paid, in 30 days, an address with demand from three or more operator sets; else half the best score of an agent outside its set that paid one of its payees, best path, at most three hops), the path, its L9 counterparty count under the published rule and under the cluster-aware rule, the inflation ratio between them, and the size of its operator set (same bound wallet, owner, minter or first funder, each link capped at 50). Definitions rank.independence.v1, rank.inflation.v1, cluster.ratio.v1.

Input parameters:

- `agent` (string, required): Agent token id, slug or bound wallet

### `ladder_dynamics` (~138 tokens)

How ranked agents end, and which platforms drain more than the market (free)

The whole-cohort document: cumulative incidence of the four competing exits (drained, abandoned, dormant, none) at 30, 60, 90 and 180 days with the numbers at risk and the restricted mean time without an exit (ladder.exit_incidence.v1); the Standardised Drain Ratio per minting address with 30 or more ranked agents, with 95% intervals (platform.sdr.v1); the day-to-day transition matrix between L7, L8, L9 and out (ladder.transition.v1); and the landmark re-check of the published survival figures (survival.landmark.v1).

### `verify_sum_log` (~205 tokens)

Verify our published total and our statement log (skeptical client)

Trust nothing you did not recompute. Verifies the Ed25519 signature on the current sum-log head (the Merkle-sum root over every counted payment and the total it commits to), optionally climbs one agent's proof from its leaf to the root and the whole total, reports how many of the previous head's leaves the current head declares unchanged, changed, removed and added, and verifies the statement log's signed tree head and, given the head you kept (tree_size, root_hash), the consistency proof that our statement history was not rewritten. Keep the heads it returns and pass them next time. Definitions sumlog.v1 and agent.statement.log.v1.

Input parameters:

- `agent` (string): Optional: an agent token id whose proof to climb
- `previous_head` (object): Optional: the sum-log head you kept: { leaves, root }
- `previous_statement_head` (object): Optional: the statement-log head you kept: { tree_size, root_hash }

### `self_check` (~187 tokens)

Self-check: everything the ledger holds about one agent (free)

One free call for an agent to check itself, or for the person who runs it: its record and level, the Agent Pass (holds or not, what failed, what could not be checked), the Watch's reading of its newest payment (none / notable / major with reasons), the token approvals its wallet gave in 30 days (unlimited ones with the money behind them, any to a plain account), its detections in 30 days and, at L8 and above, what a stolen key would control at one block. Ends with worth_a_look: the items a person should read, each with its source. Every part carries its measurement time and definition id. Facts, never a verdict: a clean list does not mean safe.

Input parameters:

- `agent` (string, required): Your agent's token id on Base, act_8453_N, slug or bound wallet (0x...)

### `agent_pattern` (~177 tokens)

Is an agent's newest payment in character (free, advisory)

The out-of-character score of an agent's newest counted payment against its own earlier payments (behaviour.out_of_character.v2: amount out of its distribution, a new payee at a new size, a never-paid plain key, a probe then a large payment, a look-alike address, an approval change, off its rhythm), with the reasons that fired, how many of its last 30 days of payments scored notable or major, and the market's rates. Levels are none / notable / major; a level is a pattern for a human to read, never a verdict, and nothing is blocked by us from it (advisory since 1 Nov 2026). Every figure carries its measurement time and definition id.

Input parameters:

- `agent` (string, required): Agent token id, act_8453_N, slug or bound wallet

### `payee_facts` (~263 tokens)

Nine facts about an address before paying it (free)

What the chain and our ledger say about an address an agent is about to pay (payee.facts.v2): its code kind (plain key, contract, EIP-7702 delegated) and whether the delegate matches a known sweeper or the tiny-forwarder shape; whether it forwards most of what it receives within minutes (relay shape); whether its stablecoin outflow goes to swap venues; who funds it and where it exits (7 days of Transfer logs); whether a contract exposes a claim-on-proof selector; an issuer freeze; how many registered agents pay it; and, given the paying agent and the amount, whether it is a never-paid destination at a size the agent never sent and whether it is a look-alike of an address in the agent's own history. Each fact carries value, evidence, method and measurement time; an unavailable channel is said, never guessed. Facts describe an address; they do not judge it.

Input parameters:

- `agent` (string): Optional: the paying agent (token id, slug or bound wallet), for the two per-agent facts
- `amount_usd` (number): Optional: the amount about to be paid, in USD
- `payee` (string, required): The 0x address to be paid

### `gate_check` (~358 tokens)

Can this agent pay this address, now, this much? (free, advisory)

One call before an agent pays: the payee facts, the agent's own context from our ledger (what it paid in the period, how often, whether and when it first paid this payee, how many new payees today), the out-of-character score of this payment as the agent's next, and a decision under a policy written in the AP2 mandate vocabulary (allowed_payees, amount_range, budget {max, period: daily|rolling_24h|rolling_7d}, agent_recurrence, execution_date) plus ours: new_payee {max, window_hours, max_new_per_day, step_up_ratio, step_up_days}, refuse_conditions {fact: block|warn|log|ignore} and signal {v2: {notable, major}}. Anything the evaluator does not understand fails closed. Named policies: log-only (default), balanced, recommended, recommended-v3, strict (their measured cost on 500 real agents is in the policy document). The answer is block / warn / log / allow with every reason, and is recorded (advisory since 1 Nov 2026; the default policy log-only never warns or blocks): we never block anything; your client decides, and decides its own fail mode when we are unreachable.

Input parameters:

- `agent` (string, required): The paying agent: token id, act_8453_N, slug or bound wallet
- `amount_usd` (number, required): The amount in USD
- `payee` (string, required): The 0x address to be paid
- `policy` (object): Or your own policy object in the AP2 vocabulary; unknown keys fail closed
- `policy_name` (string): A named policy (default log-only)

### `agent_pass` (~197 tokens)

The Agent Pass: eight checks on an agent at one moment (free, signed)

What the ledger measured about one registration at its last evaluation under agent.pass.v2, valid three hours: published level L7+, no open harm-kind incident, a counted payment in the last 30 days, its newest payment in character, no issuer freeze on a bound wallet, no unlimited approval to a plain key, no harm-kind incident in 90 days, and a month without a payment out of character. Answers holds or not, which checks failed, which could not be taken (listed, never written as 0), when it was checked and when it expires, with the issuer's public key. Every Pass that holds is signed with Ed25519 (since 24 Oct 2026). A Pass says what was checked and when; it never says safe, verified or trusted, and says nothing about the next three hours.

Input parameters:

- `agent` (string, required): Agent token id, act_8453_N, slug or bound wallet

### `blast_radius` (~147 tokens)

What a stolen key would control: an agent's wallets at one block (free)

For an agent (L8 or above) or one of its bound wallets: priced stablecoin and token balances and ETH in USD at one block, the EIP-7702 delegate if any with its code hash and known sweeper family, and the open ERC-20 allowances the wallet granted, confirmed on chain and capped at the balance per token (agent.blast_radius.v1). Read every six hours from free public nodes. A measurement of exposure at one block, not a prediction; unpriced tokens are listed by symbol.

Input parameters:

- `agent` (string): Agent token id, act_8453_N or slug
- `wallet` (string): Or one 0x wallet address

### `canary_register` (~381 tokens)

Register a canary (operator session required)

Register the public part of a decoy you planted: kind address|key|url|apikey|tool|x402 with exactly one target (address, url_sha256, key_sha256, tool_name or resource_path), a label, the triggers to watch (nonce, code, permit, siwe, inbound_transfer, http_hit, api_use, tool_call, x402_request) and planted_at. Needs Authorization: Bearer <Desk session>; the session's wallet is the operator. Private material is refused before validation; a bait key must be fresh (nonce 0, no code). A canary is a decoy you plant where only an intruder or a misled agent would read it: a bait key that never holds a balance (its first use is the signal), an address planted as a treasury, a URL, an API key, a tool description or a paid x402 resource. Register the PUBLIC part only (address, hash, tool name, path); we refuse anything that looks like a key, a URL or an API key in clear. We read the chain every 2 minutes (nonce, code, gas funding, inbound transfers, permits) and your own channels when you push them (canary ingest). A fire is a pattern for a human to read, written to your canary log; nothing is published about a plant. Live since 1 Nov 2026 (shadow 16 Oct - 1 Nov): at most 25 live canaries per operator; fires reach you through canary_status, not by e-mail yet.

Input parameters:

- `registration` (object, required): {canary_id (32-64 hex), kind, label, watch[], planted_at, and one of address | url_sha256 (+url_host) | key_sha256 | tool_name (+description_sha256) | resource_path (+price)}

### `canary_status` (~86 tokens)

Your canaries, their state and their fires (operator session required)

Every canary you registered, with the watcher's last reading (nonce, code, balance, checks) and the newest 20 events per canary (trigger, severity, evidence, whether you declared it a test, the reading in plain words and what to do). Needs Authorization: Bearer <Desk session>. Labels are your own text and come back in the untrusted envelope.

### `list_metrics` (~108 tokens)

List the measured metrics

Every metric the ledger measures or archives: key, unit, definition id, whether it is a headline figure, its first stored sample, and the date from which its history compares across our own changes (comparable_since). Use a filter (part of a key, a definition id or a word from its note) to get the notes too.

Input parameters:

- `filter` (string): Optional: part of a key, a definition id or a word, e.g. l8, bridge, x402

## Diagnostics

Captured diagnostic sections: TLS, DNSSEC, Authorisation, Transports. The full working is on the page: https://verifymcp.io/servers/com-agenticfinancegraph-agentic-finance-graph/agenticfinancegraph#diagnostics

## Score history

- 2026-11-05: 86
- 2026-11-04: 86
- 2026-11-03: 85
- 2026-11-02: 85
- 2026-11-01: 84
- 2026-10-31: 84
- 2026-10-30: 83
- 2026-10-29: 83
- 2026-10-28: 83
- 2026-10-27: 82
- 2026-10-26: 82
- 2026-10-25: 81
- 2026-10-24: 81
- 2026-10-23: 80
- 2026-10-22: 80
- 2026-10-21: 79
- 2026-10-20: 79
- 2026-10-19: 78
- 2026-10-18: 78
- 2026-10-17: 78
- 2026-10-16: 76
- 2026-10-15: 75
- 2026-10-14: 75
- 2026-10-13: 75
- 2026-10-12: 74
- 2026-10-10: 73
- 2026-10-07: 71

## Common questions

### What is the Agentic Finance Graph MCP server?

Agentic Finance Graph is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as com.agenticfinancegraph/agentic-finance-graph. Ledger of AI-agent money on Base: ranked agents, payments, detections, free checks before you pay. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://agenticfinancegraph.com/mcp).

### Is the Agentic Finance Graph MCP server safe to use?

Agentic Finance Graph scores 86 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.

### What tools does the Agentic Finance Graph MCP server expose?

Agentic Finance Graph exposes 26 tools: market_state, find_agent, agent_record, ranked_agents, detections, and 21 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 4,552 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.

### Does the Agentic Finance Graph MCP server require authentication?

No. We connected to Agentic Finance Graph without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.

### Is the Agentic Finance Graph MCP server still maintained?

Agentic Finance Graph is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 5 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.

## Links

- Remote endpoint: https://agenticfinancegraph.com/mcp
- Repository: https://github.com/AgenticFinanceGraph/agentic-finance-graph-mcp
- Website: https://agenticfinancegraph.com/mcp-server-connect-your-ai-to-agent-money-data
- Changelog RSS feed: https://verifymcp.io/servers/com-agenticfinancegraph-agentic-finance-graph/agenticfinancegraph.xml
- Changelog JSON feed: https://verifymcp.io/servers/com-agenticfinancegraph-agentic-finance-graph/agenticfinancegraph.json
- HTML version of this page: https://verifymcp.io/servers/com-agenticfinancegraph-agentic-finance-graph/agenticfinancegraph