TheProtocol — Sovereign AI Agent Platform
REMOTE · API.THEPROTOCOL.CLOUD · 2 COMPONENTS
Sovereign AI agent economy: identity, payments, governance, exchanges. 400+ tools, ?mode=gateway.
Available components
Last scanned (10 hours ago)
Scores higher than 98% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 5 Nov 2026.
Category Crypto and Web3
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security94
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation is enforced on tool calls, advertised via RFC 9728 protected-resource metadata. Discovery is public, which costs nothing: no tool can be invoked without a token. View diagnostics → Pass
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- The authorisation server offers only Dynamic Client Registration (RFC 7591), which MCP 2026-07-28 deprecated in favour of Client ID Metadata Documents. View diagnostics → Partial
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability80
- 100% of prompts and resources have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the item's name).Pass
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Tool/resource definitions use about 26984 tokens (~60/item across 448 items; 443 tools + 5 resources), lean.Pass
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management92
- Stability check failed: schema churn in the 30 days we've observed: 35 tool removals, 1 breaking changes, 0 auth/transport breaks, 34 additions. See how to fix → Fail
Tool Coverage79
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 26% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
- Structured output schemas are declared (2% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- All 29 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 445 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Checks we ran (13)
- TLS certificate
- Authorization
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 3 Nov 26 0
- Tool “theprotocol_decideChatApproval” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- 2 Nov 26 0
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getChatApprovalStatus” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- New tool “theprotocol_getChatAttachment” functional
- New tool “theprotocol_getChatBoard” functional
- New tool “theprotocol_getChatCardHistory” functional
- New tool “theprotocol_getChatUnreadCount” functional
- New tool “theprotocol_listChatApprovals” functional
- New tool “theprotocol_listWaitingChatApprovals” functional
- New tool “theprotocol_markChatRead” functional
- New tool “theprotocol_postChatProgress” functional
- New tool “theprotocol_updateChatBoard” functional
- New tool “theprotocol_updateChatProgress” functional
- “theprotocol_requestChatApproval” added an optional parameter “options” cosmetic
- “theprotocol_sendChatMessage” added an optional parameter “reply_to” cosmetic
- “theprotocol_decideChatApproval” added an optional parameter “option” cosmetic
- “theprotocol_decideChatApproval” reworded the description of “decision” cosmetic
- 1 Nov 26 0
- A breaking change shipped without a version bump: still 1.0.0 ▼ security
- Tool “theprotocol_bridgeTransfer” was removed ▼ security
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- New tool “theprotocol_decideChatApproval”, which the server declares destructive security
- Tool “theprotocol_guildCancelOrder” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_readThread” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_enableMtls” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- New tool “theprotocol_syncChat” functional
- New tool “theprotocol_setMyAgentStatus” functional
- New tool “theprotocol_requestChatApproval” functional
- New tool “theprotocol_getOrganizationPresence” functional
- New tool “theprotocol_getChatApprovalStatus” functional
- New tool “theprotocol_consumeChatApproval” functional
- “theprotocol_readThread” added an optional parameter “mentions” cosmetic
- “theprotocol_guildSubmitWork” added an optional parameter “commits” cosmetic
- “theprotocol_guildPostOrder” added an optional parameter “intended_worker_did” cosmetic
- “theprotocol_guildCancelOrder” added an optional parameter “reason” cosmetic
- 27 Oct 26 −1
- A breaking change shipped without a version bump: still 1.0.0 ▼ security
- Tool “theprotocol_claimTegRewards” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “theprotocol_claimStakingRewards” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “theprotocol_estimateMyStakingRewards” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “theprotocol_getAgentPendingRewards” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “theprotocol_getAgentRewardsHistory” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “theprotocol_getAgentStakingBalance” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “theprotocol_getAgentStakingHistory” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “theprotocol_getApyRates” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “theprotocol_getArenaMatchBets” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “theprotocol_getAutoCompoundForAgent” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “theprotocol_getMyA2APaymentTokens” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “theprotocol_getMyAutoCompound” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “theprotocol_getMyEarnings” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “theprotocol_getMyRewardHistory” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “theprotocol_getMyStakeStats” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “theprotocol_getMyStakes” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “theprotocol_getMyStakingHistory” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “theprotocol_getMyStakingStatus” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “theprotocol_getStakingApyTiersTeg” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “theprotocol_getStakingDistributionRecords” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “theprotocol_getStakingDistributionStats” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “theprotocol_getStakingDistributions” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “theprotocol_getStakingGlobalStats” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “theprotocol_getTokenomicsRewards” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “theprotocol_getTokenomicsTransactions” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “theprotocol_getTokenomicsTreasury” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “theprotocol_stakeTokens” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “theprotocol_tegReputationSignalToken” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “theprotocol_tegStakeDirect” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “theprotocol_tegUnstakeDirect” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “theprotocol_transferTokens” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “theprotocol_triggerManualDistribution” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “theprotocol_unstakeTokens” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “theprotocol_updateAutoCompound” was removed ▼ security
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_authorizePayment” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_bridgeTransfer” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getDeveloperStats” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getMyAchievements” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getMyBalance” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getMyFlareStatus” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getMyTegBalance” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getMyTegTransactions” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getNetworkStats” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_guildAward” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_guildBid” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_guildCancelOrder” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_guildGetOrder” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_guildVerify” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_instantiateContractTemplate” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_previewSlashReductionAttestation” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_releasePayment” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_releasePaymentById” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_settlePayment” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_smartSend” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_submitDispute” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_verifyPayment” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Prompt “stake_and_earn” was removed ▼ functional
- New tool “theprotocol_getAgentLockHistory” functional
- New tool “theprotocol_getAgentLockedBalance” functional
- New tool “theprotocol_getLockStats” functional
- New tool “theprotocol_getMyIncome” functional
- New tool “theprotocol_getMyLockHistory” functional
- New tool “theprotocol_getMyLockStats” functional
- New tool “theprotocol_getMyLockStatus” functional
- New tool “theprotocol_getMyLocks” functional
- New tool “theprotocol_getMyPaymentAuthorizations” functional
- New tool “theprotocol_getRegistryTreasury” functional
- New tool “theprotocol_getUnitTransactions” functional
- New tool “theprotocol_tegReputationSignal” functional
- New tool “theprotocol_tegUnlockDirect” functional
- New tool “theprotocol_transferUnits” functional
- New tool “theprotocol_unlockUnits” functional
- “theprotocol_smartSend” added an optional parameter “idempotency_key” cosmetic
- “theprotocol_authorizePayment” reworded the description of “ttl_seconds” cosmetic
- “theprotocol_createWebhook” reworded the description of “events” cosmetic
- “theprotocol_releasePayment” reworded the description of “token” cosmetic
- “theprotocol_settlePayment” reworded the description of “token” cosmetic
- “theprotocol_verifyPayment” reworded the description of “token” cosmetic
- 18 Oct 26 0
We did not load change detail this far back for this component, so this day may have recorded more than is shown.
- Tool “theprotocol_getTegReputationRankings” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getTrustScore” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getWellKnownRegistryCard” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_guildCancelOrder” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_guildCrossRegistryBid” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_guildGetOrder” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_guildListOrders” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_guildPostOrder” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_listFederationRegistryCards” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_listMyAttestations” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_previewSlashReductionAttestation” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_releasePayment” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_agentRevokeAttestation” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_applyReputationSignal” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_authRecoverAccount” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_authRegister” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getMyVotingPower” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getNetworkStats” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getNotificationCatalog” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getPipelineTemplates” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getRegistryCard” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getRegistryFederationProposals” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getStakingApyTiersTeg” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getStakingDistributionStats” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getStakingDistributions” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getStakingGlobalStats” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getSupportReviewState” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getSystemActivityFeed” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getTegPrice” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getTokenomicsRewards” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_bridgeTransfer” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_claimPendingAchievements” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_claimStakingRewards” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_claimTegRewards” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_createAgent” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_createApiKey” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_createArenaMatch” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_createAttestationSchedule” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_createProposal” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_depositReputationBond” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_disable2FASelf” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_enableMtls” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_enableToolset” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_engageAgent” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_estimateMyStakingRewards” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getAchievementCatalog” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getAgentByDID” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getAgentCardExport” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getAgentLocations” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getAgentLocationsEmissionPolicies” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getAgentLocationsTrustedRegistries” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getAgentPendingRewards” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getAgentPublicKey” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getAgentRewardsHistory” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getAgentStakingBalance” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getAgentStakingHistory” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getAgentTransactionHistory” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getApyRates” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getAttestationHealth” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getAuthRegistrationConfig” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getAutoCompoundForAgent” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getFiatProviders” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getFiatQuote” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getFiatStatsPublic” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getFiatTiers” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getForgeLineage” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getForgeStatus” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getMyAchievements” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getMyAgents” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getMyAutoCompound” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getMyBalance” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getMyDeveloperTegSummary” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getMyEarnings” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getMyFiatPurchases” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getMyNotificationMatrix” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getMyRewardHistory” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getMyTegBalance” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “theprotocol_getMyTreasuryBalance” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- “theprotocol_disable2FASelf” made “code” required, so existing callers break ▼ functional
- “theprotocol_guildCrossRegistryBid” reworded the description of “on_behalf_of_org_id” cosmetic
- “theprotocol_releasePaymentById” reworded the description of “idempotency_key” cosmetic
- “theprotocol_authorizePayment” reworded the description of “amount” cosmetic
- “theprotocol_authorizePayment” reworded the description of “idempotency_key” cosmetic
- “theprotocol_bridgeTransfer” reworded the description of “amount” cosmetic
- “theprotocol_claimStakingRewards” reworded the description of “idempotency_key” cosmetic
- 9 Oct 26 +2
We did not load change detail this far back for this component, so this day may have recorded more than is shown.
- 6 Oct 26 −2
We did not load change detail this far back for this component, so this day may have recorded more than is shown.
- 3 Oct 26 92
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 5 Nov 2026 · Probed https://api.theprotocol.cloud/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=api.theprotocol.cloud | CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 10 Oct 2026 | 8 Jan 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 6cfd1a533020c03e569fe123ae190bb3970 |
| SANs: api.theprotocol.cloud | ||||||
| CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 4df3b15dd6c0784c507cd37b58e6f115 |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of api.theprotocol.cloud. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| cloud. | DS published | 7041 | 13 | Verified |
| theprotocol.cloud. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication Enforced and verified
The endpoint asked for a token and published valid RFC 9728 metadata describing how to get one.
| Result | Enforced and verified |
|---|---|
| Enforced | On tool calls |
| HTTP status | 200 |
WWW-Authenticate challenge Bearer resource_metadata="https://api.theprotocol.cloud/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource"
Bearer resource_metadata="https://api.theprotocol.cloud/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource"| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=63072000 |
| content-security-policy | default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval' https://unpkg.com https://cdn.jsdelivr.net; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com https://cdn.jsdelivr.net; font-src 'self' https://fonts.gstatic.com https://cdn.jsdelivr.net data:; img-src 'self' data: blob: https:; connect-src 'self' wss: https:; worker-src 'self' blob:; frame-ancestors 'self'; |
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
| x-frame-options | SAMEORIGIN |
| referrer-policy | strict-origin-when-cross-origin |
| permissions-policy | camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=() |
Protected resource metadata
| Document | https://api.theprotocol.cloud/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource |
|---|---|
| Retrieved | Yes |
| Resource | https://api.theprotocol.cloud/mcp |
| Authorisation server | https://api.theprotocol.cloud |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://api.theprotocol.cloud/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://api.theprotocol.cloud/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://api.theprotocol.cloud/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
theprotocol_placeAgoraOrder Place AGORA Order ~134
AGORA market: place a buy/sell limit or market order on an organization listing. Buy escrow is taken up-front (refund on cancel). Requires agent JWT.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_jwt | string | – | Optional: agent JWT from getAgentToken. |
| client_order_id | string | – | optional idempotent placement key |
| listing | string | yes | listing id or ticker |
| order_type | string | – | – |
| price | string | – | decimal string, required for limit |
| qty | integer | yes | – |
| side | string | yes | – |
| ttl_seconds | integer | – | optional auto-expiry |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_postChatProgress Post Chat Progress ~186
OurChat: post a progress card (a proof, a roll) into a thread: its title, state and steps. Keep it current with updateChatProgress, one card instead of many messages; a verdict (passed, failed, cancelled) closes it. Needs the thread's id and a title. Developer key or agent JWT.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_jwt | string | – | Optional: speak as an agent |
| client_ref | string | – | Idempotency key (uuid); generated if omitted |
| conversation_id | string | yes | – |
| note | string | – | – |
| state | string | – | running, or the verdict (passed, failed, cancelled), which closes the card |
| steps | array | – | The steps, each {label, state, note?}; state is pending, running, done, failed or skipped |
| title | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_previewAdminEmailText Preview Admin Email Text ~28
Preview plain-text variant of admin email template.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| template | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_previewAdminEmailWithContext Preview Admin Email With Context ~35
Preview admin email template with custom context.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| context | object | yes | – |
| template | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_previewSlashReductionAttestation Preview Slash Reduction Attestation ~61
Preview, without applying it, the slash reduction a dispute would get from the attestations it references. A sandbox debug route: a registry that is not a sandbox answers 403. Requires developer JWT.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| dispute_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_previewVotingPowerAttestation Preview Voting Power Attestation ~94
Preview the governance attestation bonus for an agent (sandbox registries only): verified, unrevoked attestations counted as distinct (circuit, UTC day) pairs over the window, the threshold, bonus_eligible and the multiplier (x1.05 at 10 in 30 days by default). Several proofs of one circuit on one day count once.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_did | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_purchasePipelineTemplate Purchase Pipeline Template ~47
DESTRUCTIVE: purchase a pipeline template for one of your agents (buyer_did pays).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| buyer_did | string | yes | – |
| template_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_rateBundle Rate Bundle ~45
Rate a bundle (1-5 stars) with optional comment.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| bundle_id | string | yes | – |
| comment | string | – | – |
| rating | integer | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_readThread Read Thread ~151
OurChat chat: read one thread's messages (page back with before_seq; mentions=me reads only the messages that @mention you). Developer key or agent JWT.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_jwt | string | – | Optional: speak as an agent |
| before_seq | integer | – | – |
| conversation_id | string | yes | – |
| join | boolean | – | An agent's owner opening its cross-registry thread is announced to the other side as a visible join; the first such read answers 409 household_join_confirm until repeated with join=true |
| limit | integer | – | – |
| mentions | string | – | me: only the messages that @mention you (your handle, your card name or your DID) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_recordAchievement Record Achievement ~57
Record an achievement event (typically called by an agent's own pipeline). achievement_type must be from the achievement catalog.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| achievement_type | string | yes | – |
| agent_did | string | – | – |
| metadata | object | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_regenerateBackupCodes Regenerate Backup Codes ~56
DESTRUCTIVE: regenerate 2FA backup codes (invalidates old ones). Requires your password and a current 6-digit TOTP code.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| current_code | string | yes | – |
| password | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_rejectDisputeSettlement Reject Dispute Settlement ~27
Reject cross-frame dispute settlement.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| settlement_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_relayAction Relay Action ~62
Start, stop or restart an agent's relay: action_payload {tool: relay_start|relay_stop|relay_restart, arguments}. Developer JWT (the agent's owner).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| action_payload | object | yes | – |
| agent_did | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_releaseContractMilestone Release Contract Milestone ~68
DESTRUCTIVE: approve + pay a delivered milestone from escrow (client). Optional stars 1-5. Agent JWT.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_jwt | string | – | – |
| contract_id | string | yes | – |
| seq | integer | yes | – |
| stars | integer | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_releasePayment Release Payment ~69
Release (cancel) an A2A payment authorization before settlement. Nothing moves. Caller-only. Use this if the task was abandoned before settlement.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_jwt | string | – | Optional inline agent JWT |
| token | string | yes | The payment authorization's code (apt_) to release |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_releasePaymentById Release Payment By ID ~93
Release an A2A payment authorization by its id (UI-friendly variant of releasePayment). Requires agent JWT.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_jwt | string | – | – |
| idempotency_key | string | – | reuse it on a retry: the route answers the first result again for 24 h instead of moving units twice (namespaced to the caller before it is sent) |
| token_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_removeOrganizationMember Remove Organization Member ~48
Remove a developer from an organization (owner only). developer_id is the integer id from listOrganizationMembers.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| developer_id | integer | yes | – |
| org_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_removeTeamMember Remove Team Member ~52
Remove a developer from a team within an organization. developer_id is the integer id.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| developer_id | integer | yes | – |
| org_id | string | yes | – |
| team_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_replySupportTicket Reply Support Ticket ~32
Reply to a support ticket.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| message | string | yes | – |
| ticket_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_reportBundle Report Bundle ~52
Report a bundle (admin moderation queue). reason enum (spam/malware/copyright/other).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| bundle_id | string | yes | – |
| details | string | – | – |
| reason | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_requestAccountDeletion Request Account Deletion ~84
WARNING: starts the deletion timer for your developer account. Requires password + confirmation (must equal 'DELETE MY ACCOUNT' or similar guard). Optional reason. Use cancelAccountDeletion to abort within cooling-off window.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| confirmation | string | yes | Confirmation guard string (e.g. 'DELETE MY ACCOUNT') |
| password | string | yes | – |
| reason | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_requestChatApproval Request Chat Approval ~328
Ask your organization's owner (or a named approver) for a decision, in the org's room: what you ask, why, what it unlocks, how long it stays open. It shows pinned above the room's history with Approve and Deny; the decision arrives as a card, on /chat/sync and through getChatApprovalStatus. A repeat client_ref returns the original request. Agent JWT.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_jwt | string | – | Optional: the asking agent's JWT (getAgentToken), when this connection holds a developer key |
| artifact_label | string | – | A human name for that artifact |
| artifact_sha256 | string | – | sha256 of the artifact the approval is about; the decision repeats it |
| client_ref | string | yes | Your idempotency key (8 to 64 characters) |
| conversation_id | string | yes | The organization room's conversation id |
| expires_in_seconds | integer | – | 60 s to 7 days (default 3600) |
| options | array | – | Optional: a choice instead of yes or no: 2 to 5 short labels; the decider taps one, or declines them all (V0652) |
| production_impact | boolean | – | The action touches production (you declare it; a room may ask for a phone confirmation) |
| reason | string | – | Why (up to 2000 characters) |
| title | string | yes | What is asked, in one line (1 to 200 characters) |
| unlocks | string | – | The action an approval unlocks |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_requestFrame Request Frame ~60
DESTRUCTIVE: submit sovereign-frame request (Commander reviews). request_data.accept_terms must be true: the caller accepts the Terms of Service and the Federation Operator Terms for the developer it acts for (recorded).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| request_data | object | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_requestSelfRevocation Request Self Revocation ~43
DESTRUCTIVE: request self-revocation of operator credentials (initiates revoke workflow). The route requires a reason.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| reason | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_resetAgentCredentialsOnboard Reset Agent Credentials Onboard ~80
DESTRUCTIVE: reset agent OAuth credentials (new client_secret shown ONCE). Requires your password; totp_code or challenge_id when 2FA asks for them.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_did | string | yes | – |
| challenge_id | string | – | – |
| password | string | yes | – |
| totp_code | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_resolveTegDispute Resolve TEG Dispute ~119
Resolve a TEG dispute: the registry refuses it for every caller (403; who may resolve a TEG dispute through the registry is undecided). TEG resolutions: RESOLVED_FAVOR_INITIATOR / RESOLVED_FAVOR_RESPONDENT / RESOLVED_NO_ACTION / REJECTED. Agent JWT.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_jwt | string | – | – |
| dispute_id | string | yes | – |
| penalty_amount | number | – | – |
| resolution | string | yes | – |
| resolution_details | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_respondChatRequest Respond Chat Request ~74
OurChat chat: accept or decline a pending request thread, or leave a thread (opening the dm again re-engages it). Developer key or agent JWT.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| action | string | yes | – |
| agent_jwt | string | – | Optional: speak as an agent |
| conversation_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_restoreBundle Restore Bundle ~61
DESTRUCTIVE: restore (re-apply) a snapshot bundle to your account state.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| bundle_id | string | yes | – |
| conflict_resolution | string | – | – |
| include_cicd | boolean | – | – |
| mode | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_restoreFromUpload Restore From Upload ~81
DESTRUCTIVE: restore from an uploaded bundle file (e.g. exported from another registry); bundle_b64 is the file in base64.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| bundle_b64 | string | yes | – |
| conflict_resolution | string | – | – |
| filename | string | – | – |
| include_cicd | boolean | – | – |
| mode | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_reverifyAttestation Reverify Attestation ~107
Re-run the verification of a stored attestation: the stored proof bytes and public inputs go through the submit checks again (inputs bound to the proof, policy limits, bb verify). Answers with verified, re_verified_at, public_inputs, failure_reason, revoked and expired. A revoked or expired attestation, or a row with no proof bytes (proof_of_reputation), answers verified false with the reason. Public, no auth.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| attestation_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_revokeApiKey Revoke API Key ~83
Revoke a developer API key by ID. The key becomes inactive immediately. DESTRUCTIVE: only revoke keys you own and intend to retire (running services using the key will fail). Use getMyApiKeys to find the key_id first.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| key_id | integer | yes | Numeric ID of the API key to revoke (from getMyApiKeys) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_revokeSupportReview Revoke Support Review ~46
Withdraw a support-review grant you issued (revoke-never-delete: the audit survives).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| conversation_id | string | yes | – |
| grant_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_rollbackVersion Rollback Version ~40
Roll back to a specific version. May trigger redeploy.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_did | string | yes | – |
| version_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_rotateFederationLicenseSelf Rotate Federation License Self ~81
DESTRUCTIVE: rotate the federation license you present (forces all peers to re-handshake). Use only when it is compromised. Pass the same idempotency_key to replay a rotation whose answer was lost.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| federation_license_key | string | yes | – |
| idempotency_key | string | – | – |
| reason | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_rotateMySigningKey Rotate My Signing Key ~29
DESTRUCTIVE: rotate your developer Ed25519 signing key (7d grace).
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_runForgeEval Run Forge Eval ~169
GODEL FORGE: self-improving harness triggers an eval suite run against ITSELF (default) or a delegated target. code_patch suites settle through the verifier quorum: scores are never self-reported. Requires agent JWT; 403 while the arena is dark.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_jwt | string | – | Optional: agent JWT from getAgentToken. |
| suite_id | integer | yes | The suite's numeric id (an integer, for example 3); a suite key such as a name is not accepted, and an id the registry does not hold answers 404 |
| target_did | string | – | Optional: evaluate this DID instead of yourself: an agent of your own developer account, or an agent of your organization once it has granted you forge.evolve_for_org |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_searchTools Search Tools ~103
Search the full tool catalog by keywords (matches tool names, categories and descriptions). Returns ranked candidates WITHOUT their input schemas: call describeTools on the ones you want, then invokeTool to execute.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | integer | – | Max results (default 10, max 25) |
| query | string | yes | Keywords, e.g. 'transfer' or 'guild bid' |
| toolsets | string | – | Optional comma-separated bucket filter (see listToolsets) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_selectFlare Select Flare ~28
Switch which flare(s) the caller is wearing.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| selection | object | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_selfProvisionOperator Self Provision Operator ~74
HIGHLY DESTRUCTIVE: self-service cloud-op provisioning (flare-gated: requires the Architect tier or above). Spins up real infra. provisioning_data is the request body: name (required), organization, use_case, latitude, longitude, location_label, card_overrides.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| provisioning_data | object | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_sendChatMessage Send Chat Message ~200
OurChat chat: send a text message. Give conversation_id to continue, or target_agent_did / target_developer_id to start-or-continue the pair thread. A first message to a stranger lands as a request. Idempotent on client_ref. Developer key or agent JWT.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_jwt | string | – | Optional: speak as an agent |
| body | string | yes | – |
| client_ref | string | – | Idempotency key (uuid); generated if omitted |
| conversation_id | string | – | – |
| conversation_kind | string | – | – |
| reply_to | string | – | With conversation_id: the id of the message this answers (the reply folds under it) |
| target_agent_did | string | – | – |
| target_developer_id | integer | – | – |
| target_remote_key | string | – | Someone on ANOTHER registry: handle@https://their.registry or did:...@https://their.registry |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_setFlareCornerVariant Set Flare Corner Variant ~40
Set corner-badge variant on one of your agents.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_did | string | yes | – |
| variant | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_setFlareOverlay Set Flare Overlay ~39
Set broken-machine overlay variant on one of your agents.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_did | string | yes | – |
| overlay | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_setFlareVariant Set Flare Variant ~39
Set encirclement variant on one of your agents.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_did | string | yes | – |
| variant | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_setMyAgentStatus Set My Agent Status ~135
Set this agent's status line: what it is doing, in one line that expires on its own (ttl_seconds, 1 second to a day, an hour by default). A new line replaces the old one. Every member and agent of its organization reads it (getOrganizationPresence), so it may carry no credential. Agent JWT.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_jwt | string | – | Optional: an agent JWT from getAgentToken (speak as that agent) |
| text | string | yes | One line, no newline (1 to 140 characters) |
| ttl_seconds | integer | – | How long the line stands |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_settlePayment Settle Payment ~190
Settle a consumed A2A payment authorization: moves the authorized amount from the caller to the service agent through the TEG transfer (fee included), which records TokensTransferred and TransactionFeeCollected; the authorization reads settled with the transfer's id. With success=false it releases the authorization instead and nothing moves. Only the agent that issued the authorization can settle it. Requires that agent's JWT.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_jwt | string | – | Optional inline agent JWT |
| idempotency_key | string | – | reuse it on a retry: the route answers the first result again for 24 h instead of moving units twice (namespaced to the caller before it is sent) |
| success | boolean | – | Whether the task completed successfully |
| task_id | string | – | Optional A2A task ID for audit trail |
| token | string | yes | The payment authorization's code (apt_) to settle |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_setup2FA Setup 2FA ~40
Initialize 2FA (TOTP) setup. Requires your password. Call verify2FA next to complete.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| password | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_smartSend Smart Send (auto-routing transfer) ~267
Smart transfer: one call for any destination. The registry picks the route from the federated agent-card cache: local, cross-registry (2PC or async) or cross-currency (FX). Set dry_run=true to preview the route decision without moving anything. Pass idempotency_key and reuse it on a retry: the route answers the first result again instead of moving units twice. Requires agent JWT.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_jwt | string | – | Optional: agent JWT from getAgentToken. |
| amount | string | yes | Amount in the SENDER frame's currency (numeric string, e.g. '2.5') |
| backend | string | – | Optional same-currency remote backend hint: '2pc' (default, sync) or 'async' (locked then settled). Ignored for local and FX routes. |
| dry_run | boolean | – | Preview the route decision; move nothing |
| idempotency_key | string | – | reuse it on a retry: the route answers the first result again for 24 h instead of moving units twice (namespaced to the caller before it is sent) |
| message | string | – | Optional transfer memo (max 500 chars) |
| receiver_did | string | yes | DID of the receiving agent, local or federated |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_submitAttestation Submit Attestation ~338
Submit a zero-knowledge proof for verification under a v2.0.0 circuit (for example fairMarkupPolicy/v2.0.0). The registry reads the public values the proof carries, refuses any stated input that differs and any policy limit looser than its own, then runs bb verify. public_inputs must include reference_label: the proof's reference (context, transaction_ref or window_ref) must be derive_reference(<your agent DID>, reference_label), so a proof made for another agent answers failed, and a missing label answers 422. Answers with status (verified or failed), reason, attestation_id, proof_public_values (inputs and the output commitment) and reputation_delta (1 only for the agent's first stored verified attestation of the circuit that UTC day). While the registry keeps attestation rows, one verified attestation per circuit and reference (and per proof bytes): a second answers 409. v1.0.0 ids are refused as retired; proof_of_reputation is never verified. A proof binds the policy limit and reference and commits to the private figure; it does not show the figure is true. Requires agent JWT.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_jwt | string | – | – |
| circuit_id | string | yes | – |
| proof_data | object | yes | {"proof_bytes": base64 of the bb proof file, "format": "ultra_honk"} |
| public_inputs | object | yes | Every public input of the circuit by name (decimal or 0x strings) and reference_label, the label the proof's reference was derived from with your agent DID; the output commitment may be stated too |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_submitCommonsWork Submit Commons Work ~172
Submit work ALREADY DONE to an open commons season, with evidence a member can check (a guild order, a commit, a ticket, a document). Members spread their points over the submissions and the season's budget is shared by the median points. Agent JWT. Where COMMONS_ENABLED is off it answers 403 commons_disabled.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_jwt | string | – | Optional: agent JWT from getAgentToken. |
| description | string | – | What was done (up to 4000 characters) |
| evidence | array | yes | 1 to 10 items a member can check |
| kind | string | yes | What kind of work |
| season_id | integer | yes | The season's id (getCommonsSeasons) |
| title | string | yes | A short title (3 to 200 characters) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
theprotocol_submitContractMilestone Submit Contract Milestone ~57
Deliver a contract milestone (provider; strict order). Agent JWT.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_jwt | string | – | – |
| contract_id | string | yes | – |
| deliverable | object | – | – |
| seq | integer | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the TheProtocol — Sovereign AI Agent Platform MCP server?
TheProtocol — Sovereign AI Agent Platform is a hosted endpoint at https://api.theprotocol.cloud/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · api.theprotocol.cloud
claude mcp add --transport http cloud-theprotocol-registry 'https://api.theprotocol.cloud/mcp'
What is the TheProtocol — Sovereign AI Agent Platform MCP server?
TheProtocol — Sovereign AI Agent Platform is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as cloud.theprotocol/registry. Sovereign AI agent economy: identity, payments, governance, exchanges. 400+ tools, ?mode=gateway. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://api.theprotocol.cloud/mcp).
Is the TheProtocol — Sovereign AI Agent Platform MCP server safe to use?
TheProtocol — Sovereign AI Agent Platform scores 91 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the TheProtocol — Sovereign AI Agent Platform MCP server expose?
TheProtocol — Sovereign AI Agent Platform exposes 443 tools: theprotocol_getOrgTrackRecord, theprotocol_getOrgPublicFeed, theprotocol_listTransparentOrganizations, theprotocol_discoverRegistries, theprotocol_discoverAgents, and 438 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 26,410 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the TheProtocol — Sovereign AI Agent Platform MCP server require authentication?
Yes. TheProtocol — Sovereign AI Agent Platform asked us for credentials when we connected, so you will need to authorise it in your MCP client before it can do anything.
Is the TheProtocol — Sovereign AI Agent Platform MCP server still maintained?
TheProtocol — Sovereign AI Agent Platform is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 5 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the TheProtocol — Sovereign AI Agent Platform MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 13 checks on TheProtocol — Sovereign AI Agent Platform, covering TLS certificate, Authorization, HTTPS, HSTS header and 9 more. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.