Project Sairen - Agentic Execution Node
REMOTE · SAIREN.OMNIAPPS.CA
Zero-UI machine execution node & microservices for AI agents.
Available components
Last scanned (12 minutes ago)
Scores higher than 53% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 5 Nov 2026.
Category Developer Tools
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security57
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 64 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Schema Quality & AI Usability59
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 11274 tokens (~176/item across 64 items; 64 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage71
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 0% of tool parameters carry a description.Fail
- Structured output schemas are declared (34% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 64 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 65 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 5 Nov 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 4 Nov 26 0
- Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
- 27 Oct 26 +1
- Stability: fail → pass ▲ security
- 21 Oct 26 −1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 97 to 94.
- 20 Oct 26 0
- Stability: pass → fail ▼ security
- 19 Oct 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 18 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 93 to 97. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 28 days of observed history at the previous scan, 29 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 16 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 87 to 90. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 26 days of observed history at the previous scan, 27 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 5 Nov 2026 · Probed https://sairen.omniapps.ca/sse
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=omniapps.ca | CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 16 Sept 2026 | 15 Dec 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 66a330a623ff50593cce6bf5f0599547927 |
| SANs: *.omniapps.ca, omniapps.ca | ||||||
| CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 4df3b15dd6c0784c507cd37b58e6f115 |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of sairen.omniapps.ca. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| ca. | present | 26384 | 13 | Verified |
| omniapps.ca. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| sse | https://sairen.omniapps.ca/sse | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://sairen.omniapps.ca/sse | HTTPS enforced | 308 | https://sairen.omniapps.ca/sse |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
scratchpad_lock ~224
[Cost: $0.0005 USDC on Base & Solana] Acquires an advisory distributed mutex lock to prevent multi-agent race conditions. Returns {'acquired': true, ...} on success, or {'acquired': false, 'error': ...} if held by another agent. Locks automatically expire after ttl_seconds (default 60s, max 600s) to prevent permanent deadlocks if the holder terminates. Args: lock_name: Unique resource identifier to lock (e.g., 'arbitrage/pool-weth-usdc'). owner_id: Identifier of the agent claiming the lock (e.g., 'agent-worker-1'). ttl_seconds: Maximum duration in seconds to hold lock before auto-release (default: 60, max: 600). payment_signature: Optional x402 Base USDC transaction hash or developer mock key.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| lock_name | string | yes | – |
| owner_id | string | yes | – |
| payment_signature | string | – | – |
| ttl_seconds | integer | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
scratchpad_set ~228
[Cost: $0.0005 USDC on Base & Solana] Writes an ephemeral state key or JSON payload to the shared agent blackboard with automatic TTL expiration. Supports hierarchical namespace paths (e.g. 'swarm/task-1/data') and optional write-keys to prevent unauthorized overwrites. Ideal for multi-agent workflows passing intermediate state without spinning up dedicated databases. Args: key: State key or namespace path (e.g., 'research/summary_01'). value: Any data payload (string, number, list, or JSON dict). ttl_seconds: Time to live in seconds before automatic deletion (default: 3600, max: 604800). write_key: Optional secret passphrase to protect the key from being overwritten or deleted by other agents. payment_signature: Optional x402 Base USDC transaction hash or developer mock key.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| key | string | yes | – |
| payment_signature | string | – | – |
| ttl_seconds | integer | – | – |
| value | – | yes | – |
| write_key | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
scratchpad_unlock ~111
[Free / $0.0000 USDC] Releases an acquired distributed mutex lock immediately. Verifies owner_id identity so third-party agents cannot release active locks held by others. Releasing locks cleanly unblocks queued agents without waiting for TTL lease expiration. Args: lock_name: Resource identifier of the lock to release. owner_id: Identifier of the agent that currently holds the lock.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| lock_name | string | yes | – |
| owner_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
search_tools ~162
[Free / Zero Auth] Progressive Tool Discovery: search Sairen's capabilities and retrieve domain SSE endpoints. Keywords: search tools, discover tools, tool catalog, progressive discovery, capability lookup, find tools. Enables autonomous agents to discover relevant microservice tools on demand with minimal prompt token consumption. Args: query: Natural language capability search term (e.g. 'solana dex price', 'json repair', 'canary tokens', 'dns'). domain: Optional domain filter ('defi', 'security', 'agentops', 'resilience'). limit: Maximum matching tools to return (default: 5).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| domain | string | – | – |
| limit | integer | – | – |
| query | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
search_web ~139
[Cost: $0.0015 USDC on Base & Solana] Zero-browser web search and SERP discovery. Returns ranked results, clean canonical URLs, and snippets without requiring human API keys. Args: query: Target search query string (e.g. 'ethereum base l2 transaction fees'). max_results: Maximum SERP results to return (1-20, default: 5). payment_signature: Optional x402 Base/Solana USDC transaction hash (defaults to developer mock key).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| max_results | integer | – | – |
| payment_signature | string | – | – |
| query | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
simulate_transaction_oracle ~205
[Cost: $0.0010 USDC on Base & Solana] Pre-flight EVM transaction simulator & revert decoder. Detects if contract calls succeed or revert, decodes exact Solidity error reasons, and estimates gas costs before broadcasting. Actions & Parameters: - 'simulate': Full call execution. Params: {"to": "0x...", "from": "0x...", "data": "0x...", "value": 0, "chain": "base"|"ethereum"|"arbitrum"|"polygon"} - 'estimate_gas': Gas estimation. Params: {"to": "0x...", "data": "0x...", "chain": "base"} - 'decode_revert': Offline hex decoder. Params: {"hex_data": "0x08c379a0..."} [Free]
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| action | string | – | – |
| params | – | – | – |
| payment_signature | string | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
submit_rfp_bid ~223
[Cost: $0.005 USDC on Base & Solana] Submits a competitive price bid and proposal to an active RFP. Provider agents compete to fulfill work. Bids are automatically ranked by price ascending. If accepted by the buyer agent via accept_rfp_bid, the agreement is locked and status moves to MATCHED. Args: rfp_id: Target RFP ID to bid on. bidder_id: EVM wallet or identifier of the bidding supplier agent. bid_price_usd: Proposed execution price in USD. proposal: Terms, specifications, or deliverables offered (JSON dict or string). eta_seconds: Estimated completion time in seconds (default: 60). payment_signature: Optional x402 Base USDC transaction hash or developer mock key.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| bid_price_usd | number | yes | – |
| bidder_id | string | yes | – |
| eta_seconds | integer | – | – |
| payment_signature | string | – | – |
| proposal | – | – | – |
| rfp_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
submit_task_proof ~143
[Cost: $0.01 USDC on Base & Solana] Submits and cryptographically attests proof of task completion. Generates an immutable timestamped attestation record proving deliverables were fulfilled. Args: escrow_id: Target escrow ID. worker_id: Assigned worker ID. proof_data: Raw result payload, SHA-256 hash of deliverables, or verification URL. payment_signature: Optional x402 Base USDC transaction hash or developer mock key.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| escrow_id | string | yes | – |
| payment_signature | string | – | – |
| proof_data | string | yes | – |
| worker_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
throttle_check ~218
[Cost: $0.0002 USDC on Base & Solana] Sliding-window rate limiter and token bucket manager for multi-agent swarms. Coordinates shared API limits across autonomous agents (e.g. GitHub, CoinGecko, OpenAI RPM). Returns allowed status, remaining quota, and optimal jittered backoff delay (retry_after_ms) when throttled. Args: key: Namespace identifier for the shared API or resource (e.g. 'github_api', 'coingecko_free'). limit: Maximum requests allowed in the sliding window (default: 10). window_seconds: Duration of the sliding window in seconds (default: 60). cost: Number of tokens to acquire (default: 1). payment_signature: Optional x402 Base/Solana USDC payment transaction hash or authorized key.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| cost | integer | – | – |
| key | string | yes | – |
| limit | integer | – | – |
| payment_signature | string | – | – |
| window_seconds | integer | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
trim_llm_context ~194
[Free Promotional Preview / Zero Auth] Compresses and prunes LLM message history to strictly fit within a target token budget. Deduplicates repetitive tool outputs, condenses bulky historical payloads, and prunes older turns while preserving system instructions and recent context. Args: messages: Native list of OpenAI/Anthropic format message dicts (or JSON string). messages_json: Optional stringified messages for backward compatibility. max_tokens: Maximum target token count (default: 4000). preserve_recent_turns: Number of recent conversational turns to preserve untouched (default: 4). payment_signature: Optional x402 Base USDC transaction hash or developer mock key.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| max_tokens | integer | – | – |
| messages | – | – | – |
| messages_json | string | – | – |
| payment_signature | string | – | – |
| preserve_recent_turns | integer | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
verify_cryptographic_proof ~260
[Cost: $0.0003 USDC on Base & Solana] Cryptographic proof verifier for autonomous agents. Verifies Merkle inclusion proofs, Ed25519/ECDSA signatures, and hash preimage commitments. Args: proof_type: 'merkle' (Merkle tree audit path), 'signature' (Ed25519/ECDSA), or 'preimage' (hash commitment). payload: Dict of parameters: - For 'merkle': {'leaf': str, 'proof': list, 'root': str, 'hash_algo': 'sha256'|'sha3_256'|'blake2b'} - For 'signature': {'public_key': str, 'signature': str, 'message': str, 'curve': 'ed25519'|'ecdsa-p256'} - For 'preimage': {'commitment': str, 'preimage': str, 'salt': Optional[str], 'algorithm': 'sha256'} payment_signature: Optional x402 Base/Solana USDC transaction hash (defaults to developer mock key).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| payload | object | yes | – |
| payment_signature | string | – | – |
| proof_type | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
verify_fact_grounding ~161
[Cost: $0.0008 USDC on Base & Solana] Machine fact and citation grounding oracle. Cross-checks claims against source documents to detect hallucinations and unsupported assertions. Args: claims: List of assertion sentences generated by LLM or agent. sources: List of source context chunks, web pages, or reference documents. min_threshold: Minimum grounding confidence threshold (0.1 to 1.0, default: 0.60). payment_signature: Optional x402 Base/Solana USDC transaction hash (defaults to developer mock key).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| claims | array | yes | – |
| min_threshold | number | – | – |
| payment_signature | string | – | – |
| sources | array | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
what_is_my_ip_tool ~47
[Backward-Compatible Alias] Use 'get_egress_ip' instead.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| input_data | string | – | – |
| parameters | – | – | – |
| payment_signature | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
whois_lookup ~233
[Cost: $0.0005 USDC on Base & Solana] Master domain dispatcher for Domain WHOIS & RDAP Intelligence Screener. Structured RDAP and WHOIS domain intelligence: registration age, expiry, registrar, nameservers, DNSSEC, and privacy shield risk analysis. Actions: - 'lookup': Full domain WHOIS & RDAP structured intelligence. Params: {"domain": "example.com"} - 'screen': Autonomous fraud risk & domain age vetting (<14 days = critical risk). Params: {"domain": "example.com"} - 'rdap': Raw RFC 9083 RDAP JSON entities. Params: {"domain": "example.com"} - 'status': Protocol capabilities and cache telemetry. Args: action: Target operation name ('lookup', 'screen', 'rdap', 'status'). params: Optional dictionary of action parameters. payment_signature: Optional x402 Base USDC transaction hash (defaults to developer mock key).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| action | string | – | – |
| params | – | – | – |
| payment_signature | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the Project Sairen - Agentic Execution Node MCP server?
Project Sairen - Agentic Execution Node is a hosted endpoint at https://sairen.omniapps.ca/sse, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · sairen.omniapps.ca
claude mcp add --transport http ca-omniapps-sairen 'https://sairen.omniapps.ca/sse'
What is the Project Sairen - Agentic Execution Node MCP server?
Project Sairen - Agentic Execution Node is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as ca.omniapps/sairen. Zero-UI machine execution node & microservices for AI agents. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://sairen.omniapps.ca/sse).
Is the Project Sairen - Agentic Execution Node MCP server safe to use?
Project Sairen - Agentic Execution Node scores 67 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Project Sairen - Agentic Execution Node MCP server expose?
Project Sairen - Agentic Execution Node exposes 64 tools: get_precision_time, extract_web_markdown, check_address_risk, scratchpad_set, scratchpad_get, and 59 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 11,251 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Project Sairen - Agentic Execution Node MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to Project Sairen - Agentic Execution Node without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the Project Sairen - Agentic Execution Node MCP server still maintained?
Project Sairen - Agentic Execution Node is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 5 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.