# io.github.beepboop2025/lucent (oci · ghcr.io/beepboop2025/lucent-mcp:v0.2.1)

Call-scoped Clear Signing presentation checks for EVM signing agents.

- Trust score: 38/100 (low)
- Change this week: +7
- Registry status: active
- Liveness: live
- Owner verified: no
- Last scored: 2026-08-22

## Components

- oci · `ghcr.io/beepboop2025/lucent-mcp:v0.2.1`: 38/100 (this document), [markdown](https://verifymcp.io/servers/beepboop2025-lucent/ghcr-io-beepboop2025-lucent-mcp-v0-2-1.md), [page](https://verifymcp.io/servers/beepboop2025-lucent/ghcr-io-beepboop2025-lucent-mcp-v0-2-1)

## Channel facts

- Registry: `oci`
- Package: `ghcr.io/beepboop2025/lucent-mcp:v0.2.1`
- Transport: `stdio`

## Trust breakdown

How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically from public evidence about the published package, including repeated runs of it in an isolated sandbox, and we only credit what we can confirm. Scores are 0–100 per category. Scoring method: https://verifymcp.io/docs/scoring (what has changed: https://verifymcp.io/docs/scoring/changelog)

Scored 2026-08-22.

- **Supply Chain Security**: 0/100
  - Malware scan not yet available for this package.
  - Known CVEs could not be checked: this artifact ships no SBOM, so there is no dependency list to read. Publishing one would let us assess it.
  - Install-script risk not yet assessed.
  - Dependency health could not be checked: this artifact ships no SBOM, so there is no dependency list to read. Publishing one would let us assess it.
- **Provenance & Transparency**: 32/100
  - Source repository is publicly reachable at the declared URL.
  - Provenance check failed: no build-provenance attestation is published.
  - License check failed: no license is declared.
  - Actively maintained (last published 12 days ago).
  - Disclosure check failed: no security disclosure policy was found in the source repository.
- **Schema Quality & AI Usability**: 63/100
  - AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).
  - Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 1203 tokens (~300/item across 4 items; 4 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params.
  - Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples.
- **Stability & Change Management**: 43/100
  - Stability observed for 13 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.
- **Tool Coverage**: 92/100
  - 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).
  - 75% of tool parameters carry a description.
- **Capabilities**: 60/100
  - Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2025-06-18; the latest is 2026-07-28.

**Unverified: 1 category.** A category scored 0 because we could not verify it: a data source with nothing on this package, evidence we could not reach, or a check we could not run. We only credit what we can confirm.

## Install

### How do I install the io.github.beepboop2025/lucent MCP server?

io.github.beepboop2025/lucent runs locally as a container image, launched with docker run --rm -i ghcr.io/beepboop2025/lucent-mcp:v0.2.1. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 3 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.

### Claude

```bash
claude mcp add beepboop2025-lucent -- docker run --rm -i ghcr.io/beepboop2025/lucent-mcp:v0.2.1
```

### Cursor

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "beepboop2025-lucent": {
      "command": "docker",
      "args": [
        "run",
        "--rm",
        "-i",
        "ghcr.io/beepboop2025/lucent-mcp:v0.2.1"
      ]
    }
  }
}
```

### VS Code

```json
{
  "servers": {
    "beepboop2025-lucent": {
      "command": "docker",
      "args": [
        "run",
        "--rm",
        "-i",
        "ghcr.io/beepboop2025/lucent-mcp:v0.2.1"
      ]
    }
  }
}
```

### Codex

```bash
codex mcp add beepboop2025-lucent -- docker run --rm -i ghcr.io/beepboop2025/lucent-mcp:v0.2.1
```

### opencode

```json
{
  "$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
  "mcp": {
    "beepboop2025-lucent": {
      "type": "local",
      "command": [
        "docker",
        "run",
        "--rm",
        "-i",
        "ghcr.io/beepboop2025/lucent-mcp:v0.2.1"
      ],
      "enabled": true
    }
  }
}
```

### Hermes

```yaml
mcp_servers:
  beepboop2025-lucent:
    command: "docker"
    args: ["run", "--rm", "-i", "ghcr.io/beepboop2025/lucent-mcp:v0.2.1"]
```

### Netclaw

```json
{
  "McpServers": {
    "beepboop2025-lucent": {
      "Transport": "stdio",
      "Command": "docker",
      "Arguments": [
        "run",
        "--rm",
        "-i",
        "ghcr.io/beepboop2025/lucent-mcp:v0.2.1"
      ]
    }
  }
}
```

### Other

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "beepboop2025-lucent": {
      "command": "docker",
      "args": [
        "run",
        "--rm",
        "-i",
        "ghcr.io/beepboop2025/lucent-mcp:v0.2.1"
      ]
    }
  }
}
```

## Changelog

Every change recorded for this component, newest first. Days that predate change tracking, or that we cannot explain, say so: "we were watching and nothing happened" and "we were not watching" are different claims.

### 2026-08-22 (score 38, +1)

No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 40 to 43. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 12 days of observed history at the previous scan, 13 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

### 2026-08-20 (score 37, +1)

No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 33 to 37. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 10 days of observed history at the previous scan, 11 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

### 2026-08-18 (score 36, +1)

No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 27 to 30. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 8 days of observed history at the previous scan, 9 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

### 2026-08-17 (score 35, +4)

- [functional improvement] Stability: unverified → 0.27

### 2026-08-11 (score 31, +1)

- [functional] We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server

### 2026-08-09 (score 30)

First indexed and scored.

## MCP tools (4)

### `preflight_transaction` (~198 tokens)

PURPOSE: Analyze one exact unsigned EVM call before it is presented to a signer. Binds chain_id, sender, destination, calldata selector, decoded arguments, ETH value, and an inline ERC-7730 descriptor into one fingerprinted result. Only the selected function is assessed. Returns present/review/block plus audit, comprehension, danger, assurance, and explicit limitations.
GUIDELINES: Use this as the PRIMARY transaction-time gate. block means the screen is missing essential information or the selected ABI function has a CRITICAL known danger pattern. review means a human must inspect the named risk. safe_to_present means only that the call is clear enough to show; it does not mean execution is safe.
LIMITATIONS: Caller-supplied descriptor and ABI, static analysis only. No bytecode verification, proxy resolution, runtime simulation, MEV analysis, or counterparty judgment.

Input parameters:

- `descriptor` (object, required)
- `transaction` (object, required)

### `check_descriptor` (~259 tokens)

PURPOSE: Authoring-time review of an ERC-7730 Clear Signing descriptor. Combines three lenses — audit (does the wallet screen show the right fields, grade A-F), comprehension (a plain-language consequence sentence + risk tier per function), and danger (structural attack primitives). Returns {verdict: {gate, reason}, audit, comprehension, danger}.
GUIDELINES: Use this while writing or reviewing a descriptor. Never use it to approve a pending transaction because it does not bind chain, address, calldata, or value; use preflight_transaction for every pending call.
LIMITATIONS: Static full-descriptor analysis with transaction_bound=false. It does NOT simulate the transaction against live chain state, detect economic exploits (price manipulation, MEV), or judge whether the counterparty is honest. It reports authoring defects; its verdict is not a pending-call decision.
EXAMPLE: check_descriptor({"descriptor": {"context": {...}, "display": {"formats": {...}}}}) -> {"verdict": {"gate": "block", "reason": "1 CRITICAL danger primitive…"}, …}

Input parameters:

- `descriptor` (object, required): The full ERC-7730 descriptor JSON, inline: an object with context.contract.abi and display.formats.

### `explain_signature` (~317 tokens)

PURPOSE: Review UX copy for ONE function of an ERC-7730 descriptor — an unbound actor->action->object consequence sentence ('You let {spender} move up to {amount} of your tokens…'), a risk tier (CRITICAL/HIGH/MEDIUM/LOW), and the specific reason it earned that tier. Returns {found, function, sentence, tier, reason}.
GUIDELINES: Use this only while authoring or reviewing confirmation copy. It is not bound to chain, sender, destination, calldata, or value and MUST NOT approve a pending signature. Use preflight_transaction for every pending call.
LIMITATIONS: Explains a single function's intent and comprehension risk; it does not run the danger-primitive scan (use check_descriptor / scan_contract for that) and does not simulate on-chain effects. Returns found=false with the available function names if the name is not in the descriptor.
EXAMPLE: explain_signature({"descriptor": {…}, "function": "approve"}) -> {"found": true, "tier": "HIGH", "sentence": "You let … spend up to …", "reason": "an ERC-20 allowance lets the spender pull tokens…"}

Input parameters:

- `descriptor` (object, required): The ERC-7730 descriptor JSON.
- `function` (string): Exact function NAME to explain (not the full signature), e.g. 'approve' or 'setApprovalForAll'.
- `signature` (string): Preferred canonical signature, e.g. 'approve(address,uint256)'; required for overloads.

### `scan_contract` (~351 tokens)

PURPOSE: Assess a deployed EVM contract for structural danger primitives by ADDRESS — no descriptor needed. Fetches the contract's verified ABI from Sourcify and flags every signable function that is a 'loaded gun': arbitrary external call, delegatecall, self-destruct, upgrade-and-execute, unbounded delegation (setApprovalForAll), authority transfer, or value sweep. Returns {matched, danger_findings: [{severity, function, primitive, why}], critical, worst_severity}.
GUIDELINES: Call this to vet a contract an agent is about to interact with BEFORE any transaction is even built — the earliest possible safety check. Treat any CRITICAL finding as a strong signal not to interact without human review. Once a pending call is built, use preflight_transaction; neither this discovery scan nor check_descriptor is a signing gate.
LIMITATIONS: Flags DANGEROUS CAPABILITIES the contract exposes, not proof of malicious intent — many legitimate contracts expose upgrade or admin functions. Requires a verified ABI on Sourcify; returns matched=false with a reason when the ABI is unavailable or the fetch fails. Does not analyze bytecode, proxy implementations beyond the fetched ABI, or runtime behavior.
EXAMPLE: scan_contract({"chain_id": 1, "address": "0x00000000006c3852cbEf3e08E8dF289169EdE581"})

Input parameters:

- `address` (string, required): 0x-prefixed 40-hex-char contract address.
- `chain_id` (integer): EVM chain id: 1=Ethereum mainnet, 8453=Base, 10=Optimism, 42161=Arbitrum, 137=Polygon.

## Diagnostics

Captured diagnostic sections: Provenance. The full working is on the page: https://verifymcp.io/servers/beepboop2025-lucent/ghcr-io-beepboop2025-lucent-mcp-v0-2-1#diagnostics

## Score history

- 2026-08-22: 38
- 2026-08-21: 37
- 2026-08-20: 37
- 2026-08-19: 36
- 2026-08-18: 36
- 2026-08-17: 35
- 2026-08-16: 31
- 2026-08-15: 31
- 2026-08-14: 31
- 2026-08-13: 31
- 2026-08-12: 31
- 2026-08-11: 31
- 2026-08-10: 30
- 2026-08-09: 30

## Common questions

### What is the io.github.beepboop2025/lucent MCP server?

io.github.beepboop2025/lucent is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.beepboop2025/lucent. Call-scoped Clear Signing presentation checks for EVM signing agents. This page covers its container image (ghcr.io/beepboop2025/lucent-mcp:v0.2.1).

### Is the io.github.beepboop2025/lucent MCP server safe to use?

io.github.beepboop2025/lucent scores 38 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.

### What tools does the io.github.beepboop2025/lucent MCP server expose?

io.github.beepboop2025/lucent exposes 4 tools: preflight_transaction, check_descriptor, explain_signature, scan_contract. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,125 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.

### Is the io.github.beepboop2025/lucent MCP server still maintained?

io.github.beepboop2025/lucent is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 22 August 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.

## Links

- Repository: https://github.com/beepboop2025/lucent
- Changelog RSS feed: https://verifymcp.io/servers/beepboop2025-lucent/ghcr-io-beepboop2025-lucent-mcp-v0-2-1.xml
- Changelog JSON feed: https://verifymcp.io/servers/beepboop2025-lucent/ghcr-io-beepboop2025-lucent-mcp-v0-2-1.json
- HTML version of this page: https://verifymcp.io/servers/beepboop2025-lucent/ghcr-io-beepboop2025-lucent-mcp-v0-2-1