# PayStage — x402 payment safety and spend policy (remote · api.paystage.xyz)

x402 payment safety: judge a payment against your policy before signing. No keys, never signs.

- Trust score: 63/100 (medium)
- Registry status: active
- Liveness: live
- Owner verified: no
- Last scored: 2026-11-21

## Components

- remote · `api.paystage.xyz`: 63/100 (this document), [markdown](https://verifymcp.io/servers/base-buzz-x402-payment-safety/api.md), [page](https://verifymcp.io/servers/base-buzz-x402-payment-safety/api)
- npm · `@paystage/mcp`: 78/100, [markdown](https://verifymcp.io/servers/base-buzz-x402-payment-safety/paystage-mcp.md), [page](https://verifymcp.io/servers/base-buzz-x402-payment-safety/paystage-mcp)

## Channel facts

- Endpoint: `https://api.paystage.xyz/mcp`
- Transports: `streamable-http`
- Auth: `none`
- Version: `0.8.17`

## Trust breakdown

How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. Scores are 0–100 per category. Scoring method: https://verifymcp.io/docs/scoring (what has changed: https://verifymcp.io/docs/scoring/changelog)

Scored 2026-11-21.

- **Endpoint Security**: 63/100
  - The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key.
  - No authorisation is required to call this server. Nothing on it is marked destructive, but we can't show that an anonymous caller can only read: full credit needs the server to list at least one tool and every tool to be verifiably read-only. We use a best-effort check of tool names and descriptions to tell read-only tools from tools that change things, so some genuinely read-only tools may not get full credit. Names that start with a read verb (get, list, read, search and similar) and accurate readOnlyHint annotations help. Meet that to earn full credit, or require authorisation.
  - HTTPS enforcement could not be verified: the plaintext port answered with HTTP 405, which proves neither a plaintext path nor enforcement.
  - HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent.
  - DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC.
- **Transport & Reachability**: 100/100
  - Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake.
- **Schema Quality & AI Usability**: 60/100
  - AI-judged instruction clarity (good).
  - Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 1656 tokens (~165/item across 10 items; 10 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params.
  - Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples.
- **Stability & Change Management**: 10/100
  - Stability observed for 3 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.
- **Tool Coverage**: 71/100
  - 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).
  - 13% of tool parameters carry a description.
- **Tool Safety**: 100/100
  - No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.
  - We read all 10 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.
  - An AI judge read all 10 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.
- **Capabilities**: 100/100
  - Implements a current MCP spec version (2026-07-28).

## Install

### How do I install the PayStage — x402 payment safety and spend policy MCP server?

PayStage — x402 payment safety and spend policy is a hosted endpoint at https://api.paystage.xyz/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.

### Claude

```bash
claude mcp add --transport http base-buzz-x402-payment-safety 'https://api.paystage.xyz/mcp'
```

### Cursor

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "base-buzz-x402-payment-safety": {
      "url": "https://api.paystage.xyz/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```

### VS Code

```json
{
  "servers": {
    "base-buzz-x402-payment-safety": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://api.paystage.xyz/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```

### Codex

```toml
[mcp_servers.base-buzz-x402-payment-safety]
url = "https://api.paystage.xyz/mcp"
```

### opencode

```json
{
  "$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
  "mcp": {
    "base-buzz-x402-payment-safety": {
      "type": "remote",
      "url": "https://api.paystage.xyz/mcp",
      "enabled": true
    }
  }
}
```

### OpenClaw

```bash
openclaw mcp add base-buzz-x402-payment-safety --url 'https://api.paystage.xyz/mcp' --transport streamable-http
```

### Hermes

```yaml
mcp_servers:
  base-buzz-x402-payment-safety:
    url: "https://api.paystage.xyz/mcp"
```

### Netclaw

```json
{
  "McpServers": {
    "base-buzz-x402-payment-safety": {
      "Transport": "http",
      "Url": "https://api.paystage.xyz/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```

### Vellum

```bash
assistant mcp add base-buzz-x402-payment-safety -t streamable-http -u 'https://api.paystage.xyz/mcp'
```

### Other

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "base-buzz-x402-payment-safety": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://api.paystage.xyz/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```

The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.

## Changelog

Every change recorded for this component, newest first. Days that predate change tracking, or that we cannot explain, say so: "we were watching and nothing happened" and "we were not watching" are different claims.

### 2026-11-20 (score 63, 0)

- [security] Tool “evaluate_hip3_trade” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “evaluate_outstanding_auths” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “evaluate_velocity” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “list_outstanding_auths” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “request_testnet_funds” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “validate_policy” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “verify_receipt” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “decode_payment_required” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “evaluate_batch” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “evaluate_mcp_payment” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [functional regression] Schema quality: 128 → 165
- [functional regression] Schema quality: 128 → 142
- [cosmetic] “evaluate_mcp_payment” added an optional parameter “payment_identifier”

### 2026-11-19 (score 63, +1)

- [functional improvement] Stability: unverified → 0.03

### 2026-11-18 (score 62)

First indexed and scored.

## MCP tools (10)

### `evaluate_mcp_payment` (~270 tokens)

verify the recipient. Call this BEFORE signing any x402 payment. Verdict is pay | review | do_not_pay, each with stable reason codes (e.g. 'amount 1.00 USDC exceeds max_amount 0.05 USDC'). Fail-closed by design: do not invent authority — when policy, identity, cost or evidence is missing the answer is a refusal or a review, never a pay. Returns the decision plus a signed receipt you can verify offline with verify_receipt. Read-only: holds no keys, never signs, never moves funds. A refusal costs nothing. This tool evaluates locally, so it makes no network calls and returns no seller reputation; the hosted HTTP API adds `seller_reputation` (domain and certificate age) because it can reach the network.

Input parameters:

- `agent_id` (string): Which agent is asking. Required to reach per-agent budgets in policy.agents.
- `payment_identifier` (string): The x402 payment-identifier for this challenge, if the seller or client supplies one. Passing the same value on a retry turns the second verdict into `review` instead of a second `pay`, because a ret…
- `payment_required` (required)
- `policy`
- `policy_path` (string)

### `list_outstanding_auths` (~181 tokens)

spending limits. Call this when auditing what an agent could still spend without a new signature — ERC-20 allowances, Permit2 and EIP-3009 authorisations. Returns each authorisation with spender, amount and expiry. Read-only and needs only a public RPC; no key, no funds moved. Use it after an incident to see what remains exposed, not to revoke anything (this tool cannot revoke). Fails closed: do not invent authority — a missing policy, identity, cost or evidence is a refusal, never a default.

Input parameters:

- `eip3009_nonces` (array)
- `network` (string)
- `policy`
- `policy_path` (string)
- `rpc_url` (string)
- `spenders` (array)
- `tokens` (array)
- `wallet` (string, required)

### `evaluate_outstanding_auths` (~186 tokens)

spending limits. Call this when an agent already holds authorisations and you need to know which are dangerous. Verdict is pay | review | do_not_pay per authorisation, with reason codes naming the rule that fired (unlimited allowance, expiry already passed, spender not on the allow-list). Returns per-authorisation decisions plus a summary action. Read-only: never revokes, never signs. Revocation is a transaction you send yourself. Fails closed: do not invent authority — a missing policy, identity, cost or evidence is a refusal, never a default.

Input parameters:

- `eip3009_nonces` (array)
- `network` (string)
- `policy`
- `policy_path` (string)
- `rpc_url` (string)
- `spenders` (array)
- `tokens` (array)
- `wallet` (string, required)

### `evaluate_hip3_trade` (~149 tokens)

transaction scope. Call this BEFORE an agent places a HIP-3 / trade.xyz order. Verdict is allow | review | do_not_trade, with the rule that fired (notional above cap, market not allowed, leverage too high). Returns the decision and a one-line reason. Local policy only: this is not financial advice, holds no keys, and cannot place or cancel an order. Prices come from a read-only market query. Fails closed: do not invent authority — a missing policy, identity, cost or evidence is a refusal, never a default.

Input parameters:

- `policy`
- `policy_path` (string)
- `proposal` (object, required)
- `snapshot`

### `evaluate_velocity` (~155 tokens)

transparent risk assessments. Call this when an agent is about to make its Nth payment and you need to know whether the rate itself is the risk. Verdict is pay | review | do_not_pay over a rolling window (per-hour and per-day spend, count of payees). Returns the decision plus which window was breached. Read-only: it reads the history you pass in, holds no keys, and calls no external service. Fails closed: do not invent authority — a missing policy, identity, cost or evidence is a refusal, never a default.

Input parameters:

- `history` (array)
- `now_ms` (integer)
- `policy`
- `policy_path` (string)
- `proposed` (object, required)

### `verify_receipt` (~161 tokens)

verify the recipient. Call this when you have a receipt and want to know whether it is genuine, without trusting the server that issued it. Returns VALID with the verdict it attests to, INVALID if the payload was altered, or UNVERIFIABLE when the key cannot be fetched — and UNVERIFIABLE is a refusal, not a pass. Needs only the receipt JSON and a network connection; no account, no shared secret. Fetches the signing key from a published URL you can pin with key_url. Fails closed: do not invent authority — a missing policy, identity, cost or evidence is a refusal, never a default.

Input parameters:

- `key_url` (string): Override the published key location
- `receipt` (required): The receipt object as issued

### `decode_payment_required` (~140 tokens)

verify the recipient. Call this first when a 402 response arrives and you cannot read the payment-required header. Returns the decoded x402 v2 challenge: scheme, network, asset, atomic amount, payee, resource and timeout. Pure decoding: no network call, no signature, no verdict — use evaluate_mcp_payment when you want a decision. Fails closed with a named error if the header is malformed or not base64. Fails closed: do not invent authority — a missing policy, identity, cost or evidence is a refusal, never a default.

Input parameters:

- `header` (string, required): The raw base64 value of the payment-required header

### `validate_policy` (~111 tokens)

spending limits. Call this before wiring a policy into anything: a policy that fails validation makes every evaluation refuse, which looks like a product bug and is not one. Returns valid: true, or the exact field and message that is wrong. No payment needed, no network call, no key. Use it in CI on the policy file your agent ships with. Fails closed: do not invent authority — a missing policy, identity, cost or evidence is a refusal, never a default.

Input parameters:

- `policy` (required)

### `request_testnet_funds` (~162 tokens)

test funds. Call this when you need Base Sepolia USDC to exercise the paid path end to end — one drip of 0.5 USDC per address per 24 hours, and the refusal tells you when it resets rather than just failing. Reads a public faucet: no key needed, no account, and it can only ever send testnet USDC. Use a throwaway address for anything automated; the cap is per address, so a script that generates a new address per call is not clever, it is why faucets get closed. Fails closed: do not invent authority — a missing policy, identity, cost or evidence is a refusal, never a default.

Input parameters:

- `address` (string, required)
- `faucetUrl` (string)

### `evaluate_batch` (~141 tokens)

transaction scope. Call this when an agent might pay several times in one turn and you want one policy decision covering all of them. Verdict is pay | review | do_not_pay per item, in input order, with reason codes — so the agent can stop at the first refusal rather than discovering it after three payments. Read-only, holds no keys, never signs. Cheaper and more consistent than calling evaluate_mcp_payment in a loop: same policy, one round trip. Fails closed: do not invent authority — a missing policy, identity, cost or evidence is a refusal, never a default.

Input parameters:

- `payments` (array, required)
- `policy` (required)

## Diagnostics

Captured diagnostic sections: TLS, DNSSEC, Authorisation, Transports. The full working is on the page: https://verifymcp.io/servers/base-buzz-x402-payment-safety/api#diagnostics

## Score history

- 2026-11-21: 63
- 2026-11-20: 63
- 2026-11-19: 63
- 2026-11-18: 62

## Common questions

### What is the PayStage — x402 payment safety and spend policy MCP server?

PayStage — x402 payment safety and spend policy is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.base-buzz/x402-payment-safety. x402 payment safety: judge a payment against your policy before signing. No keys, never signs. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://api.paystage.xyz/mcp).

### Is the PayStage — x402 payment safety and spend policy MCP server safe to use?

PayStage — x402 payment safety and spend policy scores 63 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.

### What tools does the PayStage — x402 payment safety and spend policy MCP server expose?

PayStage — x402 payment safety and spend policy exposes 10 tools: evaluate_mcp_payment, list_outstanding_auths, evaluate_outstanding_auths, evaluate_hip3_trade, evaluate_velocity, and 5 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,656 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.

### Does the PayStage — x402 payment safety and spend policy MCP server require authentication?

No. We connected to PayStage — x402 payment safety and spend policy without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.

### Is the PayStage — x402 payment safety and spend policy MCP server still maintained?

PayStage — x402 payment safety and spend policy is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.

### What did VerifyMCP test on the PayStage — x402 payment safety and spend policy MCP server?

VerifyMCP ran 12 checks on PayStage — x402 payment safety and spend policy, covering TLS certificate, Authorization, HSTS header, DNSSEC and 8 more. One item could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about PayStage — x402 payment safety and spend policy: HTTPS. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.

## Links

- Remote endpoint: https://api.paystage.xyz/mcp
- Repository: https://github.com/base-buzz/paystage
- Website: https://paystage.xyz/
- Changelog RSS feed: https://verifymcp.io/servers/base-buzz-x402-payment-safety/api.xml
- Changelog JSON feed: https://verifymcp.io/servers/base-buzz-x402-payment-safety/api/changelog.json
- Trust report (JSON): https://verifymcp.io/servers/base-buzz-x402-payment-safety/api.json
- HTML version of this page: https://verifymcp.io/servers/base-buzz-x402-payment-safety/api
