Cred
REMOTE · EUTDGEMLRPVNXFKKPVLU.SUPABASE.CO
Issue, deduct, refund and sell credits: checkout, subscriptions, saved cards, escrow and wallets.
Available components
Last scanned (22 hours ago)
Scores higher than 52% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.
Category Finance and Payments
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security63
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 49 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability60
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 13392 tokens (~273/item across 49 items; 49 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management50
- Stability observed for 15 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage99
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 96% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety75
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- 0 of 8 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation; "refund_credits" implies "refund" and declares no destructiveHint at all, which the MCP spec reads as destructive by default. See how to fix → Fail
- An AI judge read all 49 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities40
- Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2025-03-26; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
Checks we ran (12)
- TLS certificate
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Checks we could not complete (1)
These are gaps on our side, not findings about this hosted endpoint. We only credit what we can confirm, so a category made up entirely of them scores 0.
- Authorization in Endpoint SecurityAuthorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 49 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe.
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 20 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 43 to 47. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 13 days of observed history at the previous scan, 14 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 18 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 37 to 40. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 11 days of observed history at the previous scan, 12 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 16 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 30 to 33. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 9 days of observed history at the previous scan, 10 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 14 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 23 to 27. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 7 days of observed history at the previous scan, 8 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 12 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 17 to 20. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 5 days of observed history at the previous scan, 6 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 10 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 10 to 13. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 3 days of observed history at the previous scan, 4 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 8 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 3 to 7. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 1 days of observed history at the previous scan, 2 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 7 Nov 26 0
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://eutdgemlrpvnxfkkpvlu.supabase.co/functions/v1/cred-mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=supabase.co | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 24 Oct 2026 | 22 Jan 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | d2b50611cd88e9c50e4e2231f4d3f059 |
| SANs: supabase.co, *.supabase.co | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of eutdgemlrpvnxfkkpvlu.supabase.co. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| co. | DS published | 7786 | 8 | Verified |
| supabase.co. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://eutdgemlrpvnxfkkpvlu.supabase.co/functions/v1/cred-mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://eutdgemlrpvnxfkkpvlu.supabase.co/functions/v1/cred-mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://eutdgemlrpvnxfkkpvlu.supabase.co/functions/v1/cred-mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
update_pricing_tier ~308
Update a pricing tier by id; only fields you pass change (same price rules as create). Pass credit_type_ids to re-scope it ([] = all credit types), is_active: false to stop selling it without deleting. Costs 1 CRD (platform credit) per call, charged even when the call is then rejected (a 429 RATE_LIMITED costs nothing). Error results include request_id; quote it to support.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| api_key | string | – | Cred API key (optional if set via the x-api-key header) |
| billing_type | string | – | Which checkouts may sell the tier. A subscription is created only when checkout is sent billing: "recurring"; recurring-only tiers cannot be used for saved-card charges or auto top-up. |
| credit_type_ids | array | – | Credit type UUIDs; [] = all |
| credits | integer | – | – |
| currency | string | – | – |
| description | string | – | – |
| id | string | yes | Pricing tier ID |
| is_active | boolean | – | Whether the tier can be purchased |
| is_popular | boolean | – | – |
| name | string | – | – |
| price | number | – | Price in dollars |
| project_id | string | – | Cred project ID (optional; the API key already identifies the project) |
| x402_payment | string | – | Base64 x402 PaymentPayload, only when a previous call failed with an x402 PaymentRequired because the account is out of CRD |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
update_subscription_quantity ~260
Change a live subscription's quantity (seats/packs, 1–10000). CHANGES FUTURE BILLING: from the next renewal the customer pays unit price × quantity and receives unit credits × quantity; no proration now. With user_id/email the customer must have exactly one live subscription (else 409 — pass subscription_id). Same quantity is a no-op. Costs 1 CRD (platform credit) per call, charged even when the call is then rejected (a 429 RATE_LIMITED costs nothing). Error results include request_id; quote it to support.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| api_key | string | – | Cred API key (optional if set via the x-api-key header) |
| string | – | Customer email (alternative to subscription_id) | |
| project_id | string | – | Cred project ID (optional; the API key already identifies the project) |
| quantity | integer | yes | New quantity |
| subscription_id | string | – | Cred subscription ID or Stripe sub_… ID |
| user_id | string | – | External user ID (alternative to subscription_id) |
| x402_payment | string | – | Base64 x402 PaymentPayload, only when a previous call failed with an x402 PaymentRequired because the account is out of CRD |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
update_user ~334
Update an existing end user (identify by user_email, checked first, or external_id). Only fields you pass change (none at all is 400 NO_FIELDS_TO_UPDATE); metadata replaces the whole object, except referral_code (kept unless you send it) and stripe_account_id (Cred-only: the stored value stays and a value you send is silently dropped). signup_* fields overwrite attribution (use to correct it). 404 USER_NOT_FOUND. To change a wallet use set_user_wallet. Costs 1 CRD (platform credit) per call, charged even when the call is then rejected (a 429 RATE_LIMITED costs nothing). Error results include request_id; quote it to support.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| api_key | string | – | Cred API key (optional if set via the x-api-key header) |
| string | – | New email | |
| external_id | string | – | External ID of the user to update |
| metadata | object | – | New metadata (replaces existing) |
| name | string | – | New name |
| project_id | string | – | Cred project ID (optional; the API key already identifies the project) |
| signup_credit_type_id | string | – | Corrected signup credit type |
| signup_host | string | – | Corrected signup host |
| signup_url | string | – | Corrected signup URL (also re-derives signup_host) |
| user_email | string | – | Current email of the user to update |
| x402_payment | string | – | Base64 x402 PaymentPayload, only when a previous call failed with an x402 PaymentRequired because the account is out of CRD |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
verify_wallet_signature ~238
Step 2: submit the personal_sign signature over the challenge message. On success the address is stored and marked verified. A challenge is single-use and a rejected signature consumes it too — a retry needs a fresh challenge. Costs 1 CRD (platform credit) per call, charged even when the call is then rejected (a 429 RATE_LIMITED costs nothing). Error results include request_id; quote it to support.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | – | Optional guard — rejected if not the address the nonce was issued for |
| api_key | string | – | Cred API key (optional if set via the x-api-key header) |
| chain_id | number | – | Chain the proof was signed on, recorded as provenance |
| nonce | string | yes | The nonce from request_wallet_challenge |
| project_id | string | – | Cred project ID (optional; the API key already identifies the project) |
| signature | string | yes | personal_sign output over the challenge message |
| x402_payment | string | – | Base64 x402 PaymentPayload, only when a previous call failed with an x402 PaymentRequired because the account is out of CRD |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
x402_supported ~72
Discover how to pay Cred with x402 (HTTP 402 stablecoin payments): the accepted scheme, network, asset and prices. Pass project_id to also get that project's credit price list. Requires no credentials and costs no CRD.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| project_id | string | – | Project whose credits you want priced (optional) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the Cred MCP server?
Cred is a hosted endpoint at https://eutdgemlrpvnxfkkpvlu.supabase.co/functions/v1/cred-mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · eutdgemlrpvnxfkkpvlu.supabase.co
claude mcp add --transport http aw3-technology-cred 'https://eutdgemlrpvnxfkkpvlu.supabase.co/functions/v1/cred-mcp'
What is the Cred MCP server?
Cred is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.aw3-technology/cred. Issue, deduct, refund and sell credits: checkout, subscriptions, saved cards, escrow and wallets. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://eutdgemlrpvnxfkkpvlu.supabase.co/functions/v1/cred-mcp).
Is the Cred MCP server safe to use?
Cred scores 67 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Cred MCP server expose?
Cred exposes 49 tools: list_credit_types, get_balance, issue_credits, deduct_credits, get_transactions, and 44 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 13,392 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Cred MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to Cred without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the Cred MCP server still maintained?
Cred is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the Cred MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 12 checks on Cred, covering TLS certificate, HTTPS, HSTS header, DNSSEC and 8 more. One item could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about Cred: Authorization. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.