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Cred

REMOTE · EUTDGEMLRPVNXFKKPVLU.SUPABASE.CO

Issue, deduct, refund and sell credits: checkout, subscriptions, saved cards, escrow and wallets.

+3 this week 67 Trust /100

Last scanned (22 hours ago)

Scores higher than 52% of remote servers

Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.

Category Finance and Payments

Trust breakdown (7 categories)

How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →

Endpoint Security63
Transport & Reachability100
Schema Quality & AI Usability60
  • AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
  • Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 13392 tokens (~273/item across 49 items; 49 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
  • Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management50
  • Stability observed for 15 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage99
  • 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
  • 96% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety75
  • No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
  • 0 of 8 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation; "refund_credits" implies "refund" and declares no destructiveHint at all, which the MCP spec reads as destructive by default. See how to fix → Fail
  • An AI judge read all 49 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities40
  • Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2025-03-26; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
What we tested

Checks we ran (12)

  • TLS certificate
  • HTTPS
  • HSTS header
  • DNSSEC
  • Transport
  • Schema quality
  • Stability
  • Tool coverage
  • Injection markers
  • Destructive annotations
  • Judged manipulation
  • MCP protocol

Checks we could not complete (1)

These are gaps on our side, not findings about this hosted endpoint. We only credit what we can confirm, so a category made up entirely of them scores 0.

  • Authorization in Endpoint SecurityAuthorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 49 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe.

Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)

  • Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
  • Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.

The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →

Changelog

Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.

  • 20 Nov 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 43 to 47. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 13 days of observed history at the previous scan, 14 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

  • 18 Nov 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 37 to 40. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 11 days of observed history at the previous scan, 12 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

  • 16 Nov 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 30 to 33. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 9 days of observed history at the previous scan, 10 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

  • 14 Nov 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 23 to 27. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 7 days of observed history at the previous scan, 8 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

  • 12 Nov 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 17 to 20. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 5 days of observed history at the previous scan, 6 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

  • 10 Nov 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 10 to 13. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 3 days of observed history at the previous scan, 4 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

  • 8 Nov 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 3 to 7. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 1 days of observed history at the previous scan, 2 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

  • 7 Nov 26 0
    • Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
Diagnostics

Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.

Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://eutdgemlrpvnxfkkpvlu.supabase.co/functions/v1/cred-mcp

TLS valid

Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .

Subject Issuer Valid from Valid until Key Signature Serial
CN=supabase.co CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US 24 Oct 2026 22 Jan 2027 ECDSA 256 ECDSA-SHA256 d2b50611cd88e9c50e4e2231f4d3f059
SANs: supabase.co, *.supabase.co
CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US 13 Dec 2023 20 Feb 2029 ECDSA 256 ECDSA-SHA384 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3
CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE 15 Nov 2023 28 Jan 2028 ECDSA 384 SHA256-RSA 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b

Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →

DNSSEC insecure

Validation of eutdgemlrpvnxfkkpvlu.supabase.co. — Not signed

Zone DS Keys Algorithms Outcome
. Trust anchor 20326, 38696 8, 8 Verified
co. DS published 7786 8 Verified
supabase.co. No DS Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation
Authentication No authorisation required

The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.

Result No authorisation required
HTTP status 200
Header Value
strict-transport-security max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload

Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →

Transports 2 probes
Transport URL Outcome Status Location
streamable-http https://eutdgemlrpvnxfkkpvlu.supabase.co/functions/v1/cred-mcp Verified 200
http (plaintext) http://eutdgemlrpvnxfkkpvlu.supabase.co/functions/v1/cred-mcp HTTPS enforced 301 https://eutdgemlrpvnxfkkpvlu.supabase.co/functions/v1/cred-mcp
MCP tools · 49 exposed · ~13,392 tokens

The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →

Tool Tokens
update_pricing_tier ~308

Update a pricing tier by id; only fields you pass change (same price rules as create). Pass credit_type_ids to re-scope it ([] = all credit types), is_active: false to stop selling it without deleting. Costs 1 CRD (platform credit) per call, charged even when the call is then rejected (a 429 RATE_LIMITED costs nothing). Error results include request_id; quote it to support.

NameTypeReqDescription
api_keystring–Cred API key (optional if set via the x-api-key header)
billing_typestring–Which checkouts may sell the tier. A subscription is created only when checkout is sent billing: "recurring"; recurring-only tiers cannot be used for saved-card charges or auto top-up.
credit_type_idsarray–Credit type UUIDs; [] = all
creditsinteger––
currencystring––
descriptionstring––
idstringyesPricing tier ID
is_activeboolean–Whether the tier can be purchased
is_popularboolean––
namestring––
pricenumber–Price in dollars
project_idstring–Cred project ID (optional; the API key already identifies the project)
x402_paymentstring–Base64 x402 PaymentPayload, only when a previous call failed with an x402 PaymentRequired because the account is out of CRD

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

update_subscription_quantity ~260

Change a live subscription's quantity (seats/packs, 1–10000). CHANGES FUTURE BILLING: from the next renewal the customer pays unit price × quantity and receives unit credits × quantity; no proration now. With user_id/email the customer must have exactly one live subscription (else 409 — pass subscription_id). Same quantity is a no-op. Costs 1 CRD (platform credit) per call, charged even when the call is then rejected (a 429 RATE_LIMITED costs nothing). Error results include request_id; quote it to support.

NameTypeReqDescription
api_keystring–Cred API key (optional if set via the x-api-key header)
emailstring–Customer email (alternative to subscription_id)
project_idstring–Cred project ID (optional; the API key already identifies the project)
quantityintegeryesNew quantity
subscription_idstring–Cred subscription ID or Stripe sub_… ID
user_idstring–External user ID (alternative to subscription_id)
x402_paymentstring–Base64 x402 PaymentPayload, only when a previous call failed with an x402 PaymentRequired because the account is out of CRD

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

update_user ~334

Update an existing end user (identify by user_email, checked first, or external_id). Only fields you pass change (none at all is 400 NO_FIELDS_TO_UPDATE); metadata replaces the whole object, except referral_code (kept unless you send it) and stripe_account_id (Cred-only: the stored value stays and a value you send is silently dropped). signup_* fields overwrite attribution (use to correct it). 404 USER_NOT_FOUND. To change a wallet use set_user_wallet. Costs 1 CRD (platform credit) per call, charged even when the call is then rejected (a 429 RATE_LIMITED costs nothing). Error results include request_id; quote it to support.

NameTypeReqDescription
api_keystring–Cred API key (optional if set via the x-api-key header)
emailstring–New email
external_idstring–External ID of the user to update
metadataobject–New metadata (replaces existing)
namestring–New name
project_idstring–Cred project ID (optional; the API key already identifies the project)
signup_credit_type_idstring–Corrected signup credit type
signup_hoststring–Corrected signup host
signup_urlstring–Corrected signup URL (also re-derives signup_host)
user_emailstring–Current email of the user to update
x402_paymentstring–Base64 x402 PaymentPayload, only when a previous call failed with an x402 PaymentRequired because the account is out of CRD

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

verify_wallet_signature ~238

Step 2: submit the personal_sign signature over the challenge message. On success the address is stored and marked verified. A challenge is single-use and a rejected signature consumes it too — a retry needs a fresh challenge. Costs 1 CRD (platform credit) per call, charged even when the call is then rejected (a 429 RATE_LIMITED costs nothing). Error results include request_id; quote it to support.

NameTypeReqDescription
addressstring–Optional guard — rejected if not the address the nonce was issued for
api_keystring–Cred API key (optional if set via the x-api-key header)
chain_idnumber–Chain the proof was signed on, recorded as provenance
noncestringyesThe nonce from request_wallet_challenge
project_idstring–Cred project ID (optional; the API key already identifies the project)
signaturestringyespersonal_sign output over the challenge message
x402_paymentstring–Base64 x402 PaymentPayload, only when a previous call failed with an x402 PaymentRequired because the account is out of CRD

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

x402_supported ~72

Discover how to pay Cred with x402 (HTTP 402 stablecoin payments): the accepted scheme, network, asset and prices. Pass project_id to also get that project's credit price list. Requires no credentials and costs no CRD.

NameTypeReqDescription
project_idstring–Project whose credits you want priced (optional)

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

Install

How do I install the Cred MCP server?

Cred is a hosted endpoint at https://eutdgemlrpvnxfkkpvlu.supabase.co/functions/v1/cred-mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.

remote · eutdgemlrpvnxfkkpvlu.supabase.co

# add to Claude Code
claude mcp add --transport http aw3-technology-cred 'https://eutdgemlrpvnxfkkpvlu.supabase.co/functions/v1/cred-mcp'
Common questions

What is the Cred MCP server?

Cred is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.aw3-technology/cred. Issue, deduct, refund and sell credits: checkout, subscriptions, saved cards, escrow and wallets. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://eutdgemlrpvnxfkkpvlu.supabase.co/functions/v1/cred-mcp).

Is the Cred MCP server safe to use?

Cred scores 67 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.

What tools does the Cred MCP server expose?

Cred exposes 49 tools: list_credit_types, get_balance, issue_credits, deduct_credits, get_transactions, and 44 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 13,392 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.

Does the Cred MCP server require authentication?

No. We connected to Cred without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.

Is the Cred MCP server still maintained?

Cred is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.

What did VerifyMCP test on the Cred MCP server?

VerifyMCP ran 12 checks on Cred, covering TLS certificate, HTTPS, HSTS header, DNSSEC and 8 more. One item could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about Cred: Authorization. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.