io.github.ariekogan/ateam-mcp
REMOTE · MCP.ATEAM-AI.COM · 2 COMPONENTS · SCANNED SEP 22
Build, validate, and deploy multi-agent AI solutions from any AI environment.
Available components
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security78
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- The endpoint enforces authorisation, advertised via RFC 9728 protected-resource metadata. View diagnostics → Pass
- HTTPS enforcement could not be verified: the plaintext port answered with HTTP 401, which proves neither a plaintext path nor enforcement. View diagnostics → Unverified
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- The authorisation server offers only Dynamic Client Registration (RFC 7591), which MCP 2026-07-28 deprecated in favour of Client ID Metadata Documents. View diagnostics → Partial
Transport & Reachability0
- Transport blocked by authentication: the endpoint requires auth we don't have to verify streamable-http. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
Schema Quality & AI Usability0
- Schema blocked by authentication: the endpoint requires auth we don't have to read it. See how to fix → Unverified
Stability & Change Management0
- Stability not yet verified: not enough scan history yet (needs a 30-day window).Unverified
Tool Coverage0
- Tool coverage blocked by authentication: the endpoint requires auth we don't have to read its tools.Unverified
Tool Safety0
- Tool safety blocked by authentication: the endpoint requires auth we don't have to read its tools.Unverified
Capabilities0
- Capabilities blocked by authentication: the endpoint requires auth we don't have to read them. See how to fix → Unverified
Unverified: 6 categories
Categories scored 0 because we could not verify them: authentication we do not have, an unreachable endpoint, or not enough scan history. We only credit what we can confirm. Claim this server and supply a read-only token to verify it and lift the score.
How do I install the io.github.ariekogan/ateam-mcp server?
io.github.ariekogan/ateam-mcp is a hosted endpoint at https://mcp.ateam-ai.com/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · mcp.ateam-ai.com
claude mcp add --transport http ariekogan-ateam-mcp 'https://mcp.ateam-ai.com/mcp'
{
"mcpServers": {
"ariekogan-ateam-mcp": {
"url": "https://mcp.ateam-ai.com/mcp"
}
}
} {
"servers": {
"ariekogan-ateam-mcp": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://mcp.ateam-ai.com/mcp"
}
}
} [mcp_servers.ariekogan-ateam-mcp] url = "https://mcp.ateam-ai.com/mcp"
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"ariekogan-ateam-mcp": {
"type": "remote",
"url": "https://mcp.ateam-ai.com/mcp",
"enabled": true
}
}
} openclaw mcp add ariekogan-ateam-mcp --url 'https://mcp.ateam-ai.com/mcp' --transport streamable-http
mcp_servers:
ariekogan-ateam-mcp:
url: "https://mcp.ateam-ai.com/mcp" {
"McpServers": {
"ariekogan-ateam-mcp": {
"Transport": "http",
"Url": "https://mcp.ateam-ai.com/mcp"
}
}
} assistant mcp add ariekogan-ateam-mcp -t streamable-http -u 'https://mcp.ateam-ai.com/mcp'
{
"mcpServers": {
"ariekogan-ateam-mcp": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://mcp.ateam-ai.com/mcp"
}
}
} The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 11 Sept 26 −40
- Endpoint reachability: reachable → behind authorisation ▼ security
- Transport: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Tool safety: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Stability: pass → unverified ▼ security
- HTTPS: fail → unverified ▼ security
- Authorization: unverified → pass ▲ security
- First check of Authorization: partial security
- Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- Capabilities: pass → unverified ▼ functional
- First check of Schema quality: unverified functional
- 6 Sept 26 0
- Tool “ateam_design_advisor” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Server version: 0.4.77 → 0.4.85 functional
- “ateam_get_spec” reworded the description of “topic” cosmetic
- 2 Sept 26 0
- Tool “ateam_upload_connector” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “ateam_test_status” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “ateam_test_abort” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “ateam_patch” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “ateam_github_read” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “ateam_github_promote” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “ateam_github_diff” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “ateam_get_chain” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “ateam_delete_connector” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Schema quality: 226 → 262 ▼ functional
- Server version: 0.3.0 → 0.4.77 functional
- New tool “ateam_connector_logs” functional
- New tool “ateam_github_reconcile” functional
- New tool “ateam_github_sync_from_main” functional
- New tool “ateam_log_lesson” functional
- New tool “ateam_log_progress” functional
- New tool “ateam_verify_surface” functional
- New tool “ateam_get_metrics” functional
- New tool “ateam_get_execution_logs” functional
- New tool “ateam_get_progress” functional
- New tool “ateam_get_lessons” functional
- “ateam_upload_connector” added an optional parameter “force” cosmetic
- “ateam_test_status” added an optional parameter “chain_id” cosmetic
- “ateam_test_status” added an optional parameter “actor_id” cosmetic
- “ateam_test_abort” added an optional parameter “chain_id” cosmetic
- “ateam_test_abort” added an optional parameter “actor_id” cosmetic
- “ateam_github_read” added an optional parameter “branch” cosmetic
- “ateam_github_patch” added an optional parameter “branch” cosmetic
- “ateam_get_chain” added an optional parameter “chain_id” cosmetic
- “ateam_get_chain” added an optional parameter “actor_id” cosmetic
- “ateam_chain_status” added an optional parameter “job_id” cosmetic
- “ateam_chain_status” added an optional parameter “actor_id” cosmetic
- “ateam_upload_connector” reworded the description of “files” cosmetic
- “ateam_test_status” reworded the description of “job_id” cosmetic
- “ateam_test_abort” reworded the description of “job_id” cosmetic
- “ateam_patch” reworded the description of “source” cosmetic
- “ateam_get_spec” reworded the description of “topic” cosmetic
- “ateam_get_chain” reworded the description of “job_id” cosmetic
- “ateam_test_status” made “skill_id” optional cosmetic
- “ateam_test_status” made “job_id” optional cosmetic
- “ateam_test_abort” made “skill_id” optional cosmetic
- “ateam_test_abort” made “job_id” optional cosmetic
- “ateam_get_chain” made “job_id” optional cosmetic
- 26 Aug 26 −1
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Aug 26 +1
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 11 Aug 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 31 Jul 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 30 Jul 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 22 Sept 2026 · Probed https://mcp.ateam-ai.com/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=ateam-ai.com | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 13 Aug 2026 | 11 Nov 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | 1964533d7eb11bbc13b2fff6686c6113 |
| SANs: ateam-ai.com, *.ateam-ai.com | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of mcp.ateam-ai.com. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| com. | present | 19718 | 13 | Verified |
| ateam-ai.com. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication Enforced and verified
The endpoint asked for a token and published valid RFC 9728 metadata describing how to get one.
| Result | Enforced and verified |
|---|---|
| Enforced | On connection |
| HTTP status | 401 |
WWW-Authenticate challenge Bearer error="invalid_token", error_description="Missing Authorization header", resource_metadata="https://mcp.ateam-ai.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource"
Bearer error="invalid_token", error_description="Missing Authorization header", resource_metadata="https://mcp.ateam-ai.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource" | Header | Value |
|---|---|
| www-authenticate | Bearer error="invalid_token", error_description="Missing Authorization header", resource_metadata="https://mcp.ateam-ai.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource" |
Protected resource metadata
| Document | https://mcp.ateam-ai.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource |
|---|---|
| Retrieved | Yes |
| Resource | https://mcp.ateam-ai.com/ |
| Authorisation server | https://mcp.ateam-ai.com/ |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://mcp.ateam-ai.com/mcp | Auth required | 401 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://mcp.ateam-ai.com/mcp | Inconclusive | 401 |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
ateam_test_skill ~467
Send a test message to a deployed skill and get the execution result. Wait modes (wait_for): • 'root' (default, back-compat) — wait until the message's root job completes, return single-job result. Fast, ignores any sub-skills the root delegated to via askAnySkill. • 'chain' — wait until EVERY job in the chain (root + handoffs + askAnySkill subcalls, recursively) reaches a terminal state, then return the full chain tree. Use when testing multi-skill flows (orchestrator → workers, builders → sub-builders, etc.). The response.chain field carries chainJobs[] with parentJobId/relation/depth and executionSteps[] with tool-nesting (opId/parentOpId/_toolDepth). Legacy: wait:false is equivalent to wait_for:'never' — returns job_id immediately for polling via ateam_test_status. wait:true is the same as the default wait_for:'root'.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| actor_id | string | – | Optional actor ID for conversation continuity. Pass the actor_id from a previous test response to continue the conversation. Omit to auto-generate a test actor (test_<timestamp>_<random>, auto-expire… |
| chain_timeout_ms | number | – | Optional. Max total ms to wait when wait_for:'chain'. Default 300000 (5 min). Long-running chains (skill-factory, large bundle builds) may need higher. Clamped to [10000, 900000]. |
| message | string | yes | The test message to send to the skill |
| skill_id | string | yes | The skill ID to test (original or internal ID) |
| solution_id | string | yes | The solution ID |
| wait | boolean | – | Legacy: if false, return job_id immediately for polling. If true or omitted, behaves like wait_for:'root'. Prefer wait_for going forward. |
| wait_for | string | – | What to wait for before returning. 'root' (default) = root job done; 'chain' = every chain job terminal (use for multi-skill flows); 'never' = return job_id immediately (poll via ateam_test_status).… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
ateam_test_status ~385
Poll the progress of an async test. Pass chain_id for the WHOLE run (recommended — the root job finishing does NOT mean the run finished; a handoff may still be going). Pass job_id to poll one job alone: iteration count, tool call steps, status, and result when done. Set include_chain:true to ALSO include the full chain tree (every job in the chain, rooted at this job_id, with parent/child linkage). Use when this job dispatched askAnySkill subcalls and you want a single snapshot of the whole multi-skill state instead of polling each child job_id separately.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| actor_id | string | – | Optional. WHO is asking. A job belongs to an actor and Core enforces that on per-job reads, so a tenant key alone is refused. Usually unnecessary — the session remembers the actor from ateam_conversa… |
| chain_id | string | – | THE EXECUTION'S IDENTITY — what ateam_conversation returns and what you actually hold. A chain is the whole run: root job + every handoff + every askAnySkill subcall. Prefer this. |
| include_chain | boolean | – | If true, includes response.chain — the full chain tree rooted at this job_id (chainJobs[] with parentJobId/relation/depth, executionSteps[] with tool-nesting). Costs one extra Core call. Default fals… |
| job_id | string | – | ONE job inside the chain, when you want that job alone. Omit and pass chain_id for the whole run — a root job can be 'completed' while a handoff is still running. |
| skill_id | string | – | The skill ID |
| solution_id | string | yes | The solution ID |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
ateam_test_voice ~197
Simulate a voice conversation with a deployed solution. Runs the full voice pipeline (session → caller verification → prompt → skill dispatch → response) using text instead of audio. Returns each turn with bot response, verification status, tool calls, and entities. Use this to test voice-enabled solutions end-to-end without making a phone call.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| messages | array | yes | Array of user messages to send sequentially (simulates a multi-turn phone conversation) |
| phone_number | string | – | Optional: simulated caller phone number (e.g., '+14155551234'). If the number is in the solution's known phones list, the caller is auto-verified. |
| skill_slug | string | – | Optional: target a specific skill by slug instead of using voice routing. |
| solution_id | string | yes | The solution ID |
| timeout_ms | number | – | Optional: max wait time per skill execution in milliseconds (default: 60000). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
ateam_upload_connector ~771
Upload connector code to Core and restart — WITHOUT redeploying skills. MERGES with the GitHub state at `ref` by default (default ref: 'dev'). Sending a partial file set ONLY overlays those files — the rest of the connector is preserved from GitHub. To fully replace the connector dir (historical behavior), pass replace:true. Modes: • github:true (no files) — deploy the GitHub state at `ref` as-is. • github:true + files:[] — GitHub state at `ref` as BASE, your files overlay on top (incoming wins). • files:[] (no github) — default MERGE with GitHub state at `ref`. Refuses if no GitHub base exists (no silent nuke). • files:[] + replace:true — full replace. Wipes connector dir + writes only the provided files. Use deliberately. Multi-file connectors (server.js + dashboard HTML + RN bundle + package/manifest): pass each file with content_base64 (a single-line, escape-safe base64 string) instead of content — so you don't hand-escape ~90KB of HTML/JS/JSON inside one tool call. This is the CANONICAL agent path for a full connector; do NOT hand-roll `curl` against the raw endpoint (that skips connector registration / PAT provisioning). Common traps this design prevents: • Pre-fix bug (2026-06-06): sending just ui-dist HTML wiped server.js + node_modules — connector broke until a full re-upload. Now: those files merge with the GitHub base. • Pre-fix bug: github:true silently read from `main` even when patches were on `dev`. Now: defaults to dev; pass ref:'main' to opt into the legacy path.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| connector_id | string | yes | The connector ID to upload (e.g. 'personal-assistant-ui-mcp') |
| files | array | – | Files to upload — each needs 'path' plus ONE of content (inline string) or content_base64 (escape-safe base64; preferred for multi-file connectors). By default merges with the GitHub state at `ref`.… |
| force | boolean | – | RECOVERY: respawn the connector + re-inject its CURRENT env even when the source is UNCHANGED. Normally an unchanged-source upload no-ops (unchanged:true) and leaves the process running. But a connec… |
| github | boolean | – | If true, pull connector files from GitHub repo at `ref`. Default: false. Combine with files:[] to use GitHub as the base and overlay your files. |
| ref | string | – | GitHub branch to read from for the BASE state. Default: 'dev' (matches ateam_github_patch). Pass 'main' to read from production. Pre-2026-06-05 callers that relied on the silent-main default must pas… |
| replace | boolean | – | Opt into FULL REPLACE: wipe the connector dir and write only the provided `files`. Default: false (= merge with GitHub state at `ref`). Use with intent — sending an incomplete file set with replace:t… |
| solution_id | string | yes | The solution ID |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
ateam_verify ~107
ONE call that returns the REAL runtime end-state of a solution — connectors connected + tools discovered, every declared widget actually rendering, skills deployed — with the EXACT failing gaps. Use this instead of guess-and-check after a deploy/patch: it tells you the truth (what's actually live) and names precisely what's broken, not a generic warning. Reliable from any connection (routes through the Builder, not a direct Core call).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| solution_id | string | yes | The solution ID to verify. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
ateam_verify_consistency ~173
Check that the Builder filesystem state and GitHub state are in sync for a solution. Read-only probe — does NOT trigger a deploy. Returns: • ok: true + drifts: [] if everything matches • ok: false + drifts: [{path, kind}] listing files that differ (kinds: fs_missing, gh_missing, content_differs) Drift can creep in when GitHub writes happen but Builder FS doesn't get the mirror update (network blip, container restart mid-write). Boot sync heals most of it on next backend restart; this tool surfaces drift earlier. Run after a series of ateam_github_patch calls to confirm the Builder backend is consistent with GitHub before you ateam_build_and_run.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| solution_id | string | yes | The solution ID to verify |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
ateam_verify_surface ~260
PROVE a connector ui_plugin actually renders WITH DATA — the required evidence that a user-visible UI fix is done. A plugin fetches its data over postMessage from its parent window, so opening its iframe alone shows the empty state and 'confirms' the very bug you're checking. This opens the plugin in the REAL host surface in headless Chromium, records every MCP tool call it makes, and returns { ok, verdict, visible_text, calls, failures }. It distinguishes 'invented tool name' / 'right tool, no data' / 'plugin never asked'. FAIL-CLOSED: a browser-mcp outage returns ok:false verdict:'inconclusive' (never a soft pass). Run AFTER a UI/data fix; quote visible_text in your report. Requires authentication.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| actor_id | string | – | Optional actor to render as; defaults to the solution's context actor. |
| expect | object | – | Optional assertion: { tools: ['memory.get', ...] } — each MUST be called by the plugin, else ok:false. |
| plugin_id | string | yes | The ui_plugin id to probe, e.g. 'mcp:accounting-mcp:spending-dashboard'. |
| solution_id | string | yes | The solution id. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
What is the io.github.ariekogan/ateam-mcp server?
io.github.ariekogan/ateam-mcp is listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.ariekogan/ateam-mcp. Build, validate, and deploy multi-agent AI solutions from any AI environment. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://mcp.ateam-ai.com/mcp).
Is the io.github.ariekogan/ateam-mcp server safe to use?
io.github.ariekogan/ateam-mcp scores 31 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the io.github.ariekogan/ateam-mcp server expose?
io.github.ariekogan/ateam-mcp exposes 57 tools: ateam_bootstrap, ateam_auth, ateam_get_spec, ateam_get_workflows, ateam_get_examples, and 52 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 15,211 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the io.github.ariekogan/ateam-mcp server require authentication?
Yes. io.github.ariekogan/ateam-mcp asked us for credentials when we connected, so you will need to authorise it in your MCP client before it can do anything.
Is the io.github.ariekogan/ateam-mcp server still maintained?
io.github.ariekogan/ateam-mcp is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 22 September 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.