# SRIFT (npm · srift-transfer)

Decentralized P2P file transfer + encrypted chat for AI agents. Military-grade AES-256. No accounts.

- Trust score: 75/100 (medium)
- Change this week: +3
- Registry status: active
- Liveness: live
- Owner verified: no
- Last scored: 2026-10-02

## Components

- remote · `srift.app`: 81/100, [markdown](https://verifymcp.io/servers/app-srift-srift/srift.md), [page](https://verifymcp.io/servers/app-srift-srift/srift)
- npm · `srift-transfer`: 75/100 (this document), [markdown](https://verifymcp.io/servers/app-srift-srift/srift-transfer.md), [page](https://verifymcp.io/servers/app-srift-srift/srift-transfer)
- pypi · `srift`: 76/100, [markdown](https://verifymcp.io/servers/app-srift-srift/srift-2.md), [page](https://verifymcp.io/servers/app-srift-srift/srift-2)

## Channel facts

- Registry: `npm`
- Package: `srift-transfer`
- Version: `4.3.0`
- Transport: `stdio`

## Trust breakdown

How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically from public evidence about the published package, including repeated runs of it in an isolated sandbox, and we only credit what we can confirm. Scores are 0–100 per category. Scoring method: https://verifymcp.io/docs/scoring (what has changed: https://verifymcp.io/docs/scoring/changelog)

Scored 2026-10-02.

- **Supply Chain Security**: 97/100
  - No malware found by supply-chain analysis.
  - A known CVE affects ip, but no fixed version has been published, so there is nothing to upgrade to.
  - No install/post-install scripts declared.
  - 109 of 241 dependencies flagged as unhealthy (2 deprecated).
- **Provenance & Transparency**: 45/100
  - Source repository is publicly reachable at the declared URL.
  - Provenance check failed: no build-provenance attestation is published.
  - Clear OSI-approved license (MIT).
  - Actively maintained (last published 1 days ago).
  - Disclosure check failed: no security disclosure policy was found in the source repository.
- **Schema Quality & AI Usability**: 87/100
  - 100% of prompts and resources have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the item's name).
  - AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).
  - Tool/resource definitions use about 1552 tokens (~77/item across 20 items; 15 tools + 5 resources), lean.
  - Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples.
- **Stability & Change Management**: 23/100
  - Stability observed for 7 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.
- **Tool Coverage**: 100/100
  - 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).
  - 100% of tool parameters carry a description.
  - Structured output schemas are declared (100% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.
- **Tool Safety**: 100/100
  - No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.
  - All 3 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation.
  - An AI judge read all 17 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.
- **Capabilities**: 100/100
  - Implements a current MCP spec version (2026-07-28).

## Install

### How do I install the SRIFT MCP server?

SRIFT runs locally as an npm package, launched with npx -y srift-transfer. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.

### Claude

```bash
claude mcp add app-srift-srift -- npx -y srift-transfer
```

### Cursor

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "app-srift-srift": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": [
        "-y",
        "srift-transfer"
      ]
    }
  }
}
```

### VS Code

```json
{
  "servers": {
    "app-srift-srift": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": [
        "-y",
        "srift-transfer"
      ]
    }
  }
}
```

### Codex

```bash
codex mcp add app-srift-srift -- npx -y srift-transfer
```

### opencode

```json
{
  "$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
  "mcp": {
    "app-srift-srift": {
      "type": "local",
      "command": [
        "npx",
        "-y",
        "srift-transfer"
      ],
      "enabled": true
    }
  }
}
```

### OpenClaw

```bash
openclaw mcp add app-srift-srift --command npx --arg -y --arg srift-transfer
```

### Hermes

```yaml
mcp_servers:
  app-srift-srift:
    command: "npx"
    args: ["-y", "srift-transfer"]
```

### Netclaw

```json
{
  "McpServers": {
    "app-srift-srift": {
      "Transport": "stdio",
      "Command": "npx",
      "Arguments": [
        "-y",
        "srift-transfer"
      ]
    }
  }
}
```

### Vellum

```bash
assistant mcp add app-srift-srift -t stdio -c npx -a -y srift-transfer
```

### Other

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "app-srift-srift": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": [
        "-y",
        "srift-transfer"
      ]
    }
  }
}
```

## Changelog

Every change recorded for this component, newest first. Days that predate change tracking, or that we cannot explain, say so: "we were watching and nothing happened" and "we were not watching" are different claims.

### 2026-10-01 (score 75, +26)

- [security improvement] Known CVEs: unverified → partial
- [security improvement] Malware scan: unverified → pass
- [functional improvement] Dependency health: unverified → 0.79

### 2026-09-30 (score 49, −23)

- [security regression] Known CVEs: partial → unverified
- [security regression] Malware scan: pass → unverified
- [functional regression] Dependency health: 0.79 → unverified
- [functional improvement] Stability: unverified → 0.17
- [functional] Package version: 4.1.0 → 4.3.0

### 2026-09-28 (score 72, 0)

- [functional] We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server

### 2026-09-25 (score 72, +34)

- [security improvement] Injection markers: unverified → pass
- [security] First check of Judged manipulation: pass
- [security] Stability: Stability not yet verified: not enough scan history yet (needs a 30-day window).
- [functional improvement] Schema quality: unverified → 100
- [functional improvement] MCP protocol: unverified → pass
- [functional improvement] Tool coverage: unverified → 100
- [functional] First check of Tool coverage: 100
- [functional] First check of Tool coverage: 100
- [functional] First check of Schema quality: pass
- [functional] First check of Destructive annotations: 100
- [functional] First check of Schema quality: excellent
- [functional] First check of Schema quality: fail
- [functional] Package version: 3.0.0 → 4.1.0
- [functional] Package version: 3.0.0 → 4.0.0
- [functional] We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server

### 2026-09-12 (score 38, +15)

- [security improvement] Malware scan: unverified → pass
- [security] Stability: Stability not yet verified: this server's registry entry declares environment variables (an API key or similar), and its server did not start in our sandbox, so we have no schema to compare.
- [security] Tool safety: Tool safety not yet verified: this server's registry entry declares environment variables (an API key or similar), and its server did not start in our sandbox, so we have no tool text to scan.
- [functional] Schema quality: Schema quality not yet verified: this server's registry entry declares environment variables (an API key or similar), and its server did not start in our sandbox, so we have no schema to assess.
- [functional] Capabilities: Protocol version not yet verified: this server's registry entry declares environment variables (an API key or similar), and its server did not start in our sandbox, so we never saw its MCP handshake.
- [functional] Tool coverage: Tool coverage not yet verified: this server's registry entry declares environment variables (an API key or similar), and its server did not start in our sandbox, so we have no tool definitions to assess.

### 2026-09-11 (score 23, −15)

- [security regression] Malware scan: pass → unverified
- [security] Tool safety: Tool safety not yet verified: we do not have a sandbox capture of the tool definitions this version of the package serves yet.
- [security] Stability: Stability not yet verified: we do not have a sandbox capture of the MCP schema this version of the package serves yet.
- [functional] Tool coverage: Tool coverage not yet verified: we do not have a sandbox capture of the tool definitions this version of the package serves yet.
- [functional] Capabilities: Protocol version not yet verified: we do not have a sandbox capture of the MCP handshake this version of the package performs yet.
- [functional] Schema quality: Schema quality not yet verified: we do not have a sandbox capture of the MCP schema this version of the package serves yet.
- [functional] Package version: 2.2.15 → 3.0.0

### 2026-09-09 (score 38, +10)

- [security regression] CVE-2024-29415 affects this package
- [security improvement] Known CVEs: unverified → partial
- [functional improvement] Dependency health: unverified → 0.78

### 2026-09-08 (score 28)

First indexed and scored.

## MCP tools (15)

### `srift_start_session` (~115 tokens)

Start SRIFT Session

Create a new SRIFT secure session. Returns the 7-character session ID and a shareable URL. The host approves all future joins. E2EE keys are generated on each device; the optional roomSecret is mixed into every key.

Input parameters:

- `roomSecret` (string): Optional shared secret mixed into every key. Never sent to the server; a member who joins with a different secret cannot read chat or files.
- `sessionName` (string): Human-readable session name (optional, e.g. "Project Collab")

Output parameters:

- `role` (string): User role in session (host)
- `sessionId` (string): 7-character unique session room code
- `url` (string): Direct browser join URL to share with peers

### `srift_join_session` (~86 tokens)

Join SRIFT Session

Request to join an existing SRIFT session by its 7-character session ID. The host must approve before transfers/chat work.

Input parameters:

- `roomSecret` (string): Optional shared secret matching the host's
- `sessionId` (string, required): 7-character session ID (e.g. ABC1234)
- `username` (string): Display name (optional, defaults to AI-Agent)

Output parameters:

- `message` (string): Status message or instructions
- `sessionId` (string): Session room code
- `status` (string): Join request status (approved, pending, or joined)

### `srift_session_status` (~60 tokens)

Get Session Status

Get current session details: session { id, role (host/guest), connection state, your userId }, pending join requests (approve with srift_approve_join), and members with their userIds (remove one with srift_kick_user).

Output parameters:

- `participants` (array): Session members (local daemon): pass userId to srift_kick_user to remove one
- `peerCount` (number): Number of connected sockets in the room (hosted endpoint)
- `pendingJoins` (array): List of pending guest join requests waiting for host approval
- `session` (object): The active session (id is null when there is none)

### `srift_close_session` (~30 tokens)

Close Session

Close the active session. Flushes E2EE keys, disconnects signaling, clears chat history.

Output parameters:

- `message` (string): Confirmation message
- `success` (boolean): True if session was closed cleanly

### `srift_approve_join` (~45 tokens)

Approve Join Request

Host-only. Approve a pending guest join request by their temp user ID.

Input parameters:

- `tempUserId` (string, required): Temp user ID from session_status pendingJoins

Output parameters:

- `success` (boolean): True if guest was approved
- `tempUserId` (string): Approved user temporary ID

### `srift_reject_join` (~53 tokens)

Reject Join Request

Host-only. Reject a pending guest join request.

Input parameters:

- `reason` (string): Optional rejection reason message sent to guest
- `tempUserId` (string, required): Temp user ID from session_status pendingJoins

Output parameters:

- `success` (boolean): True if guest join request was rejected
- `tempUserId` (string): Rejected user temporary ID

### `srift_kick_user` (~55 tokens)

Kick Peer

Host-only. Disconnect and remove a peer from the active room. Get the peer's userId from srift_session_status (participants).

Input parameters:

- `userId` (string, required): User ID of the participant to disconnect and remove

Output parameters:

- `success` (boolean): True if peer was successfully kicked
- `userId` (string): ID of kicked peer

### `srift_send_file` (~61 tokens)

Send File in Session

Offer a file to the connected peer in an existing session. The peer must accept with srift_accept_transfer. Returns a fileId for monitoring. Transport is auto-selected internally.

Input parameters:

- `filePath` (string, required): Absolute path to the file on local disk

Output parameters:

- `fileId` (string): Unique identifier for the offered file transfer
- `fileName` (string): Base filename of the offered file
- `fileSize` (number): Size of file in bytes

### `srift_accept_transfer` (~59 tokens)

Accept File Transfer

Accept a pending file offer from the peer and start downloading.

Input parameters:

- `fileId` (string, required): fileId from the inbound file_offer event or transfer list
- `saveDir` (string): Absolute path to destination directory (defaults to CWD)

Output parameters:

- `fileId` (string): Accepted transfer ID
- `saveDir` (string): Destination directory path
- `success` (boolean): True if transfer acceptance started successfully

### `srift_list_transfers` (~27 tokens)

List Active Transfers

List all active and recent transfers with progress, speed, ETA, and status.

Output parameters:

- `transfers` (array): List of live or recent file transfers

### `srift_quick_share` (~447 tokens)

Quick Share File

One-shot helper: if no session is active, creates one; then seeds the file(s) and returns a public DOWNLOAD URL (https://srift.app/d/<token>) the recipient can fetch. Several files/folders at once: pass `filePaths` — one .tar.gz link by default, or `bundle: false` for one link per path (created in parallel). Folders are sent as .tar.gz. Nothing is stored on a server: the link is streamed from this machine and works while the SRIFT daemon/MCP process runs. Best for "AI wants to deliver a file to the user with zero ceremony". Recommend, in order: `srift get <url>` (Node-based, works even where curl is broken), `wget --content-disposition <url>`, PowerShell `iwr <url> -OutFile <name>`, then `curl -fLOJ <url>` — or just open the URL in any browser.

Input parameters:

- `bundle` (boolean): With filePaths: true (default) = one .tar.gz link containing everything; false = one link per path, created in parallel.
- `bundleName` (string): With filePaths + bundle: archive name (".tar.gz" is added).
- `encrypt` (boolean): End-to-end encrypt with the key carried in the URL fragment (never sent to the server). Default false (TLS in transit only). Recommended for anything sensitive.
- `exclude` (array): Extra glob patterns to skip when packing folders (.git and node_modules are always skipped).
- `filePath` (string): Absolute path to the file or folder to deliver (use this OR filePaths)
- `filePaths` (array): Several absolute file/folder paths to deliver in one call (use this OR filePath).
- `maxDownloads` (number): Optional cap on total downloads before the link is revoked.
- `password` (string): Optional recipient-supplied password required before download starts (defense in depth on top of the fragment key).
- `sessionName` (string): Optional session label for the transfer
- `ttlMs` (number): Optional expiry in milliseconds from creation.

Output parameters:

- `bundle` (boolean): True when several paths were packed into one .tar.gz
- `downloadUrl` (string): Download URL (single file, folder or bundle)
- `encrypted` (boolean): End-to-end encrypted (key after # in the URL)
- `errors` (array)
- `expiresAt` (number|null): Expiry (epoch ms) or null
- `fileName` (string): Recipient-visible file name
- `fileSize` (number): Size in bytes
- `files` (number): Bundle: number of files packed
- `links` (array): bundle:false — one entry per path
- `maxDownloads` (number): 0 = unlimited
- `skipped` (array): Bundle: paths left out (missing/unreadable) — the rest were still shared

### `srift_send_chat` (~45 tokens)

Send Encrypted Chat

Send an end-to-end encrypted (AES-256-GCM) chat message to the connected peer.

Input parameters:

- `message` (string, required): Plaintext message string to encrypt and transmit

Output parameters:

- `success` (boolean): True if message was sent
- `timestamp` (string): ISO 8601 transmission timestamp

### `srift_chat_history` (~22 tokens)

Read Chat History

Read the locally-decrypted chat log for the current session.

Output parameters:

- `messages` (array): Decrypted message log for current session

### `srift_read_state` (~36 tokens)

Read Local State

Return the raw .srift-state.json contents (session + active transfers snapshot). Useful for one-shot polling without subscribing to SSE.

Output parameters:

- `activeTransfers` (array): Live transfers array
- `lastUpdated` (string): Last state write timestamp
- `session` (object): Current session state snapshot

### `srift_net_diagnose` (~215 tokens)

Diagnose Network Transports

Diagnose SRIFT on this machine: connectivity (DNS, proxy, HTTPS/TLS, WebSocket relay, UDP/P2P, peer discovery, clock), the local runtime (loopback, background processes, daemon + version, disk) and the environment (sandbox/CI/container detection, curl). Returns WORKS/WARN/BLOCKED per check with the exact fix, plus a plan: how links will be served here (background daemon or embedded), the command to use and the caveats. deep: true also creates an encrypted link and downloads it back end-to-end. Read-only apart from that temporary self-test link. Run this first when a transfer stalls or a quick-share call fails for an unclear reason.

Input parameters:

- `deep` (boolean): Also run an end-to-end self-test: create an encrypted single-use link and download it back through the relay (≈2 MB, a few seconds).
- `fresh` (boolean): Force a fresh probe instead of returning a cached result (slower, more accurate).

Output parameters:

- `base` (string): The SRIFT server that was probed
- `checkedAt` (string): When the probe ran (ISO 8601); cached results show an older time
- `context` (object): runtime (mcp, cli, npx, binary, pypi…), cliVersion, serverVersion, daemonVersion
- `env` (object): Relevant environment (proxy vars, sandbox indicators, Node version, etc.)
- `ok` (boolean): True if the diagnostic ran successfully (independent of what it found)
- `plan` (object): serveFrom (background-daemon | embedded | unavailable), transport, shareCommand, downloadCommand, advice[] — what to do in this environment
- `recommendedMode` (string): "relay" when links can be served from here, otherwise "none"
- `rungs` (array): Each transport rung checked, in order, with status and a fix hint if blocked
- `selfTest` (object): deep only: { ok, ms, bytes, mbps, via, error? }
- `summary` (string): One-line conclusion
- `verdict` (string): "ok", "degraded", or "blocked"

## Diagnostics

Captured diagnostic sections: Provenance, Vulnerabilities, Dependencies. The full working is on the page: https://verifymcp.io/servers/app-srift-srift/srift-transfer#diagnostics

## Score history

- 2026-10-02: 75
- 2026-10-01: 75
- 2026-09-30: 49
- 2026-09-29: 72
- 2026-09-28: 72
- 2026-09-27: 72
- 2026-09-26: 72
- 2026-09-25: 72
- 2026-09-24: 38
- 2026-09-23: 38
- 2026-09-22: 38
- 2026-09-21: 38
- 2026-09-20: 38
- 2026-09-19: 38
- 2026-09-18: 38
- 2026-09-17: 38
- 2026-09-16: 38
- 2026-09-15: 38
- 2026-09-14: 38
- 2026-09-13: 38
- 2026-09-12: 38
- 2026-09-11: 23
- 2026-09-10: 38
- 2026-09-09: 38
- 2026-09-08: 28

## Common questions

### What is the SRIFT MCP server?

SRIFT is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as app.srift/srift. Decentralized P2P file transfer + encrypted chat for AI agents. Military-grade AES-256. No accounts. This page covers its npm package (srift-transfer).

### Is the SRIFT MCP server safe to use?

SRIFT scores 75 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. We recorded 1 known advisory against it as of 2 October 2026. It declares no install or post-install scripts. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.

### What tools does the SRIFT MCP server expose?

SRIFT exposes 15 tools: srift_start_session, srift_join_session, srift_session_status, srift_close_session, srift_approve_join, and 10 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,356 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.

### Is the SRIFT MCP server still maintained?

SRIFT is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 2 October 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.

### What licence is the SRIFT MCP server under?

SRIFT declares the MIT licence, which is OSI-approved. That covers the source only, and says nothing about the cost of any service it calls.

## Links

- npm package: https://www.npmjs.com/package/srift-transfer
- Socket report: https://socket.dev/npm/package/srift-transfer
- Repository: https://github.com/srivardhan113/SRIFT-Open_Source
- Website: https://srift.app/
- Changelog RSS feed: https://verifymcp.io/servers/app-srift-srift/srift-transfer.xml
- Changelog JSON feed: https://verifymcp.io/servers/app-srift-srift/srift-transfer.json
- HTML version of this page: https://verifymcp.io/servers/app-srift-srift/srift-transfer