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io.github.anima-labs-ai/anima

REMOTE · MCP.USEANIMA.SH

Give your AI agent an identity it owns: email inbox, US phone number, SMS, voice, and a vault.

Available components

0 this week 18 Trust /100

Last scanned (8 hours ago)

Scores higher than 4% of remote servers

Reachable. Last reached 5 Nov 2026.

Category Communication

Trust breakdown (7 categories)

How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →

Endpoint Security46
Transport & Reachability0
Schema Quality & AI Usability0
  • Schema not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's schema, or could read only part of its tool list.Unverified
Stability & Change Management0
  • Stability not yet verified: not enough scan history yet (needs a 30-day window).Unverified
Tool Coverage0
  • Tool coverage not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's tools, or could read only part of the list.Unverified
Tool Safety0
  • Tool safety not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's tools, or could read only part of the list.Unverified
Capabilities0
  • Capabilities not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's capabilities.Unverified

Unverified: 5 categories

Categories scored 0 because we could not verify them: authentication we do not have, an unreachable endpoint, or not enough scan history. We only credit what we can confirm.

Changelog

Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.

  • 10 Oct 26 −18
    • Endpoint reachability: behind authorisation → not serving MCP ▼ security
    • Transport: unverified → fail ▼ security
    • HTTPS: pass → unverified ▼ security
    • Authorization: pass → unverified ▼ security
    • Tool safety: Tool safety not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's tools, or could read only part of the list. security
    • Tool coverage: Tool coverage not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's tools, or could read only part of the list. functional
    • Capabilities: Capabilities not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's capabilities. functional
    • Schema quality: Schema not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's schema, or could read only part of its tool list. functional
  • 28 Sept 26 0
    • We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
  • 25 Sept 26 0
    • We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
  • 21 Sept 26 0
    • Endpoint reachability: reachable → behind authorisation ▼ security
    • Tool safety: pass → unverified ▼ security
    • Stability: 0.40 → unverified ▼ security
    • Transport: pass → unverified ▼ security
    • Authorization: The endpoint enforces authorisation, advertised via RFC 9728 protected-resource metadata. security
    • Capabilities: pass → unverified ▼ functional
    • Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
    • Schema quality: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
  • 9 Sept 26 0
    • Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
  • 8 Sept 26 0
    • Transport: unverified → pass ▲ security
    • Injection markers: unverified → pass ▲ security
    • First check of Judged manipulation: pass security
    • Authorization: Authorisation is enforced on tool calls, advertised via RFC 9728 protected-resource metadata. Discovery is public, which costs nothing: no tool can be invoked without a token. security
    • MCP protocol: unverified → pass ▲ functional
    • Schema quality: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
    • Tool coverage: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
    • First check of Schema quality: fail functional
    • First check of Schema quality: excellent functional
    • First check of Schema quality: fail functional
    • First check of Capabilities: pass functional
    • First check of Destructive annotations: 100 functional
    • First check of Tool coverage: 100 functional
    • First check of Tool coverage: 100 functional
  • 4 Sept 26 0

    First indexed and scored.

Diagnostics

Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.

Captured 5 Nov 2026 · Probed https://mcp.useanima.sh/mcp

TLS valid

Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .

Subject Issuer Valid from Valid until Key Signature Serial
CN=mcp.useanima.sh CN=WR3,O=Google Trust Services,C=US 26 Sept 2026 25 Dec 2026 RSA 2048 SHA256-RSA b4cfe835d8f902290ae1e6a7c101c2c7
SANs: mcp.useanima.sh
CN=WR3,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) CN=GTS Root R1,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US 13 Dec 2023 20 Feb 2029 RSA 2048 SHA256-RSA 7ff005a91568d63abc22861684aa4b5a
CN=GTS Root R1,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE 19 Jun 2020 28 Jan 2028 RSA 4096 SHA256-RSA 77bd0d6cdb36f91aea210fc4f058d30d

Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →

DNSSEC insecure

Validation of mcp.useanima.sh. — Not signed

Zone DS Keys Algorithms Outcome
. trust_anchor 20326, 38696 8, 8 Verified
sh. present 34349 8 Verified
useanima.sh. absent Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation
Authentication Inconclusive

We could not reach the endpoint well enough to judge its authorisation posture.

Result Inconclusive
HTTP status 503

Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →

Transports 2 probes
Transport URL Outcome Status Location
streamable-http https://mcp.useanima.sh/mcp HTTP error 503
http (plaintext) http://mcp.useanima.sh/mcp Inconclusive 503
MCP tools · 67 exposed · ~8,116 tokens

The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →

Tool Tokens
vault_credential_get_totp ~80

Get the current TOTP code for a credential that has a TOTP secret configured. Returns the live 6-digit code derived from the stored secret — the secret itself is never disclosed.

NameTypeReqDescription
agentIdstring–Agent ID that owns the credential. Optional when using an agent-bound credential.
idstringyesCredential ID.

Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.

No examples provided.

vault_credential_list ~82

List credentials in an agent vault with optional type filter. Use to browse stored secrets before reading, updating, or deleting entries. Sensitive fields are masked.

NameTypeReqDescription
agentIdstring–Agent ID whose vault to list. Optional when using an agent-bound credential (ak_* or oat_* with agentId).
typestring–Optional credential type filter.
NameTypeReqDescription
countnumber––
cursorstring|null––
has_moreboolean––
itemsarray––
next_offsetnumber––
totalnumber––

No examples provided.

vault_credential_request_cancel ~61

Cancel a pending credential request by ID. Invalidates the single-use fill link so the human can no longer submit a value. Use when the request is no longer needed or was created in error.

NameTypeReqDescription
requestIdstringyesCredential-request ID.

Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.

No examples provided.

vault_credential_request_create ~275

Request a credential from a HUMAN without the agent or LLM ever seeing the secret. When the connecting MCP client supports inline elicitation, the human is shown a form to type the secret directly — the tool returns `status: FULFILLED` with the `credentialId` in one call, no link needed. Otherwise it returns a single-use fill link (`fillUrl`, emailed to the org owner); poll vault_credential_request_status until `status` is FULFILLED, then use the returned `credentialId` as a normal vault credential. Use this when a flow needs a secret the agent doesn't hold and can't safely be given (passwords, API keys, card numbers).

NameTypeReqDescription
agentIdstring–Agent ID whose vault the requested credential lands in. Optional when using an agent-bound credential.
namestringyesHuman-readable name for the requested credential.
notifyOwnerboolean–Whether to email the single-use fill link to the org owner. Defaults to true.
reasonstringyesPlain-language reason shown to the human explaining why the credential is needed.
ttlSecondsnumber–Optional fill-link lifetime in seconds before the request expires.
typestringyesCredential type the human will be asked to fill: login, secure_note, or card.

Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.

No examples provided.

vault_credential_request_fill ~66

Internal: submit a credential-request secret from the Anima UI widget. Not for direct agent use.

NameTypeReqDescription
fillTokenstringyesSingle-use fill token from the ui-tier render-data.
valuesobjectyesThe secret field values the human entered in the widget.

Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.

No examples provided.

vault_credential_request_status ~85

Get the status of a pending credential request by ID. Poll this after vault_credential_request_create until `status` is FULFILLED, then use `credentialId` as a normal vault credential. `maskedPreview` shows a redacted hint of the filled value once available — the plaintext is never returned.

NameTypeReqDescription
requestIdstringyesCredential-request ID.

Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.

No examples provided.

vault_credential_search ~108

Search vault credentials by keyword across names and content. Use when you know part of the name, URL, or username but not the exact credential ID. Different access pattern from vault_credential_list — list is paginated browsing, search is text-query lookup.

NameTypeReqDescription
agentIdstring–Agent ID whose vault to search. Optional when using an agent-bound credential.
searchstringyesSearch text matched against names and content.
typestring–Optional credential type filter.
NameTypeReqDescription
countnumber––
cursorstring|null––
has_moreboolean––
itemsarray––
next_offsetnumber––
totalnumber––

No examples provided.

vault_credential_update ~223

Update an existing vault credential by ID, including optional structured sections and metadata flags. Use to rotate passwords or revise stored details.

NameTypeReqDescription
agentIdstring–Agent ID that owns the credential. Optional when using an agent-bound credential.
apiKeyobject–Optional updated API key payload. Changing allowedHosts requires a master key.
cardobject–Optional updated card payload.
certificateobject–Optional updated certificate payload.
favoriteboolean–Optional updated favorite flag.
fieldsarray–Optional updated custom fields.
idstringyesCredential ID to update.
identityobject–Optional updated identity payload.
loginobject–Optional updated login payload.
namestring–Optional updated name.
notesstring–Optional updated note text.
oauthTokenobject–Optional updated OAuth token payload.
revealPolicystring–Optional reveal-policy change. Upgrading standard → brokered needs UPDATE access; downgrading brokered → standard is master-key-only.

Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.

No examples provided.

vault_credential_use ~231

Make an outbound HTTPS call with a stored credential attached SERVER-SIDE, and get the upstream response. Use this to act with a secret (call an API, hit an authed endpoint) WITHOUT ever seeing the plaintext — the platform injects the credential on the wire. The target host must be on the credential's allowlist. Works even for `brokered` credentials that can never be revealed. Prefer this over trying to read a secret: you can use it, you cannot see it.

NameTypeReqDescription
agentIdstring–Agent ID that owns the credential. Optional when using an agent-bound credential.
bodystring–Raw request body (encode JSON yourself).
headersobject–Extra request headers. Any Authorization / auth header you set is IGNORED and replaced by the real credential.
idstringyesCredential ID to broker the call with.
methodstringyesHTTP method for the outbound call.
urlstringyesAbsolute https:// URL to call. Its host MUST be on the credential's allowlist (allowedHosts / login URIs).

Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.

No examples provided.

vault_exchange_token_for_injection ~130

Exchange a vtk_ vault token for the PLAINTEXT credential, to inject into a trusted client process (a CLI, the browser extension) — NOT to read it yourself. The API gates this to injector credentials: it only succeeds for a master key or a key carrying the `vault:inject` scope; a plain agent key gets 403. If you are an agent that needs to USE a secret, do NOT use this — use vault_credential_use (the server-side broker), which never reveals the secret.

NameTypeReqDescription
tokenstringyesThe vtk_ vault token to exchange.

Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.

No examples provided.

vault_provision ~78

Provision a credential vault for an agent. Required before vault_credential_create can be called against a freshly-created agent — without a vault, credentials have nowhere to live. Idempotent: returns the existing vault if one already exists. Master-key only.

NameTypeReqDescription
agentIdstringyesAgent ID to provision a vault for. Master-key only.

Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.

No examples provided.

voice_list ~131

List available AI voices for placing phone calls. The catalog is multilingual — filter by language or gender. Each voice includes descriptive metadata and a vendor-neutral audio preview URL (sampleUrl), plus the voice ID needed for phone_call_create.

NameTypeReqDescription
genderstring–Filter by voice gender.
languagestring–Filter by BASE language code — the bare two-letter code, e.g. 'en' or 'fr'. Matching is a prefix test against the catalog's own base codes, so a region tag like 'en-US' matches nothing. Call without…
NameTypeReqDescription
countnumber––
cursorstring|null––
has_moreboolean––
itemsarray––
next_offsetnumber––
totalnumber––

No examples provided.

webhook_delete ~53

Delete a webhook subscription by ID. Permanently removes the configuration and stops future deliveries. To temporarily pause without deleting, use webhook_set with { id, active: false }.

NameTypeReqDescription
idstringyesWebhook ID
NameTypeReqDescription
deletedboolean––
idstring––

No examples provided.

webhook_get ~40

Get a webhook subscription by ID. Returns the full configuration (URL, subscribed events, active state, description).

NameTypeReqDescription
idstringyesWebhook ID

Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.

No examples provided.

webhook_list ~62

List webhook subscriptions for the calling org with cursor pagination. Use to enumerate existing webhooks before set/delete operations.

NameTypeReqDescription
cursorstring–Pagination cursor from a previous list call
limitinteger–Maximum number of webhooks to return (1-100)
NameTypeReqDescription
countnumber––
cursorstring|null––
has_moreboolean––
itemsarray––
next_offsetnumber––
totalnumber––

No examples provided.

webhook_set ~275

Create or update a webhook subscription (upsert). If `id` is provided the call updates that webhook (PUT). If omitted it creates a new one (POST) — `url` and `events` are then required. Use this for declarative 'ensure webhook X exists' workflows.

NameTypeReqDescription
activeboolean–Whether the webhook is active. Defaults to true on create.
authConfig––Auth the platform presents to your endpoint IN ADDITION to the always-on X-Anima-Signature HMAC — a bearer token, HTTP basic, or a custom header. Pass { type: 'none' } to remove it.
descriptionstring–Optional human-readable label
eventsarray–List of event types to subscribe to (e.g. 'message.received', 'email.bounced'). Required on create; optional on update.
idstring–Webhook ID. Present → updates that webhook (PUT). Omitted → creates a new one (POST).
maxAttemptsinteger–Max delivery attempts before dead-lettering (default 3)
rateLimitPerMinuteinteger–Max deliveries per minute to this endpoint; omit for unlimited
urlstring–HTTPS endpoint URL that will receive event payloads. Required on create; optional on update.

Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.

No examples provided.

webhook_test ~86

Send a test event payload to a webhook to verify the endpoint is reachable and signature verification works. Returns a deliveryId you can correlate with your endpoint's logs.

NameTypeReqDescription
eventstring–Event type to simulate in the test payload (e.g. 'message.received'). Defaults to 'message.received'.
idstringyesWebhook ID to send a test delivery to

Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.

No examples provided.

Install

How do I install the io.github.anima-labs-ai/anima MCP server?

io.github.anima-labs-ai/anima is a hosted endpoint at https://mcp.useanima.sh/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.

remote · mcp.useanima.sh

# add to Claude Code
claude mcp add --transport http anima-labs-ai-anima 'https://mcp.useanima.sh/mcp'
Common questions

What is the io.github.anima-labs-ai/anima MCP server?

io.github.anima-labs-ai/anima is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.anima-labs-ai/anima. Give your AI agent an identity it owns: email inbox, US phone number, SMS, voice, and a vault. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://mcp.useanima.sh/mcp).

Is the io.github.anima-labs-ai/anima MCP server safe to use?

io.github.anima-labs-ai/anima scores 18 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.

What tools does the io.github.anima-labs-ai/anima MCP server expose?

io.github.anima-labs-ai/anima exposes 67 tools: agent_create, agent_get, agent_list, agent_update, agent_delete, and 62 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 8,116 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.

Does the io.github.anima-labs-ai/anima MCP server require authentication?

Its publisher declares no required credentials for io.github.anima-labs-ai/anima. We have not been able to confirm that against the live endpoint, and a server can require authorisation without declaring it here.

Is the io.github.anima-labs-ai/anima MCP server still maintained?

io.github.anima-labs-ai/anima is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 5 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.