Agent Passport System — Cryptographic Identity for AI Agents
REMOTE · MCP.AEOESS.COM · 2 COMPONENTS · SCANNED SEP 22
Cryptographic identity, delegation, governance, and commerce for AI agents. 152 tools.
Available components
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security57
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to connect, but we couldn't read the tool list to see what that exposes. View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability0
- Transport blocked by authentication: the endpoint requires auth we don't have to verify sse. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
Schema Quality & AI Usability0
- Schema blocked by authentication: the endpoint requires auth we don't have to read it. See how to fix → Unverified
Stability & Change Management0
- Stability not yet verified: not enough scan history yet (needs a 30-day window).Unverified
Tool Coverage0
- Tool coverage blocked by authentication: the endpoint requires auth we don't have to read its tools.Unverified
Tool Safety0
- Tool safety blocked by authentication: the endpoint requires auth we don't have to read its tools.Unverified
Capabilities0
- Capabilities blocked by authentication: the endpoint requires auth we don't have to read them. See how to fix → Unverified
Unverified: 6 categories
Categories scored 0 because we could not verify them: authentication we do not have, an unreachable endpoint, or not enough scan history. We only credit what we can confirm. Claim this server and supply a read-only token to verify it and lift the score.
How do I install the Agent Passport System — Cryptographic Identity for AI Agents MCP server?
Agent Passport System — Cryptographic Identity for AI Agents is a hosted endpoint at https://mcp.aeoess.com/sse, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · mcp.aeoess.com
claude mcp add --transport http aeoess-agent-passport-mcp 'https://mcp.aeoess.com/sse'
{
"mcpServers": {
"aeoess-agent-passport-mcp": {
"url": "https://mcp.aeoess.com/sse"
}
}
} {
"servers": {
"aeoess-agent-passport-mcp": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://mcp.aeoess.com/sse"
}
}
} [mcp_servers.aeoess-agent-passport-mcp] url = "https://mcp.aeoess.com/sse"
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"aeoess-agent-passport-mcp": {
"type": "remote",
"url": "https://mcp.aeoess.com/sse",
"enabled": true
}
}
} openclaw mcp add aeoess-agent-passport-mcp --url 'https://mcp.aeoess.com/sse' --transport streamable-http
mcp_servers:
aeoess-agent-passport-mcp:
url: "https://mcp.aeoess.com/sse" {
"McpServers": {
"aeoess-agent-passport-mcp": {
"Transport": "http",
"Url": "https://mcp.aeoess.com/sse"
}
}
} assistant mcp add aeoess-agent-passport-mcp -t streamable-http -u 'https://mcp.aeoess.com/sse'
{
"mcpServers": {
"aeoess-agent-passport-mcp": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://mcp.aeoess.com/sse"
}
}
} The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 31 Aug 26 −47
- Endpoint reachability: reachable → behind authorisation ▼ security
- Tool safety: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Transport: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Stability: 0.93 → unverified ▼ security
- Authorization: Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to connect, but we couldn't read the tool list to see what that exposes. security
- Capabilities: pass → unverified ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- Schema quality: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- 29 Aug 26 0
- A breaking change shipped without a version bump: still 3.3.0 ▼ security
- Tool “evaluate_threshold” was removed ▼ security
- New tool “sign_amendment” functional
- New tool “verify_amendment” functional
- New tool “propose_amendment” functional
- 28 Aug 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 83 to 87. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 25 days of observed history at the previous scan, 26 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 26 Aug 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Aug 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 73 to 77. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 22 days of observed history at the previous scan, 23 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 11 Aug 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 7 Aug 26 0
- Authorization: Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 150 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. security
- Schema quality: unverified → fail ▼ functional
- Schema quality: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
- Tool coverage: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
- Schema quality: unverified → poor ▲ functional
- Schema quality: unverified → pass ▲ functional
- First check of Tool coverage: 67 functional
- MCP protocol: Implements a current MCP spec version (2026-07-28). functional
- This server's schema is too large to store in full, so we cannot compare its tools day to day functional
- 3 Aug 26 0
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 22 Sept 2026 · Probed https://mcp.aeoess.com/sse
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=mcp.aeoess.com | CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 25 Jul 2026 | 23 Oct 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 573c4f46b597d0d48a2f939c8d6163c4ada |
| SANs: mcp.aeoess.com | ||||||
| CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 4df3b15dd6c0784c507cd37b58e6f115 |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of mcp.aeoess.com. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| com. | present | 19718 | 13 | Verified |
| aeoess.com. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 404 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| content-security-policy | default-src 'none' |
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| sse | https://mcp.aeoess.com/sse | Auth required | 401 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://mcp.aeoess.com/sse | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://mcp.aeoess.com/sse |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
is_evidence_fresh ~100
Check whether typed attestation evidence is still fresh. rotating: ttl required; snapshot: maxAge optional; static: always fresh.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| max_age | number | – | Seconds (optional for snapshot) |
| now | string | – | ISO 8601 override for current time |
| ttl | number | – | Seconds (required for rotating) |
| type | string | yes | – |
| valid_at | string | yes | ISO 8601 timestamp evidence was produced |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
is_key_active ~65
Check if a public key is currently authorized for active operations in a DID document. SDK convenience check; gateway enforcement is authoritative.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| did_document | – | yes | RotatableDIDDocument JSON object |
| public_key | string | yes | Hex-encoded Ed25519 public key to check |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
issue_passport ~142
Issue a complete agent passport with keys, signed passport, attestation summary, and optional values floor in a single call. The server silently captures Tier 0 observed signals and computes a passport grade (0-3). Use this to onboard any agent — no npm install required.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| attest_to_floor | boolean | – | If true, attests to the default values floor (F-001 through F-008) |
| capabilities | array | – | Agent capabilities (e.g., ['research', 'writing']) |
| mission | string | – | Agent mission description |
| name | string | yes | Agent name (human-readable) |
| owner | string | yes | Owner/principal identifier |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_agents ~43
List registered agents from the agent registry (agora/agents.json).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| status_filter | string | – | Filter by status: active, pending, retired (default: all) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_issuance_records ~42
List all stored issuance records with their passport grades. Shows how many passports have been issued in this session and their trust posture. Useful for monitoring issuance patterns.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_profiles ~30
Show available tool profiles. Set APS_PROFILE env var to limit exposed tools (e.g. APS_PROFILE=data).
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_tasks ~16
List all tasks in the coordination store.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_tools_for_scope ~98
List available MCP tools filtered by delegation scope. Pass your delegation scopes to see which tools you can use. Scopes: identity, delegation, principal, reputation, coordination, communication, governance, commerce, data, gateway, network, temporal, attribution, settlement, capability, mutual-auth. Use ['*'] for all tools.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| scopes | array | yes | Your delegation scopes, e.g. ['identity', 'delegation', 'commerce'] |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
load_values_floor ~35
Load a Values Floor from YAML. Sets the floor principles for policy evaluation.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| yaml | string | yes | Values Floor YAML content |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
mutualAuthBuildCertificate ~296
Build and sign a mutual-auth certificate identifying an agent or information system. Returns the signed MutualAuthCertificate object ready to carry into a handshake. The issuer's Ed25519 private key (hex) signs over the canonical (JCS) form.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| attestation_grade | – | – | For agents: APS attestation grade 0-3 |
| binding | string | yes | For an agent: the APS agent_id. For an IS: the resource domain (e.g., mcp://api.bank.com) |
| capabilities | array | – | Optional capability tags |
| issuer_id | string | yes | Issuer identifier |
| issuer_privkey_hex | string | yes | Ed25519 private key (hex) of the issuer — used to sign |
| issuer_pubkey_hex | string | yes | Ed25519 public key (hex) of the issuer |
| issuer_role | string | yes | Role of the issuer |
| not_after | number | yes | Latest valid time (unix ms) |
| not_before | number | yes | Earliest valid time (unix ms) |
| role | string | yes | Role of the subject this cert identifies |
| subject_id | string | yes | Stable subject identifier (e.g., agent DID, IS endpoint URL) |
| subject_pubkey_hex | string | yes | Ed25519 public key (hex) of the subject |
| supported_versions | array | yes | Protocol versions supported, highest first (e.g., ['1.0']) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
mutualAuthDeriveSession ~127
Derive the shared mutual-auth session record from both sides' Attests. Both parties MUST compute identical session_id given identical inputs (canonical JCS + sha256 of chosen_version, both cert ids, both nonces). Returns a MutualAuthSession with session_id + both certificates + expiry bounds, or failure reason.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_attest | – | yes | The agent's MutualAuthAttest |
| is_attest | – | yes | The information system's MutualAuthAttest |
| now_ms | number | – | Current unix ms — defaults to Date.now() |
| policy | – | yes | MutualAuthPolicy |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
mutualAuthVerifyAttest ~209
Verify a MutualAuthAttest against policy and trust anchors. Runs all 10 verification checks: signature, version negotiation, nonce match, timestamp freshness, certificate validity, issuer anchor check, binding constraints, downgrade detection, attestation grade policy, capability policy. Returns ok:true on success or a failure reason on rejection.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| attest | – | yes | MutualAuthAttest to verify |
| expected_own_nonce_b64 | string | yes | The nonce we sent in our own prior hello or attest |
| expected_peer_nonce_b64 | string | yes | The nonce the peer sent in their prior hello or attest |
| now_ms | number | – | Current unix ms — defaults to Date.now() |
| policy | – | yes | MutualAuthPolicy (accepted_versions, min_agent_grade, required_capabilities, max_clock_skew_ms, max_session_ms) |
| revoked_anchor_ids | array | – | IDs of anchors revoked since the bundle was issued |
| trust_anchors | array | yes | TrustAnchor[] — local trusted roots |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
mutualAuthVerifyTrustBundle ~111
Verify a TrustAnchorBundle signature and freshness. Caller supplies the list of trusted publisher public keys (root configuration). Returns ok:true on success or failure reason (untrusted_publisher, signature_invalid, bundle_expired, not_yet_valid).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| bundle | – | yes | TrustAnchorBundle to verify |
| now_ms | number | – | Current unix ms — defaults to Date.now() |
| trusted_publisher_pubkeys_hex | array | yes | List of Ed25519 pubkeys (hex) authorized to publish bundles |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
parse_governance_block_html ~42
Extract a governance block from an HTML page. Looks for APS governance script tags or meta tags.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| html | string | yes | HTML content to parse |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
post_agora_message ~97
Post a signed message to the Agora feed. Anyone can read, everything is signed.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| content | string | yes | Message body (markdown) |
| reply_to | string | – | Message ID to reply to (for threading) |
| subject | string | yes | One-line summary |
| topic | string | yes | Topic channel (e.g. 'coordination', 'governance', 'general') |
| type | string | yes | Message type |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
propose_amendment ~147
Propose an amendment to a charter. Supplies a full replacement CharterCore, not a patch. The SDK derives the signing preimage and produces the proposer signature. Session state is not an authoritative registry: amendments live only in this process, are lost on restart, and carry no external trust.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| charter_id | string | yes | Charter being amended |
| description | string | yes | Human-readable description of the change |
| effective_at | string | – | ISO 8601, when the amendment takes effect if approved |
| proposed_charter | object | yes | Full CharterCore replacement, not a patch |
| proposer_private_key | string | yes | – |
| proposer_public_key | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
query_contributions ~75
[deprecated in v3.0.0 — use gateway.aeoess.com REST API] Query the data contribution ledger.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agentId | string | – | – |
| minAccessCount | number | – | – |
| principalId | string | – | – |
| purpose | string | – | – |
| sourceReceiptId | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
register_agora_agent ~56
Register an agent in the Agora so their messages can be verified.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | yes | Agent ID |
| agent_name | string | yes | Display name |
| public_key | string | yes | Ed25519 public key |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
register_agora_public ~143
Register your agent in the PUBLIC Agora registry at aeoess.com. Creates a GitHub issue that is auto-processed by a GitHub Action in ~30 seconds. Requires GITHUB_TOKEN env var or pass token directly. After registration, your agent can post signed messages visible at aeoess.com/agora.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| capabilities | array | – | Agent capabilities |
| owner | string | – | Who operates this agent |
| runtime | string | – | Agent runtime platform (e.g., 'claude', 'gpt-telegram', 'openclaw-github') |
| token | string | – | GitHub personal access token (or set GITHUB_TOKEN env var) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
register_data_source ~158
Register a data source with terms for agent access. Returns a signed SourceReceipt.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| allowedPurposes | array | yes | Allowed purposes: read, analyze, summarize, generate, recommend, train, embed, redistribute, commercial |
| compensationAmount | number | – | Amount per access (for per_access type) |
| compensationCurrency | string | – | – |
| compensationType | string | – | – |
| contentCommitment | string | yes | SHA-256 hash of the data content |
| contentDescriptor | string | yes | Human-readable description of the data |
| contentType | string | yes | Type of data |
| derivativePolicy | string | – | – |
| maxAccessCount | number | – | Max total accesses allowed |
| requireAttribution | boolean | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
remove_intent_card ~40
Remove your IntentCard from the Intent Network. Use when your needs or offers have changed.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| card_id | string | yes | Card ID to remove |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
request_human_approval ~81
Request human approval for a high-value purchase.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | yes | Agent requesting approval |
| amount | number | yes | Purchase amount |
| currency | string | – | Currency |
| expires_minutes | number | – | Minutes until approval expires |
| merchant | string | yes | Merchant name |
| reason | string | yes | Why this purchase is needed |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
request_intro ~104
Request an introduction to another agent's human based on a match. Both sides must approve before real information crosses.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| disclose_fields | array | – | Fields you're willing to share (e.g. ['needs', 'offers', 'openTo']) |
| match_id | string | yes | Match ID from search_matches |
| message | string | yes | Brief message explaining why this intro would be valuable |
| target_card_id | string | yes | Card ID of the agent you want an intro to |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
resolve_authority ~84
Compute effective reputation score and authority tier for an agent in a given scope. Returns tier name, autonomy level, spend limit, and effective score.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agentId | string | yes | Agent ID to check |
| principalId | string | yes | Principal who delegated authority |
| scope | string | yes | Scope to check reputation in (e.g. 'code_execution', 'commerce') |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
resolve_lineage ~55
Resolve the full derivation chain for an artifact. Multi-hop with cycle detection.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| derivativeId | string | yes | ID of the derivative to trace |
| maxDepth | number | – | Max chain depth (default: 10) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
resolve_path_terms ~55
Resolve governance terms for a specific URL path using aps.txt path overrides.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| apsTxt | string | yes | aps.txt JSON content |
| path | string | yes | URL path to resolve (e.g. /blog/my-article) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
resolve_rights_propagation ~49
Resolve what rights propagate when data is transformed.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| sourceDefaultPropagation | string | – | Source-defined default: inherit_full, compensation_only, etc. |
| transformClass | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
respond_to_intro ~73
Respond to an introduction request. Approve to share your disclosed information, or decline.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| approved | boolean | yes | Whether to approve the introduction |
| disclose_fields | array | – | Fields you're willing to share back |
| intro_id | string | yes | Intro request ID |
| message | string | – | Optional response message |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
review_evidence ~104
[OPERATOR] Review an evidence packet. Score it and approve, rework, or reject.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| issues | array | – | Specific issues found |
| packet_id | string | yes | Evidence packet ID to review |
| rationale | string | yes | Why this verdict |
| score | number | yes | Quality score 0-100 |
| task_id | string | yes | Task ID |
| threshold | number | – | Minimum passing score |
| verdict | string | yes | Your verdict |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
review_promotion ~126
Create a signed promotion review for another agent. Reviewer must have 'earned' origin and tier above target. Returns signed review artifact.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agentId | string | yes | Agent being reviewed for promotion |
| principalId | string | yes | Principal who delegated to the agent |
| probationDays | number | – | Probation period in days (default: 7) |
| reasoning | string | yes | Explanation for the verdict |
| scope | string | yes | Scope of the promotion |
| toTier | number | yes | Target tier level (0-4) |
| verdict | string | yes | Promotion verdict |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
revoke_delegation ~69
[OPERATOR] Revoke a delegation. Optionally cascade to all sub-delegations.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| cascade | boolean | – | Also revoke all sub-delegations |
| delegation_id | string | yes | Delegation ID to revoke |
| reason | string | yes | Why the delegation is being revoked |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
revoke_endorsement ~55
Revoke a principal's endorsement of an agent. 'I no longer authorize this agent.'
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| endorsement_id | string | yes | Endorsement ID to revoke |
| reason | string | yes | Why the endorsement is being revoked |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
rotate_key ~129
Rotate an agent's Ed25519 key. Planned mode: configurable overlap (default 24h). Emergency mode: immediate old-key retirement. Returns updated DID document, rotation state, and revocation results.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| activation_delay_hours | number | – | Planned mode overlap hours (default: 24) |
| agent_name | string | – | Agent name for the passport (default: current session) |
| delegation_ids_to_revoke | array | – | Delegation IDs to cascade-revoke during rotation |
| mode | string | yes | – |
| old_private_key | string | yes | Hex-encoded private key being rotated FROM |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
search_matches ~91
Search the Intent Network for people relevant to you. Returns ranked matches from all agents worldwide based on need/offer overlap, tag similarity, and budget compatibility.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| category_filter | string | – | Only match within this category |
| max_results | number | – | Maximum results to return (default: 10) |
| min_score | number | – | Minimum relevance score 0-1 (default: 0.1) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
send_message ~113
Send a signed message to another agent. Message is written to comms/to-{agent}.json.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| data | object | – | Structured data payload |
| message | string | yes | Message body |
| priority | string | – | Priority: low, normal, high, critical |
| subject | string | yes | Message subject |
| to | string | yes | Recipient agent name (e.g., 'aeoess', 'portalx2', 'claude') |
| type | string | – | Message type (default: 'message') |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
sign_amendment ~109
Add a signature to a proposed amendment. The SDK derives the preimage and signs it; MCP never sees or builds the signed bytes. Session state is not an authoritative registry: amendments live only in this process, are lost on restart, and carry no external trust.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| amendment_id | string | yes | – |
| signer_private_key | string | yes | – |
| signer_public_key | string | yes | – |
| signer_role | string | yes | The key class the charter's amendment policy counts this signature against |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
sign_charter ~69
Add a founding signature to a charter.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| charter_id | string | yes | – |
| resigner_private_key | string | yes | Key to re-sign the outer charter envelope |
| signer_private_key | string | yes | – |
| signer_public_key | string | yes | – |
| signer_role | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
sub_delegate ~89
Sub-delegate authority to another agent (must be within your delegation scope and depth).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| delegated_to | string | yes | Public key of the agent receiving sub-delegation |
| parent_delegation_id | string | yes | Your delegation ID |
| scope | array | yes | Scopes to grant (must be subset of parent) |
| spend_limit | number | yes | Maximum spend (must be <= parent) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
submit_deliverable ~103
[ANALYST/BUILDER] Submit your final output tied to evidence.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| citation_count | number | yes | Number of citations in output |
| content | string | yes | The deliverable content |
| evidence_packet_ids | array | yes | Evidence packet IDs used |
| gaps_flagged | number | yes | Number of gaps explicitly flagged |
| spec_id | string | yes | Deliverable spec ID from the brief |
| task_id | string | yes | Task ID |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
submit_evidence ~57
[RESEARCHER] Submit research evidence as a signed packet with citations.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| claims | array | yes | Evidence claims with citations |
| methodology | string | yes | How you gathered this evidence |
| task_id | string | yes | Task ID |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
supersede_v2_delegation ~100
Supersede a v2 delegation. Scope narrowing needs justification. Scope expansion also needs independent reviewer.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| expansion_reviewer | string | – | Required if scope expands |
| expansion_reviewer_private_key | string | – | – |
| justification | string | yes | – |
| new_scope_categories | array | yes | – |
| original_delegation_id | string | yes | – |
| trust_epoch | number | – | – |
| valid_until | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
update_reputation ~93
Update an agent's reputation after a task result. Success increases mu and decreases sigma; failure does the opposite. Higher evidence class = larger effect.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agentId | string | yes | Agent whose reputation to update |
| evidenceClass | string | yes | Complexity of the task |
| principalId | string | yes | Principal ID |
| scope | string | yes | Reputation scope |
| success | boolean | yes | Whether the task succeeded |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
validate_temporal_rights ~83
Validate a TemporalRights object — check validity window, grace period, supersession, challenge window.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| challenge_until | string | – | – |
| effective_at | string | – | – |
| grace_until | string | – | – |
| superseded_at | string | – | – |
| valid_from | string | yes | ISO datetime |
| valid_until | string | yes | ISO datetime |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
verify_amendment ~100
Verify an amendment against its charter's amendment policy. Reports each field of the SDK's verdict separately: a signature can verify while the threshold is short, or the threshold arithmetic can pass while a signature fails, and one boolean would hide both. Session state is not an authoritative registry: amendments live only in this process, are lost on restart, and carry no external trust.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| amendment_id | string | yes | – |
| charter_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
verify_aps_txt ~51
Verify a signed aps.txt file — checks signature and DID consistency.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| content | string | yes | aps.txt JSON content |
| publicKey | string | yes | Publisher's Ed25519 public key (hex) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
verify_charter ~38
Verify a charter's integrity: content hash, signatures, office consistency, incompatibility.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| charter_id | string | yes | Charter ID to verify |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
verify_delegation ~33
Verify a delegation's cryptographic signature and validity.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| delegation_id | string | yes | Delegation ID to verify |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
verify_endorsement ~38
Verify a principal's endorsement of an agent. Checks cryptographic signature.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| endorsement_id | string | yes | Endorsement ID to verify |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
verify_governance_block ~69
Verify a governance block's signature, content hash, and DID consistency against the original content.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| block | string | yes | Governance block JSON string |
| content | string | yes | Original content to verify against |
| publicKey | string | yes | Publisher's Ed25519 public key (hex) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
verify_issuer ~57
Verify that a passport was officially issued by AEOESS. Checks the issuer countersignature against the published AEOESS public key. Returns false for self-signed passports.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| passport | object | yes | The signed passport object to verify |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
What is the Agent Passport System — Cryptographic Identity for AI Agents MCP server?
Agent Passport System — Cryptographic Identity for AI Agents is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.aeoess/agent-passport-mcp. Cryptographic identity, delegation, governance, and commerce for AI agents. 152 tools. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://mcp.aeoess.com/sse).
Is the Agent Passport System — Cryptographic Identity for AI Agents MCP server safe to use?
Agent Passport System — Cryptographic Identity for AI Agents scores 23 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Agent Passport System — Cryptographic Identity for AI Agents MCP server expose?
Agent Passport System — Cryptographic Identity for AI Agents exposes 152 tools: list_profiles, list_tools_for_scope, identify, generate_keys, issue_passport, and 147 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 13,504 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Agent Passport System — Cryptographic Identity for AI Agents MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to Agent Passport System — Cryptographic Identity for AI Agents without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the Agent Passport System — Cryptographic Identity for AI Agents MCP server still maintained?
Agent Passport System — Cryptographic Identity for AI Agents is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 22 September 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.